|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 25 Records
-
1964 (5) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the interpretation we placed would leave an assessee without remedy against a wrong order by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the appeal is incompetent or does not lie. If this is the result it is not because of the interpretation being wrong but because that was the policy of the legislature. The legislature was not bound to provide a remedy against that wrong order. If it intended to give a remedy in such a case it should have laid down in section 33 that an appeal would lie to the Tribunal from any order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the result we answer the question in the negative. The assessee will pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax his costs, which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsels fee is assessed at ₹ 200. We direct that a copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Register to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5) of the Act. Question answered in the negative.
-
1964 (5) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 44 the provisions of Chapter IV shall apply to the assessment of a firm whose business has not been discontinued but has passed into other hands, and to which the provisions of section 26(2) apply. But the amendment is with effect from April 1, 1958, only, and cannot be made to serve for the purpose of curing the invalidity of assessment orders made before that date. In the view that we are taking, therefore, it must be held that even if the case is one which falls for consideration under section 26(2), the assessment orders are invalid. Accordingly, whether the assessment orders are considered with reference to section 26(1) or section 26(2), we answer the question referred in each case in the negative. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 100 in each case. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 100 in each case.
-
1964 (5) TMI 53 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fail to attend on the 30th August, 1961; he did not also make any effort to ascertain what had happened to the suit which was directed by G.K. Mitter, J., to be placed in the subsequent special list. He came to know about the dismissal in the Court of Sinha, J., on the 16th January 1962, when Mr. P.K. Sen, the counsel for the other side had conveyed the information. On these facts the learned trial judge, apart from other considerations, was, in our opinion, justified in refusing to set aside the order of dismissal. We should also point out that the appellant is not going to be irretrievably prejudiced by reason of the order of August 30, 1961. All that would happen, is that the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce would now be taken up and it is up to the appellant to satisfy the arbitrators that the respondents have no claim against it. 28. For reasons aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed. 29. Each party will bear and pay its own costs. H.K. Bose, C.J. 30. I agree.
-
1964 (5) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Mills was liable to be treated as the profits of a business. The court found that what was received by the assessee was received by it as an employee and, therefore, fell to be treated as salary paid to the assessee and accordingly was outside the scope of the Excess Profits Tax Act. To the extent, however, that the expenditure of the selling agency business was met from the grant received by the assessee, the court held that the profits of the selling agency business were liable to be increased for the purpose of the excess profits tax assessment. The provisions of section 4(3)(vi) did not fall for consideration. I am, therefore, of the view that the sum of ₹ 54,956 was also exempt under section 4(3)(vi) and, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 200.
-
1964 (5) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ncome Tax Act, the losses of ₹ 6,129 and ₹ 20,471 suffered by the assessee in speculative transactions could be set off against the assessees income from non-speculative business ?" We have held in Jagannath Mahadeo Prasad v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Income-tax Reference No. 130 of 1960, decided on April 14, 1964), that an assessee is entitled to an adjustment of speculative losses against the profits from the other business in the computation of income, profits and gains under section 10(1) and that the Income Tax Officer is not entitled to disallow the claim to such adjustment by reference to the proviso to section 24(1). We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 100. Counsels fee is assessed at ₹ 100. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (5) TMI 50 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the partners depended upon the assessment of the partnership and consequently the information received was of a relevant fact leading to the discovery of escape. Raja Mohan Raja Bahadur v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 49 ITR 801 was governed by post-1948 section 34. In the case of Jawahar Lal Mani Ram's case (supra) the order resulting in escape of income was itself held to be wrong by the appellate authority and the decision that it was wrong was held to be information leading to the discovery of escape. As the section 15 proceeding itself was illegal, the annulment of the partition under section 10A in that proceeding also was illegal and of no effect. Section 10A could not be used after an assessment order under the Excess Profits Tax Act was passed, unless a proceeding was taken under section 15 in respect of escaped profits. I, therefore, agree with the answers in the negative given by my learned brother to the two questions and with the order proposed by him.
-
1964 (5) TMI 49 - HOUSE OF LORDS
... ...
... ... ..... f assignment, contract or otherwise shifting the beneficial ownership of that income from such clients to the appellant. In the circumstances it becomes unnecessary to consider whether the interest would, if it belonged to the appellant, have satisfied the statutory definition of "earned income." The ruling of the council of the Law Society for Scotland cannot help the appellant. It is simply the council's opinion, and if the words "the solicitor is entitled to retain the interest" are intended to refer to a legal title, then, in my view, the opinion is wrong. If I may say so, I think the council recognised the difficulty it was in for, in effect, the ruling says that if certain work is too difficult or impracticable then a charge may be made for other work which the solicitor would be doing in any event. The premise is really irrelevant to the conclusion. Be that as it may, I am of opinion that this appeal is hopeless and must fail. Appeal dismissed.
