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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 62 Records
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1974 (5) TMI 122 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conviction run concurrently with the previous sentence in exercise of the inherent power under Section 561-4, of the Code. The fact that there was no allegation of any rapacity or undue violence while committing the dacoity could also not furnish a valid consideration for exercise of the inherent power of the Court. A dacoit may not indulge in beating or terrorising the victims because no resistance is offered during the commission of the crime and not because of any humane or noble trait in his own character. Where offences giving rise to separate trials and convictions are distinct and are not intimately connected, the sentences should be made to take the normal course and it would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion more so in the exercise of the inherent power of the court, to make them run concurrently. The applications of Mulaim Singh and Sukh Ram do not make out any case for making their sentences concurrent. 16. The applications are accordingly dismissed.
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1974 (5) TMI 121 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... debt acknowledged under the contract being a live one in the sense that it had not become barred under the law of limitation. This aspect of the matter has been totally lost sight of by the lower Courts. As already stated, the respondent has categorically stated under Ex. P-1 that he was indebted to the plaintiff in a sum of ₹ 312/- till 31-10-1968 and consequently his undertaking under the terms of Ex. P-1 to discharge this amount at the rate of ₹ 10/- per mensem is an independent contract and is clearly enforceable by the plaintiff. Both the lower Courts were, therefore, clearly in error in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his action only in respect of a portion of the claim. Consequently the orders of both the lower Courts are set aside and the revision petition will stand allowed. The plaintiff will be entitled to sustain his action for the total amount claimed by him in the plaint on the basis of Ex. P-1. There will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (5) TMI 120 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the circumstances of the case and. Section 160 adds, such person must attend as so required From the record of the present case it is apparent that when the orders under Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were issued 'the petitioners were not within the limits of the police Station of the police officer issuing the order, nor of any adjoining station. The address of the petitioner mentioned in the order indicates that they were present at New Delhi. There is no evidence whatever to show that they were in Simla at all. Ex-facie, the order under Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is without jurisdiction. The order did not proceed from a public servant legally competent as such public servant to issue it. Accordingly no offence can be said to have been committed within the purview of Section 174 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. The petition is allowed. The proceedings pending against the petitioners before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Simla, are quashed.
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1974 (5) TMI 119 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ately transferred the case to the relevant Small Cause Court. There is no evidence to show that the defendant was not aware of the coming into force of the Amending Act. Under the circumstances the position is that the defendant voluntarily had a trial on the merits before a, regular court. The procedure before a regular court is more detailed. Further, the defendant has had another innings on the merits before the lower appellate court. Under the circumstances we do not think that this is a fit case where the prayer for conversion of the appeal into a revision should be sustained. We, therefore, decline to convert the appeal into a revision. 7. After the hearing was over, learned counsel for the appellant submitted a note containing references of four authorities. Having perused them we find that they are not relevant or material on the question of the maintainability of the appeal. 8. The appeal is accordingly dismissed as incompetent. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1974 (5) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es while not belying those hopes and expectations took care not to make any commitment. After, however, the respondent succeeded in acquiring the mills, there developed a coolness in his attitude towards the first appellant. This circumstance must necessarily have caused disappointment and disillusionment to the first appellant. The respondent, it seems, kept some kind of cannot dangling before the first appellant during the delicate stage of his negotiations with the Government for the acquisition of the mills lest the first appellant did something to sabotage those efforts. After acquisition of the mills by the respondent, his attitude changed and he gave a cold rebuff to the first appellant. The above conduct of the respondent may have a bearing on the question of the award of costs, but it cannot affect our decision on the point as to whether the suit is within limitation or not. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances without costs. Appeal dismissed.,
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1974 (5) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... erations in granting leave is whether the party seeking leave is aggrieved by the impugned decision, in which case it would, at any rate, have locus to ask for leave. The locus standi of State Governments to file appeals in this Court against judgments or orders rendered in criminal matters, particularly those commenced otherwise than on private complaints, has been recognised over the years and for a valid reason. All crimes raise problems of law and order and some raise issues of public disorder. The effect of crime on the ordered growth of society is deleterious and the State Governments are entrusted with the enforcement and execution of laws directed against prevention and punishment of crimes. They have, therefore, a vital stake in criminal matters which explains why all public prosecutions are initiated in the name of the Government. The objection of Mr. Garg that the State Government has no locus standi to file this appeal must be rejected. P. H. P. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (5) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itions for the renewal of the licence as for the initial grant is unreasonable, as it renders the entire future of the business of the dealer uncertain and subject to the caprice and arbitrary will of the administrative 'autho- rities. Therefore, clauses (a), (b), (e) and (g) of s. 27(6) are constitutionally invalid". In the instant case we have already examined the two criteria laid down under rule 70(4) (i) and have held that they do not place any unreasonable restriction on the right of the applicants to obtain a licence. By rule, 70(4)(i)(b) the Committee has to be satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person (upoyukta) to whom a licence may be granted. This is not the same thing as the suitability simpliciter which this Court had to deal with in the Gold (Control) Act case. The decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In the result all the applications fail and are dismissed. