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Showing 1 to 20 of 93 Records
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1962 (2) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nity in favour of the Crown based on common Law in the United Kingdom has disappeared from the land of its birth, there is no legal warrant for holding that it has any validity in this country, particularly after the Constitution. As the cause of action in this case arose after the coming into effect of the Constitution in, our opinion, it would be only recognising the old established rule, going back to more than 100 years at lest, if we upheld the vicarious liability of the State. Art. 300 of the Constitution itself has saved the right of Parliament or the Legislature of a State to enact such law as it may think fit and proper in this behalf. But so long as the Legislature has not expressed its intention to the contrary, it must be held that the law is what it has been ever since the days of the East India Company. 22. In view of the these considerations, it must be held that there is no merit in this appeal, and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. 23. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 136 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en to the appellate Court in a proper case to set aside that reservation and to order that the amendment shall take effect from the date of the presentation of the plaint. I would, therefore, reverse the finding of the lower appellate Court on this point and hold that the plaintiff's suit cannot be held to be time-barred on the ground that the plaint was not properly signed at the time of its presentation (After discussing the evidence His Lordship proceeded). In this view of the matter it must be held that the findings given by the learned District Judge in paragraph 11 of his judgment are wholly unjustifiable on the materials on record. 10. For the reasons stated above, I would allow this revision application and decree the plaintiff's claim for Rs. 360/- as principal and Rs. 96/12/- as interest at the rate of 9% per annum. In view of the extremely negligent conduct of the plaintiffs, 1 shall order that they shall not be entitled to any costs or any future interest.
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1962 (2) TMI 135 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d not do away with the effect of acknowledgment, the position is different where the liability itself is denied, as in that case there is no acknowledgment of any subsisting liability at all. In the case before us, Gauri Shankar specifically denies his liability and clearly asserts that the mortgage-deed has become a sale deed in terms of the document itself. It may be that in this assertion he was wrong, as the document has been held to be a mortgage-deed with a stipulation by way of a clog on the equity of redemption; but that does not mean that Gauri Shankar is to be deemed to have acknowledged his liability on that account. In that view, therefore, the suit for possession over the grove should have been dismissed as barred by time. 21. The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the trial Court, the first appellate Court and the learned single Judge of this Court are set aside. The suit of the plaintiffs will stand dismissed with costs to the appellant throughout.
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1962 (2) TMI 134 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vil Court would have no jurisdiction to question the validity or legality of those orders. I find it difficult to uphold this contention, in cases where the order made by a tribunal or authority of a limited jurisdiction is without jurisdiction or a nullity, the order can be always challenged in a Civil Court. See Abdul Majid v. Nayak AIR 1951 Bom 440; Abdulmiyan Abdul Rehman v. Govt. of Bombay AIR 1942 Bom 257 and Husein Miya v. Chanounnai AIR 1954 Bom 239. mere is, therefore, no substance in this contention of Mr. Rane. 24. It is undoubtedly true that the plaintiff has paid a large amount and .has been inconvenienced a great deal because of the orders made by the officers. Taking into account all these facts, it would be desirable to direct the parties to bear their own costs. 25. In the result, I allow the appeal, set aside the order made by the learned trial Judge and dismiss the suit. Parties to bear their own costs. Status quo to be maintained for one month from to-day.
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1962 (2) TMI 133 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... he Panchnama is recorded, nor would the officer keeping that document with him make any difference. As held in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0167/1976MANU/SC/0167/1976 1976CriLJ1875 , the mere presence of a police officer when a statement is made does not by itself render such a statement inadmissible. So long as a Panchnama is a mere record of things heard and seen by panchas and does not constitute a statement communicated to a police officer in the course of investigation by him, it would not fall within the mischief of Section 162 of the Code. This- very distinction appears to have been made in 1961 2 Guj LR 664 of the report. Mr. Barot, in fact, was not able to point out any particular statement in the Panchnama which, according to the above test, would fall within the mischief of Section 162 of the Code. That being so the learned trial Judge was not in error in admitting the same in evidence and the contention raised by Mr. Barot must consequently fait. 20-21.
