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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 68 Records
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1964 (11) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ajlis may delegate any of its powers and duties under this Act to the Sadr, to be exercised and performed in such special circumstances as the Majlis may specify, and may likewise withdraw any such delegation." 14. There is nothing to show that the powers of the Majlis were not delegated. But even if section 38 did not apply it would appear from section 37 that the Sadr possessed all the powers of the Majlis in an emergency and the High Court and the Additional District Judge have concurrently held that it was necessary to remove forthwith the appellant and to take away from him the property of the Waqf, particularly when he disobeyed the order of the Majlis and did not deposit the amount which the auditor found was due to the Waqf. The order of the Sadr was reported to the Majlis and the Majlis also approved of it. This is hardly a ground which can be considered in this Court. 15. The appeal is devoid of merit. It fails and is dismissed with costs. 16. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 123 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f when the suit was instituted. The amount is legally recoverable even before an accounting is done, with or without the intervention of the Court, and consequently on the application of the above rule the amount be comes due even though no steps for its determination have been taken. 28. To sum up, on the date the appellants moved the present application under Section 398 of the Companies Act, they were indebted to Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills (Private) Ltd., Chhitauni and the company's lien extended to all the shares held by the appellants. The appellants had not paid all the sum due on their shares and as laid down in the proviso to Clause (a) of Section 399 of the Companies Act, they had no right to apply under Section 398 till such time as the sums due were not paid. The learned Single Judge thus rightly held that the present application under Section 398 of the Companies Act was not maintainable. 29. The Special Appeal has no force and it is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1964 (11) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s shall be liable to furnish accounts of the receipts of the usufruct of the mortgaged properties from August 10, 1950, the date of the filing of the suit, till they handover possession of the mortgaged properties to the defendants and that amount shall be adjusted towards the decretal amount". As we have held that that direction to the said extent was wrong, the order of the learned Civil Judge was also wrong to that extent and if that be so, the decree was also incorrect in that regard. We, therefore, hold, that the High Court should have modified the decree to that extent as it would not be in conformity with the judgment as modified by the earlier judgment of this Court. We, therefore, substitute for the words in para, 13 of the fresh preliminary decree "from 10th August, 1950 the date of the filing of the suit" the words "from April 25, 1953, the date of the original preliminary decree". With this modification, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1964 (11) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... paid was less than what they had to pay under the decree. By paying the said amount they did nothing more than discharging their liability under the decree. The discharge by the respondents of their legal liability under the decree cannot in any sense of the term be described as detrimental to them. Whether the representation was made or not they had to pay that amount and by paying that amount they had secured a benefit in as much as from the date of payment the interest on that amount ceased to run. There is no scope, therefore, in this case to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. We, therefore, hold that the order of the Rajasthan High Court was correct, except in regard to the direction given by it to the Subordinate Judge to take into account ,ill the receipts of the mortgaged properties from August 10, 1950, to July 25, 1953. The order of the, High Court is accordingly modified. The parties will pay and receive proportionate costs here and in the High Court. Order modified.
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1964 (11) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w that in spite of the acquittal of a person in one case it is open to the Court in another case to proceed on the basis-of course if the evidence warrants it-that the acquitted person was guilty of the offence of which he had been tried in the other case and to find in the later case that the person tried in it was guilty of an offence under section 34 by virtue of having committed the offence along with the acquitted person. There is nothing in principle to prevent this being done. The principle of Sambasivam's L.R. 1952 A.C. 458, 479) case has no application here because the two cases we are concerned with are against two different persons though for the commission of the same offence. 7. Furthermore, as we have already said, each case has to be decided on the evidence led in it and this irrespective of any view of the same act that might have been taken on different evidence led in another case. 8. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 119 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ved in the original tribunal only if there were specific directions in the appellate order to that effect. If the appellate order merely annulled the original order without containing any other directions there was no power in the original tribunal to initiate de novo proceedings and impose a fresh penalty and in the words without prejudice to the merits of the case were held to make no difference on the ground that final communication was merely an interpretation by the officer who wrote that letter upon the order of the appellate authority and such interpretation in a communication could not be treated as a part and parcel of the appellate order. Respondent No. 1 had therefore no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice. 8. In the result the writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the impugned notice dated January 13 1961 Respondent No. 1 is prohibited from holding any proceedings in pursuance thereof. The petition accordingly allowed and the rule made absolute with costs.
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1964 (11) TMI 118 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in it to the plaintiff. In support of this contention he cited Maradugu'a Venkataratnam v. Kotala Ramanna 9 Ind. Cas. 255 21 M.L.J. 413 9 M.L.T. 276. It is more than doubtful whether in face of Clause 12 of the agreement of February 1906 the lien purported to be given to the plaintiff was one which the Naidus could validly give. But be that as it may, it could obviously give no property in the mica as the arrangement never contemplated that the mica should ever be handled by the plaintiff at any stage after it left the mine in a merchantable condition; it was to be consigned for sale not to him, but to the defendant Company; and even if the lien is to be treated as an assignment, the assignment to him was not of the proceeds in his own hands but in the hands of the defendant Company. In these circumstances, it is impossible to hold that there was at any time any appropriation of the mica to him. 14. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, certified for two Counsel.
