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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 49 Records
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2011 (1) TMI 1513 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which are not binding contracts, if the injunction was not granted. Here too, denial of relief would prejudice the Plaintiff in a similar manner, because the trustee Defendants, who have no discernable interest in the properties can secure orders for its ostensible administration or preservation, and charge the estate with costs that can be crippling on it, and effectively dissipate it. Further, the Plaintiff's interest in the estate will also be jeopardized since the trustee Defendants wish to use the assets of the estate of which he is a beneficiary, to cover their costs of litigation. 33. In view of the above, this Court is of opinion that these issues are to be answered in favour of the Plaintiff, and against the Defendants. Accordingly, the suit has to succeed, in terms of the reliefs claimed, the permanent injunctions sought by the Plaintiff shall therefore, issue against the Defendants. The suit is decreed in such terms, with costs payable by the ninth Defendant.
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2011 (1) TMI 1509 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Maintainability of LPA against a judgment or order passed in exercise of “criminal jurisdiction” - Held that:- Both the sides are ad idem that when the writ petition is filed invoking original jurisdiction of this Court, LPA would be maintainable against the order passed by the Single Judge in such a writ petition. However, the parties have joined issues on the question as to whether writ petition filed for quashing the FIR should be treated as invoking criminal jurisdiction of this Court. Whereas Ajay Fotedar (2005 (7) TMI 688 - DELHI HIGH COURT ) suggests that such writ petition would be treated as invoking the criminal jurisdiction and LPA would not be maintainable, some of the observations made in Harwinder Singh (1994 (3) TMI 391 - DELHI HIGH COURT ) suggests otherwise. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the matter needs to be referred to the Full Bench to resolve this issue.
Accordingly, we make following reference for consideration by the Full Bench:-
“Whether the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing a FIR amount to invoking “original jurisdiction” or these proceedings are to be treated as invoking “criminal jurisdiction?”
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2011 (1) TMI 1506 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... CC costs and fee of the arbitrator had to be deposited in advance, the judgment debtor cannot raise a grievance that merely because the judgment debtor could not afford to make payment thereof, its counter claim ought not to have been left unconsidered. 48. Consequently, I dismiss E.A. No.704/2009 filed by the judgment debtor, and hold that the foreign award in question is enforceable under Chapter I Part II of the Act, and the award is deemed to be decree of this Court. E.A. NO.77/2010 This application has been moved by the decree holder to require the judgment debtor to deposit the awarded amount in this Court pending the hearing of the application preferred by the judgment debtor under section 48 of the Act. No specific orders were passed in this application and the same remained pending. Now that the objections of the judgment debtor under section 48 of the Act (E.A. No.704/2009) have been dismissed, this application has become infructuous. The same is dismissed as such.
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2011 (1) TMI 1488 - SUPREME COURT
Rules of guidance for Offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - General directions have been issued to all the criminal courts, which are called upon to hold trials, particularly in cases involving an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - discretion on the court to exempt an accused from personal appearance before the Magistrate/ the Trial Court, - complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act
HELD THAT:- Section 205 of Code of Criminal Procedure confers a discretion on the court to exempt an accused from personal appearance till such time his appearance is considered by the court to be not necessary during the trial. It is manifest from a plain reading of the provision that while considering an application under Section 205 of the Code, the Magistrate has to bear in mind the nature of the case as also the conduct of the person summoned. He shall examine whether any useful purpose would be served by requiring the personal attendance of the accused or whether the progress of the trial is likely to be hampered on account of his absence - Therefore, the satisfaction whether or not an accused deserves to be exempted from personal attendance has to be of the Magistrate, who is the master of the court in so far as the progress of the trial is concerned and none else.
Order of the Magistrate should be such which does not result in unnecessary harassment to the accused and at the same time does not cause any prejudice to the complainant. The Court must ensure that the exemption from personal appearance granted to an accused is not abused to delay the trial.
In Manoj Narain Agrawal Vs. Shashi Agrawal & Ors. [2009 (4) TMI 1056 - SUPREME COURT], this Court, while observing that the High Court cannot lay down directions for the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate under Section 205 of the Code, had held that similarly, the High Court should not have, for all intent and purport, issued the direction for grant of exemption from personal appearance. Such a matter undoubtedly shall be left for the consideration before the learned Magistrate. We are sure that the Magistrate would exercise his jurisdiction in a fair and judicious manner.
It is equally trite that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code have to be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and in rare cases to correct patent illegalities or to prevent miscarriage of justice - Similarly, while it is true that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. In any event, the power of superintendence cannot be exercised to influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in a particular manner.
Thus, in the instant case, there are no hesitation in holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code and/or Article 227 of the Constitution by laying down the afore-extracted general directions, which are inconsistent with the clear language of Sections 205 and 313 of the Code. In light of the afore-noted guidelines laid down by this Court, further directions on the same issue by the High Court were wholly uncalled for.
