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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 208 Records
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1962 (11) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f 1952 is struck down as unconstitutional and of no force and effect. We may add, however, that learned counsel for the respondents has stated before us that if a claim is made even now under Chap. II by the petitioner within thirty days of our judgment, even though it' may be time-barred as from the date of the proclamation issued under S. 6, the Forest Settlement Officer will entertain it and consider the claim as required under Chap. II. We therefore allow the petition in part and strike down the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, No. XV of 1952 as unconstitutional. The rest of the prayers in the petition are rejected, subject to the petitioner being free to take such steps as may be open to him in law to establish his right whatever it may be under the registered lease of June 1952 and subject to the State having the right to contest the said claim. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs oft this petition. Petition allowed in part.
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1962 (11) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... slature. We must therefore hold that the Validation Act is not ultra vires the powers of the legislature under entry 54, for the reason that it operates retrospectively." The State Lagislature has power to levy a fee under the Seventh Schedule, List III, Item 28 read with item 47. The Legislature was, therefore, competent to levy a fee for rendering services in connection with the maintenance, supervision and control over the religious institutions and it was competent to levy the fee retrospectively. If the amounts received by the State have been expressly regarded as fee collected by the Commissioner tinder the provisions as amended and account has to be made on that footing between the Government and the Commissioner, challenge to the vires of s. 82 (2) must fail. In our view the High Court was right in declaring ss. 52(1)(f), 55, 76(1) & (2), 80, 81.,and 82 intra vires. The appeals therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d one because with the efflux of 3 or 5 years' period, they will automatically come under the scheme framed under the Act. The operation of s. 17 has already been discussed, and it has already been indicated that an establishment coming under the exemptions granted or to be granted under s. 17 does not mean that the establishment bears less burden of its share of contribution to the fund. It has not been contended before us that the petitioners' establishment does not come within the general rule laid down in s. 1 (3) of the Act or within the scope of the scheme framed under s. 5. It is equally clear that all hotels and restaurants come within' the scope of the notification impugned in this case. Hence, there is absolutely no reason for complaint that the petitioners' establishment of that class has been chosen for hostile discrimination. As all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail, the petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inserted so that after the amendment the rule that a suit by a creditor should be brought in a representative capacity would apply as much to a suit set aside a summary order under O. 21, r. 63, as to other suits. It was not suggested that there was anything in the terms of the amended s. 53 (1) which referred to a defence to a suit and, in fact, learned Counsel did not contend that if a defence under s. 53 (1) could be raised by defeated attaching-creditor such a defence had to be in a representative capacity, and we consider that learned Counsel was correct in this submission. From a provision as to how a plaintiff, if he filed a suit, should frame it, we can see no logical process by which it could be held that a defendant cannot impugn the validity of the sale which is voidable at his instance. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the legal point urged on behalf of the appellant. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed,
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1962 (10) TMI 94 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a doctor for the examination of injuries on his body so as to ascertain whether he, could not have participated in an occurrence. He can also be taken to an identification parade to enable the prosecution witnesses to observe his physical features with" a view to identify them." 24. Until recently the accused person was not competent to be a witness. 25. As the accused is present in Court it would be improper to provide that a summons should be issued to a person present in the Court and also present in the dock o£ the Court as an accused person. If the Legislature had intended that an accused person should be called upon to produce documents from his possession, it would have made a provision similar to Section 91 and would not have provided that summons should be issued to the accused in such a case. 26. For all the above, reasons, the learned Magistrate was right in rejecting the application of the Police Prosecutor. The reference is, there fore, rejected.
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1962 (10) TMI 93 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Section 151 C. P. C. to rectify the situation, as the earlier settlement between the petitioning creditor and the debtor was substantially "an abuse of the process of the court." 10. Consequently, the revision proceeding has to be dismissed. But learned counsel for the revision petitioner (debtor) represents that ample provision has been made already for the satisfaction of the claim of the non-petitioning creditor who has not been substituted under Section 16, and that the alleged act of insolvency was a perfectly bona fide act which might be fully justified when the facts of the context of the transaction are taken into account. I need not express any opinion upon these arguments. They will no doubt be carefully considered on the merits, when further proceedings are taken by the Court below in the insolvency, resulting from the lifting of the interim stay directed by this court. 11. The revision proceeding is accordingly dismissed, but I make no order as to costs.
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1962 (10) TMI 92 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me, both the lower courts appear to have relied on this document for the purpose of holding that ₹ 901/- were paid by the plaintiff to the defendant-appellant. In so far as they have done so, they have gone wrong. They were to give a finding 'on the basis of the evidence on record ignoring the document and treating it as inadmissible on the point whether the plaintiff has proved that ₹ 901/- were paid by him to the defendant-appellant. I am, therefore, constrained to remit the case back to the lower appellate court for giving a finding on this point without taking the document (Ex. P/1) into consideration. 19. As a result of the aforesaid discussion the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur dated the I3th of April 1957 are set aside and the case is remitted back to that court to decide it in accordance with law, keeping in view the afore said observations. Costs in this appeal shall abide the result.