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1964 (11) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... noticed that the Division Bench had concurred in the views expressed by the learned Single Judge as regards the defects in the judgment of the first appellate Court on its findings on this issue. Learned Counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge fell into serious errors in interfering with a finding of fact. Though we are satisfied that certain portions of the judgment of the learned Single Judge had suffered from errors, we do not purpose to examine this question as the same is wholly unnecessary for the disposal of this appeal. It is only in the event of our accepting the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee that the correctness of the reversal of the finding on the Chelaship of Neki Puri would have become material. In the view that we have expressed as regards the appellant's title to the Gaddi we do not consider it necessary or proper to discuss what, in fact, is merely an academic question. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 116 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d in the various decisions referred to. If the expenditure passes that test, it must be allowed. Again the reference by the learned advocate for the assessee to the schedule to the Act that in certain contingencies the tax was not to be payable because of deficiency of profits cannot be a solid ground for urging that the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of earning profits. The schedule merely provides for cases where the legislature thought it fit to grant the assessee relief from the operation of the Wealth-tax Act because of the paucity of profits. The provisions in the Schedule to which our attention was drawn do not lead us to hold that the imposition was to be an outgoing out of profits alone. In my view, the Appellate Tribunal came to the right conclusion in this case and the answer to the question framed should be in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee who will have the costs of this reference. MASUD J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (11) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Punjab High Court on May 18, 1957, and it was finally decided on January 13, 1964. It is very much to be regretted that the final disposal of this writ petition should have been taken such an unusually long period. The appellants have been agitating this matter since 1957 and as a result of the long duration of the present writ petition in the High Court, they have had the benefit of the stay order all this time, though ultimately it was found that there was no substance in the petition. It is hardly necessary to add that writ petitions in which orders of stay and injunction are passed, should be decided as expeditiously as possible. That is why when it came to the notice of this Court that this writ petition has taken an unusually long period in the High Court, we directed that it should be set down for hearing within a fortnight after it was brought to us on a notice of motion for stay. 23. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 24. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 114 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... IILL J 17 Mad . As we have pointed out, the findings that remain should be as to "substantial misdemeanours" to justify the argument that this court will not interfere with the punishment imposed in the case (dismissal), though the officer is cleared in respect of certain charges. Applying this test, in the present case, very minor irregularities alone remain, with the exception of charge 4, in respect of which the petitioner was acquitted, which are not "substantial misdemeanours" in any conceivable sense, and for which it is impossible to imagine, that any authority, exercising disciplinary jurisdiction, would have imposed the punishment of dismissal on those charges. In this view, I allow the writ petition, quash the order of dismissal, and release the matter for fresh determination, in the light of the charges which alone remain established against the writ petitioner, namely, charge 5 to 9. The parties will bear their own costs. 10. Petition allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 113 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot only the principal but also the agent, manager or the servant acting on behalf of the former, is based on an erroneous reasoning. It is no doubt true that under the aforesaid section any person acting on behalf of its principal is also liable to punishment. In the instant case however, it was the Company which was the principal and its agent was the salesman who was found selling the adulterated milk. The Company has not been prosecuted while the agent has already been punished. To make the applicant liable for the offence committed by the Company and its salesman, it was necessary for the prosecution, as has been indicated earlier, within the meaning of Section 17(2) of the Act to prove that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of" the applicant. 9. In the result, this revision is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the applicant are set aside. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to him.