The impugned order containing general directions to the lower courts is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1484 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... form the SEBI." From the said paragraph, we find that the High Court has given liberty to SEBI to proceed with the inquiry. At the same time, the High Court has directed Respondent No.1 to give the names of the investors to ROC in terms of the notice dated 21st September, 2010 and 14th October, 2010. We make it clear that SEBI would also be entitled to call for any information which it deems fit, including the names of the investors who have invested in OFCD in the course of the inquiry. Mr. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.1, very fairly states that they agree to give information that SEBI will call upon them to furnish in the inquiry. However, it shall be given without prejudice to the rights and contentions in the pending matter. Before concluding, we make it clear that we express no opinion on the merits of the case. We request the High Court to expeditiously hear and decide the case. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.
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2011 (1) TMI 1479 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing sand filter in river, waste weir back filling, extra masonary, providing heavy gate, additional amount due to raising of prices, additional amount towards establishment charges, interest etc., the trial Court based on the materials placed accepted certain items in toto and rejected certain claims and ultimately granted a decree for a sum of ₹ 2,27,758/- with proportionate costs and interest 6 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till realization. On going through the materials placed, relevant issues framed, ultimate discussion and conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, we fully agree with the same and the plaintiff is entitled to the said amount as granted by the trial Court. 12) In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court in First Appeal No. 2038 of 1983 dated 07.10.2002 is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 30 of 1977 dated 14.12.1982 is restored. The civil appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2011 (1) TMI 1446 - SUPREME COURT
Summoning of certain documents - Election Petition - Rejection of application praying for the summoning of certain documents on the ground that it was not permissible to summon the said documents - same person cast two votes in the election - it is alleged that Smt. Kalpana Kunwar and Smt. Kalpana Singh (wife of Petitioner) were one and the same person, but her name was registered at two places in the electoral rolls of the constituency and hence she had cast two votes in the election - it is also the case that Six (6) tendered votes cast in the election must be counted and the six (6) votes originally polled against the tendered votes must be rejected.
HELD THAT:- In KAILASH VERSUS NANHKU & ORS. [2005 (4) TMI 542 - SUPREME COURT], this Court held that the trial of an election petition is entirely different from the trial of a civil suit, as in a civil suit trial commences on framing the issues while trial of an election petition encompasses all proceedings commencing from the filing of the election petition up to the date of decision. Therefore, the procedure provided for the trial of civil suits under CPC is not applicable in its entirety to the trial of the election petition. For the purpose of the election petition, the word `trial' includes the entire proceedings commencing from the time of filing the election petition till the pronouncement of the judgment. The applicability of the procedure in Election Tribunal is circumscribed by two riders: firstly, the procedure prescribed in CPC is applicable only "as nearly as may be", and secondly, the CPC would give way to any provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder. Therefore, the procedure prescribed in CPC applies to election trial with flexibility and only as guidelines.
The object of framing issues is to ascertain/shorten the area of dispute and pinpoint the points required to be determined by the court. The issues are framed so that no party at the trial is taken by surprise. It is the issues fixed and not the pleadings that guide the parties in the matter of adducing evidence - There may be an exceptional case wherein the parties proceed to trial fully knowing the rival case and lead all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation thereof by the other side. In such an eventuality, absence of an issue would not be fatal and it would not be permissible for a party to submit that there has been a mis-trial and the proceedings stood vitiated.
Thus, it is evident that the party to the election petition must plead the material fact and substantiate its averment by adducing sufficient evidence. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings and the issue cannot be framed unless there are pleadings to raise the controversy on a particular fact or law. It is, therefore, not permissible for the court to allow the party to lead evidence which is not in the line of the pleadings. Even if the evidence is led that is just to be ignored as the same cannot be taken into consideration.
In the case at hand, the election petitioner/respondent has claimed only that there has been irregularity/illegality in counting of 6 tendered votes and the case squarely falls within the ambit of Section 100(1)(d)(iii) of the Act, 1951. Election petitioner has further pleaded that the result of the election stood materially affected because of improper receiving the six tendered votes and in absence of any Recrimination Petition in the case the appellant cannot be permitted to lead evidence on the fact which is not in issue - there are no cogent reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment and order of the High Court impugned herein.