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1962 (2) TMI 132 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
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... ... ..... ecutive power. 24. It is pointed out that under para 7 of Clause 6 of the Memorandum of Association of the Society, the Society is required to take into consideration the suggestions, if any, made by the Central Government or the State Government while prescribing rules and regulations for the admission of students into the various courses of instructions at the College. But, there is no material placed before us indicating or making it possible to hold either that the Central Government or the State Government has made any specific suggestions in that regard or that either or both of them have utilised this power of making suggestions in such a way as to circumvent any Constitutional letters on the exercise of the State's power. 25. in the circumstances, therefore, the petitioners are not in a position to invoke the protection afforded by Article 14 of the Constitution. 26. Writ Petitions therefore fail and are hereby dismissed but without costs. 27. Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 131 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ew had been taken in the assessment proceedings. But the department is not precluded from relying upon the finding in the assessment proceedings to establish, prima facie, that the cash credits represented his income. We are unable to see why an inference that the assessee deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of his income should not be drawn from the fact that the sum of ₹ 41,360 was shown as mere cash entries in the business accounts, that the department found that it was taxable income, and that the assessee has all along been unable sustain the position that it represented capital and not income. The department and the Tribunal were reasonably and properly satisfied on the materials on record that the assessee fell within the mischief of section 28(1)(c) of the Act and we have no reason to differ from them. The question is answered against the assessee, who will pay the costs of the department. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (2) TMI 130 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eek the creditor becomes applicable. In the present case according to the plaint allegation a sum of ₹ 1769-13-0 remained due to the plaintiff from the defendant as a result of the transactions which had taken place between the parties and the plaintiff was entitled to institute a suit to recover this sum in the court within whose jurisdiction he was residing. In this connection the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kishanlal v. Bhanwarlal, (AIR 1952 Raj 81) 1951 Raj LW 439, and the decision in Firm Chandanmal Fatehraj v. Hazarimal, (AIR 1962 Raj 122) 1951 Raj LW 606, in which it was followed, may be referred to. 17. I therefore allow the revision application, set aside the order of the learned District Judge returning the plaint for presentation to the proper court and direct the Civil Judge, Ratangarh, to try the suit in accordance with law. 18. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this revision application.
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1962 (2) TMI 129 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uate rate of remuneration payable to the employee, but it is not within the province of this Court to set right matters, and direct the department to make a further allowance. On the basis of the allowed salary the bonus allowed is reasonable and in conformity with Section 10(2)(x). 10. The digression of the Tribunal into the scales of pay of an I.A.S. officer and of a I Class Honours graduate employed in the Accountant General's office cannot remain un-noticed. In our opinion a comparison of wages earned by an employee in a business concern with those of an official employed in Government service is wholly irrelevant in determining the question of propriety of a deduction claimed under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act. Despite the faulty reasoning adopted by the tribunal it managed to reach the correct conclusion, and we uphold its decision. 11. The reference is answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department, ₹ 250/-.
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1962 (2) TMI 128 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment for Income Tax is made, not against him but against a wrong person. I do not see why he is bound to assist the revenue authorities by bringing the matter to their notice within the period of limitation. Taxation of a citizen should be made strictly in accordance with law and there does not seen to be any bounden duty on the part of the taxpayer to point out the infirmities of the revenue authorities, in time to save limitation. That being so, these assessment orders and certificate proceedings taken thereon cannot be supported and must be quashed. The result, therefore, is that this rule is made absolute and the impugned assessment orders being annexures "A", "A-1" and "A-2" to the petition, all the certificates issue on the basis thereof and the certificate proceedings are all quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari. There will be no orders as to costs. The security furnished by the petitioner shall now be refunded. Order accordingly.
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1962 (2) TMI 127 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ounsel. Adjournments had been granted to them on three previous occasions on the footing that the counsel had no objection. It is, therefore, no wonder that this impression persisted when the plaintiff approached the court for adjournment on 23-5-56 and 24-5-56. 27. Before we part with this case we would like to observe that the case had been pending on the file of the Civil Judge since 1953 but no progress appears to have been made towards the disposal of the case. It is hoped that the court below will now proceed to dispose of it as expeditiously as possible. 28. After having given our anxious consideration to the facts of the case we have come to the conclusion that this, appeal must be allowed and the order refusing to restore the suit vacated. We, therefore, direct that the suit would be restored on condition that the plaintiff pays a sum of ₹ 250/- to the defendants within one month from the date of this order. The parties will bear their own costs of this appeal.
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1962 (2) TMI 126 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt family after severance without a reunion and, secondly, if they were kartas they would not hold shares along with their respective minor sons. In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Nand-lal Gandalal 1960 40 ITR 1; 1960 3 SCR 620, the Supreme Court said that when a karta of an undivided Hindu family enters into a partnership the contract is not between the family and the other partners but between the coparcener individually and the other partners. The Tribunal in the present case erred in holding that the shares were allotted to the Hindu undivided families and the Tribunal could not take away the individual character of Tolaram and Routhmall and make them partners qua undivided families. For all these reasons I am of opinion that the minor is a partner and his share is not specified and the agreement is incapable of registration. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative. The assessee is to pay costs. Certificate for two counsel. G.K. Mitter, J.-I agree.
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1962 (2) TMI 125 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... give that construction to that expression when no power is given to the Tribunal itself to condone delay making an application made under section 66(1). If the Tribunal had been given a power to that nature, and if the Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the assessee had failed to show sufficient cause for excusing any delay, then it would be open to the High Court to go in to that question and take a different view from the one taken by the Tribunal, but when such a power is not given to the Tribunal at all. it is difficult to understand how the High Court can even consider the application and direct the Tribunal to treat the application as made within the time allowed" (As summarised in the headnote). 20. We are in respectful agreement with these observations of the learned Chief Justice. 21. For the reasons mentioned above, we are constrained to reject this application. But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. 22. Application dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 124 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... both the sections for the purpose of computing limitation is the came. In our opinion, therefore, in so far as that case laid down that there could be no conviction for a continuing contravention unless there be a previous conviction for what may be called the original or primary contravention, is erroneous and has to be overruled. We also do not agree, for the reasons given above, with the decision reported in (S) AIR 1957 Cal 483 (supra), which lays down that it was not open to the prosecution to select any particular date following the contravention and launch a prosecution within the special period prescribed in the Act on the footing that there was a fresh contravention on that date and that the earlier contravention should be ignored. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The order of the trial Court dismissing the complaint as barred by time is hereby set aside and the case shall now go back to the trial Court for being dealt with in accordance with law.
