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Showing 1 to 17 of 17 Records
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1960 (6) TMI 29 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... operty the tenant may be restituted. I would make it clear that there is no question of restitution with regard to the demolished structure. The structure has been demolished and is not in existence, so no question of tenant's option arises with regard to the non-existing properties. The structure was leased out, not the land underlying and after the structure was demolished, the tenant cannot be put in possession of that structure as a matter of fact even if he would like to be so put in possession; he has no right to build on the land another structure nor has he any right to compel the landlord to raise a similar structure for him; he may have some right for abatement of rent but that is not for me to decide. He would be, therefore, restituted to possession of other property leased out than the structure demolished. 27. The result is that the appeal is dismissed but there would be no order for costs. 28. Leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is granted.
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1960 (6) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ine a trust as an individual as follows 63(1). In this Act, trust or estate means the trustee or the executor, administrator, heir or other legal representative having ownership or control of the trust or estate property. 63(2). A trust or estate shall, for the purposes of this Act, and without affecting the liability of the trustee or legal representative for his own income tax, be deemed to be in respect of the trust or estate property an individual..… Section 63 has no relevancy in the determination whether a corporation is a personal corporation. Although s. 63(2) may require executors to be demed an individual for the purpose of taxation of the trust or estate and although they may be an individual holding the shares of the appellant company, for the reasons I have given they cannot be the individual referred to in s. 68(1)(a), because a plain intention to the contrary is to be gathered from the context of the section itself. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1960 (6) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... not given then it may preclude a defendant in those circumstances from advancing an affirmative case at the trial. I think Salmon J.s order was right and I would dismiss this appeal Pearce, L. J. I agree. It is clear from the pleadings that the traverse is a negative pregnant. The admissions of counsel have made it even clearer that the defendant intends to set up an affirmative case. The only object of the defendant in seeking to avoid giving these particulars is admittedly to prevent the plaintiffs knowing before the trial what the defendants case is, and thus to give the defendant the advantage of surprise. That is an unmeritorious object and would probably lead to an inconvenient adjournment in the middle of the hearing. For the reasons that my Lord has given, I think that this is a case where particulars should be ordered, and that the judge was right. Appeal dismissed with costs. Particulars to be delivered within 28 days. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.
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1960 (6) TMI 26 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at 5 per cent. That there was no pilferage or surreptitious removal of any portion of the tobacco was established. D. W. 1 has stated, as would be clear from his evidence, that the loss represented the dryage. It stands to reason that the licensee would be liable to account only for the deficiency in the weight of the stock where it is found that the weight is less than the weight noted in the receipt account. I am, therefore, in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court, that the loss in weight is attributable only to the evaporation and dryage and such other natural causes. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff is not liable to pay duty on such loss. He would, therefore, be entitled to refund of the duty paid on such loss of weight due to evaporation and dryage. There is no other matter to be considered. The result will be that the judgment of the lower appellate Court will be confirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.
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1960 (6) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rely because the delegation in writing has not been disclosed I cannot come to the conclusion that it authorised the respondent No. 1 to deal with the matter. This difficulty could easily have been got over by demanding justice of the Life Insurance Corporation of India and making the Corporation a party respondent herein but that course has not been adopted. 18. Mr. Chowdhury also argued that as no demand has been made on the Zonal Manager for the reliefs sought in this case the application was not maintainable. He drew my attention to Exhibit D. E. F. and G. annexed to the petition which showed that the person before whom the claims of the ex-employees of the Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. were being pressed was the Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India who had his office at Bombay outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The objection does not seem to be unfounded. 19. In view of the above the rule must be discharged hut without any order for costs.
