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Showing 1 to 20 of 95 Records
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1963 (4) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re be allowed and the notification under s. 6 and that part of the notification under s. 4, which says that the Governor was pleased to direct that under sub-s. (4) of s. 17, the provisions of s. 5-A shall not apply, are bad and are hereby set aside. Rest of the notification under s. 4 will stand and it will be open to the Government if it so chooses to proceed with the acquisition after action is taken under s. 5-A and thereafter to issue a notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the circumstances we feel that the appellants should be given an opportunity under s. 5-A now, though the period for making objections provided in that section expire long ago in view of the misunderstanding of the law on the part of the Government by treating the objections made before the Collector after the issue of the notices under s. 9 as objections under s. 5-A. The appellants will get their costs of this Court from the respondents; one set of hearing fee. 18. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 108 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rom taking any evidence outside the facts mentioned in the case stated, is erroneous. In terms, Rule 5 provides that after due compliance with the requirements of Rules 1 to 3, the case shall be set down for hearing as a suit in the ordinary manner and the Court has to try and determine the case in accordance with the rule contained in Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. 30. Thus, in our opinion, the learned Judge was wrong in dismissing the case without following the procedure prescribed by Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and in holding that it is not permissible for the parties to lead any evidence in proof of the facts stated in the case. 31. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the Judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge and remand the case to the District Court for disposal according to law. 32. The costs of this appeal will abide the result of the case. The institution fees shall be refunded to the appellants. 33. Case remanded.
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1963 (4) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... usiness" the resultant computation of the profits or gains can be reached only after all the allowances contemplated by section 10(2) are given effect to, and except for depreciation covered by section 10(2)(vi), every other kind of allowance has to be deducted from the gross profits or gains before the assessable profits can be reached, and when once that has been done, it is the result that represents the profits or gains under that head. Section 24(2) does not therefore give any support to the contention that development rebate being an allowance, which is not in the nature of a business expenditure or business loss, must be segregated and treated separately. It follows that the assessment made ignoring the requirement of the law with regard to the adjustment of the development rebate is clearly in violation of the provisions relevant thereto. The petition succeeds. The rule nisi is made absolute. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsels fee ₹ 100.
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1963 (4) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt for consideration. The High Court should bear this in mind for deciding whether the evidence of the approver should be acted upon or not. Then again it would not be sufficient for the High Court to deal with the evidence in a general way. It would be necessary for it to consider for itself the evidence adduced by the prosecution on the specific charges and then to conclude whether those charges have been established or not. The prosecution would be well, advised if, instead of placing the evidence on each and every one of those large number of charges against the respondents, it chooses to select a few charges under each head other than the head of conspiracy and concentrates on establishing those charges, this would save public time and also serve the purpose of the prosecution. With these observations we set aside the acquittal of the respondents and remit the appeal to the High Court for decision on merits in the light of our observations. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1963 (4) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ention of Kamani that the suit could not be stayed, the arbitration agreement being inffective and invalid. For reasons already set out by us, that assumption cannot be supported Whether having regard to the terms of s. 3 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 6 of 1937 stay may be granted of the suit commenced by Kamani is a question on which no decision has been recorded by the Trial Judge nor by the High Court, and we will not be justified in this appeal in entering upon questions of fact for the first time without having the (1) Appeal No. 63 of 1959 decided on September 22, 1960. benefit of the view of the High Court on those questions. The appeal will therefore be allowed, and the proceeding remanded to the Court of First Instance to be heard and disposed of according to law. Costs in this Court and before the Division Bench of the High Court will abide the result of the proceeding taken pursuant to this order in the Trial Court. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1963 (4) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a period of five years was too severe and that we should reduce the period of suspension even on the basis that the charge against the appellant be held to be established. We can only express surprise that Counsel should have made bold to make this submission. The appellant had got into his hands a considerable sum of money belonging to his clients and, on the finding of the High Court, had failed to pay it back when demanded. Not content with this he had put forward a false defence of payment and had even sought to sustain his defence by suborning witnesses. In the circumstances, even if the learned Judges of the High Court had struck off the name of the appellant from the roll of advocates we would have considered it a proper punishment having regard to the gravity of the offence. The order now under appeal therefore errs, if at all, on the side of leniency and there is no justification for the request made on behalf of the appellant. 19. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 103 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d post on the 15th November, 1962, they were received later and if the period is taken to be the date on which the copies were received, the applications were within time. He has further contended that even if the applications were beyond time, an affidavit and an application have been filed along with the petitions for condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the circumstances of the case we are of opinion that even if the applications are filed beyond time, these are cases where the delay should be condoned and the applications should be treated as having been filed in time. We accordingly allow the petitions and direct the Tribunal to treat the applications filed under section 66(1) as having been filed within time and to dispose of those petitions in accordance with law. The applications are allowed with cost. We assess a consolidated cost of ₹ 50 in rules Nos. 1 and 2 and in the other rule we assess another sum of ₹ 50. Nayudu J.-I agree.
