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Showing 1 to 20 of 35 Records
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1960 (5) TMI 47 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct that this difficulty has not in the present case, even as regards the individual legatees, materialised will be no encouragement to increase the number, already large enough, of such arrangements. 33. Having regard to this uniform practice we do not wish to deviate from it in the present case so far as the terms of settlement are concerned. We follow the procedure adopted by Woodroffe, J. and direct that the probate be granted of this Will and these terms of settlement be recorded with the decree in a separate schedule. 34. The petitioner is entitled to costs both of this appeal and of the court below out of the estate, as between attorney and client. There will be no order for costs so far as the respondents are concerned. But this order for costs is without prejudice to any agreement that may have been arrived at between the parties. 35. We certify the case as fit for the appointment of two counsel. 36. Let the decree be drawn up expeditiously. H.K. BOSE, J. 37. I agree.
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1960 (5) TMI 46 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nder the said Article as the loss or injury to the goods occurred more than a year before the suit was filed. 23. As regards the respondent's contention that their suit should be taken to be within time on the basis of Ex. 4 it is to be noted that in this letter the railway authorities only offered to Pay compensation on certain terms which were not acceptable to the plaintiff. This is not a Promise of the kind mentioned in Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. In our opinion the plaintiff cannot base his claim on this document. 24. The result is that this appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned District Judge is modified. The plaintiffs suit would now stand decreed for a sum of Rs. 7830/7/3 instead of Rs. 12930/13/6 as decreed by the court below. The plaintiff will get proportionate costs of both the courts. The defendants will pay this amount within a period of three month from today. Plaintiff's suit for rest of the amount is dismissed.
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1960 (5) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ndustrial tribunal. The obvious answer to this contention is that no plea had been apparently raised before the tribunal that the dispute was not an industrial dispute in the sense in which the argument was sought to be raised in the present proceedings. 6. Then Mr. Sinha attempted to contend that there was no scope for applying the principle 'first come last go' because respondents 3 to 5 were working in a department which was distinct and separate from the department in which respondents 6 to 8 were working. In our opinion, this point cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time at this stage. It is a question of fact and it should have been raised in the original writ proceedings themselves. Mr. Sinha fairly conceded that this point had not been considered in either of the two judgments and that must be because it was not argued before the courts. That being so, we are satisfied that there is no substance in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1960 (5) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent. Question No. 3 As regards the two gardens standing in the names of Veerappa and Viswanathan, the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal is that they were purchased out of the monies supplied by Chockalinga. The will purports to bequeath all the properties of Chockalinga. Therefore, even if these two gardens had not been speci- fically referred to in the will or in the letters of administration which was granted, they should be held to have disposed of by the will and the income therefrom would have to be treated as income of the estate of the deceased. Question No. 3 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. Question No. 4 Payment to Meenakshi Achi was directed to be made out of the assets left by the deceased. It cannot, therefore, be of revenue in nature. That amount could not, therefore, be excluded from the assessable income. The question is answered in the negative. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (5) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... present case, therefore, when the karta, Seth Lal Chand, accepted the appointment on behalf of the family, it must be held that what he accepted was work as an independent contractor. As a manager of the business of the Hindu undivided family he had a right to enter into contracts and he could deal with all the properties of the Hindu undivided family on their behalf. This consideration of the facts found in this case can only lead to the inference that the appointment of the family as Government Treasurer was accepted as work of an independent contractor and not as an appointment in the capacity of a servant. The first part of the question which has been referred to us for opinion is, therefore, answered in the negative and the second part in the affirmative. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 300. The same amount shall be treated as fees payable to learned counsel for the Department for the purposes of calculation of costs.
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1960 (5) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n assessment. When an assessment is thereafter made again it can he done only by the issue of a notice under Section 34 of the Act and when that is done any firm whose registration has been cancelled and which has been assessed as an unregistered firm thereafter can prefer an appeal and question the propriety of its assessment in the status of an unregistered firm, and may thus challenge the propriety or the order cancelling registration passed by the Income Tax Officer. In the instant case at this stage we find nothing inherently wrong in the notice under Rule 6-B of the Income Tax Rules so as to justify our interference in the exercise of our writ jurisdiction. In the view of the matter the non-appeal ability of the order cancelling registration becomes immaterial. 20. In the light of the above observations the petitions are dismissed with costs which we assess at ₹ 500/- in both the cases, as fee of the counsel for the opposite party. The stay orders are discharged.
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1960 (5) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... taken from this decision in Johnson v. W.S. Try Ltd. 1946 27 Tax Cas. 167, it would only support the conclusion that we have arrived at. It may be mentioned that even the language of the English Income Tax Act, as contained in Schedule D, is not identical with the language of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, but there is no material difference because in Schedule D of the English Income Tax Act also income becomes chargeable to tax when it is received or arises or accrues to the assessee. No English case was, however, brought to our notice in which the principle now urged by learned counsel for the Department might have been accepted when dealing with assessment of income under Schedule D of the English Income Tax Act. For these reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 400. The fee of learned counsel for the Department shall also be assessed at the same amount.
