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Showing 121 to 140 of 1051 Records
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2013 (1) TMI 944
The Calcutta High Court allowed the withdrawal of applications CA No. 760 of 2012 and CA No. 782 of 2012 under Sections 391(1) and 391(6) of the Companies Act, 1956. The company can file them again later if needed, with no costs imposed.
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2013 (1) TMI 943
Whether in a complaint case, an appeal from an order of acquittal of the Magistrate would lie to the Sessions Court under Section 378(1) (a) of the Code or to the High Court under Section 378(4) of the Code - Held that:- As already noted Clause 37 of the 154th Report of the Law Commission of India and Clause 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 1994 which state that in order to guard against the arbitrary exercise of power and to reduce reckless acquittals Section 378 was sought to be amended to provide appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable and non-bailable offence. Thus, this step is taken by the legislature to check arbitrary and reckless acquittals. It appears that being conscious of rise in unmerited acquittals, in case of certain acquittals, the legislature has enabled the District Magistrate to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Sessions Court, thereby avoiding the tedious and time consuming procedure of approaching the State with a proposal, getting it sanctioned and then filing an appeal.
It is true that the State has an overall control over the law and order and public order of the area under its jurisdiction. Till Section 378 was amended by Act 25 of 2005 the State could prefer appeals against all acquittal orders. But the major amendment made in Section 378 by Act 25 of 2005 cannot be ignored. It has a purpose. It does not throw the concern of security of the community to the winds. In fact, it makes filing of appeals against certain types of acquittal orders described in Section 378(1)(a) easier, less cumbersome and less time consuming. The judgments cited by Mr. Malhotra pertain to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and Section 378 prior to its amendment by Act 25 of 2005 and will, therefore, have no relevance to the present case.
We conclude that a complainant can file an application for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal of any kind only to the High Court. He cannot file such appeal in the Sessions Court. In the instant case the complaint alleging offences punishable under Section 16(1)(1A) read with Section 7 of the PFA Act and the Rules is filed by complainant Shri Jaiswal, Local Health Authority through Delhi Administration. The appellant was acquitted by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. The complainant can challenge the order of acquittal by filing an application for special leave to appeal in the Delhi High Court and not in the Sessions Court. Therefore, the impugned order holding that this case is not governed by Section 378(4) of the Code is quashed and set aside. In the circumstances the appeal is allowed.
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2013 (1) TMI 942
The Delhi High Court issued an order on 21.01.2013 for a second motion petition under Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 regarding the Scheme of Amalgamation of Tirupathi Build Plaza Pvt. Ltd. with Gupta Promoters Pvt. Ltd. Notice was issued to the Official Liquidator and Regional Director for their reports within three weeks, with publication in 'Business Standard' and 'Veer Arjun' prior to the next hearing on 11th April 2013.
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2013 (1) TMI 941
Issues involved: Application u/s 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 for Scheme of Arrangement between Transferee company and Demerged company.
Details of the Judgment:
1. The application was filed by the Transferee company under Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 for a Scheme of Arrangement involving it and the Demerged company.
2. The Transferee company is located in New Delhi, within the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, while the Demerged company is situated in Hyderabad, outside the court's jurisdiction.
3. The application provided details of the Transferee company and Demerged company, including their authorized, issued, subscribed, and paid-up capital.
4. Copies of the Memorandum and Articles of Association, along with the latest audited Annual Balance Sheets for the year ended 31st March, 2012, were enclosed with the application.
5. It was confirmed that no proceedings under Sections 235 to 251 of the Companies Act were pending against the Transferee company.
6. The proposed Scheme had been approved by the Board of Directors of both the Transferee and Demerged companies, with copies of the Board Resolutions submitted with the application.
7. Details of the equity shareholders, preference shareholders, secured and unsecured creditors of the Transferee company were provided, along with consents obtained from them for the proposed scheme.
8. A prayer was made for dispensation of the requirement of convening meetings of equity shareholders, preference shareholders, and secured creditors of the Transferee company, and for directions for convening the meeting of unsecured creditors.