Appeal dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1390 - SUPREME COURT
Grounds for declaring election to be void - Validity of election of the respondent No. 2, who is returned candidate from Legislative Assembly Constituency of Dibrugarh - seeking to order repoll in Polling Station No. 124 Manik Dutta L.P. School (Madhya) of 116 Dibrugarh Legislative Assembly Constituency - whether there had been or not a breach of the Act and the Rules in the conduct of the election at this constituency? - HELD THAT:- It is hardly necessary for this Court to go over the evidence with a view to ascertaining whether there was or was not a breach of the Act and the Rules in the conduct of the election concerned. Having read the evidence on record, this Court is in entire agreement with the decision of the learned Single Judge that by the change of venue of casting votes, breach of the provisions of Sections 25 and 56 of the Act read with Rule 15 of the Rules of 1961 was committed by the officials who were in charge of the conduct of the election at this constituency.
The matter is governed by Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act. The question still remains whether the condition precedent to the avoidance of the election of the returned candidate which requires proof from the election petitioner, i.e., the appellant that the result of the election had been materially affected insofar as the returned candidate, i.e., the respondent No. 2, was concerned, has been established in this case - It is well to remember that this Court has laid down in several reported decisions that the election of a returned candidate should not normally be set aside unless there are cogent and convincing reasons. The success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with. This is all the more so when the election of a successful candidate is sought to be set aside for no fault of his but of someone else. That is why the scheme of Section 100 of the Act, especially clause (d) of sub-Section (1) thereof clearly prescribes that in spite of the availability of grounds contemplated by sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (d), the election of a returned candidate shall not be voided unless and until it is proved that the result of the election insofar as it concerns a returned candidate is materially affected.
The heads of substantive rights in Section 100(1) are laid down in two parts: the first dealing with situations in which the election must be declared void on proof of certain facts and the second in which the election can only be declared void if the result of the election, insofar as it concerns the returned candidate, can be held to be materially affected on proof of some other facts. The appellant has totally failed to prove that the election of the respondent No. 2, who is returned candidate, was materially affected because of non-compliance with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, or Rules or Orders made under it.
This Court is of the firm opinion that the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not commit any error in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant challenging the election of the respondent No. 2. Therefore, the appeal, which lacks merits, deserves to be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1346 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent had claimed that he was denied reasonable opportunity of hearing at the enquiry and the same has caused serious prejudice to his defense?
Whether the Disciplinary Authority has not relied on any recommendations of the CVC and the respondent has failed to plead or prove any prejudice having been caused, the disciplinary proceedings can not be said to be vitiated?
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2011 (1) TMI 1342 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alert circular and it in no way casts a stigma and does not remotely black list the petitioner. It is also submitted by him that on certain occasions a alert circular is issued only for inspection when the goods that reach the port are not in conformity with the declaration certificate. Learned counsel has further submitted that no adverse consequence has visited the petitioner. 4. In view of the aforesaid, we are only inclined to hold that the circular dated 5th August, 2010 contained in Annexure P-1 shall not be treated to be stigmatic as far as the petitioner is concerned. Needless to say, it should not be treated that the petitioner has been black listed by the department. To clarify the said position, the respondents shall put it on its website. 5. With the aforesaid observation and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of without any order as to costs. Copy of this order be given dasti to the learned counsel for the parties under signature of the Court Master.
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2011 (1) TMI 1337 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the Applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 8. By applying the dictum laid down to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that each case has to be decided on the facts of the concerned case. In the instant case, if the delay is not condoned, it would cause great prejudice to the public exchequer. Therefore, we are of the opinion, it would be appropriate to condone the delay on payment of cost of ₹ 13,500/- to the Respondents by the Petitioner. Accordingly, the delay is condoned on condition that the Petitioner shall pay a sum of ₹ 13,500/- to the Respondents 3 to 11 (Rs.1,500/- each) within ten days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which the Delay Petition shall stand dismissed without any further reference to this Court.
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2011 (1) TMI 1331 - SUPREME COURT
Whether any statutory, fundamental or other right of any person is being violated and an activity which is prohibited under law is being carried out i.e. production and manufacture of asbestos and allied products?
Whether the Government is actively permitting such illegal activity? Second, whether in any case this Court can, in law, direct the banning of this activity, if not, what directions can be issued by the Court?
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2011 (1) TMI 1325 - SUPREME COURT
Whether terms and conditions mentioned in the Collectors order are followed by the Applicant land owner or not?
Whether the Applicant has committed any violation?
Whether the land owner has kept water culverts open or not? If the committee finds that the water is stopped which may ultimately cause destroying of mangroves, the committee i.e. Area Officers should make the owner to open the culverts immediately. The committee should make detailed enquiry and the consolidated report should be sent to the District Collector within 15 days?
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2011 (1) TMI 1322 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of the BDA Act, specifically or by implication, require exclusion and/or inclusion of certain provisions like Sections 6 and 11A of the Land Acquisition Act?
Whether the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act will apply to the acquisition under the BDA Act and if the final declaration under Section 19(1) is not issued within one year of the publication of the notification under Section 17(1) of the BDA Act?
Whether it is a case of legislation by reference or legislation by incorporation?
