1963 (4) TMI 109 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Applicability of the Kanpur Act to the acquisition process.
2. Necessity of compliance with Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act before issuing a notification under Section 6.
3. Validity of invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act in conjunction with Section 17(1-A) for taking possession of land other than waste or arable land.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of the Kanpur Act to the Acquisition Process:

The appellant argued that the acquisition for Scheme No. XX should have been conducted under the Kanpur Act, specifically under Section 114, which modifies the Land Acquisition Act for acquisitions by the Board. The Supreme Court analyzed Sections 71, 108, 109, and 114 of the Kanpur Act and concluded that these sections apply when the Board itself decides to acquire land with the State Government's sanction. The Court stated, "It is only when the Board proceeds to acquire land by virtue of its powers under s. 71 that s. 114 comes into play." The acquisition in this case was by the Government for public purposes, thus the Kanpur Act did not apply. The Court held, "The contention therefore on behalf of the appellants that the Kanpur Act has not been complied with and therefore the proceedings for acquisition of land are bad has no force and must be rejected."

2. Necessity of Compliance with Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act Before Issuing a Notification Under Section 6:

The appellant contended that the Government could not issue a notification under Section 6 without first complying with Section 5-A, which provides the right to object to the acquisition. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act and emphasized the importance of Section 5-A, stating, "The right to file objections under s. 5-A is a substantial right when a person's property is being threatened with acquisition." The Court noted that Section 17(4) allows the Government to bypass Section 5-A only in cases of urgency involving waste or arable land. Since the land in question was not waste or arable, the invocation of Section 17(4) was invalid. Consequently, the notification under Section 6 issued without compliance with Section 5-A was deemed invalid. The Court concluded, "In consequence the notification under s. 6 also as it was issued without taking action under s. 5-A must fall."

3. Validity of Invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act in Conjunction with Section 17(1-A) for Taking Possession of Land Other Than Waste or Arable Land:

The appellant argued that Section 17(4) could not apply to land other than waste or arable land, even though Section 17(1-A) (introduced by the U.P. Amendment Act) allows for taking possession of such land for planned development. The Supreme Court agreed with this argument, stating, "There has been no change by the U.P. Act in sub-s. (1) and therefore when sub-s. (4) speaks of any land to which sub-s. (1) applies it still refers only to waste or arable land and no other." The Court clarified that Section 17(1-A) accelerates possession-taking for non-waste or non-arable land but does not extend the applicability of Section 17(4) to such land. The Court held, "It cannot be said that power was conferred on the State Government to apply sub-s. (4) also to a case falling under sub-s. (1-A), simply by the introduction of sub-s. (1-A) in the form in which it was introduced in s. 17."

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the notification under Section 6 and the part of the notification under Section 4 that invoked Section 17(4). The Court stated, "The appeals must therefore be allowed and the notification under s. 6 and that part of the notification under s. 4, which says that the Governor was pleased to direct that under sub-s. (4) of s. 17, the provisions of s. 5-A shall not apply, are bad and are hereby set aside." The Court provided the appellants an opportunity to file objections under Section 5-A, and the Government could proceed with the acquisition following proper procedure. The appellants were awarded costs.