9. Meeting of equity shareholders of the Transferee company was dispensed with as 80% in number and 93.95% in value had given their consent to the Scheme.
10. The requirement of convening meetings of preference shareholders and secured creditors of the Transferee company was dispensed with due to written consents/NOC provided.
11. A meeting of the unsecured creditors of the Transferee company was directed to be held on a specified date and venue, with appointed Chairperson and Alternate Chairperson.
12. The Transferee company was directed to publish advance notices of the meeting in specified newspapers at least 21 days before the scheduled date.
13. Individual notices for the proposed meeting of unsecured creditors were to be sent by ordinary post at least 21 days in advance.
14. Quorum for the meeting of unsecured creditors was fixed, with provisions for adjournment and determination of proper Quorum.
15. Voting by proxies was permitted subject to prescribed form and timely filing with the Transferee company.
16. The Chairperson/Alternate Chairperson were required to file their reports within seven days of the respective meeting.
17. The application was allowed in the terms specified, with an order for dasti.
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2013 (1) TMI 940
Issues involved: Quashing of FIR and ongoing investigation u/s 468 and 471 IPC based on allegations of forgery and fabrication of documents.
Summary:
1. The appeal arose from a judgment quashing FIR No.41/10 dated 25th March, 2010, registered for offences u/s 468 and 471 IPC, based on allegations of forged sale deeds. The High Court allowed the petition to quash the FIR and ongoing investigation.
2. The complainant, General Manager of SNP Ventures Pvt. Ltd., alleged that respondents, legal advisers/Senior Managers of GWL, used forged sale deeds to claim ownership of land. The Sub-Registrar confirmed the sale deeds were unrelated to GWL's claim.
3. The High Court quashed the FIR citing that the allegations did not constitute an offence and the bar u/s 195 Cr.P.C. against taking cognizance without a court complaint. The appellant argued against interference in ongoing investigations.
4. The legal position on quashing criminal proceedings during investigation was discussed, emphasizing the need for a strong factual foundation in the complaint to proceed with the case.
5. The appellant's complaint detailed the alleged forgery and fabrication of documents by GWL representatives to make fraudulent claims over the land, urging for investigation and legal action.
6. The Constitution Bench clarified that the bar u/s 195 Cr.P.C. applies only if the document forgery occurred while in court custody, which was not the case here.
7. The High Court erred in quashing the FIR as the allegations constituted an offence and required investigation. The judgment was set aside, allowing the investigation to proceed without influence from this decision.
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2013 (1) TMI 939
Issues Involved:
1. Scope and ambit of the power of revision u/s 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.
2. Maintainability of a revision application u/s 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 in respect of a procedural order passed under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Comprehensive Summary:
Issue 1: Scope and Ambit of the Power of Revision u/s 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999
The court examined the legislative intent and historical context of the provision, emphasizing that the revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and not as broad as appellate jurisdiction. The revisional power is intended to correct errors that result in a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The court referred to several precedents, including the observations of Chief Justice Beaumont in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj and the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v/s. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhuri, to underline that the phrase "according to law" refers to the overall decision and not merely errors of law or fact. The court concluded that the revisional powers should be exercised to subserve the ends of justice and not for correcting mere procedural errors.
Issue 2: Maintainability of a Revision Application u/s 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999
The court held that a revision application is not maintainable against procedural orders unless such orders affect the substantive rights and liabilities under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act or any other substantive law. The court emphasized that the order must affect the very existence of the suit or the foundation of the party's case and not merely procedural aspects. The judgment provided illustrative lists of revisable and non-revisable orders to clarify the application of this principle.
Revisable Orders:
1. An order refusing leave to amend the plaint or written statement, where the proposed amendment asserts rights or liabilities under substantive law.