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (5) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nts or mesne profits. And it is further ordered that in the event of the said defendant's failure to make any of, the above deposits, this, decree shall become executable at once." We, are accordingly of the opinion that the decree of the trial court dated November 24, 1958 merged in the decree of the High Court dated January 8, 1969. Since the decree. of the High Court was passed after the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1968, that is to say after August 26, 1967, section 17D of the Act of 1956 can have no, application and therefore the decree of the High Court which is the only decree to be executed cannot be set aside under that section. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated May 31, 1971 and restore that of the Munsif, Second Court, Alipore dated July 15, 1970. The respondent shall pay to the appellants the costs of this appeal and of the Revision before the High Court. S. C. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (5) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hallenge did not arise out of any averments in the writ petitions, and moreover, all directly recruited non-graduate Supervisors and promotee non-graduate Supervisors holding LCE, LME or LEE diplomas, who would be affected by an adverse decision, were not before the High Court. We are of the view that in the absence of necessary averments 'in regard to this challenge in the writ petitions before the High Court as also in Writ Petition No. 385 of 1969 before this Court and particularly the non-graduate Supervisors, who would be affected by an adverse decision, not being before the High Court or this Court to contest such challenge, it was not possible for the High Court and it is equally not possible, for this Court to entertain this challenge and examine its validity on merits. We, therefore, refuse to consider contention D. We accordingly dismiss the writ petitions and appeals. There will, however, be no order as to costs all throughout. Petitions and appeals dismissed.
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1974 (5) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 12 of the Abolition Act is inclusive of the Abkari rights. As the abolition of inams is a legislation intended to give effect to agrarian reforms by making the land available to persons who have no lands, compensation provided for under s. 12 cannot be challenged. The scheme of compensation under the Abolition Act is that four and a half times the family holding is to be retained by the inamdar and in respect of the rest of it a patta is given to the tenants which even with respect to them, along with any lands they own and cultivate personally, be equal to four and a half times the family holding. If after providing for these two items there remains any balance left the Government is required to pay compensation whether to the inamdar or to the tenants who have excess of land in their possession. In any view of the matter we think that the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh cannot be assailed. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. S.B.W. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (5) TMI 112 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution within a reasonable time. The present petition which was instituted on 5th April, 1973, was much beyond the usually prescribed period of ninety days. In the Writ Petition there is no explanation why this order was not challenged within the usually prescribed period of time. The Petitioner company seems to have acquiesced in that order, Hence it is not entitled to any relief in respect of this order. 22. In the result the Writ Petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The orders passed by the Supdt., Central Excise, on 16th July, 1970, and 4th December, 1971, are quashed and so are the appellate orders dated 22nd March, 1973, and 24th May, 1973. We need not set aside the order dated 27th October, 1972, passed by the Superintendent Central Excise, because that is the subject matter of an appeal which is still pending. The petitioner would be entitled to refund of excise duty, paid in virtue of the aforesaid orders.
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1974 (5) TMI 111 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d under rule 16-A of the Rules. This would be in accord with the requirements of natural justice. The learned standing counsel had requested us to indicate in clear terms that the Assistant Sales Tax Officer would be free to reject the applications as not maintainable under rule 16-A of the Rules. We do not find it necessary to say so, as on the earlier occasion the applications had not been rejected as not maintainable. We are also of the view that in the absence of any clear exclusion, it is open to an assessee to bring the fact to the notice of the Sales Tax Officer or the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, as the case may be, within the ambit of rule 16-A of the Rules for appropriate action being taken. 4.. Each of these applications is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is quashed and a direction be issued to the Assistant Sales Tax Officer for redisposal of each petitioner s application in the manner indicated above. No costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1974 (5) TMI 110 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the petitioner. A special statutory definition of country liquor has been given in the Mysore Act. There is no such definition in our Act. As already observed by me, beer falls within the definition of liquor . The beer in question was manufactured in India in the Mysore case as well as in our case. The Mysore law says that liquor manufactured and compounded in India and coloured and flavoured would not be country liquor for purposes of items 38 and 39. If that special definition were not there, the assessee before the Mysore High Court would not have succeeded. The petitioner cannot, therefore, successfully base an argument on a provision which does not exist in the statute with which we are concerned. The second submission of Mr. Narula also, therefore, cannot succeed. No other argument having been advanced in this case, this petition must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The costs of this petition shall be borne by the parties as incurred by them. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (5) TMI 109 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r did not occasion the export. This paragraph sums up the view of the Tribunal at the stage of reference. It has no reference to the facts found in the appellate order of the Presiding Officer of the Sales Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal has not to find facts at the stage of reference. The facts have to be stated as found by the Tribunal in its final order, appellate or revisional, which is the subject-matter of reference to the High Court on the ground that certain questions of law arising out of that order require determination by the High Court. We are, therefore, constrained to remit the case back to the Presiding Officer of the Sales Tax Tribunal, Punjab, for drawing up a complete and proper statement of the case for the adjudication of the questions of law referred to this court. While drawing up the fresh statement of the case, the Tribunal will be well-advised to keep the above observations in view. The costs will abide the events. B.S. DHILLON, J.-I agree. Case remitted.
