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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 301 Records
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1997 (11) TMI 515 - ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
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... ... ..... clauses 13 and 16 of the sale contract are capable of being read as referring only to the position as between the X Sugar and Food Corporation and the bank, and not as between the X Sugar and Food Corporation and X. In other words, the bond is to be forfeited when it is called upon in the circumstances described, the bank must pay, and the money must go to the X Food and Sugar Corporation. But that does not effect the position which generally applies, as between the X Sugar and Food Corporation and X, so that there must be an accounting. I do not need to resort to the decision of the House of Lords in Charter Reinsurance v. Fagan in order to reach that conclusion. I too would dismiss the appeal on the substantive point. As to the question of the costs in the court below, it seems to me that the order which Morrison J made was well within his discretion, and we cannot interfere with it. ORDER Appeal dismissed with costs; to be taxed and paid forthwith. Leave to appeal refused
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1997 (11) TMI 363 - SC ORDER
Confiscation of conveyance ... ... ... ... ..... pondent preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court but it was dismissed. Therefore, he approached the High Court with a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of confiscation on the ground that the authorities had failed to establish that the owner of the truck had any knowledge that his truck was likely to be used for carrying forest produce in contravention of the provision of the Forest Act. This finding was based upon the evidence on the record. Therefore, we do not consider it proper to interfere with such finding. 3. emsp We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.
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1997 (10) TMI 420 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... extent of operations of the subsidiary banks. In these circumstances, if the State Bank of India has offered increments to persons joining the State Bank of India, the same cannot be given to the officers joining the subsidiary banks. 20. All the grievances center around these benefits. We do not think that the State Bank of India and the subsidiary banks are in a comparable position in this regard. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the State Bank of India that the benefits which are extended to the employees of the subsidiary banks are negotiated settlements with the unions of their employees. The benefits which are conferred are in accordance with the agreements which have been reached between the unions of the employees and the management of each bank. In these circumstances, we fail to see how the principle of equal pay for equal work can be applied in the present set of facts. 21. The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (10) TMI 419 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Court in a matter of contract, will depend on the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors will not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as that was a case founded on a concluded contract between the parties whereas in the present case no contract has been entered into between the petitioner on one hand and the Railway Administration on the other. The petitioner, on the other hand, is seeking a direction calling upon Railway Administration to award contracts in question in his favour after quashing the contracts in favour of Opposite Party. No. 3. As such, the observations made in para 12 of the Report AIR 1989 SC 1239 are unavailing to the petitioner. 9. In the conspectus of what we have discussed above, we converge to the conclusion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Needless to say, the petitioner shall be at liberty to seek his remedy elsewhere.
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1997 (10) TMI 418 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing decisions and opinions, we think it necessary that all future petitions for anticipatory bail made by any one in common or related matters referring to such activities committed within the territorial limits of Guwahati High Court shall be heard only by the same Division Bench. We further direct that no such application for anticipatory bail shall be entertained by any Court other than the Division Bench of the High Court of Guwahati indicated above. 7. Status quo as on today will be maintained by the Appellants vis-a-vis the Respondents herein till 7-11-1997 which is necessary to enable the Division Bench of the High Court of Guwahati to pass appropriate orders on the applications filed by the Respondents. 8. We direct the Registry to take immediate steps to ensure that the applications filed by the Respondents for anticipatory bail in Bombay High Court are despatched to Guwahati High Court so as to reach there on or before 3-11-1997. 9. The appeals are thus disposed of.
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1997 (10) TMI 417 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ns and opinions, we think it necessary that all future petitions for anticipatory bail made by any one in common or related matters referring to such activities committed within the territorial limits of the Guwahati High Court shall be heard only by the same Division Bench. We further direct that no such application for anticipatory bail shall be entertained by any court other than the Division Bench of the High Court of Guwahati indicated above. 12. Status quo as on today will be maintained by the appellants vis-a-vis the respondents herein till 7-11-1997 which is necessary to enable the Division Bench of the High Court of Guwahati to pass appropriate orders on the applications filed by the respondents. 13. We direct the Registry to take immediate steps to ensure that the applications filed by the respondents for anticipatory bail in Bombay High Court are despatched to the Guwahati High Court so as to reach there on or before 3-11-1997. 14. The appeals are thus disposed of.
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1997 (10) TMI 416 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ate order on the application that may be filed before him by the legal heirs of the deceased complainant. In view of the fact that the complaint is lodged in the year 1994, the learned Magistrate should give priority to this case and dispose of the same as early as possible. 19. The learned advocate for the respondent urged before me that operation of this order passed by this court today should be stayed as the respondent intends to approach the higher forum. In my opinion, in view of the nature of the proceedings and the fact that the criminal case filed in the year 1994, has not gone beyond the stage of issuance of process and in view of the clear provision of law, it is not at all necessary to stay the operation of the order passed by this court. I have also to state that the order passed by this court is by exercising revisional jurisdiction and there is no necessity to stay the operation of such order. 1, therefore, reject his prayer to stay the operation of this order.