-
1964 (5) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f such suit, or (b) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action." The benefit of this section would be available to the Corporation only if it was held that this deduction of ten per cent was "an act done or purported to be done in pursu- ance or execution or intended execution of this Act." We have already held that this levy was not in pursuance or execution of the Act. It is equally clear that in view of the provisions of s. 127(4) (to which we have already referred) the levy could not be said to be "purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act." For, what is plainly prohibited by the Act cannot be claimed to be purported to be done in pursuance or intended execution of the Act. Our conclusion is that the High Court has rightly held that the suit was not barred by limitation. All the points raised in the appeal fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Anneal dismissed.
-
1964 (5) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... under Art. 19. Such a plea does not appear to have ever been raised and, in our opinion, cannot be validly raised for the simple reason that the further damental rights are not retrospective in their operation. The observations on which Mr. Sastri relies must be read in "he light of the relevant fact to which we have just referred. The deprivation of the petitioner’s property rights was brought about by invalid orders and it was in respect of such invalid orders that the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to seek the protection of Art. 19 and invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention that since in the present case, the scheme has not been completely implemented till 1952, we must examine its validity in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant under Art. 19 of the Constitution. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed,.
-
1964 (5) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... That, however, is not the end of the matter. Immediately after the breach occurred some reports were made and as pointed out by my brethren in their judgments they were not placed before the court despite its order requiring their production. When the matter went up before the High Court it was said that the records had been destroyed in the year 1958 or so and therefore they could not be furnished. This action on the part of the State is manifestly unreasonable and the legiti- mate inference that could be drawn from it is that if the documents had been produced they would have gone against the State and would establish its negligence. In it could legitimately be presumed that the State was negligent inasmuch as it had deliberately suppressed evidence in its possession which could have established negligence. In the circumstances of this case I do not think it appropriate to refer to the rule of evidence res ipsa loquitur. Appeal No. 416 dismissed and Appeal No. 417 allowed
-
1964 (5) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lawful assembly came to be formed, we are satisfied that these young men must have joined the unlawful assembly under pressure and influence of the elders of their respective families. The list of accused persons shows that the unlawful assembly was constituted by members of different families and having regard to the manner in which these factions ordinarily conduct themselves in villages, it would not be unreasonable to hold that these three young men must have been compelled to join the unlawful assembly that morning by their elders, and so, we think that the ends of justice would be met if the sentences of death imposed on them are modified into sentences of life imprisonment. Accordingly, we confirm the orders of conviction and sentence passed against all the appellants except accused Nos. 9, 11 and 16 in whose cases the sentences are altered to those of imprisonment for life. In the result, the appeals are dismissed, subject to the said modification. Appeals dismissed.
-
1964 (5) TMI 44 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e production of the certificate, he runs the risk of losing his claim for deduction if the Department succeeds in showing that the purchasing dealers were not, in law, registered dealers. Question (b) This question also is partly answered by the aforesaid answer to question (a). There is also an erroneous assumption in this question. The declaration which states that the purchasing dealer is a registered dealer may be correct so far as the statement of fact is concerned, but it may not be correct so far as the question of law as to whether the purchasing dealer was validly registered is concerned. Hence the mere production of a declaration though strong presumptive evidence in support of the claim for deduction, will not be conclusive and it will be open to the Department to rebut that presumption. There will be one consolidated cost in respect of all these references. Hearing fee in all these references is fixed at Rs. 100. MISRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1964 (5) TMI 43 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s containers the materials in which bundles of cloth are packed in the usual course of trade. It is a well known courtesy observed by traders that goods purchased are wrapped or packed before they are delivered to the customers and they charge nothing extra for such wrapping or packing-the case of containers made of metal, glass etc., being quite different. The inference of the Sales Tax Authorities that the price of cloth sold included the cost of its packing is not based on any evidence, nor is it warranted by the circumstances of this case. Unless there be a sale of the packing materials, directly or indirectly, to the consignees, tax cannot be attracted. The definition of turnover in the Act makes clear that only the sale price of goods sold would attract sales tax. There having been no sale of the packing materials the assessment concerned has no sanction of law and has to be discharged. We do so, and allow this petition with costs, rupees one hundred. Petition allowed.
