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Showing 1 to 20 of 287 Records
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1988 (8) TMI 441 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f dispossession pending disposal of the appeal. It should be remembered in this connection that merely because an appeal has been filed, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants, the finality of the decree is not lost. At any rate the liability to pay mesne profits which is in the nature of a money decree can be executed without any impediment whatsoever, this position is admitted by both sides before us. Under these circumstances we are unable to see how the mere pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court will destroy the finality of the decree. The finding of the learned judge is that, should the respondent herein succeed in the appeal before the Supreme Court ultimately, it will bring down his image in the eyes of the public. We find this is not the relevant consideration borne out by the statutory provisions. Hence with respect, we are unable to agree with this finding. Accordingly we allow the appeal. The appellants will be entitled to their costs.
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1988 (8) TMI 440 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nnecting evidence the documents produced by the respondent, to prove the age of the aforesaid two candidates have no evidentiary value. The High Court committed serious error in accepting the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents. In our view the High Court's entire approach in considering the question of dates of birth was wholly misconceived. The burden to prove the fact in issue, namely, the dates of birth of Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was on the respondent who was the election petitioner. The respondent could not succeed if no evidence was produced by the appellant on the question of age of the aforesaid candidates and his election could not be set aside merely on the ground that the respondent had made out a prima facie case that the entry contained in the electoral roll regarding the age of two candidates was incorrect. It appears that in his list of witnesses the appellant had included the name of Suraj Prakash Joshi and his father Maghdutt
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1988 (8) TMI 439 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alone can be included in the qualifying service for pension cannot be accepted. The period prior to 22.10.1980 also should be counted for purposes of pension.7. We, therefore, direct the Union Government to treat the period during which the workers had served in the canteens established under Section 46 of the Act in the Defence establishments at Kanpur with which we are concerned in these cases prior to 22.10.1980 also as part of the qualifying service for purposes of pension. We further direct that the pension payable to those employees who have retired from service on or after 22.10.1980 shall be recomputed by taking the period of service during which they had worked prior to 22.10.1980 in such canteens into consideration. Such computation shall be made within six months from today. The arrears of pension payable to those who have retired from service shall be disbursed to them within three months after such computation. 8. The petitions are accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1988 (8) TMI 438 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... charge-sheet is not complete, the applicant was not entitled to the said benefit looking to the fact that he was alleged to have been found in possession of about 10 Kgs. of opium. Whether a person is entitled to be released on bail in view of the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C. does not depend upon the question whether there is a prima facie case against the accused and whether the offence is a serious nature. One has only to look to the question whether report under Section 173(2) is submitted to the Court within the prescribed period or not. If it is not submitted within the prescribed period, then the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C. come into play and we cannot look to the merits of the case for refusing bail to such an accused Such accused is entitled to the benefit of Section 167(2) as of right as soon as it is established that report under Section 173(2) of the Code is not submitted to the Court of the Magistrate within the prescribed period.
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1988 (8) TMI 437 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o direct that the applicant be deleted from the array of parties in this proceeding. The proceedings shall now be proceeded with a direction to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee to prosecute the petition together with the aid and assistance of such persons or agencies as the Court may permit or direct from time to time. 18. The other prayer in the application is for modification of the order dated 5.8.1986 and 13.8.1986 forbidding the applicant from using the information collected by her during her visits to jails and other custodial institutions pursuant to the Court's order in 1986. This permission cannot be granted during the pendency of the proceedings as the information was gathered for purposes of the case and pursuant to the directions of this Court. 19. In the result, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed; but the name of the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee shall be substituted in place of that of the applicant. There will be no order as to costs.
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1988 (8) TMI 436 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y as on a particular day. It confers no title to remain in possession of the disputed property. The order is subject to decision of the civil court. The unsuccessful party therefore must get relief only in the civil court. He may move the civil court with properly constituted suit. He may file a suit for declaration and prove a better right to possession. The civil court has jurisdiction to give a finding different from that which the Magistrate has reached. 9. Counsel for the respondent, however, suggested that having regard to the nature of dispute and the rights of parties relating to the property in question, we should not exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. We do not think that the contention could be accepted in view of the patently erroneous order of the High Court. 10. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Magistrate. The parties may work out their rights as per law.
