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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 301 Records
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1997 (8) TMI 543 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of likelihood of tampering with the prosecution evidence cancan be taken care of by imposing necessary conditions and the breach whereof may expose the petitioner to the consequence/risk of cancellation of bail. (9) In the result, the relief under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code . is granted. The petitioner accused Sushil Ansal, on his furnishing surety for the amount of ₹ 25,000.00 and personal bond in the like sum to the satisfaction of the Metropolitan Magistrate concerned, is ordered to the released on bail in F.I.R. No. 432 of 1997, P.S. Hauz Khas, New Delhi pending the trial on conditions that the accused shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence, in any manner, directly or indirectly, and shall not leave the limits of the National Capital Territory of Delhi without the prior permission of the Trial Court. (10) Petition disposed of as granted. (11) None of the above observations should be construed to mean expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
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1997 (8) TMI 541 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch touch a right in existence at the passing to the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment'. As the aforesaid provision is purely procedural in nature, It cannot. be gainsaid that it could have retrospective effect. Consequently, the connection is well made out and must be accepted. We, therefore, hold that Section 45B can be pressed in service to effect recovery of unpaid contributions when the contributions nave remained unpaid since prior to the coming into force of Section 45B and have throughout also remained unpaid. Consequently, notices issued in the present case against the respondent could not be said to be unauthorised or incompetent. The appeal is accordingly, allowed, The judgment and order of the High Court as well as that of the Employees Insurance Court, Allahabad are set aside. The respondent's application before the Employees Insurance Court is disposed of in aforesaid terms. No costs.
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1997 (8) TMI 540 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y business of the firm before filing a complaint with regard to the dishonour of cheque issued on behalf of the firm particularly when a notice contemplated under section 138(b) of the Act was complied with. The same view was taken by the Delhi High Court in a decision Smt. Renu Vohra v. Shreyans Paper Mills Limited 1993 (2) Crimes 1145 and also by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a decision Anita v. Anilk Mehra 1996 (1) Crimes 412. 14. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing discussion, it emerges that the liability of the petitioners 3 to 5 depends upon whether they are incharge and responsible for the conduct of the day today business of the first petitioner firm and no notice need be issued to each of the partners before filing the complaint for the dishonour of the cheque issued on behalf of the first petitioner firm. The petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought for. 15. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. 16. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (8) TMI 538 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ch runs into 3 pages was in his own handwriting and it also makes a mention about the warning that the statement can be used adversely against him in a Court of Law. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the impugned judgment acquitting the respondent cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and convict the accused of charge of having committed an offence punishable under Section 20(b) (ii) of NDPS Act, the prosecution having successfully proved that the respondent attempted to illegally export 975 grams of hashish out of India in contravention of Section 8(c) of the Act and the accused committed an offence punishable under Section 28 read with Section 23 of the Act. In view of above, the respondent is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten (10) years and shall also be liable to pay fine of rupees one lakh and shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment of one year on failure to pay the fine.
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1997 (8) TMI 537 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e applicable for the purposes of recording the evidence of a dumb witness. I am of the view that a deaf witness may also be examined in the same manner, provisions contained in Section 119 of the Indian Evidence Act may be invoked in the instant case which provide thus -- "A witness who is unable to speak may give his evidence in any other manner in which he can make it intelligible, as by writing or by signs; but such writing must be written and the signs made in open Court. Evidence so given shall be deemed to be oral evidence." 10. In view of the aforesaid observations I do not see any good reason to interfere in the finding arrived at by the learned trial Court. There is no jurisdictional error in the impugned order and if it is allowed to stand, it would not occasion failure of justice. The trial Court under Section 118 of the Evidence Act has rightly considered the matter. 11. In the result the revision fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1997 (8) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a corroborative piece of evidence which the learned Sessions judge excluded from consideration and in our view erroneously. 14. In this view of the matter it must be held that apart from the reliable testimony of the prosecutrix herself there has been sufficient corroborative pieces of evidence on which the High Court has relied upon in setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, In our view on the evidence on record the conclusion is irresistible that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge of attempt to commit rape beyond all reasonable doubts and consequently the conviction and sentence passed by the High Court does not require any interference by this Court. 15. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. The bail bond stands cancelled and the accused is directed to surrender for serving the balance period of sentence failing which appropriate steps be taken for arresting the accused and put him into custody for serving the sentence.
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1997 (8) TMI 535 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this point in favour of granting anticipatory bail to the respondent. 12. The most glaring feature which even the respondent did not repudiate is the magnitude of the criminal conspiracy hatched, the ingenuity with which the cabal was orchestrated and the meticulousness with which it was implemented and the colossal amount of foreign exchange siphoned off from the country. It is not disputed that whomsoever perpetrated this grave economic offence deserves to be dealt with sternly under law. 13. When the learned Single Judge himself felt, after going through the records in this case, that the materials already collected were capable of stretching accusing finger towards the respondent, it was not at all a proper exercise of the discretion by favouring him with an order of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code. 14. For the aforesaid reasons we allow this appeal, upset the impugned order and dismiss the application of the respondent filed under Section 438 of the Code.