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1964 (11) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... wo months earlier. The High Court rightly pointed out that it was a pure surmise and accepted the evidence of the 1st respondent that a few days after he saw the foundations being dug in the suit site be filed the suit. But all these are beside the point, for it is not the case of the appellant that because of the 1st respondent's conduct he was induced to put up the building at a heavy cost his case throughout was that there was no contract at all. If so, there was no question of his being induced to act to his detriment because of the conduct of the 1st respondent. Therefore, except for some delay, there are no circumstances within the meaning of the aforesaid decisions which should induce a Court to refuse in its discretion to give a relief of specific performance. The High Court rightly held that it was a fit case where the plaintiff should have been given a relief of specific performance. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 111 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r had reason to believe. The learned Government Pleader has produced some records before us. One of them is a report by the Assistant Collector to a higher authority dated 15-10-1963 about conduct and result of the relating to this case. We do not propose to deal with the detailed contents of those documents. But there is no room to hold that there was no basis which gave the warrant officer reason to believe at the time when he issued the warrants. This contention is not tenable. 54. In view of our finding on the various contentions, we hold that no ground has been made out for the issue of a writ as prayed for except bottles of Indian made beer. So, we dismiss the Writ Petition except for ordering that the two quart bottles of Indian made beer should not be detained by the Customs Authorities. As the petitioner has substantially failed, we direct the petitioner to pay the costs of the respondents. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/- (one hundred only). 55. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 110 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and construction of the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act. In their revision application before the Commissioner of Wealth-tax, they raised the point which has been raised in this petition. It is difficult to deny to the petitioners their lawful rights in this petition because in the first instance they did not appreciate that wealth-tax could not be assessed as against them as executors under the provisions of the Act. We have already dealt with the third contention that was made by Mr. Padhye. The contention was that having regard to the last part of sub-section (1) of section 19, the executors were liable to be directly taxed in respect of the estate left by the deceased, Smt. Sodradevi. As we have found that there is no provision in the Wealth-tax Act entitling the revenue to charge wealth-tax against the petitioners in respect of the estate of the late Smt. Sodradevi left in their hands, the petitioners are entitled to succeed. The rule will be made absolute with costs.
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1964 (11) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the absence of sufficient and proper evidence to prove the original cost price of plant and machinery purchased before 1949 and to prove the increase in price of the rest of the plant besides that purchased from the English company, we do not think that we should interfere with the finding of the tribunal on this point. We are, therefore, not prepared in the circumstances to allow a higher multiplier. In this view of the matter, the tribunal's award of four months' wages (at the rate of ₹ 12,000 per month) as profit bonus for the year 1959 must stand. 14. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed and the tribunal's award in respect of customary Puja bonus payable in 1961 is set aside. We also set aside the award of the tribunal allowing profit bonus for the year ending December 1960. The award of the tribunal allowing Profit bonus at the rate of four months wages for the year ending December 1959 will stand. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
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1964 (11) TMI 108 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd object of the expenditure will determine the character of the expenditure, whether it is a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure. In this case, it is clear that substantial improvements were made in the building and the land appurtenant thereto including the compound wall with the sole aim and object of getting an enduring benefit for the business. The Appellate Tribunal in such circumstances has held that the expenditure was in the nature of capital expenditure. We are of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the nature of the substantial improvements made in the capital asset at an enormous outlay, the expenditure must be deemed to be in the nature of a capital expenditure and not a revenue expenditure. We, therefore, answer the second question in the negative. The reference is answered accordingly. The assessee shall pay the costs of the reference. Advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... atement was that he wanted to pay the extra amount but the landlord did not receive it. It is quite obviously that he avoided Payment over the years under one pretext or the other and the Tribunal-, were right in holding that be had failed to make out sufficient cause for non-payment. Indeed such a finding giving concurrently by the High Court and the three Tribunals below would be sufficient for the disposal of the case. We have only allowed the argument to be used because Mr. Iyengar claimed that conditions on which persons can be evicted under the two clauses of s. 14-A were inconsistent. On examination it is apparent that the reasons for eviction under the two clauses are 3Sup.165 4 entirely different. The appellant could not be evicted under the second clause of S. 14-A but it is obvious that his case is covered by the first clause. The irregularity in payment is patent and there was no sufficient cause. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... internal management of its own affairs. No outside agency should impose its will unless the action of the Company is lacking in bona fides or is manifestly perverse or unfair. There is nothing to indicate this. At the same time we must say that existence of Union No. 4145 which has a larger membership than Union No. 729 which is the only recognised Union, has in a great measure contributed to this dispute. We have often noticed that Companies favour one Union out of several and thus create rivalry which disturbs industrial peace. It often turns out that this has adverse effect on Company itself. Since Union No. 729 was formed in 1950 and Union No. 4145 in 1957 we cannot say that the non-recognition of Union No. 4145 was deliberate. But as that Union seems to be the stronger of the two Unions the Company should seriously consider whether Union No. 4145 should not also be recognised. The appeal must succeed. It will be allowed but we make no order about costs. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... greed to pay it. It had been expressly provided in the sale deed that the property was being sold free from the charge. The vendees were in no way liable for the amount and had not undertaken to pay it. In these circumstances the property cannot be said to have been sold subject to the charge of ₹ 1 1,000, and if it was not being sold subject to that charge, the Explanation to section 24 becomes inapplicable." o p /o p It has already been noticed that this sum of ₹ 1 1,000 forms part of the price for items other than the immoveable property. Mr. Aggarwala has not seriously controverted the finding of the High Court on this point. Accordingly, we hold that this sum of ₹ 1 1,000 cannot be included for the purpose of levying stamp duty. o p /o p In the result, we agree with the High Court that the stamp duty is to be calculated only on the sum of ₹ 1,00,000. o p /o p The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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