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1974 (5) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly, sale can be made either by cash or deferred payment as provided in section 2(g) of the Act. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the impugned order of the Commercial Tax Officer dated 30th September, 1971, and the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 28th October, 1972, for the period of four quarters ending 31st December, 1967, and order dated 16th November, 1972, passed by the Commercial Tax Officer for the period of four quarters ending 31st December, 1968, must be quashed. As no order has yet been passed with respect to four quarters ending 31st December, 1969, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in the present writ petition. In the result, this rule is made absolute. The impugned orders are set aside. There will be no order as to costs. The petitioner would be at liberty to withdraw the security which has been furnished with the Registrar, Appellate Side, in pursuance of the order of this court. Petition allowed.
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1974 (5) TMI 107 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ks should disclose the said amount separately. Even granting for purposes of argument that the writing in the bills of the seller showed that the amount included sales tax payable by the dealer also, the fact that there was no evidence showing that the said amounts collected as being tax had been shown separately in the account books of the seller, would still bring the turnover in question within the protection of section 10(1) of the amending Act, 1969. In this case there is no evidence to show that the dealer had shown the amounts which he had collected by way of tax separately in his account books. Hence, in view of the observation made in Spencer and Co. Ltd. case 1970 26 S.T.C. 283. , these petitions should be allowed. The orders passed by the assessing authority demanding payment of Central sales tax in respect of the turnover of inter-State sales in cotton for the years ending Deepavali 1965, Deepavali 1966 and Deepavali 1967 are quashed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1974 (5) TMI 106 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ngs had come into existence terminated by an assessment order which had become final. In the result, we are of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case the order dated 14th March, 1961, passed by Sri T.S. Bharti, Sales Tax Officer, was not a valid assessment order under section 7 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Since that was not a valid assessment order, Sri R.N. Pradhan, successor to Sri Bharti, had no other option but to complete the assessment proceedings after making a final assessment order under section 7 read with rule 41(5). The order passed by Sri Pradhan could not be said to be invalid on the ground that an assessment order had already been made by his predecessor. In the result, we answer question No. (1) in the negative and in favour of the department. Question No. (2) is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the department. The department would be entitled to receive costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (5) TMI 105 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rather difficult to hold that the word drink used in the S.R.O. would also include liquor. Firstly, because all restaurants cannot supply liquor unless they hold a licence. Then, secondly, the word drink , which has been used, is co-related with the word tea in the notification. It would naturally mean that such of the drinks which are beverages in the nature of tea, etc., may it be hot or cold, but certainly considering the entire notification, it cannot mean that the Government meant that the word drink used there would also include liquor. It is also a well-known fact that drink and such other beverages may be an accompaniment of a meal, but liquor is not a necessary accompaniment especially for the general mass of people. Having regard to all these facts, I am of the opinion that the petitioner s establishment did not come within the exemption of S.R.O. 28 and, therefore, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (5) TMI 104 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lance to mean maida , i.e., wheat flour only, specific provision has been made in item No. 52 with regard to barley products which contain types of powdered barley and describe them as flour , suji, atta and dalia of barley, to avoid any confusion with the popular meaning of the word flour used in item No. 2. I must, therefore, hold that on a true and proper construction of item No. 2 of Schedule 1 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as it stood prior to its amendment by West Bengal Act 14 of 1963 the word flour occurring in the said item did not include barley powder and barley powder was not exempt from sales tax. Barley powder which is not covered by item No. 2 must, therefore, be considered to be a kind of cereal included in item No. 1 and must, therefore, be held to be taxable. I answer the question referred accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not propose to make any order as to costs. HAZRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (5) TMI 103 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... desh the tax will be leviable on the commission agent and such a provision in the notification would be perfectly legal because under the explanation to section 2(c) a commission agent who carries on the business of buying or selling goods or through whom the goods are sold or purchased on behalf of his principal is deemed to be a dealer for the purposes of the Act. Thus it is obvious that the State Government had ample power to levy tax upon persons like the petitioner under section 3-A of the Act itself. The fact that the State Government, instead of making a suitable provision in the notification issued under section 3-A, has chosen to frame a rule to achieve the same object, does not affect its jurisdiction to levy tax in cases like the petitioner. For all these reasons we are unable to quash the assessment orders and to grant to the petitioner the refund of the tax which has rightly been levied upon it. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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