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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 220 Records
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1991 (12) TMI 262 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the word regulation would encompass the power to fix rates of admission and classification of the seats?
Held that:- The fixation of the prices of cinema tickets is integral to and a necessary adjunct of the larger power to 'regulate' and 'licence' the cinematograph trade. At best, such a power is a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public to carry on such a business. That being so, we are unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the Act and the Rules thereunder cloths the licensing authority with power to fix prices which had been exercised by imposing condition No. 4, then the same would become necessarily unconstitutional.
Thus Section 5, read with Rule 4 and condition 4A of the licence is a regulatory measure to fix the rates of admission and classification of the seating in the interest of the general public. It is within the power of the licensing authority. They do not impinge upon the fundamental right to trade, avocation or business of the licensee under the Act. It is a reasonable restriction imposed in the public interest. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 276 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng this appellant as juvenile under Section 3 of the Act and exercising powers of Juvenile Court Under Section 7(3) of the Act, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC I direct the appellant to be released on probation of good conduct on executing a bond to the satisfaction of the trial court that he will keep peace and be of good behaviour for a period of three years. He is further directed in the circumstances of the case to pay a sum of Rs. 5000/- as One, which shall be paid as compensation of the widow of deceased Chandradip Singh, though this amount is not an adequate compensation to her for the loss she has suffered. 44. As regards the other appellants, the conviction and sentence imposed upon them by the trial court are found to be well made out and so they are affirmed and their appeal is dismissed. The appeal of appellant Rajendra Singh is also dismissed with the modification in sentence as mentioned above. S.K. Singh, J. 45. I agree.
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1991 (11) TMI 274 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the respondents perform their duties in execution of the works, repairs and maintenance thereof in connection with the generation, transmission and distribution of the electrical energy by the Corporation licensee. The Corporation is the Principal employer. The respondents' immediate employers execute the work etc. under the supervision of the Corporation as its agents. Their employees, in law, work under the supervision of the principal employer, corporation. They are covered under Section 2(9)(iii) of the Act entitling to the sickness benefits, etc. envisaged therein and the respondents are liable to make their contribution to the Employees' Insurance Fund. 48. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The writ appeal Nos. 16 & 436/ 86 and matter No. 1650 of 1985 dated April 4, 1988 in the Calcutta High Court stand dismissed confirming the order of the learned single Judge dated December 11, 1986, but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 273 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as 18th December 1991 for trial. The petitioner also received a letter dated 5-10-1991 from his Advocate informing him that as the Advocates were on strike he had not appeared in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and therefore the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had issued a fresh non-bailable warrant against the petitioner and had adjourned the case to 18th December 1991. The petitioner says that he had already booked a ticket for 14th December 1991 and he would leave Bombay on 14th December 1991 by Paschim Express by 11 a.m. and that he would go to Delhi and then he would get the non-bailable warrant cancelled, and he undertakes to remain present in the Tis Hajari Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Smt. Sangita Dhingare on 18th December 1991 to face the trial. 3. The present application is clearly misconceived . No such anticipatory bail can be granted after a Magistrate has issued a warrant. The application is dismissed. 4. Application dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 272 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the offence. 5. In Ess Bee Food Specialities and Ors. v. Kapur Brothers and Ors. 1991 PAP 203, relying on these authorities, this Bench held that to make person liable, it has to be shown that he was incharge or responsible to the company for the conduct of the affairs of the company or liable to the company. 6. In the impugned complaint, as well as in the evidence produced before the summoning, there is no allegations that Smt. Amrit Rani was incharge of the affairs of the firm or liable to the firm for its affairs as such, there was no material before the learned Magistrate to summon her under Section 138-B of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The impugned summoning order is hereby quashed. 7. This order will, however, not stand in the way of the learned Magistrate of the resummon Smt. Amrit Rani under the provisions of Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure If evidence comes on the record about her being incharge of the affairs of the firm or being liable for its business.
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1991 (11) TMI 271 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... into and considering the evidence, as law did not require it, as held in the case of Madula (Supra). But if the Court below had done so, even then the judgment cannot be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the Court below had wrongly thrown the entire burden of proof of nonpayment of rent on the defendant. The submission is not correct. It had considered the case on merits and by examining the evidence, found that plaintiff proved that the defendant was in arrears of rent for more than six months and that it failed to comply with the order passed under Section 13(4) of the Act. In that view of the matter, decree of ejectment had to be passed. 13. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellant is given six months time from today to vacate the shop and hand over the possession of the same to the plaintiff-respondent with the condition that the appellant would regularly pay the rent to the plaintiff-respondent at the agreed rate.