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1960 (6) TMI 24 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... arose. It was not itself a perquisite or profit. My Lords, in all the cases hitherto when a servant has been granted by his employer a purely personal right to receive in the future a benefit during his service, the judges have with one accord held that he receives the "perquisite" or "profit" when the thing is actuary transferred to him and not before. So said Danckwerts J. in Bridges (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hewitt 1957 1 W.L.R. 59, 68, 69; 1958 33 I.T.R. 653 (Ch.D.), and both Jenkins and Sellers L.JJ. agreed with him on this point 1957 1 W.L.R. 674, 689, 703. So said all the judges in Forbes's Trustees v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 1958 S.C. 177. And I must say that I agree with them. It is the same point as I have insisted on throughout. Tax is not payable on the right in the future to receive " salaries, fees, wages, perquisites or profits," but only on those things when received. I would therefore dismiss this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (6) TMI 23 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ould not have the power to issue any notice under clause (a) of sub-section (1). Clause (iii) of the proviso imposes a further safeguard against any arbitrary exercise by an Income-tax Officer of the power conferred on him by section 34. In any case the Income-tax Officer must record his reasons and in every case falling under clause (ii), i.e. where he wants to issue a notice under clause (ii), he must get the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue and in any other case that of the Commissioner, that it is a fit case for issuance of such notice. The learned Advocate-General had drawn our attention to a decision of D.N. Sinha J. in Debi Moody v. Belan 1959 35 I.T.R. 781 (Cal.). The learned judge has there taken the same view which we are taking in this case. For all these reasons, the contentions urged before us must be negatived. In the result, the petition will stand dismissed and the rule will be discharged with costs. Costs are fixed at ₹ 200. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (6) TMI 22 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acts clause (2). That being so, the assessee would not have paid excise duty on the preparations as such but only on the spirituous content of the preparations. Therefore, the total turnover in regard to which exemption was claimed could not come within the purview of section 4 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. It follows that the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes setting aside that of the Commercial Tax Officer is correct. It was lastly urged by Sri Subba Reddy that exemption should be granted at least in regard to the spirituous content of the liquor. But this point was not taken either before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes or before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal or in the revision case. We have no means of judging the actual spirituous content of these medicines. No effect can, therefore, be given by us to this contention. In the result, the revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (6) TMI 21 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Co. v. State of Andhra (1956) An. W.R. 698 1956 A.L.T. 598., a Division Bench of this Court held that the inherent power to make an order for refund of court-fee must be confined to the cases authorised by precedent and could not arbitrarily be extended. That was also a Tax Revision Case. In Chidambaram Chettiar, In re(1934) 67 M.L.J. 321., a Division Bench of the Madras High Court pointed out that a court could order a refund of court-fees in the following cases (1) where the Court-Fees Act applies (2) where there is an excess payment by a mistake and (3) where on account of a mistake of a Court, a party has been compelled to pay the court-fees either wholly or in part and that outside these cases, the Court had no authority to direct a refund. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the direction given by us on the former occasion for the refund of court-fees in these cases should be vacated, and it is therefore ordered accordingly. Ordered accordingly. June 15, 1960.
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1960 (6) TMI 20 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rit Taxation Act, 1939, manufactured tobacco as defined in the Madras Tobacco (Taxation of Sales and Licensing) Act, 1939, and any goods on which duty is or may be levied under the Madras Abkari Act, 1886, the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, or the Opium Act, 1878. It is obvious that the provision guards against double taxation so that the dealer, who has already paid some charge on the sales of the goods under the Madras Abkari Act, 1886, or the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, or the Opium Act, 1878, would not be liable again to pay the sales tax. The learned Advocate for the appellant has argued that the words any goods on which duty is or may be levied do not mean sales of goods so described by the words. We feel that not to be the correct interpretation, for these words are covered by the word sales used earlier in the section, which means sales of all what follows. We, therefore, see no force in the appeal which is dismissed. Parties will bear their costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (6) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld on the facts of the present case that the starting point of limitation is 22nd November, 1958, when the certified copy of the order passed by the Board of Revenue was received by the assessee. In my opinion, the starting point is 14th October, 1958, when the order of the Board of Revenue was communicated to the assessee, and as the application under section 21(1) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act was filed on 2nd January, 1959, it was barred by limitation and was rightly dismissed by the Board of Revenue. An application under section 21(2)(b) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act presupposes a valid application under section 21(1) of the Act. Since the conditions of a valid application under section 21(1) of the Act have not been fulfilled the application under section 21(2)(b) of the Act must fail. For the reasons given above, I would discharge this Rule, but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. BACHAWAT, J.-I agree. Rule discharged.