2. An order rejecting an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of the CPC.
3. An order allowing or rejecting an application for a declaration that the suit has abated.
4. An order refusing to extend the time for filing a written statement.
5. An order for deleting an issue pertaining to rights or liabilities under substantive law.
Non-Revisable Orders:
1. An order granting leave to amend the plaint or written statement.
2. An order granting extension of time to file a written statement.
3. An order raising additional issues.
4. An order for production of documents or discovery or inspection.
5. An order directing a party to furnish better and further particulars.
6. An order issuing or refusing to issue a commission for examination of witnesses.
7. An order issuing or refusing to issue summons for additional witness or document.
8. An order condoning delay in filing documents after the first date of hearing.
9. An order of costs to one of the parties for its default.
10. An order granting or refusing an adjournment.
11. An order allowing an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of CPC.
Conclusion
The court clarified that the scope of revision u/s 34(4) is limited to orders affecting substantive rights and not merely procedural aspects. The revisional jurisdiction is intended to correct miscarriages of justice due to mistakes of law, ensuring that the overall decision is "according to law." The writ petitions were remanded to the learned Single Judge for further hearing in light of these principles.
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2013 (1) TMI 938
Issues Involved: Appeal against CIT (Appeals) order sustaining addition u/s 41(1) of Income-tax Act, violation of principles of natural justice.
Appeal against CIT (Appeals) Order:
The appellant, a wholly owned subsidiary of Air India Limited, filed an appeal against the order of CIT (Appeals)-IV, New Delhi dated 09.03.2012. The appellant, engaged in air transportation business, declared a loss of &8377; 15,67,17,875 for the assessment year 2008-09. An addition of &8377; 306.75 crores was made u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, which was confirmed by CIT (A). The appellant challenged this addition on grounds including the order being bad in law and facts, and the CIT (A) not appreciating that the liability amount was not written back in the appellant's books.
Violation of Principles of Natural Justice:
The appellant contended that the CIT (A) violated principles of natural justice by relying on unreported judgments without giving the appellant an opportunity to explain its case in light of those judgments. The appellant requested the appeal to be restored to the file of the CIT (A) for a fair consideration based on the unreported judgments from various High Courts and ITAT. Both parties did not object to restoring the issues to the file of the CIT (A).
Judgment and Direction:
After hearing both sides, the ITAT decided to restore the appeal to the file of the CIT (A) with a direction for the CIT (A) to provide the appellant with copies of the unreported judgments from other High Courts and ITAT. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes. The order was pronounced on 10th January 2013 after the conclusion of the hearing.
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2013 (1) TMI 936
Issues involved:
1. Taxability of profit from offshore supply contract under u/s 9 of Income Tax Act, 1961
2. Computation of profit for project executed in India
Taxability of profit from offshore supply contract:
The Tribunal held that income from offshore supply contract cannot be taxed in India as it did not accrue or arise in India. The Tribunal's decision was based on previous cases like Siemens Aktiengesellschaft and M/s.Xelo Pty. Limited, which were upheld by the High Court. The Revenue argued that in this case, no documents were submitted to determine the location of supply. However, the Tribunal found that the supply was made outside India based on contract clauses. Without any contrary evidence from the Revenue, the Tribunal's finding was accepted. Therefore, the question of taxability of offshore profit cannot be entertained.
Computation of profit for project executed in India:
Both the Commissioner of Income Tax (A) and the Tribunal found that the assessee maintained regular books of account, which were submitted for verification. The assessing officer verified the accounts, and there was no justification for rejecting them without explanation. As the finding was not shown to be perverse by the Revenue, the application of Rule 10 of the Income Tax Rules to estimate income was deemed unnecessary. Since this is a factual finding and not challenged by the Revenue, the question regarding the computation of profit for the project in India cannot be entertained.
Judgment:
The appeal by the Revenue for the assessment year 1997-1998 was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2013 (1) TMI 935
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 80IB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 regarding approval of building plan for project Krishna Keval Township.
Summary:
1. The High Court of Bombay heard appeals by the revenue for assessment years 2003-04 & 2004-05, focusing on whether the project Krishna Keval Township fulfills the requirements of Section 80IB(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, specifically regarding the approval of the building plan by the Municipal Corporation.
2. The parties acknowledged that the issue in the appeals aligns with a previous decision in CIT V/s. Vandana Properties, where the Court ruled in favor of the respondent-assessee on a similar matter, providing precedent for the current case.
