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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 208 Records
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1962 (11) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... accused persons is a police officer above the rank of a constable, shall not be cognizable except by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate not lower than a second class Magistrate. 19. If the legislature had intended to limit the application of s. 161(1) offences under the Police Act only, it would have instead of using the words in any case of alleged offences used words like in any case of offences against this Act. It appears clear that the legislature deliberately gave the protection of s. 161(1) to offences against any law and there is no justification for our limiting that protection to offences under the Police Act only. It must accordingly be held that the prosecution against the appellant should have been dismissed in accordance with the provision of s. 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act. 20. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and order that the case against him be dismissed. 21. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d appeal did not amount to a finding that the judgment thereof was accepted to be correct. We are however unable, with the greatest respect, to agree with the aforesaid observation, for it seems to us that as soon as the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 of 1950 particularly the former were dismissed by this Court whatever the reason for the dismissal was the judgment of the trial Court on the common issues became final so far as those suits were concerned, and having become final, they cannot be subsequently registered in an appeal between the same parties, particularly when the other essential conditions of Section 11 are also present. 23. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is that F. A. S. Nos. 365 and 366 of 1951 are barred under Section 11, Civil P. C., to the extent of the decision of the five issues, which were common in the four connected suits. The appeal will now be returned to the learned single Judge with our opinion.
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1962 (11) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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... ... ..... Respondent No. 5. The orders of appointment were made on the 22nd of April 1961 and the petitioners have presented their petitions as late as the 7th of July 1962. Thus, there is a delay of more than 1 year-2 months. The only reason for the delay that has been given is that the petitioners were making certain representations. But this is no reason for them not to have come to this Court at a much earlier stage. We are of the opinion that the Writ petitions deserve to be dismissed on this ground as well. The third objection is that the petitioners had made certain scandalous reflections in their Writ petitions against the then Chief Justice and the petitions deserve to he dismissed on that ground alone. nOW that they have withdrawn, the scandalous allegations, we only express our strong disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners in making such reflections. 17. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the Writ Petitions are dismissed with one set of costs to the respondents.
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1962 (11) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... ct Court will be futile and its effect will be merely to promote technicality without in any manner advancing the cause of justice. I do not therefore see any reason to interfere with the order of the District Court. (42) In the result, Revision Application No. 347 of 1962 fails and will be dismissed. Each party will bear and pay his own costs of the revision application. So far as Revision Application No. 349 of 1962 is concerned, there will be no order on the revision application since the order of the District Court appointing Shri Navnitlal Ranchhoddas as a member of the Committee does not call for interference in revision but inasmuch as the Charity Commissioner has succeeded in the main contention arising in this revision application, he must get the costs of the revision application. Such costs shall be paid to him out of the trust funds. Opponents Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 to 9 will bear their own respective costs of the Revision Application. (43) Revision petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tool in the hands of a superior officer who might have been approached by Chauhan. There is nothing on the record to disclose that Chauhan approached any superior officer in the Police Department and that the appellant had manipulated the records on the dictation of such an officer. This is a pure surmise based upon an observation made by the learned Judge of the High Court in the judgment. There is nothing improbable in Chauhan or some other person interested in him directly approaching the appellant and the appellant acting in the manner he did for consideration or otherwise. If a police officer manipulates the record such as police diary etc., it will be the end of honest criminal investigation in our country. Such offences shall receive deterrent punishment. The punishment awarded errs more on the side of leniency than otherwise. 12. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the decision of the High Court is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 81 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he sense of sleeping there. I am of the opinion that the mere presence of furniture and willingness to pay rent does not constitute occupation within the meaning of Section 13(2)(v). This view was also expressed by Harnam Singh, J. in Baij Nath v. Badhawa Singh I.L.R. 1956 P&H 421 1956 P.L.R. 236. The learned Judge held that although occupation includes possession as its primary element it also includes something more and the owner of a vacant house who as long as leaves it vacant is not in occupation. The fact that 'occupation' means occupation in the sense of actual user appears to be clear from the words of Section 13(2)(v), since it specifically exempts houses situated in a hillstation which normally remain unoccupied by owners or tenants from October to April, although their furniture remains there. I thus consider that the decision of the learned Appellate Authority was correct and dismiss the revision petition, but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1962 (11) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tired on invalid pension and his pension had been paid for three months, the matter was re-opened and an order was made removing the Sub-Inspector from service as from the date on which he was invalided. Lord Roche speaking for the Board said "It seems to require no. demonstration that an order purporting to remove the appellant from the service at a time when, as their Lordships hold, he had for some months duly and properly ceased to be in the service, was a mere nullity and cannot be sustained." The position is the same here. The respondent had ceased to be in service on March 31, 1961 by the very order of the State Government. Art. order of retention in service passed more than a month thereafter, was a mere nullity and cannot be sustained. 8. Therefore, the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition was justified, though not for the reasons given by it. We would accordingly dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances there will be no order for costs.