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1997 (10) TMI 415 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cy. This, in my view, does not amount in law into an offence under section amount in law into an offence under section 409 as the ingredients of section 409 are not attracted. For attracting the provisions of Section 409 one has to allege that the breach of trust is committed by public servant or by banker, merchant or agent, broker or attorney. Reading the accused occupy any of these positions. In absence of these particulars in the complaint, in my view, the complainant has prima facie failed to make out the case against the petitioners, Similarly, it is clear from reading the complaint and other material on record that the complainant has failed to make out any case under section 120B or 409 of IPC." We are in agreement with the view expressed above by the High Court. This one aspect is sufficient to quash the proceeding and we need not deal with the other points on which arguments were advanced before us. In the result, the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (10) TMI 414 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alai cannot be convicted thereunder and it must be held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt and they are accordingly acquitted from the said charge. But the case against accused Devendran must be held to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, he is convicted under Section 326 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. The sentences against accused Devendran are directed to run concurrently. 35. These appeals are disposed of accordingly. 36. Before we part with this case we must keep on record our appreciation for the invaluable services rendered by Shri Muralidhar, learned Counsel who appeared for the appellants as amicus curiae and by his sincere and hard work put forth all possible arguments for a correct interpretation of the provisions of Sections 306 and 307 of the CrPC. The analysis made by him on the question of law as well as the evidence on record became an asset for delivering this judgment.
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1997 (10) TMI 413 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion with regard to rate of interest, in the absence of anything specified in the instrument with regard to rate of interest and in the absence of any specific agreement, the interest has to be calculated only at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from the date at which the amount ought to have been paid by the defendant. Accordingly, I confirm the finding of the trial court with regard to the amount payable by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. However, the interest rate mentioned in all the decrees is modified as 6 per cent. for the said amount from the date when the suit cheques were returned by the banker till the date of realisation. 54. As a result, Appeal Suits Nos. 308 of 1982, 434 of 1982, 637 of 1981, 639 of 1981, 640 of 1981 and Transferred Appeal No. 888 of 1982 are allowed in part, the decree with regard to interest alone is modified as stated above with costs. Appeal Suits Nos. 821 and 822 of 1982 filed for higher rate of interest are dismissed with costs.
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1997 (10) TMI 412 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h subject to some conditions, have not been taken into account by the learned single judge. We have absolutely no doubt that if respondents are equipped with such an order before they are interrogated by the police it would greatly harm the investigation and would impede the prospects of unearthing all the ramifications involved in the conspiracy. Public interest also would suffer as a consequence. Having apprised himself of the nature and seriousness of the criminal conspiracy and the adverse impact of it on "the career of millions of students", learned single judge should not have persuaded himself to exercise the discretion which Parliament had very thoughtfully conferred on the sessions judges and the High Court through Section 438 of the Code, by favouring the respondents with such a pre-arrest bail order. 13. In the result, we allow these appeals and quash the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh granting anticipatory bail to the respondents in this case.
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1997 (10) TMI 411 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... k for long period. In the present case, prima facie, I am satisfied that there is no user of the mark in India, particularly when there is no evidence of the date on which the reputation of the mark travelled into India. This again, is only my prima facie observation in the context of the nature of relief which this Court should grant depending on the facts of the present case. The entire Order is based only on facts of this case. 47. Taking into account all the above facts and circumstances of the case, ends of justice would be subserved if the ad-interim Order of this court is continued. Accordingly, the prayer for injunction sought by the plaintiff is rejected. However, the defendants will maintain an account of profits every year and that shall forward the Account of Profits every year after the end of the Accounting year to the plaintiffs. 48. Accordingly, the Motion is disposed of. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (10) TMI 408 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... expertise acquired by the holders of the aforesaid degrees awarded by the said institution. In any event, when proper medical facilities have not been made available to a large number of poorer sections of the society, the ban imposed to the practitioners like the writ petitioners rendering useful service to the needy and poor people was wholly unjustified. It is not necessary for this Court to consider such submissions because the same remains in the realm of policy decision of other constitutional functionaries. We may also indicate here that what constitutes proper education and requisite expertise for a practitioner in Indian Medicine, must be left to the proper authority having requisite knowledge in the subject. As the decision of the Delhi High Court is justified on the face of legal position flowing from the said Central Act of 1970, we do not think that any interference by this Court is called for. These appeals therefore are dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1997 (10) TMI 407 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gment over the sufficiency of material on the basis of which the detaining authority has recorded its subjective satisfaction. That is not the scope of these writ petitions, in the circumstances, the contention is rejected. 54. In view of the above discussion, our conclusions are that there is no substance in any of the contentions, namely, (i) paucity of time at the disposal of the detaining authority; (ii) unexplained delay on the part of the detaining authority; (iii) absence of any prejudicial act or omission on the part of either of the detenues between 27th November, 1995 and 3rd September, 1996 resulting in the link being snapped or (v) insufficiency of the material for passing the order of detention against Sajid Ahmed the detenu in Writ Petition No, 1212 of 1996. 55. In view of the above, we do hot find any merit in any of the contentions raised before us. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed. Rule in both the petitions stands discharged. 56. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (10) TMI 405 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng powers, that is to say, power . . . (b) to institute, conduct, defend compromise or abandon any legal proceedings by or against the Sangha or its officers, or otherwise concerning the affairs of the Sangha and also to compound and allow time for payment of or satisfaction of any debts due and of any claims or demands by or against the Sangha . . ." 2. A reading of the above article leads to an inference that it is the directors who should jointly authorise to decide to institute or institute a suit. Concedingly, the directors have passed no resolution deciding to institute a suit binding the institution with the result of the suit. The suit having been filed without there being any resolution and as the corporation can only file a suit if there is a resolution for the same, the suit was not filed by an authorised person under Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit as such is not maintainable. 3. Consequently, the letters patent appeal is dismissed.