3. The revenue contended that the approval of the layout plan differs from that of the building plan, emphasizing that for Section 80IB benefits, the sanction of the building plan is crucial. Despite the alignment with the Vandana Properties case, the Court refrained from expressing a definitive opinion on the deduction under Section 80IB based on plan approvals, leaving it open for future cases to determine.
4. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of without costs, based on the precedent set by the Vandana Properties case, without providing a conclusive stance on the deduction under Section 80IB related to plan approvals.
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2013 (1) TMI 934
Issues involved: Appeal against penalty order u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for claiming excess depreciation on hospital equipment.
Summary:
Issue 1: Assessment of excess depreciation claimed
The appellant, a hospital, claimed depreciation at 40% on all equipment, which was found excessive by the Assessing Officer. The penalty was imposed under section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income.
Details:
- The Assessing Officer disallowed &8377; 6,92,74,634 as excess depreciation claimed by the appellant.
- Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that it was a wrong claim of deduction, not concealment of income.
- The Revenue appealed, arguing that the appellant's intentions were not bona fide.
Issue 2: Interpretation of depreciation rates
The dispute arose from the interpretation of depreciation rates for hospital equipment, specifically regarding the classification of "life saving devices" for higher depreciation.
Details:
- The appellant treated all equipment as "life saving devices" for claiming 40% depreciation.
- Assessing Officer bifurcated equipment into "life saving devices" and normal equipment for depreciation calculation.
- Tribunal found no concealment or inaccurate particulars in the appellant's actions.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the deletion of the penalty by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The judgment emphasized that the disallowance of depreciation was a normal part of scrutiny assessment and did not indicate concealment of income.
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2013 (1) TMI 933
Issues involved: Application seeking dispensation from approaching the High Court of Bombay for sanction of the Scheme of Amalgamation under Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956.
Summary:
The Applicant, a Transferee Company, sought dispensation from approaching the High Court of Bombay for sanction of the Scheme of Amalgamation with the Transferor company. The Court had previously allowed directions for dispensing with the meeting of equity shareholders, secured creditors, and unsecured creditors of the Transferor company for approval of the Scheme. The Transferee company held 100% paid-up equity shares of the Transferor company, making it a wholly owned subsidiary. The legal position, as established in various cases including Auto Tools India Pvt. Ltd., Sharat Hardware Industries Pvt. Ltd., Mahaamba Investments Ltd., Andhra Bank Housing Finance Ltd., and others, indicated that there was no requirement for a separate application for sanction of the Scheme by the Transferee Company. Consequently, the application was allowed, and the need for the Transferee Company to approach the Bombay High Court for sanction of the Scheme was dispensed with.
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2013 (1) TMI 932
Dowry Death - Inquest Report under Crpc - Dealth of wife within 1 year of marriage - Father of deceased made a complaint to the Police Control Room alleging, that he suspected that his daughter had been poisoned. This suspicion was based on the fact, that the body had turned blue. On the aforesaid complaint, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi, in exercise of powers vested in him under Section 176 of the Crpc, initiated inquest proceedings. On the basis of Medical reports the reason for death was observerd that death is consequent to cardiac decompensation due to enlarged atrial septal defect & pulmonary hypertension. No definite opinion can be given about falciparm Malaria, histopathological assessment and also gave negative tests for common poisons.
HELD THAT:- The criminal proceedings against the appellants-accused Rajiv are hereby set aside.The order of the High Court is accordingly also set aside. the facts of the case which needed to be kept in mind that the respondent-complainant had continued to represent before the SDM, Delhi, that he would produce the mother of the deceased, who knew the facts best of all. Despite that, the mother of the deceased did not appear in the inquest proceedings to record her statement, even though a number of opportunities were afforded to the respondent-complainant to produce her. The permissible inference is that he was himself not privy to the facts. The fact that the mother of the deceased had not appeared to record a statement against the appellants-accused has to have some reason/justification.
The instant appeal, accordingly succeeds
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2013 (1) TMI 931
Issues Involved:
1. Meaning of the expression "the service" in Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India.
2. Definition of "advocate" or "pleader" under Article 233(2).
3. Eligibility of District Attorney/Additional District Attorney/Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor/Assistant Advocate General for appointment as District Judge under Article 233(2).