Whether the BDA Act is a complete code in itself?
Whether the BDA Act and Land Acquisition Act can co-exist and operate without conflict?
Whether there being no contravention between the two laws, they can be harmoniously applied and Section 11A of the Land
Whether Acquisition Act can be read into the BDA Act without disturbing its scheme?
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2011 (1) TMI 1321 - SUPREME COURT
Whether mere presence of Dhapubai in the ceremonies performed by her husband Gopalji for adoption of Ghisalal amounted to her consent as contemplated by the proviso to Section 7 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956?
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2011 (1) TMI 1309 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there are mitigating circumstances in the case in favour of the respondents to show that in spite of the fact that they had committed the offence they did not intend to kill the deceased. Thus, they are liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC read with Section 34 IPC?
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2011 (1) TMI 1307 - SUPREME COURT
Denial of partial refund claim - amount represented the acquisition and departmental charges and approximately ₹ 11,00,000/- towards super structure charges.
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2011 (1) TMI 1248 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a benefit given by a statutory notification can be withdrawn by the Government by another statutory notification and whether the principles of promissory estoppel would be applicable in a case where concessions/rebates given by a statutory notification are subsequently withdrawn by another statutory notification? - Held that:- Appeal dismissed.The petitioners cannot raise plea of estoppel against the notification dated August 7, 2000 reducing Hill Development Rebate to 0% as there can be no estoppel against the statute.
Whether the term stipulated in the contract entered into between the petitioners and the U.P. State Electricity Board (now the Corporation) stipulating that the respondent No.2 would give 33.33% rebate to the petitioners, is legally enforceable and whether in view of the said term the respondent No.2 precluded from changing the tariff rates? - Held that:- This Court does not find any prohibition in the agreement by which the respondent No.2 was bound to give 33.33% rebate to the petitioners in all the circumstances or was precluded from changing the tariff rates. The petitioners being parties to the agreement now cannot turn around and argue that the respondent No. 2 is bound to give 33.33% Hill Development Rebate and can never change the tariff rates to the detriment of the petitioners. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, therefore, this Court holds that the respondent No. 2 is not bound to give 33.33% Hill Development Rebate to the petitioners for the period specified in the notification irrespective of change in the tariff rates.
Whether the Court of law would be justified in interfering with the policy decision of the Government either to grant or not to grant rebate to certain industrial units? - Held that:- What is relevant to notice is that if the power to reduce the rebate to 17% is assumed to be available, then power to reduce the rebate to 0%, as is done by the notification dated August 7, 2000, is also available. The petitioners have not challenged previous judgment of the High Court wherein this Court has held that the rebate would not be available/cannot be given after coming into force of the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999. The petitioners have also not challenged the tariff rates made applicable from September 16, 2001 to March 31, 2002 vide order dated September 1, 2000 by the U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, wherein no rebate based on geographical area has been provided. The discussion made above makes it very clear that the petitioners have not been differently treated nor the tariff is sought to be recovered in any illegal or arbitrary manner. Under the circumstances, this Court does not find breach of the salutary provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. As no right guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 14 of the Constitution is found to have been breached, the present petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be entertained and the petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the instant petition. Therefore, the petitioners are precluded from challenging notification dated August 7, 2000 withdrawing the rebate in electricity rates.
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2011 (1) TMI 1246 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
RTI application seeking information relating to the expenditure, movable and immovable properties of the petitioner posted as District Food and Supplies Controller, Yamuna Nagar. - Held that:- The word “Third-Party” has been defined under Section 2(n) of the Act, to mean a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority (and not otherwise). - It is not a matter of dispute that respondent No. 5-Shamsher Singh sought the information from the SPIO and it was the SIC, which directed the SPIO to supply the information, vide impugned speaking orders (Annexures P-4 and P-14). Since, the matter was between respondent No. 5, SPIO and FAA, so, the question of providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, did not arise at all, as he cannot possibly be termed to be a third-party, as defined under Section 2(n) of the Act, in the obtaining circumstances of the case. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted as such, then no information is permissible, which would certainly nullify the aims and objects of the Act. Therefore, the contrary arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. - information under TRI to be provided - Decided against the petitioner.
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2011 (1) TMI 1240 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Demand of information - Petitioner instead of supplying information arbitrarily asked for extra fees - Appellate authority directed petitioner to supply documents free of costs - Held that:- there is a provision under the Act/Rules, vide which, the SIC can direct the petitioner-SPIO to supply the information free of costs to Respondent - SPIO did not comply with the time-limits specified in sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act and did not supply the information, despite specific order/letter (Annexure P3/T) of FAA. In that eventuality, the SIC was within its jurisdiction to direct the petitioner-SPIO to supply the information free of charges, vide impugned order - Decided against Petitioner.
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