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1962 (10) TMI 88 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case, ILR (1960) Punj 639 to give an extended meaning to the definition of a shop and a commercial establishment in that Act. So far as the Act as it stands at present is concerned, a provision analogous to Section 5 in the Bombay Act has been incorporated in Section 2 (4) of the Act which defines "commercial establishment". Therefore, the reason for giving the extended meaning to the definition of commercial establishment no longer holds good. 23. After giving the entire matter my full and careful consideration I am definitely of the view that the present depot does not fall within the ambit of the Act inasmuch as it is neither a shop nor a commercial establishment. 24. The result, therefore, would be that this petition for revision is allowed and the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala, and that of the Magistrate Ambala are set aside. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded. Dulat, J. 25. I agree and have nothing to add. Gurdev Singh, J. 26. I also agree.
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1962 (10) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... llant in declining to appear before the authorities, at the stage of the enquiry itself, and to state facts within his knowledge. In other words, it is distinctly at a premature stage that the protection has been claimed for the appellant. Of course, it is a heavy and true objection that the testimony thus compelled, in the guise of proceedings under Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act, might be later utilised to prosecute the appellant, and thus effectively divest him of the protection of Article 20(3) by taking two steps, instead of one. The answer to this objection has been clearly demonstrated, if I may say so with respect, by my Lord, the Chief Justice; such compelled testimony cannot be later relied on or used in a criminal prosecution, as, at that stage, the protection of Article 20(3) will be available to the appellant. This fully disposes of the argument or objection upon this ground. 66. I therefore concur that the appeal fails, and has to be dismissed with costs.
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1962 (10) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Schedule II applies we are referred to the case of nfcitation ILR Bom 408 /nfcitation and ILR 23 Cal 723 (FB). These decisions undoubtedly, support the contention. The question of the applicability of Article I of Schedule II was not considered in Appeals Nos. 54 and 94 of 1900 already referred to, and, we are prepared to follow the Calcutta and Bombay decisions. We also think that on principle an ad valorem stamp should not be levied in such cases. The only title which the order appealed against, gives to the petitioner, is the right to administer the estate, and if he has to sue to recover the estate, he will have to pay stamp duty on its value. We do not think that stamp duty on the value of the estate should (SIC) exacted." 33. Agreeing with the view taken in the above cases, we are of opinion that the court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is ₹ 5/- as laid down, in Schedule II, Article 1 (e) (5) of the Act.
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1962 (10) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... entertain the complaint and appeals from orders of conviction recorded by them would lie to the High Court, or the Court of Session, according as the Magistrate, trying the case was a Presidency Magistrate, or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. The difference of the venue results from the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate trying the case, and not from any unequal dealing by the executive constituting the Courts of the Magistrates. It is because powers exercisable by a Presidency Magistrate are conferred upon the Special Magistrate, as they may lawfully be conferred, that the incidental right of appeal which is prescribed by the statute is exercisable in the High Court, and not in the Court of Session. We do not think that there is any discrimination practised by the Notification constituting a Special Magistrate for the trial of the case against the petitioners and others. 9. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed. 10. Petition dismissed.l
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1962 (10) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction to workmen who are thrown out of employment for no fault of their own, to tide over the period of unemployment"; and in that sense, the said compensation is distinguishable from gratuity. Therefore, if the transferor is by statute required to pay retrenchment compensation to his workmen, it would be anomalous to suggest that the workmen who received compensation are entitled to claim immediate re-employment in the concern at the hands of the transferee. The contention that in cases of this kind, the workmen must get retrenchment compensation and re-employment almost simultaneously is inconsistent with the very basis of the concept of retrenchment compensation. We are, therefore, satisfied that the general principles of social justice and fair play on which this alternative argument is based, do not justify the claim made by the respondents. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the award is set aside. There would be no order as to costs. 23. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (10) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n fact or in law that he participated in the strike. If he joined demonstrations organised in connection with the strikes, or if he took part in the preparations for the strike, it cannot be said that he took part in the strike as such, and so, the charge cannot be reasonably construed to mean that his conduct amounted to a contravention of the rule which prohibits strikes. Therefore, though Rule 4-A is partly, and not wholly, invalid as held by this Court in the case of Kameshwar Prasad( 1962 Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369), the particular charge against the respondent being on the basis of that part of the rule which is invalid, it must follow that the departmental proceedings based on that charge are also invalid. That is why appeal No. 379/1962 must be allowed and the departmental proceedings instituted against the respondent for the alleged contravention by him of rules 4-A and 4-B must be quashed. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal 378/62 dismissed. Appeal 379/62 allowed.