-
1964 (5) TMI 42 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ng. All that the Assessing Authority has to do is to fix the purchase price of the ginned cotton or the cotton-seeds that have actually been disposed of according to section 5(2)(vi) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act and I can see no great difficulty in that connection, as the Assessing Authority can certainly call and consider evidence bearing on the matter. It is admitted that the assessment orders in these two cases are not in accordance with the conclusion mentioned above. In one case the Assessing Authority has deducted the sale price of ginned cotton instead of the purchase price, while in both the cases the purchase price of cotton-seeds have been unlawfully ignored and since the error in each case is apparent, these assessments cannot stand. I would, therefore, allow these petitions with costs, quash the assessments made and direct that a fresh assessment in each case be made in accordance with the view expressed above. HARBANS SINGH, J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
-
1964 (5) TMI 41 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e matter were res integra, it may have been arguable that owing to the provisions of section 11, read with the relevant rules, the Assessing Authority can make the assessment for each period for which the return is furnished but the majority judgment of the Supreme Court settles the matter so far as the nature of the tax and its incidence is concerned. If sales tax is a yearly tax, then the assessment has to be made at the end of the year and cannot be made during the pendency of the year as and when a return is filed in the absence of any clear and explicit provisions to that effect. For the reasons given above, the petition is allowed and the order of assessment made by the respondent on 22nd January, 1963, is hereby quashed, it being open to that authority to make a proper order of assessment on the expiry of the assessment year. No other relief need be granted. In the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs. GURDEV SINGH, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
-
1964 (5) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
Whether raw hides and and dressed or tanned hides and skins be treated as one class of goods for purpose of taxation or as two different classes of goods?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 discriminates against imported hides and skins which were sold up to the 1st of August, 1957, upto which date the tax on sale of raw hides and skins was at the rate of 3 pies per rupee or 19/16th per cent. This however does not mean that the sub-section is valid with respect to the sales which took place subsequent to August 1, 1957. The sub- section being void in its provisions with respect to a certain initial period, we cannot change the provision with respect to the period as enacted to the period for which it could be valid as that would be re- writing the enactment. We have therefore to hold sub-section (1) of section 2 void, and accordingly hold so. Thus the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 2 being invalid the other provisions of that section become unenforceable.
-
1964 (5) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Power to pay certain commissions and prohibition of payment of all other commissions, discounts, etc. and Directors, etc. not to hold place of profit
-
1964 (5) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Power to order public examination of promoters directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... t the said order of March 4, 1963, directs is that the report of the official liquidator should be considered in the presence of the respondents and the court should take into consideration any affidavit that the respondents and the liquidator may file. The discharge of the order of public examination made on June 18, 1963, has not in any way fettered the right of the official liquidator to ask for public examination of the respondents when the report is considered by the court in the presence of the respondents and after taking into consideration any submissions that may be made on. their behalf. That being so, I do not at all see any reason why the court should recall or set aside the order made on March 4, 1963, or rehear the application on which the said order was made. For the reasons mentioned above this application is misconceived and is dismissed with costs. The official liquidator will be entitled to retain costs out of the assets in his hands. Certified for counsel.
-
1964 (5) TMI 23 - IN THE QUEEN S BENCH DIVISION
Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases ... ... ... ... ..... t to express a view, albeit of a tentative character since the matter has not been explored before this court, that the receiver and manager appointed in the present case would be an agent of the applicant company within the meaning of section 167(1) of the Act, though not a manager or officer of the company within the meaning of section 333(1). Vide In re (B. ) Johnson and Co. ( Builders) Ltd. 1955 Ch. 634 1953 3 WLR. 269 1955 2 All ER. 775. It was somewhat faintly submitted by Mr. Wheeler that mandamus should not issue because there was an alternative remedy available under section 165(a) (ii ) of the Statute and R. S. C, Ord. 96, rule 7(c). It appears to me that the procedure there provided is an alternative course rather than a remedy which is both alternative and equally convenient for the company. I would allow an order of mandamus to issue. Lord Parker, CJ.. I have had the advantage of reading both judgments I agree with them and there is nothing which I desire to add.
-
1964 (5) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the rate applicable to the total income of the said companies was the rate as finally applied after taking into consideration the effect of the Concession Order?
Whether the word " rebate " occurring in section 16(2) does not include the relief given to the said companies under the Concession Order for the Concession Order is not concerned with granting rebate but is concerned with the determination of the tax payable?
Held that:- We agree with the High Court that though the rate applicable is the rate which is actually applied, rebate, if any, allowed to a company has not to be, as directed by section 16(2), taken into account.
Regarding his first contention, we are unable to limit the meaning of the word " rebate " to rebate granted under the Indian Finance Act. The word " rebate " is not qualified and is wide enough to include any rebate which may be granted by other statutory orders. The form of the certificate referred to us which mentions reduction of rate cannot change the meaning of the word " rebate ". In the result, we agree with the High Court that the answer to the question referred should be in the affirmative. Appeal dismissed.
|