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1960 (6) TMI 18 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (v) of section 6 of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. T.R.C. No. 23 of 1959 is therefore allowed. There will be no order as to costs. So far as T.R.C. No. 24 of 1959 is concerned, Sri Venkataramayya learned counsel for the respondents, urges that the case of his clients was that a good part of the cloth sold by them was less than Rs. 2-8-0 per yard and as such part of the turnover has to be excluded from the purview of clause (v) of section 6. Since this matter has not been investigated by the Tribunal, it has to go back to the Tribunal. If the Tribunal feels that the matter should be investigated into by the Department, it could send the matter to the assessing authority. There will be no order as to costs in T.R.C. No. 24 of 1959. These Tax Revision Cases having been set down for being mentioned on this day, the Court made the following order No costs in T.R.C. Nos. 23 and 24 of 1959. In T.R.C. No. 20 of 1959 the advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Ordered accordingly.
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1960 (6) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meetings and Proceedings – Extra Ordinary General Meeting, Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served
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1960 (6) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... e liquidator of the company. Therefore, I hold that the applicant is not entitled also to apply under section 209H(4), proviso and section 243, nor is he entitled to apply under section 213. The application also seems to me not to be a bona fide one. Looking at the verification of paragraphs 7 to 12 in the petition it appears that these statements were based on the result of searches in the office of the Registrar of Companies. But the statement contained in those paragraphs appear to be contrary to the records. I will simply give one instance. The records in the office of the Registrar of Companies about this company show that the company was running at a loss for several years whereas I find it has been stated in the petition that it was a very sound concern. This, I think, is sufficient to dispose of this application. I am unable to rely on this petition. In my opinion, the petition does not disclose any case. The application is dismissed with costs. Certified for counsel.
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1960 (6) TMI 3 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Seized goods ... ... ... ... ..... committed an error of law in holding that he will not entertain the claim of the petitioner to the gold ornaments merely because they were not seized from her custody. For these reasons we hold that the order of the Collector of Excise dated the 20th June, 1958, is vitiated by an error of jurisdiction. Acting, therefore, in exercise of our authority under Article 226 of the Constitution we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Collector dated the 20th June, 1958, and order that this case should go back to the Collector of Excise for re-hearing the appeal and for disposing of it in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to establish her claim. We, accordingly, allow this application, set aside the order of the Collector of Excise, dated the 20th June, 1958, and order that the appeal should go back for re-hearing to the Collector of Excise, who will dispose of it in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs of this application.
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1960 (6) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Export of Indian Currency - Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... as a hearing in the usual way by calling evidence and hearing arguments, the only person that could have conducted it would be the person serving the notice and the order would have to be made by the authority hearing the case. Here, however, a determination had to be made on the documents or evidence on record. The Additional Collector is a person duly authorised to hear and decide such cases. That appears from the schedule annexed to paragraph 2 Chapter II of the Indian Sea Customs Manual as amended by the Notification No. 36-Cus., dated 2nd June, 1956 being a notification under section 6 of the Sea Customs Act. In my opinion, therefore, the Additional Collector of Customs was entitled to consider the matter and to pass orders in the facts and circumstances of this case. These are the points taken in this case which all fail. The result is that this application must be dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Interim orders, if any are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1960 (6) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... nts of this Court as also of the Supreme Court it is now finally settled that under Section 167 (8) the personal penalty to be imposed can never exceed Rs. 1,000. That position is incontravertible and does not require any further argument. 25.Having regard to my aforesaid findings, the petitioner is entitled to relief as prayed in prayer (a). The order dated January 31, 1958 is quashed and set aside. 26.As regards the question of costs, it appears to me that one of the reasons why the petitioner did not get a personal hearing before M.G. Abrol was that he failed to present himself before him though time was extended twice as already recited by me above. If the petitioner or his agents had interviewed M.G. Abrol in December 1957 or January 1958 (before the date of the order viz. January 31, 1958) I have no doubt that the first respondent would have given a hearing to the petitioner and considered all his arguments. This is not a case where the petitioner is entitled to costs.
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