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1991 (11) TMI 270 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ound that his wife has to remain at Chandigarh. No doubt the guidelines require the two spouses to be posted at one place as far as practicable, but that does not enable any spouse to claim such a posting as of right if the departmental authorities do not consider it feasible. The only thing required is that the departmental authorities should consider this aspect along with the exigencies of administration and enable the two spouses to live together at one station if it is possible without any detriment to the administrative needs and the claim of other employees. 6. The High Court was in error in overlooking all the relevant aspects as well as the absence of any legal right in the respondent to claim the relief which the High Court has granted as a matter of course. The High Court's order must, therefore, be set aside. 7. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the respondent's writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n of the executive directions and order of this Court dated February 7, 1991 and is, therefore, not a fit case in which contempt proceedings need to proceed any further. We, accordingly, drop the contempt proceedings and discharge the rule issued against the respondents. 11. Since the Court has found entitlement of the untrained teachers in all the categories to appointment provided they are otherwise qualified and trained teachers are not available, we direct the respondents to properly comply with the orders of this Court dated February 7, 1991 and select and appoint untrained teachers who are otherwise qualified for appointment in all categories without putting the condition of training or age bar against them where trained teachers are not available. The State must conclude the process of fresh selection in the light of the observations made in this order expeditiously and, in any case, not later than three months from today. 12. The petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... benefit of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) was clearly available to the claimant as held in the impugned judgment. In the result, the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14297 of 1990 in Union of India v. Zora Singh must be dismissed with costs. 19. As far as the other appeals filed by the Union of India which have been heard together with the Zora Singh's case are concerned, learned Counsel for the Union of India has not drawn our attention to any material difference in the relevant facts therein from the facts in Zora Singh's case. In facts, the arguments proceeded on the footing that all the relevant facts were the same as in the case of Zora Singh. In a result, all these appeals must also be dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. 20. As far as the appeals before us which have been filed by the claimants are concerned, the same will have to be placed before appropriate Benches of this Court for disposal in the light of this decision.
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1991 (11) TMI 267 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on given to the three candidates in pursuance of the High Court orders. We do not know whether the petitioner's case is true. All the same, we think it appropriate to make the following direction the college authorities shall create three more seats in the said course and admit the first three available students in the waiting list against those seats. The Chandigarh Administration shall pass the necessary orders in this behalf. Action in terms of this direction shall be taken forthwith by the Chandigarh Administration and the college authorities. Before we part with this case we wish to make an observation. In matters of this nature where the High court directs students to be admitted in Educational Institutions. it would be advisable if the High Court stays the operation of its order for a period of about 3 to 4 weeks, if a request therefor is made by the Educational Institution or the State, as the case may be. SLPs disposed of accordingly. R.P. Petitions Disposed of.
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1991 (11) TMI 265 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he States and Union Territories; the question of appropriate pay scales of judicial officers be specifically referred and considered. (v) A working library at the residence of every judicial officer has to be provided by 30.6.1992. Provision for sumptuary allowance as stated has to be made. (vi) Residential accommodation to every judicial officer has to be provided and until State accommodation is available, Government should provide requisitioned accommodation for them in the manner indicated by 31.12.1992. In providing residential accommodation, availability of an office room should be kept in view. (vii) Every District Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate should have a State Vehicle, Judicial officers in sets of 5 should have a pool vehicle and others would be entitled to suitable loans to acquire two-wheeler automobiles within different time limits as specified. (viii) in service Institute should be set up within one year at the Central and State or Union Territory level.
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1991 (11) TMI 263 - KARKATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... till it will not come in the way of making interlocutory order in the Probate suit such as appointment of a receiver or Administrator. The Bombay High Court in the case reported in AIR 1922 Bom 276, has held that even if the order of stay is passed still the Court can pass interlocutory order such as appointment of receiver or attachment before Judgment. 17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and the suit is pending before the Bombay High Court and that the Probate proceedings in this Court is still at the interlocutory stage and in both suits the trial has not yet commenced, and the matter in issue is not directly and substantially the same between the same parties and that the reliefs claimed in the Probate proceedings and the proceedings in the suit are not the same, I am of the firm view, that this is not a fit case to grant stay much less to grant any interim order of stay of this Probate Proceedings. 18. Consequently, the application is rejected.