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1960 (5) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it in this haphazard manner when on the all-important question of possession, the appellants themselves do not wish to say whether the mother was in possession actually or constructively, whether the daughters' possession was merely permissive, or whether the daughters were in independent possession, on their own behalf. These and other questions of fact, and the questions of law that have to be considered in deciding a claim by the first appellant or the other two appellants under s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, should properly be considered in any suit that they may bring in future, if so advised. We express no opinion on any of these questions. 24. For the reasons which have been mentioned earlier, we hold that the High Court rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the non-ancestral property also, and dismiss the appeal. In the circumstances of the case, we order that the parties will bear their own costs throughout. 25. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (5) TMI 39 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he amount of compensation payable by Jagdish Chander, and Suraj Bhan and Kishori Lal so that in future there may not be any dispute between them inter se. He, however, could not draw our attention to any provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act empowering us to do so. Section 12 of this Act under which the liability has been incurred by Jagdish Chander makes ample provision for indemnifying the principal who is held liable to pay compensation under this section. It would thus be open to Jagdish Chander if his case falls within this section to claim necessary relief by appropriate proceedings, with respect to which we express no opinion at this stage. (11) For the foregoing reasons this appeal is allowed and Jagdish Chander along with Suraj Bhan and Kishori Lal is also held liable to pay the sum of ₹ 2,940 to Bawa Singh workman. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs of this appeal. Bishan Narain, J. (12) I agree. (13) Appeal allowed.
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1960 (5) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... from the date of arrival of the ship is therefore null and void. 33. Though the additional defence raised by the shipping companies must therefore fail, the main defence, as we have already found, succeeds. None of the suits were brought within a year from the date when the ship carrying the goods left the port of discharge. We therefore dismiss with costs the Civil Appeals Nos. 91 and 92 of 1958 and confirm the order of dismissal made by the Bombay High Court. One set of hearing costs will have to be paid. 34. Civil Appeal No. 88 of 1956 is infructuous because of the fact, as already indicated, that after the order of remand now appealed from was made by the Madras High Court the suit was heard in the Small Causes Court and a decree was passed and that decree has become final. We therefore dismiss Civil Appeal No. 88 of 1956, as already ordered by this Court when giving leave to appeal; the appellant will pay the costs of the appeal to the respondent. 35. Appeals dismissed.
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1960 (5) TMI 37 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntroller, Food Accounts Punjab in July 1947 Exhibit D. 3. The exact date is not given in the letter. The suit was file don 27-3-1949. Under Art. 60 of the Limitation Act plaintiff has three years within which he can sue when the demand is made. Thus the starting point of period of limitation is the date of demand by defendant No. 1 or his assignee and not the date of the release of the security by the Government. Demands was made by defendant No. 1 on 25-2-1948 by means of letter, Exhibit D. 4, and the plaintiff-firm made the demand on 3-9-1948 the date of giving notice to the Bank from plaintiff's counsel vide Exhibit D. 6. The plaintiff's suit is, therefore, well within limitation. (24) In view of what has been stated above the plaintiff's suit was rightly decreed against defendant No. 2 Punjab National Bank. This appeal filed by the Bank must therefore fail. Parties will bear their own costs throughout. Shamsher Bahadur, J. (25) I agree. (26) Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (5) TMI 36 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of the case and especially the fact that the dispute is between two real brothers, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout. Bishan Narain, J. (41) I am in complete agreement with my learned brother but the plaintiff-Company in the present case has failed to prove that it used to manufacture solidified spirit at the relevant time and further it has failed to prove that L. P. Jaiswal (respondent) purchased methylated spirit from the plaintiff-Company at a price lower than the market price and thereby caused loss to the plaintiff-Company. The present suit, therefore, as laid fails and must be dismissed. I express no opinion on the other points discussed by my learned brother in the judgment. (42) In view of the above findings, I agree that the appeal fails and must be dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs throughout. BY THE COURT Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed and the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (5) TMI 35 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me a young Advocate, having been enrolled as a pleader in July, 1947; his age was then only 23 years; he became Advocate of this Court in January, 1955. Mr. Nanda pleads in an affidavit made by him that he had no knowledge of the Bar Council Rules till late. He, however, is supposed to know the Bar Council Rules as an Advocate. We must make it clear that ignorance or lack of knowledge of the rules of the Bar Council can be no defence to such charge of professional misconduct. However, having regard to Mr. Nanda's inexperience, young age and the whole life in front of him, we desire to take a lenient view as to punishment; and we, accordingly, reprimand Mr. Nanda for his conduct. We also warn him that in future he must not be indiscreet in his professional relation" ship with his clients and should not act recklessly, as he did in the present case. There will be no order as to costs in these proceedings throughout. Narasimham, C.J. 15. I agree. Misra, J. 16. I agree.