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1962 (11) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... It was not in dispute that the case allotted to the special court related to the same occurrence, charged the same accused with substantially the same offences as were involved in the proceedings in the case before the Magistrate. The appellant therefore gains no advantage by a fresh allotment in July 1957 or the earlier allotments on which reliance was placed. It is precisely such an allotment that is within the prohibition in s. 12 and the protection which that section affords is not to be nullified by considering the fresh allotment as the initiation of a fresh proceeding. This point has therefore no substance and is rejected. 25. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court set aside. 26. We hope that with the decision of this Court, there will be an end to the objections as to forum and the case will be proceeded with expeditiously be the judge of the Special Court we have held has jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. 27. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h the Courts below that the defendants had not executed any fresh promissory note, as pleaded by them, and in the absence of any such fresh promissory note, the original debt would be the amount due and payable on the promissory note. 6. In any event, the learned advocate for the appellants contends, the plaintiff-respondent would not be entitled to claim more than the amount mentioned in the reply notice, viz, ₹ 2,550, and in support of his contention, he cited Bans Gopal v. Mewa Ram A.I.R. 1930 All. 461 where it was held that where a definite sum has been acknowledged, the acknowledgment an be used to save limitation only with respect to the sum acknowledged. I agree. The result would be that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for the sum mentioned in the reply notice, Exhibit A-3, viz., ₹ 2,550 with interest as decreed by the Courts below from 2nd January, 1954. 7. In the result, the decree of the lower Courts is modified as above. No costs. No leave.
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1962 (11) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er's territory merged with the State of Orissa. On the finding that the petitioners, or their ancestors, had ceased to the sovereign State, on the eve of the merger of the State of Gangpur with the State of Orissa, the petitioners' position would be that of intermediaries who held or owned "interest in land between the Raiyat and the state", within the meaning of s. 2(h) of the Act, and the 'Takoli paid by them to the Ruler of Gangpur and later to the State of Orissa was land revenue within Explanation I read with Explanation III to s. 2(g) which defines "estate". There is, thus, no escape from the conclusion that their interest in their lands was liable to be acquired under the Act. No other point was urged before us in support of the appeals, and as the only point urged in this Court has no substance in it, the appeals must be held to be without any merit. They are accordingly dismissed with costs, one set of hearing fees. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 72 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bench decision of this Court (Parsuram Sahu v. Sant Saran Lall, ILR 39 Pat 714, it was held that, if a suit is instituted by a money-lender for an amount exceeding the maximum amount mentioned in the registration certificate, no decree could be passed beyond the maximum amount so mentioned. Hence, according to this decision, if the amount advanced by the plaintiff was a loan, he could not get a decree for more than ₹ 20,000/-as principal. It is however, not necessary to express any opinion on this point, in view of the finding that the amount advanced by the plaintiff was not a loan. 19. In conclusion, it must be held that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any amount in the suit as framed; and the suit shall be dismissed, without prejudice to his right to sue for rendition of accounts. 20. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside and the suit is dismissed with costs through out. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 21. I agree.
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1962 (11) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... assistance or even relevance. The amending Act does not purport to be declaratory but seeks in terms to carry out an amendment, in other words, to effect a change. The mere fact that the change effected conforms to a particular interpretation which the words which previously existed might bear and which found acceptance at the hands of the courts in a few cases, is, in our opinion, a wholly insufficient foundation to base an argument that it is declaratory and further that it must be taken to have declared the law from the commencement of the parent Act so as to invalidate all proceedings validly taken on a proper construction of the law as it then stood. We find therefore that there is no substance in the argument regarding the effect of the amending Act upon which reliance is placed for the purpose of imputing the jurisdiction of the special court and, we have no hesitation in repelling that argument. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y Establishment Code and was, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 311 of the Constitution. It is not disputed that there is no provision in the Rules relating to Posts and Telegraphs Service corresponding to r. 148 of the Railway Establishment Code. In the instant case, therefore, the premature termination of service before the age of superannuation could be justified only by virtue of r. 3. As r. 3 had not been attracted to the appellant's case for reasons given above, it follows at the premature termination of the appellant's service would be tantamount to removal from service by way of penalty. In that view of the matter, the appellant certainly had a grievance which he could ventilate under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and on the findings arrived at by us on the main question he is entitled to the declaration that his service was not legally terminated in accordance with r. 3 of the Security Rules. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... person not being a licensee upon (1) (1865) L. R. I C. P. 69, such terms and conditions as the board may from time to time fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and for purposes for which it is required without showing undue preference to any person. Mr. Vishwanath Sastri contended that a dispute might arise if the Board unreasonably refused to supply electricity to a private consumer or showed undue preference to someone else and such a dispute might be taken to arbitration under s. 76. I do not wish to pronounce any opinion upon this matter because the present dispute is not a dispute of this character. For these reasons I am of opinion that the Additional District judge, Bangalore, was right in granting the declaration sought by the appellants. 11 would, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Additional District judge, Bangalore, with costs on the respondents throughout. One hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ication had passed. Now on the dates when the State Transport Authority and the High Court passed their orders, the period of thirty days so counted had passed. On those dates the respondents could not successfully ask for an amendment of their application under s. 64A. It, therefore, seems to me that if the order of the Regional Transport Authority is to be taken as having been, made, on June 28, 1960, then the respondents' petition under s. 64A was incompetent because it sought anorder for setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's resolution of December 3/4, 1959 and under s. 64A that order could not be effected at All. in. my view, the appellant municipality was clearly entitled to a writ quashing "I order of the; State Transport Authority of January 6, 1961. I would, therefore; allow the appeal with cost. By COURT By majority judgment the appeals are allowed and the matter sent back for disposal in accordance with law. Parties to bear their own Costs.