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1963 (4) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ctly clear that the particular nomenclature was not decisive and that what mattered in these cases was the nature of the duties and responsibilities of a post. If the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the posts held by the respondents legitimately Justify the conclusion that they are comptists, then the special allowance can be claimed by them. It is in the light of these observations that the Labour Court should proceed to deal with these cases after remand. If the parties want to amend their pleadings, they should move the Labour Court in that behalf within a fortnight after the receipt of the record in that Court. Then the Labour Court should fix an early date for taking evidence and should deal with these matters as expeditiously as possible. The result is, the appeals are allowed, the orders passed by the Labour Court are set aside and the matters sent back to that Court for disposal in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is employees. Under these circumstances, if the intimation card in question was taken away by some fraudulent person, it would be difficult to hold that the appellant can be charged with negligence which, in turn, can be held to be the proximate cause of the loss caused to the respondent. In our opinion, therefore, Mukarji.J. was in error in holding that the respondent could successfully plead estoppel by negligence against the appellant. As we have already observed, the question as to whether the claim made by the appellant against the respondent under S. 70 is concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. B. K. Mondal & Sons ( 1962 Supp. I. S. R. 876), in favour of the appellant, and so, it must be held that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in dismissing the appellant's claim. The result is, the appeal is allowed., the decree passed by the appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 100 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Income-tax Act, 1922 are applicable to the petitioners, as the assessments on the shebaits under the said provision of the Act are lawful. But to conclude this much is not necessarily to concede that the Hindu Deity as such is liable to income-tax. I need say no more than this. 144. Lastly. I may mention that Ananda-moyee Kalimata was in existence in the F. B. case of ILR 37 Cal 128; 14 Cal WN 18 (FB); is in existence in this Reference and will always be in existence. It is my conviction, that candles will still flicker before the Idols and in the temples with the subdued splendour, preserving the same sense of divinity, though with the marks of vicissitudes but with the lasting feeling of centuries of worship of the Hindu Deity. The Supreme Court declares in the case of Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji, (supra) that the Deity is immortal. 145. I accordingly, agree, respectfully, in the answer proposed by my learned brother and I also agree with no order for costs as passed by him.
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1963 (4) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hese provisions of cl. (K) and would have thought fit to make an order as was made by this Court in similar circumstances in Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1961 (II) L. L. J. 623), making it clear that there 21 workmen should be re-employed in the crushing season of 1962-63 only in so for as it was possible to do so without breach of the provisions of cl. (K) of the Standing Orders. There are no materials on the record however to show how many of the workmen already employed by the Company in the crushing season of 1962-63 had actually worked in the latter half of 1961-62 season. In the written statement of the Company no such point about the difficulty of reinstatement of any of these 21 workmen because of the provisions of cl. (K) was raised. In these circumstances, we have not allowed Mr. Pathak to raise this new plea for the first time in this Court. As all the points raised in the appeal fail, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... way by which the appellant could get at the money will be to enforce his decree through the process of civil Court by attachment, etc. This contention, however, ignores the express provisions contained in Section nfba 50(2) /nfba of the Act. It makes no difference whether the interim payment is regarded either as compensation or as income or of any other variety of payment. The statute creates an obligation on the part of the Government to make interim payment in certain circumstances and it provides that it shall be paid over to persons specified in Section nfba 50(2) /nfba . We have already referred to the fact that Section nfba 50(2) /nfba will comprehend the case of the mortgagee. The appellant in the present case as mortgage will be entitled to take what is due to him out of the interim payment of compensation amount by reason of that provision. The appeals have, therefore, to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1963 (4) TMI 97 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e notice of the nature of a notice under section 19(2) had to be issued within three years of the end of the respective financial years. This was not done. In the result therefore the assessments made are illegal. 36. I will like to add a few words regarding section 20A of the Act. The Martycherra Tea Estate formerly belonged to a partnership firm. It was sold to a company on July 9, 1953. Under section 2oA(2), where a person discontinues any business receiving agricultural income, he has to give notice of such discontinuance to the Agricultural Income-tax Officer. If by sale of the Martycherra Tea Estate the partners discontinued all their business of receiving agricultural income, they had to give such a notice. In default of such a notice, they could be subjected to a penalty not exceeding the agricultural income-tax subsequently assessed. But, in the present cases, when the subsequent assessments have been held to be illegal the question of imposing penalty cannot arise.