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1997 (10) TMI 404 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ow LJ 273) (supra) which have gone to the extent of saying that once the detentioin of a person is rendered illegal on account of non- fulfilment of provisions of Article 22(1) of the Constitution, then such an illegality cannot be cured even by a subsequent valid order of remand. Accordingly the case of Hazari Lal and Ashok Kumar Singh as also the cases mentioned therein taking the same view are overruled. 27. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is as follows - Where an accused person is in judicial custody on the basis of a valid remand order passed Under Sections 209 or 309 Code of Criminal Procedure by the magistrate or by any other competent Court then such accused person cannot be set at liberty by issuing a writ of habeas corpus solely on the ground that his initial detention was violative of a constitutional guarantee enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. 28. Let the papers be now placed before the Division Bench with this opinion.
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1997 (10) TMI 400 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t liberty to remove the containers after the goods have been destuffed on payment of outstanding amount of ground rent. The payment should be made by depositing the amount due in the Bombay High Court. The money must be kept in deposit in a nationalised bank so that the amount can earn interest. The High Court will decide the controversy on merits. An important question has been raised by Mr Diwan that there is no liability on the client's part to pay ground rent because the containers are being detained due to non-performance of the statutory duty of the customs authority and also the Port Trust. All these questions must be finally decided by the High Court. Since the Customs have not taken any action in the matter so far, the customs authority will not try to stop the sale of the imported goods by the Port Trust on any ground. Liberty to apply to the Bombay High Court for any further orders which may be needed for working out this order. 5. The appeals are disposed of.
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1997 (10) TMI 399 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... earned their pension on the basis of their holding higher ranks though the pension was being paid by their parent department. This may be on the basis of relevant pension rules as applicable in the State. Now, if the respondents go back to their parent department and work their as Constables or Head Constables their emoluments would be reduced considerably and they would be deprived of getting higher pension when they retire. 22. Considering the whole aspect of the matter we affirm the order of the High Court to the extent that option be given to all those respondents who have put in 20 years qualifying service to seek voluntary retirement from the CID in the ranks they are holding and they will be deemed to have worked in CID upto the date of this judgment. The option shall be given within 30 days. 23. Except as aforesaid the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. Writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (10) TMI 390 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . May be in the event the Delhi Administration decides to upgrade and include the post of Senior Sub-Judge in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service, the legal contentions raised by the appellant would justify such upgradation and beyond that it will not help the appellant to pray the Court to issue a direction to the Administrative to upgrade and include the post of Senior Subordinate Judge in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service. Normally the court will not interfere with the Administrative Policy of the Government. When such policy violates some provisions of the Constitution such as Article 14, the court will step in to set right. On facts we are unable to hold that such a contingency has arisen in this case warranting interference. Though the appellant in person ably presented his case by elaborately arguing the matter, we are not able to persuade ourselves to take a different view from the one taken by the High Court. The appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (10) TMI 389 - SUPREME COURT
Order of acquittal of the charge under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 7 and 8 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order after applying Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act
Held that:- The order of the High Court is obviously correct. No evidence on the record has been pointed out from which it could be inferred that the two respondents had any knowledge of the sale which was manoeuvred by Kamdar and Vallabhadas Thacker, nor is there evidence to show that they took any part in the negotiations for sale, or in the sale itself. Consequently, it is clear that their conviction was not justified.
In the present case, there is no finding either by the Magistrate or by the High Court that the sale in contravention of Clause 5 of the Iron & Steel (Control) Order was made by the Company. In fact, the Company was not charged with the offence at all. The liability of the persons in charge of the Company only arises when the contravention is by the Company itself. Since, in this case, there is no evidence and no finding that the Company contravened Clause 5 of the Iron & Steel (Control) Order, the two respondents could not be held responsible. The actual contravention was by Kamdar and Villabhadas Thacker and any contravention by them would not fasten responsibility on the respondents. The acquittal of the respondents is, therefore, fully justified. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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