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1988 (8) TMI 435 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er had not withdrawn the first writ petition with leave to file a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action. 8. It will thus he noticed that in Sarguja Transport, (AIR 1987 SC 881 (supra), the Supreme Court applied the principle of Order 23, Rule (3) of the Code and in other cases noticed above rule of res judicata. i.e. bar of Section 11 of the Code, was applied. Daryao's case (AIR 1981 SC 1457) (supra) was noticed in Sarguja (supra). 9. Principles embodied in Section 11 and in Order 23, Rule 1(3) are different, one bars a suit, the other bars a remedy. This was specifically noticed in Sarguja Transport. The contention of the petitioner that in Sarguja Transport a Division Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court differed with larger Division Bench or Constitution Bench is not correct, 10. Following the law laid down in Sarguja Transport (AIR 1987 SC 88) (supra) it must be held that this writ petition is not maintainable and it is dismissed. B.P. Singh, J. 11. I agree.
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1988 (8) TMI 434 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion under section 91 of the Act was maintainable. However, it was possible for him to show from the application that the petitioner was in any way connected with the society, either as a servant or in any other capacity. The application is absolutely silent in regard to the connection of the petitioner with the society. In view of this it would not be possible to sustain the award, notwithstanding that the appeal was preferred by the petitioner after several years. It is a case of grave injustice and if the award and the impugned order is allowed to sustain merely because the appeal was not filed within time. It would amount to mockery of justice ; it would tantamount to legalising injustice on technical grounds. Having regard to the above facts the petitioner is allowed and the award dated 31-3-1968 as well as the appellate order dated 16-7-1979 in regard to the petitioner is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.
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1988 (8) TMI 433 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... should be published then, possibly, the plaintiff might have legitimately prayed for an injunction restraining the publication of the complete book or from making the said 30 pages public. But this is not the case here. The direction of Maulana Azad was that ultimately the entire book should be published. (39) For the aforesaid view that I am taking, it is not necessary for me to deal with the other contentions which have been raised by the defendants. (40) I accordingly vacate the aforesaid ad interim injunction whereby the defendants had been restrained from breaking the seals of the covers of the complete book India Wins Freedom and from making its contents known to the public. In order to secure the interest of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 shall, however, give security in the sum of rupees one lac to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court. This security shall be furnished prior to defendant No. 1 publishing the complete book. I.As. stand disposed of. No costs.
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1988 (8) TMI 432 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... misstatement of facts resulting in miscarriage of justice or of equity, the award remains unassailable. In this case the arbitrator gave no reason for the award. There is no legal proposition which is the basis of the award, far less any legal proposition which is erroneous. There is no appeal from the verdict of the arbitrator. The Court cannot review, in such circumstances, the award and correct any mistake in the adjudication by the arbitrator-See Champsey Bhara and Company v. Jivray Ballo Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. 50 I.A. 324 and the observations of Bachawat, J. in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd., Indore 1967 1SCR105 of this Court. 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, this award is not assailable. The High Court was, therefore, right in upholding the learned District Judge's dismissal of the challenge to the award. These petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed accordingly, without any order as to costs.
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1988 (8) TMI 431 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sitting at Delhi and that too a clerk of an advocate practising at Delhi giving reply to the allegations and facts and circumstances existing at Karnataka on the basis of records maintained in advocate's office at Delhi. The practice of clerks of advocates filing affidavits without a proper verification should be deprecated. As matters before the apex court are determined on the basis of the statements contained in affidavits it is the duty of the litigants and the lawyers to file affidavits in accordance with the rules to assist the Court in administering justice. 6. Since the affidavit filed in Support of the contempt petition as well as the affidavit in reply to the petition do not comply with Rules, no reliance can be placed on them and both are liable to be rejected. We accordingly reject the same and the contempt petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. But we give a chance to the parties to file proper affidavits within six weeks. List thereafter.
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1988 (8) TMI 430 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urt and the Court will try to solve the problem by enlarging the horizon. But in this case this Court finds that the petition is a premature one at this stage. The legislature will examine in details the accord and the petitioners or any person or persons have liberty to file an appropriate case if the situation so demands. Considering this aspect of the matter this Court finds that at this stage it would be futile to entertain this writ petition and to cause further enquiry as to the background be it political or historical as to the outcome of the Memorandum of Settlement. All these questions as raised by the petitioner may be canvassed at a later stage, if any appropriate case is made out by the petitioner. The writ petition is thus rejected without any order as to costs. It is made clear that by , rejection of this writ petition this court has not decided anything as to the proposed steps likely to be taken by the respondents, if any, subsequent to signing of the accord.