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1991 (11) TMI 260 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t's inherent powers under the Code and powers otherwise under Article 142 of the Constitution, to further the cause of complete justice, confining it to the facts of this case, and to be fair to the auction purchasers, direct the appellant to burden himself in paying to the auction purchasers, interest on their blocked sum of ₹ 1,05,000, the purchase money, lying in Court since 1963, which we quantify as equivalent to the sum deposited. We thus allow this appeal on the condition that the appellant shall deposit in the executing Court a sum of ₹ 1,05,000, within a period of two months from this date and direct that this sum together with the sum of ₹ 1,05,000, lying in deposit as auction money be paid over by the executing Court to the auction purchasers, singularly or collectively, at the convenience of the auction purchasers. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 259 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e that such provisional admission should not be granted. We dismiss this special leave petition and sustain the order not on merits but for the reason indicated. The interlocutory application in the civil appeal need not be further dealt with in view of what we have said above. We had issued notice to the Principals of the seven medical colleges. They have appeared and have given a written undertaking to the Court by way of affidavit that there was some misunderstanding in regard to the requirement of a selection test for post-graduate admission. There were two year and three-year courses running simultaneously for some period and some confusion was there as to whether the two year course students were covered by the direction of this Court. Though we are of the view that there was hardly any scope for being misled, we are prepared to give the benefit of doubt to the Principals. The contempt proceedings are withdrawn but the undertaking are kept on record. Appeals dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 258 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on debarring renewal of permits, applied for, under old Act could be pointed out. Reliance was placed on absence of preferential provision under Section 81 of the Act which provides for renewal of permits. It was urged that there was a definite departure from the old Act therefore any right under the old Act, could not be continued to under the new Act. The submission does not appear to be sound. The new Act is a legislation on the same subject. Section 81 specifically provides for renewal. It cuts across the argument of intention to the contrary. Rather it is kept alive by Sub-section (4) of Section 217. The scheme of renewal having been continued even under new Act mere absence of preference clause in Section 81 of the new Act could not be construed as destroying the claim for renewal set in motion under the old Act. In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs. T.N.A. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 257 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t of the validity thereof and, therefore, we are only required to construe the meaning of the provision. In our opinion, the contention of the appellants Degree-holders that the rules must be construed to mean that the three years' service in the grade of a Degreeholder for the purpose of Rule 11 is three years from the date of obtaining the Degree is quite tenable and commends to us being in conformity with the past practice followed consistently. It has also been so under-stood by all concerned till the raising of the present controversy recently by the respondents, The tribunal was, therefore, not justified in taking the contrary view and unsettling the settled practice in the Department. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside resulting in dismissal of the respondents' application made in the Tribunal. The Department will now consider the question of promotion in accordance with this decision. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 256 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ied upon a decision in Kurjibhai Dhanjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1985 (1) Scale 964. In our view, the said decision cannot be availed of because the facts therein are entirely different. In that case, the show cause notice and the reply to the said notice sent by the detenu himself, which according to the Court were vital documents, have not been placed before the detaining authority. For the reason stated above, the second contention has to be repelled. 11. The third contention that there is unexplained delay in passing the impugned order has no force in the present case. Even according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the detenu came to India only by the end of October, 1990 that is after passing of the impugned detention order and till then the detenu was in abroad. 12. For all the aforementioned reasons, we see no substance in any of the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel and consequently dismiss this writ petition as devoid of any merit.
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1991 (11) TMI 255 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is true that selection of the petitioner and the stand taken by the Selection Committee before the High Court that he was not eligible at all are, indeed, antithetical and cannot co-exist. But the fact remains that the case of Dr. Kalyana Raman was considered and he was placed second in the panel of names. It is not shown that the selection was arbitrary or whimsical or the Selection Committee did not act fairly towards Dr. Kalyana Raman. The fact that he was placed second in the parcel, itself indicates that there was proper consideration of his case and he has been treated fairly. It should not be lost sight of that the Selection Committee consisted of experts in the subject for selection. They were men of high status and also of unquestionable impartiality. The Court should be slow to interfere with their opinion. 9. In the conclusion, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 254 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rnor of Karnataka on 25th July, 1991 (now the Act) is beyond the legislative competence of the State and is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution. Question No. 2. (i) The Order of the Tribunal dated June 25, 1991 constitutes report and decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956; (ii) the said Order is, therefore, required to be published by the Central Government in the official Gazette under Section 6 of the Act in order to make it effective. Question No. 3. (i) A Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief to the parties to the dispute when a reference for such relief is made by the Central Government; (ii) whether the tribunal has power to grant interim relief when no reference is made by the Central Government for such relief is a question which does not arise in the facts and circumstances under which the Reference is made. Hence we do not deem it necessary to answer the same.
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1991 (11) TMI 253 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hich he did not otherwise possess nor could it take away the rights of the members of the joint Hindu family by accepting the properties in suit to be the personal properties of respondent No. 1. Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that as has been held above, the properties in suit had been earmarked by respondent No. 1 as his personal properties which he was competent to do as a sovereign and the Government by accepting or approving the list of properties submitted by him as his personal properties in pursuance of the covenant did not purport on its own to create any right in favour of respondent No. 1 in such properties. The Government could have disputed the list submitted by respondent No. 1 but it chose not to do so and the assertion of respondent No. 1 that the properties in suit were his personal properties was accepted; 66. In view of the foregoing discussion, both the Civil Appeals fail and are dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.
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