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1997 (8) TMI 533 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nal order dated 11-11-1982 and the consequential order of 18-11-1982 passed by the Custodian were justified on merits or not. In the result, these appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent only and the common order passed by the High Court is set aside and all the three writ petitions are restored to the file of the High Court with a request to consider the legality and propriety of the impugned orders dated 11-11-1982 and 18-11-1982 passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property and as approved by the Assistant Custodian General of Evacuee Property. It is made clear that we express no opinion on the merits of these orders. They will have to be examined by the High Court on their own merits. As the remanded proceedings would obviously be old proceedings of 1985 and 1987, the High Court is requested to dispose them of in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 4 months from the receipt of a copy of this order at the end of the High Court.
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1997 (8) TMI 530 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... chose to adopt a particular name or get up is always highly relevant. It is a question which calls for an answer. (29) Learned Single Judge, thus, in the impugned order rightly remarked that it was for the defendant to have shown as to how and in what manner it had shown the said photographs on the label of the product and how the word Cleanzo had been coined, since the word Cleanzo is not available in the dictionary. Prima facie the plaintiff was the prior user of the mark. The defendant started using the same much later. There being no answer to the question, the clarification ought not to have been issued. In these circumstances, the plaintiff's appeal deserves to be allowed and that of the defendant's deserves rejection. (30) Consequently Fao 48/96 is allowed and Fao 98/96 is dismissed with costs. Resultantly the impugned order is modified. The defendant is further restrained from using, in any manner, the trademark Cleanzo in any form whatsoever on its product.
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1997 (8) TMI 528 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Union of India, 1984 (2) All India Cri LR 130, is also not applicable to the facts of this case. In that case representation was made by the detenu to the Central Government which was ultimately rejected by the Central Government at Delhi. It was only in that situation it was held that the Delhi High Court had got jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 25. After going through all the judgments cited by both the parties, I find that by mere arrest of the detenu in Punjab, when the detention order has been passed at Mumbai, the detention order and grounds of detention were also served in the State of Maharashtra and his prejudicial activities also concerned with that State, no cause of action even in part arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, I hold that this petition is not maintainable in this High Court as this High Court has got no jurisdiction to entertain the same. 26. Resultantly, this petition is dismissed on the point of jurisdiction only.
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1997 (8) TMI 527 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... aracter, by an investigation in public." There is a very old and familiar proverb about throwing plenty of mud, which applies very much to these charges made by members of the same family, or members of the same partnership, against one another in public. It must be an injury, as a rule, to the person charged with fraud to have it published, and I must say that I am by no means satisfied that the mere desire of the person charging the fraud is sufficient reason for the Court refusing to send the case to arbitration." The aforesaid observations of the learned Master of Rolls has been followed and applied by our Courts including the Supreme Court. 20. At the conclusion of hearing the learned Counsel filed their respective Notes of Argument and Supplementary Notes of Argument and they have been directed to be kept on records. 21. For the foregoing reasons, this application must fail and the same is accordingly dismissed. 22. There will however be no order as to costs.
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1997 (8) TMI 524 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory owers (v) If he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) If he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great. 29. The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated." In the premises and in the light of the finding of the disciplinary authority, the view taken by the Tribunal to set aside the punishment cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and that of the disciplinary authority is restored, However, there will be no order as to costs. IN THE MATTER OF
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1997 (8) TMI 521 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y or CCSU norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C.Chaturvedi's case that the Court might, - to shorten litigation - think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. (In B.C.Chaturvedi and other cases referred to therein it has however been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different). For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent, namely, State of Maharashtra vs. M.H.Mazumdar cannot be of any help. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the order of the Tribunal which has interfered with the quantum of punishment and which has also substituted its own view of the punishment. The punishment awarded by the departmental authorities is restored. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (8) TMI 519 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... electricity from the Board in any part of the State of U.P. It is further directed that in case such credit is not given within that period or refund is not made available within that period to the appellants falling in these respective two categories then on the expiry of the period of three months such amount shall start earning interest at the rate of 12 p.a. for the benefit of the appellants concerned till actual effecting of credit entries in their respective accounts or till actual payment to the appellants concerned, as the case may be. All appeals (except Civil Appeal Nos. 1713 of 1991 and 3534 of 1991) arc allowed accordingly. The common judgment of the High Court in these appeals is set aside. Writ petitions filed by these appellants will stand allowed in the aforesaid terms. However Civil Appeal Nos. 1713 and 3534 of 1991 will stand dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the cases there will be no order as to costs in each of these appeals. Appeals allowed.