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1988 (8) TMI 429 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t considering the entire evidence on the record including the aforesaid documents. It is true that the High Court while hearing the appeal under s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no jurisdiction to re-appraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the first appellate court, but at the same time its power to interfere with the finding cannot be denied if when the lower appellate court decides an issue of fact a substantial question of law arises. The court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case. We, therefore, do not discover any defect in the judgment of the High Court, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1988 (8) TMI 428 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the court or its officer to the parties concerned; and (c) such notice need not necessarily be in writing. It is upon the date of service of such notice that the period of limitation begins and as at present under Clause (b) of Article 119 of the Act, the limitation expires on the expiry of the thirty days of the service of that notice for an application for setting aside of the award. The importance of the matter, which need be emphasised, is the service of the notice by the Court. It is not the method of the service that is important or relevant. In this case as both the Courts have, in fact, found that the notice was issued and served and, in our opinion, that finding is based on cogent material and relevant evidence, prior to 30th July, 1981, the application made in this case was clearly barred by lapse of time. 11. We find, therefore, no ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1988 (8) TMI 427 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e diploma course of studies in a particular discipline, the moment the seat in a medical college in that discipline is available in a medical college in any particular academic year. The State Government should ensure that the authorities charged with the duty of granting admission to students under r. 10 of the Rules must act with due promptitude, and should not by their lethargy or inaction deprive an otherwise meritorious candidate admission to such a higher course of studies to which he was otherwise entitled. Perhaps, the solution lies in making a suitable provision in the Rules providing for a reasonable period, say fifteen days, within which the authorities ought to exercise their powers under r. 10 of the Rules, failing which the seat available would be deemed to have been filled by the candidate placed first in the waiting list strictly according to merit. In the result, the appeals must fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1988 (8) TMI 426 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... here would be empty reasons. In our opinion,bearing in mind the well-settled principle that the rights of the parties crystallise on the date of the institution of the suit as enunciated by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, (supra), the meaningful construction must be that the exemption would apply for a period of 10 years and will continue to be available until suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of 10 years. Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be in accordance with law. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in the view it took. The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the order of the learned Sub-Judge is restored. The suit will now proceed in accordance with law in the light of the observations herein as expeditiously as possible. The costs of the appeal will be the costs of the suit. N.V.K. Appeal allowed.
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1988 (8) TMI 425 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... view to deny compensation to the lessee and thus get over the hurdle of the assessee putting in a claim for acquiring the property by purchase. lt is clear that the lease deed between the parties is a simple lease deed containing the usual clauses and covenants that one expects in it and nothing more. lf indeed, the parties had been conscious of the possibility of the lessee claiming any rights under the Act, the lessors would have tried to safeguard themselves by making it clear that what was being let out was only a building and appurtenant land. We, therefore, do not think that there is much force in this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. As the view we have taken is entirely based on a construction of the lease deed before us, we do not consider it necessary to refer to the various decisions discussed by the High Court in its judgment. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondents will be entitled to their costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1988 (8) TMI 424 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 0 of the Act should not be brought into force immediately it is a different matter. But it cannot be allowed to leave the matter to lie over without applying its mind to the said question. Even though the power under section 30 of the Act is discretionary, the Central Government should be called upon in this case to consider the question whether it should exercise the discretion one way or the other having regard to the fact that more than a quarter of century has elapsed from the date on which the Act received the assent of the President of India. The learned Attorney General of India did not seriously dispute the jurisdiction of this Court to issue the writ in the manner indicated above. o p /o p We, therefore, issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Central Government to consider within a period of six months whether section 30 of the Act should be brought into force or not. The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of. o p /o p N.P.V. Petition disposed of. o p /o p
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1988 (8) TMI 423 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . All values and all ideals in life; all norms and obligations are thrown to the winds. It s a betrayal of the worst order. It is the most foul and senseless assassination. The preparations for and the execution of this egregious crime do deserve the dread sentence of the law. Having regard to the views which I have expressed, I too would dismiss the appeals of Kehar Singh and Satwant Singh, but allow the appeal of Balbir Singh by setting aside his conviction and sentence, and acquitting him of all the charges. Before parting with the case, I would like to express my gratitude to counsel amicus curiae for their willingness to assist, on behalf of the accused. With their profound learning and experience, they have argued the case remarkably well. I must also place it on record my appreciation about the deep learning and assiduity with which Mr. G. Ramaswami, Additional Solicitor General assisted on behalf of the State. He was extremely fair to the Court as well as to accused.
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1988 (8) TMI 422 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the Constitution does not arise. The contention of the petitioner that rule 498-A and the impugned notification dated July 8, 1986 issued by the Commissioner of Police in exercise of his powers under section 21(1) of the Hyderabad City Police Act, infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 19(l)(d) and Article 21 of the Constitution, is devoid of merit and is rejected. As to the contention of the petitioner that the wearing of the helmet causes some ailments, we do not think that there is any merit in the contention, particularly in view of the medical opinions of some Neuro-Surgeons of repute, as referred to by the High Court in its judgment. The contention has not also been seriously pressed before us. The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in rejecting the contention. For the reasons aforesaid, the special leave petition is dismissed. As no notice has been served on the respondent, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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