Issue 1: Meaning of "the service" in Article 233(2)
The Supreme Court examined the meaning of the expression "the service" in Article 233(2) and concluded that it refers to the judicial service. The Court stated, "The expression 'the service' in Article 233(2) means the judicial service." This interpretation aligns with the Constitution Bench decision in Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., which held that "the service" pertains to judicial service and not any other service of the Union or State.
Issue 2: Definition of "advocate" or "pleader"
The Court clarified that the term "advocate" or "pleader" in Article 233(2) refers to a legal practitioner who has the right to act and/or plead in court on behalf of a client. The Court stated, "The expression 'advocate or pleader' refers to legal practitioner and, thus, it means a person who has a right to act and/or plead in court on behalf of his client." This definition includes Public Prosecutors and Government Pleaders who are on the rolls of the State Bar Council and entitled to practice under the Advocates Act, 1961.
Issue 3: Eligibility of Government Law Officers for Appointment as District Judge
The Court addressed whether full-time government law officers (e.g., District Attorney, Additional District Attorney, Public Prosecutor, Assistant Public Prosecutor, Assistant Advocate General) are eligible for appointment as District Judges under Article 233(2). The Court held that such officers do not cease to be advocates by virtue of their employment and are eligible for appointment if they have been advocates for not less than seven years and are recommended by the High Court. The Court stated, "None of the five private appellants, on their appointment as Assistant District Attorney/Public Prosecutor/Deputy Advocate General, ceased to be 'advocate' and since each one of them continued to be 'advocate', they cannot be considered to be in the service of the Union or the State within the meaning of Article 233(2)."
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that the five private appellants fulfilled the eligibility criteria under Article 233(2) of the Constitution and Rule 11(b) of the Haryana Superior Judicial Service Rules on the date of application. The Court set aside the impugned judgment regarding their ineligibility.
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2013 (1) TMI 930
Issues involved: Delay in filing the Petition, Dishonor of cheque leading to legal action under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Failure to honor settlement agreement, Challenge to court orders.
Delay in filing the Petition: The delay of 8 days in filing the Petition was condoned by the court based on the reasons provided in the application, and the application was allowed.
Dishonor of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: The Petitioner issued a cheque to the Respondent Bank which was dishonored due to insufficient funds. A demand notice under Section 138 of the Act was ignored, leading to a complaint being filed by the Respondent Bank under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act.
Failure to honor settlement agreement: Despite entering into a settlement agreement with the Respondent Bank to pay a certain amount in installments, the Petitioner failed to honor the agreement citing health reasons. The court noted the Petitioner's repeated breaches of the settlement terms and dismissed the application for modification of the settlement agreement.
Challenge to court orders: The Petitioner challenged the court orders regarding the settlement agreement before the learned ASJ, but the challenge was unsuccessful. The court emphasized that once a settlement is accepted by the court, it becomes binding on the parties, and the Petitioner's conduct did not warrant any leniency.
The court held that the orders passed by the learned MM and ASJ were legal and valid, finding no illegality or irregularity in them. Consequently, the Petition was dismissed for lacking merit, and any pending applications were disposed of.
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2013 (1) TMI 929
Interest on Fixed Deposits - Netting of interest income on FD with interest expenses on borrowings for setting up of business u/s 57(iii) - Assessee had obtained large amount of secured loan, out of which it had invested an amount in FD in banks, from which it had earned interest. Since the assessee had not commenced business operation, the AO was of the view that the said amount of interest earned on that FDS in banks, is taxable as income under the head ‘income from other sources.’ - HELD THAT:- The interest income earned during the year by the assessee, from the FDs made out of borrowed funds was rightly taxed by the AO. Interest payable on borrowed funds has no connection with the receipt of interest. The interest payable on the loans out which the FDs were made is not allowable as deduction u/s 57(iii).
Decision in the case of TUTICORIN ALKALI CHEMICALS & FERTILIZERS LTD VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX [1997 (7) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT], relied upon.