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1997 (8) TMI 518 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ity. 27. Lastly, we come to the third writ petition, which is filed by a subscriber, praying, inter alia, that the respondents be restrained from realising entertainment tax from him. In the scheme of the Cable T. V. Network assessment is made on the Cable T.V. operators and not on the subscriber. The demand is, therefore, raised on the Cable T. V. operators by the authorities and not against the subscriber. The demand having been raised against the Cable T.V. operators, the assessment can be challenged by the operator before the competent authority and if he succeeds, then liability of the subscriber will be wiped out. It is for the Cable T.V. operator, who has provided cable connection to the petitioner (subscriber) to challenge the assessment order and the petitioner has no right to challenge the same, as no order has been made against him by the respondents. This petition, therefore, fails for this reason. 28. In the result, all the writ petitions fail and are dismissed.
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1997 (8) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e may note that on the suggestion of the Court, the appellant’s counsel on instructions agreed to deposit with respondents concerned ₹ 50 lakhs without prejudice to appellant’s rights and contentions in the delinked SLP and also the remanded review proceedings. This good gesture was made with a view to seeing that proper pipelines are laid in the surrounding area of the industrial estate where other admitted polluting industries are operating. This deposits will be considered to be a benevolent act on the part of the appellant, if it ultimately succeeds in these litigations. We note this fair stand of the appellant and direct it to deposit ₹ 50 lakhs as agreed to before us, with respondents concerned for being utilised for the purposes indicated in the main judgment in Special Civil Application No.770 of 1995. In the result these appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (8) TMI 514 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the Sessions Court of the district in which the offence is allegedly committed or which Court has jurisdiction in the matter. The reference is accordingly answered as follows - (1) Special Court of Economic Offences being a Court having jurisdiction throughout the State is alone empowered to take cognizance of the offences which are referable to the special enactments in the Annexure to the notification under which the Special Court has been created and to act for all purposes in Chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure including for granting anticipatory bail; (2) Jurisdiction of the regular Court of Session to the extent of the offences under the Acts which are mentioned in the annexure to the notification creating the Special Court of Economic Offences is excluded. Persons apprehending arrest for the offences under any of such Acts can move the Special Court of Economic Offences for anticipatory bail and not the regular Court of Session. 14. Order accordingly.
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1997 (8) TMI 513 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... id down by this Court in various decisions and there is no infirmity in its judgment. 41. The circumstance, the conduct and behaviour of the appellant conclusively establish his guilt on no amount of innovative steps by him including sporting a beard and later shaving off the beard and the head could conceal the offence or his identity. It was rightly remarked by the famous Urdu poet, Amir Meenai in a couplet - "Qareeb hai yaro jo Roz-i-Mahshar Chhupey ga kuston ka khoon keonkar Jo chup Rehegi Zaban-i-Khanjar Lahoo Pukarega Aastin Ka" 42. Translated into English, it will mean - "On the day of Judgment, you will not be able to conceal the killing of innocents. If the sword will keep silent, the blood stains on your sleeves will reveal your guilt." 43. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in the appeal which is dismissed. The appellant is no bail. His bail bonds are cancelled. He shall be take into custody forthwith to serve out the life sentence.
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1997 (8) TMI 512 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court in the present case. In view of the above legal position we have to record an order of acquittal of the accused. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence passed on them and acquit them and direct them to be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in any others case. Bail bonds executed by accused 4 shall stand discharged. Learned counsel for the State of Gujarat submitted that we may clarify that acquittal of the accused on the above ground would not preclude the State from launching a prosecution afresh with valid sanction. We may observe that if the State Government considers the feasibility of launching any such fresh prosecution it would bear in mind the fact that first accused has remained in jail for all these years pursuant to the prosecution already launched against him and, therefore, whether it would be desirable to launch fresh prosecution. Criminal Appeal No.1909 of 1996 is thus, allowed and criminal Appeal No.162 of 1997 is dismissed.
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1997 (8) TMI 511 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ustody fothwith if he has undergone the sentence passed on him under section 25 (1B)(a) of the Arms Act and is not wanted in any other case. Before parting with this judgment, we wish to observe that the manner in which convictions have been recorded for offences under Section 153A, 124A and 505(2), has exhibited a very casual approach of the trial court. Let alone the absence of any evidence which may attract the provisions of the sections, as already observed, even the charges framed against the appellant for these offences did not contain the essential ingredients of the offences under the three sections. The appellant strictly speaking should not have been put to trial for those offences. Mechanical order convicting a citizen for offences of such serious nature like sedition and to promote enmity and hatred etc. does harm to the cause. It is expected that graver the offence, greater should be the care taken so that the liberty of a citizen is not lightly interfered with.
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