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1962 (2) TMI 123 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, the order imposing the second levy under exhibit P-14 dated November 30, 1960, is quashed and as I mentioned earlier as far as the orders, exhibit P-1 and exhibit P-8, are concerned, the petitioner has to seek appropriate reliefs in the appeals that are actually pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 8. Therefore, this writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned above and the parties will bear their own costs. 9. As there has been a stay of collection of tax levied under exhibit P-1 and the penalty under exhibit P-8 by the order of my learned brother, Mr. Raghavan J., dated December 27, 1960, passed in C.M.P. No. 6226 of 1960, the proper direction that has to be given is that there will be no attempt at collecting the tax under exhibit P-1 or the penalty under exhibit P-8 till the disposal of the appeals pending against those orders and for two weeks thereafter. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner may dispose of the appeals as expeditiously as possible.
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1962 (2) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the award. Neither s. 6 nor any other provision in the Act provides now the award is to be made. 22. Under s. 3(g) however the Government has power by general or special order to provide for incidental or supplementary matters necessary for the decision of an industrial dispute referred for adjudication under any order made under s. 3. The provision as to the pronouncement of the decision in open court in clause 9(7) of the Statutory Order clearly is within the powers contemplated in s. 3(g). Section 6 does not prohibit the making of such a provision. Its main purpose is to direct that the Tribunal shall submit the award to the Government so that it may be enforced. It has nothing to do with the manner in which the Tribunal is to make its award. A rule duly framed under the Act requiring the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open court is therefore not in conflict with s. 6. 23. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. 24. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 121 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ase there was a change of ownership from the family to the firm by operation of law due to the partition. That the business was the same before and after partition does not admit of any doubt. The Tribunal states as follows in its order "On the 7th October, the partnership referred to above started and the old business was continued." In our opinion, the constitution of partnership between Chandappa Iyer and his son, Hanumantha Rao, to continue and carry on the erstwhile joint family business as a result of the partition, brought about a succession by the firm of the pre-existing business and that the assessee firm is entitled to claim the allowance under section 10(2)(xi) of the Act. The trade debts written off as bad and irrecoverable debts do not constitute capital assets in the hands of the assessee. The question is answered in favour of the assessee who will get his costs from the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (2) TMI 120 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ght have been some irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale the auction-sale cannot be set aside without proof of substantial injury to the appellant. There is no evidence to prove substantial injury. The sale fetched an aggregate sum of ₹ 22,300/-; the estimated value of the sold properties was show as ₹ 20,000/- in the sale" proclamation. Presumably in the case of Mainawati, also the, properties were auction-sold at about ₹ 22,000/-. Thus the appellant has failed to prove that he has sustained any substantial injury. It is urged that it is not necessary to establish substantial injury as the sale was vitiated by illegalities and not mere irregularities. But none of the infirmities pointed out to us are in our opinion illegalities in the sense that an illegality renders an act null and void. 17. For the reasons already discussed the application of the appellant under Rule 90 has rightly been, dismissed. The appeal is also dismissed with cost.
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1962 (2) TMI 118 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the partners, if there are any, or from the partners individually. If the Income-tax Officer thought fit to proceed against the partners severally the partners can not raise any valid objection. Sri Srinivasan says that some High Courts had taken the view-after the filing of this petition this High Court and Supreme Court have differed from that view--that a person against whom action is taken under section 44 is not an assessee; it is because of those decisions his client field the present petition; therefore, we should give the petitioner an opportunity to file an appeal against the order of assessment passed on the firm. This is not a matter which is within our jurisdiction. It is a matter that has to be considered by the Appellate Assistance Commissioner and we are sure that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner will consider the same if and when the matter is taken to him in appeal. For the reasons mentioned above, the petition is rejected. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 117 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gh Court. Construing the above provisions of the Act the learned judges of the East Punjab High Court observed "...if a man has suffered loss of income due to any cause other than depreciation that loss is first to be deducted and then the depreciation and there seems to be a good reason for it. The former cannot be carried forward for more than six years and the latter can be carried forward up to any term of years. This is really to stop the Income-tax Officers giving a set-off of an item which can be taken into consideration at any time rather than to a loss which cannot be set off after six years." In my view, therefore, the question should be answered in favour of the assessee and the unabsorbed depreciation of the past year should be added to the depreciation of the current year and the aggregate be deducted from the total income of the previous year relevant for the assessment year 1952-53. The assessee will have the costs of this reference. Ray, J.-I agree.
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