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1962 (11) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ider that it is implicit in the provision granting an appeal from the order of the revenue officer that even if the rules do not so provide, he should so conduct it that the right of appeal granted by the statute is not nullified. In saying this we should not be understood to mean that he is bound to follow the procedure prescribed for civil courts for the recording of evidence. Only he should maintain some record from which the appellate authority would be able to gather the materials which the officer had before him in arriving at the decision which is the subject of the appeal. The result is that Civil Appeal 105/60 fails and is dismissed, while Civil Appeal 106/60 succeeds and is allowed. As a result of the orders passed in these two a peals the revision under Art. 227 preferred by the appellant to the High Court will stand dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to his costs in this Court (one hearing fee). C.A. No.105 of 1960 dismissed. C.A. No. 106 of 1960 allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al's marriage no consideration passed from the bridegroom to the bride's father, the father must be held to have made a gift of the girl to the bridegroom. To put in other words there was 'Kanyadhan' in Bangaru Ammal's marriage. We therefore reject this contention. Lastly reliance is placed on the conduct of the appellant in not questioning the correctness of the finding given by the learned Subordinate judge in his application for delivery that the marriage was in Asura form. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to explain his conduct but in our opinion nothing turns upon it. If the marriage was not in Asura form as we held it was not, the conduct of the appellant could not possibly make it an Asura marriage. In this view it is not necessary to give opinion on the other questions raised in the appeals. In the result the decrees of the High Court are set aside and both the suits are dismissed with costs throughout. One hearing fee. Appeals allowed
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1962 (11) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted without being used or consumed in the municipal area. In this view of the matter it was not necessary for the Municipality to follow the procedure for imposing taxes when the section was amended. The tax still remained the same. Its nature, incidence or rate were not altered. In our opinion, the company was liable to pay octroi tax on goods brought into local area, (a) to be consumed by itself or sold by it to consumers direct and (b) for sale to dealers who in their turn sold the goods to consumers within the municipal area irrespective of whether such consumers bought them for use in the area or outside it. The company was, however, not liable to octroi in respect of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re-exported. But to enable the company to save itself from tax in that case it had to follow the procedure laid down by rules for refund of taxes. For the reasons above stated this appeal must fail. It will be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ringed. But it cannot be forgotten that in the first instance Government of the State admitted the ’Provincialised’ teachers into a single unit of employment and thereafter by retrospective provision they have sought to provide a differential treatment between the two sections constituting one unit. It is against this differential treatment that the protection of Art. 16 is claimed and in our judgment avails. In our view the High Court was right in holding that the rules in so far as they provide for differential treatment between the members of the’ State Cadre’ and the ’Provincialised Cadre’ in the matter of promotion to the higher scale must be regarded as invalid. The appeal must therefore fail. BY COURT In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court striking down r. 2(d) and (e) and r. 3 in so far as it relates to promotions is set aside. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
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1962 (11) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ome-tax purposes is not of any relevance in the present case, for one reason, the said owner did not say so in his evidence and for the other, it was not indicated in the charge or in the evidence. In the charge framed, she was alleged to have defrauded the insurance company and the only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that Nalini was a minor, the insurance company might not have paid the money. But as we have pointed out earlier, the entire transaction was that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her made minor daughter for reasons best known to herself. On the evidence as disclosed, neither was she benefited nor the insurance company incurred loss in any sense of the term. In the result, we allow the appeal and hold that the appellant was not guilty of the offence under ss. 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentence passed on her are set aside. Fine, if paid, is directed to be refunded to the appellant, Appeal allowed.
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