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1963 (4) TMI 96 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... agency fell through. That managing director died in 1949, and the assessee sold the shares in the syndicate in 1941 and 1943. The sale brought an amount to the assessee which was in excess of what they had paid for the shares by about ₹ 2,00,000. It was held that the purchase of shares to the tune of ₹ 3,00,000 was an investment and not an adventure and the sum of ₹ 2,00,000 received by the assessee was not in the nature of income from business and was, therefore, not liable to tax. The material facts of these two cases were different from those of the present one, and they have no application to the facts of the present case. The result, therefore, is that all the questions in the two cases referred to this court, as stated above, are answered in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs to the department. Hearing fee a consolidated amount of ₹ 250 in both the cases. Ramaswami, CJ.-I agree.
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1963 (4) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fer an intention to create a trust or equitable interest, by means of an irrevocable mutual testament, upon the facts, merely because two persons happen to make a single document of their testamentary dispositions. 51. As far as this country is concerned, the emphasis, in the Supreme Court decision in AIR1959SC71 is, as my learned brother has shown, upon the benefit taken by the surviving testator. Their Lordships would appear to have laid emphasis upon that form of a mutual Will, in which each party is in a relationship of both testator and legatee, as regards the other party. Such terms would, by themselves, constitute powerful evidence of a mutual agreement not to revoke, except by both together. Hence, I do not think that this decision implies that the element of irrevocability may be dispensed with, as a test. AIR1960All126 has been cited by us, as regards the exposition of legal principles; upon the facts, it is distinguishable from the present case, in vital respects.
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1963 (4) TMI 94 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the ginning and pressing of their cotton, there is involved as a severable part of the transaction a sale of the material of hessian and iron hoops used in the execution of the contract. Having regard to the view taken by this Court in the decision referred to above, it must be held that the applicants are dealers within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. 8. As we have already pointed out earlier, in the view that we are taking, the other contention, which was raised by the applicants, viz., that they are not carrying on the business of purchasing hessian and iron hoops, which they are utilizing in the course of their business activity, need not be considered at the present stage. 9. In the result, therefore, our answer to question No. (1) referred to us is in the affirmative. For reasons which we have already stated, question No. (2) need not be answered. The applicants will pay the costs of the Department. 10. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (4) TMI 93 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT (FB)
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... ... ..... ns of Section 7-B, and, in my view cannot apply to the interpretation of Section 7-E where the provisions are materially different. There are certain observations, however, in that Judgment which interpret the decision In 1961CriLJ740 . In the light of what I have said earlier, I would express my respectful disagreement with those observations. 64. The Munsif, while acting under the provisions of Section 7-E of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act acts as a person a designata and not as a Court, and a revision application against an order made under Section 7-E is not maintainable, and I would decide the question referred accordingly. BY THE COURT 65. For the reasons given in our judgments we hold that a Munsif exercising jurisdiction under Section 7-E of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 is a Civil Court and not a persona designata and that an order passed by him is revisable by this Court under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code.
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1963 (4) TMI 92 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ana Row v. Dharmachar ILR 26 Mad 514. Graham v. Peat (1801) 1 East 244, Chambers v. Donaldson (1809) 11 East 65 and B. Gangayya v. V. Satyanarayana, AIR 1925 Mad 1021). There is nothing to show that the State had authorized the acts when the cause of action arose, nor is there anything to show that it had approved of them or ratified them even today. He has also pointed out, on the authority of a long track of cases, that an action must be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the action; and that no advantage could be given to a defendant because a third party had acquired the right and title of the plaintiff. The law on the subject has also been elaborately discussed by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. in the leading iudgment on the subject reported in Rai Charan v. Biswanath. AIR 1915 Cal 103. We, therefore, hold that the suit was rightly decreed. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The costs of this appeal shall be borne as incurred.
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1963 (4) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... irl was not satisfactory, that it was not corroborated and that there were other circumstances which showed that the prosecution case might be improbable, but having done his duty, the learned Judge had to leave it to the jury to consider whether the prosecution had established its charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt or not. The jury apparently considered the matter for an hour and half and returned the unanimous verdict of guilty. In the circumstances of this case, we cannot accede to Mr. Chari's argument that the Sessions Judge was required by law to treat the said verdict as perverse. In a jury trial where questions of fact are left to the verdict of the jury, sometimes the verdicts returned by the jury may cause a disagreeable surprise to the Judge, but that itself can be no justification for characterising the verdict as perverse. 19. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, the appellant to surrender to his bail bond. 20. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... own that all cash reserves in the shape of depreciation reserve, general reserve, renewal reserve and so on and also in the shape of investments and advances cannot be deducted from the gross rehabilitation amount as they may be used as working capital next year. This means that the tribunal has to recalculate the rehabilitation amount due in view of what we have said above. 14. In view of the fact that the adjudication of the claim for bonus has already been delayed, we direct the tribunal to recalculate the available surplus in accordance with the observations made in this judgment after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence and submit its findings to this Court within three months of the receipt of the record by it. When the findings of the tribunal have been received, notice will be given to parties to file objections if any within ten days of the receipt of the notice and thereafter the appeals will be listed for final disposal. 15. Case remanded.
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