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1960 (5) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the building owner any moneys due to the "builder at the time of termination". Now on the facts of this case the Defendants by their non-disclosure of the contract and relevant correspondence between themselves have deprived the Court from knowing what is the contract between these two co-Defendants on this deposit money and what are the circumstances, if any, of this forfeiture. Therefore the Court is entitled to draw the adverse inference against both the Defendants, that had they been disclosed they would have shown that this deposit cannot be forfeited in the facts of this case and must be returned. 76. For these reasons both the Defendants are liable. The claim is not barred against either. In any event Article 145 or Article 120 protects this claim from limitation. I agree with my learned brother that this appeal should be allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge set aside and the suit decreed with costs, here and below, as proposed.
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1960 (5) TMI 33 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aintiffs. They ignored the plaintiffs mala fide and purchased the land from persons having no title. The appellants cannot plead absence of knowledge of the right of the plaintiffs. The documents enumerated above and the facts show that they were aware of the rights of the plaintiffs in the land in suit. Any way, actual knowledge is not necessarily in all cases material, if there be the means of such knowledge. If the appellants had exercised care and diligence expected of a man of ordinary prudence, they would have easily discovered where the true title lay. The appellants cannot say that they constructed the building in an honest belief that they had title. Rather, they knew or had the means to know that the plaintiffs had the title and not their vendors. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs' suit cannot be barred by the principles of waiver and acquiescence. This contention also falls to the ground. 28. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (5) TMI 32 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the initiation of the assessment proceedings. The amendment of section 25(1) came into effect on the 1st of April, 1951, long after the initiation of the assessment proceeding and the commencement of the lis. I am, therefore, of opinion that for the accounting year 1949-50 the proviso to section 25(1) of the Act does not apply and the appeal of the assessee is governed by the old law, and the Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax ought not to have required the payment of the prescribed proportion of the tax before entertaining the appeal. I hold, therefore, that for the accounting year 1949-50, the Deputy Commissioner ought not to have rejected the petition of appeal of the assessee for failure to pay the prescribed proportion of the tax. I would accordingly answer the question of law referred to the High Court in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to no order as to costs of this reference. CHOUDHARY J.--I agree. Question answered accordingly.
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1960 (5) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... do not think that the distinction between a purchase and a mortgage made in this decision is well founded. The propositions in question treated an alienation made for the payment of the father's antecedent debt on the same footing as an alienation made in execution of a decree passed against him and in both cases the principle enunciated is that in order to succeed in their challenge the sons must prove the immoral character of the antecedent debt and the knowledge of the alienee. Having regard to the broad language used in stating the two propositions, we do not think that a valid distinction could be made between a mortgage and a sale particularly after the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Brij Narain (1973) L.R. 51 I.A. 120. That is the view taken by the Nagpur High Court in Udmiram Koroodimal and Anr. v. Balramdas Tularam & Ors. In the result the appeal fails, but in the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (5) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ight to this money accrued to the assessee earlier than the 26th April, 1945, is sufficient for deciding this case. The date 26th April, 1945, does not fall within the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1945-46, as that previous year ended on the 18th January, 1945. This date is subsequent to the previous year in question. Consequently, even the earliest date which may be held to be the date of the right to receive this amount falls subsequent to the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1945-46, and clearly therefore this amount of compensation cannot be taken into account when assessing the income for the assessment year 1945-46. In the circumstances we answer the first part of the question in the negative. For the reasons we have indicated earlier, we refrain from answering the second part of the question. Since the answer to the question answered is in favour of the assessee, we direct that the assessee would be entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1960 (5) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... relief to the assessee and enable him to get back the institution fee. As we said, the payment was incidental to the reference, which commenced with the application preferred by the assessee under section 66(1) of the Act and terminated with its disposal by this court under section 66(5). The proviso to section 66(1) enables the Tribunal to order refund in certain cases when the proceedings terminate before the Tribunal and do not come up before the High Court. When the reference does come up before the High Court and is finally disposed of there, section 66(6) enables the High Court to deal with all the costs of the reference including what had been deposited with the Tribunal as the institution fee. The proper order, in our opinion, is to direct the Tribunal to refund that amount and continue the practice sanctioned by precedent in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1945 13 ITR 177 and Raghavalu Naidu and Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1945 13 ITR 194.
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1960 (5) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was overwhelming material to show Chat K. K. Shah's car was surrounded by the mob and some of the rioters tried to drag out and attack the appellant. K. K. Shah was one of the witnesses mentioned by the complainant and so also two of the Inspectors of Police. Their evidence clearly supported the plea of the appellant and in any case, showed that the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent were totally unworthy of credence as to the circumstances in which the shots were fired. We cannot therefore say that the learned Magistrate was wrong in his judgment that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding further on the complaint. We accordingly hold that the High Court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate on an erroneous view of the scope of s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated September 13, 1957, and restore that of the learned Presidency Magistrate dated April 30, 1957. Appeal allowed.
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