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1962 (10) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onsider. any order of its officers under the Act and to make such orders as would subserve the objects and purposes of consolidation proceedings. The change in allotment, as a result of an appeal, may produce a chain of reactions and affect the rights of a number of persons which cannot be satisfactorily adjusted in appeal but under its general powers the Government may make such orders as would prevent the right of all or a large number of landowners from being affected. Without such a power, as we have said above the whole scheme of consolidation may fail because there would be no remedy in a civil court and finality being given to the appellate order would produce an impasse which must necessarily defeat the object of the Act and the process of consolidation. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, this (1) A.I. R. (1959) Punj. 157. petition is without force and is dismissed with costs. BY COURT -In view of the majority opinion the Writ Petition is allowed with costs.
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1962 (10) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s committed theft as soon as Z's dog has begun to follow A. (1). A takes an article belonging to Z out of Z's possession without Z's consent, with the intention of keeping it until he obtains money from Z as a reward for its restoration. Here A takes dishonestly; A has therefore committed theft. It will be seen from the said illustrations that a temporary removal of a dog which might ultimately be returned to the owner or the temporary taking of an article with a view to return it after receiving some reward constitutes theft, indicating thereby that temporary deprivation of another person of his property causes wrongful loss to him. We, therefore, hold that the facts found in this case clearly bring them within the four comers of s. 378 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the courts have rightly held that the appellant had committed the offence of theft. No other Point was pressed before us. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (10) TMI 64 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it petitions are allowed and the proceedings challenged therein are quashed and a writ of mandamus will issue forbearing the respondent therein from taking further ation on the basis of the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, Act 13 of 1961, or the rules framed thereunder. 173. In reply to view of the fact that the writ petitions are allowed because of the Act being declared unconstitutional, I am not expressing any opinion regarding any other contentions that have been taken regarding the applicability or otherwise of the Act to particular cases even on the assumption that the Act is a valid piece of legislation. These questions do not arise for consideration for the present. 174. As the State has not even discharged the duty cast upon it under Section 6(3 by specifying the necessary form for enabling the parties concerned, to claim reller under Section 6(2) of the Act, within the time mentioned in the Act, the Stale will pay the costs of the petitioners in all these writ petitions.
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1962 (10) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , that parties aggrieved by an award made by such an arbitrator should be denied the protection of the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act as well as the protection of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136. There is some force in this connection., It appears that in enacting section 10A the Legislature probably did not realise that the position of an arbitrator contemplated therein would become anomalous in view of the fact that he was not assimilated to the status of an Industrial Tribunal and was taken out of the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act. That, however, is a matter for the Legislature to consider. In the result, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents in the appeals before us must be upheld and the appeals dismissed on the ground that they are incompetent under Article 136. The appellants to pay the costs of the respondents in C A. No. 204 of 1962. No order as to costs in C. A. Nos. 182 and 183 of 1962. Appeal dismissed,
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1962 (10) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
What is the effect of the retrospective operation of s. 31 introduced by the Punjab Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1960 (X of 1960) in the parent Act of Pre- emption (No. 1 of 1913)?
Held that:- We are satisfied that the respondents are entitled to claim that they should be given an opportunity to prove their case that as tenants of the lands in suit they have a right to claim preemption. Incidentally, when the respondents filed the present suits, they had a right to preempt under the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood at that time; by the amendment, that right has been taken away, but instead they claim another right by virtue of their status as tenants of the lands, and this right is, by the retrospective operation of s. 31, available to them. We must accordingly set aside the decrees passed by the High Court and send the matters back to the trial Court with a direction that it should allow the respondents an opportunity to amend their claims by putting forth their right to ask for preemption as tenants under the amended provision of 8.
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1962 (10) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of dismissal was void because the rules relating to the holding of an enquiry against non-gezetted public servants, called the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951. were discriminatory and that in holding the enquiry against him the Tribunal had violated the rules of natural justice?
Held that:- If the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal Prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this Court and the High Court.
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1962 (9) TMI 110 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d, the auction-sale cannot be confirmed. I, therefore, order that the house of the judgment-debtor, Kishan Singh, situated at Gujjarpur Village in Hoshiarpur District be reauctioned after complying with the requirements of Order 21, rule 66. The official liquidator shall make a fresh application giving all the necessary details with respect to location, area, dimension and value of the property and the auction-sale is to be duly advertised and proclaimed. Dharam Singh has deposited Rs. 20,000 in this Court in token of his bona fides as a bidder. This sum shall remain in the Court and will be treated as his first bid at the re-auction. In case the house is auctioned in favour of a person whose bid is higher than that of Dharam Singh, the latter will be entitled to the refund of the amount deposited by him. The official Liquidator shall make an application under Order 21, rule 66, within three weeks. 15. Case to come up on 19th October, 1962. There will be no order as to costs.
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