Decided against the assessee.
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2013 (1) TMI 928
Addition in respect of unverifiable Sundry Creditors - addition u/s 41 - Held that:- We find that ld. CIT(A) has given relief to the assessee by holding that no condition required to make addition towards remission or cessation of liability as per provisions of section 41(1) of the Act is fulfilled in this case, therefore the A.O. was not justified in making the addition by invoking the provisions of this section - Decided against revenue.
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2013 (1) TMI 927
Interim Relief under Specific Relief Act - Execution of Power of Attorney - The plaintiffs claim that they along with deceased were residing in Suit flat and they were also in occupation of an suit office from where the first plaintiff was carrying on her profession of advocate and solicitors .The suit flat was gifted in favor of the first plaintiff whereas a general power of attorney was executed in favor of the first plaintiff. Both the properties were self-acquired properties of deceased.
Whether Interim relief for Possession against Power of Attorney can be provided to Plaintiffs - HELD THAT:- there were inconsistencies and improbabilities in the case of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the interim relief of direction to be put back in possession, as claimed by the plaintiffs, was declined. The version of the plaintiffs that the visiting card showing her office at Ashoka Centre was a forged document and also the claim that the plaintiff had used the said premises temporarily as the suit office was under renovation was accepted by the learned Appellate Court as sufficient explanation to counter the stand taken by the defendants. On the aforesaid basis the order of the learned Trial Judge was found fit for reversal and refusal of interim relief to the plaintiffs was held to be unjustified. Accordingly, interim relief(s) was granted in the appeal. The interim relief granted to the plaintiffs by the Appellate Bench of the High Court in the present case is a mandatory direction to handover possession to the plaintiffs. Grant of mandatory interim relief requires the highest degree of satisfaction of the Court; much higher than a case involving grant of prohibitory injunction.
Considering all the relevant facts, We find that the learned Appellate Bench of the High Court was not correct in interfering with the order passed by the learned Trial Judge we wish to make it clear that our aforesaid conclusion is not an expression of our opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties. Our disagreement with the view of the Division Bench is purely on the ground that the manner of exercise of the appellate power is not consistent with the law laid down by this Court in the case of Wander Ltd. [1990 (4) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT]. Accordingly, we set aside the order dated 09.10.2012 passed by the Appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court and while restoring the order dated 13.04.2012 of the learned Trial Judge we request the learned Trial Judge, or such other court to which the case may, in the mean time, have been transferred to dispose of the main suit as expeditiously as its calendar would permit with the expectation that the same will be possible within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. The appeal shall stand disposed of in terms of the above.
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2013 (1) TMI 926
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Notification No. 2/2002-Cus., dated 8-1-2002 under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
2. Satisfaction and immediate action requirement under Section 8A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
3. Judicial review of the notification based on the principles laid down in Indian Express Newspapers and Others v. Union of India and Others.
4. Procedural compliance with parliamentary approval under Section 8A(2) read with Section 7(3) and (4) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
Summary:
1. Validity of Notification No. 2/2002-Cus., dated 8-1-2002:
The petitioners, textile mills importing cotton, challenged the increase in import duty from 5% to 10% as per Notification No. 2/2002-Cus., dated 8-1-2002. They argued that the conditions under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 were not satisfied, specifically the Central Government's satisfaction and the existence of circumstances necessitating immediate action.
2. Satisfaction and Immediate Action Requirement:
The petitioners contended that the notification was issued arbitrarily without the necessary satisfaction of the Central Government or any immediate circumstances justifying the increase in import duty. Despite the Court's orders, the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue failed to produce the original file or provide a counter-affidavit explaining the circumstances leading to the notification.
3. Judicial Review Based on Indian Express Newspapers Case:
The Court referenced the Indian Express Newspapers case, which allows judicial review of subordinate legislation on grounds of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, and non-conformity to the statute. The Court found that the notification did not meet the statutory requirements and lacked material evidence supporting the Central Government's satisfaction and immediate action.
4. Procedural Compliance with Parliamentary Approval:
Although the notification was placed before the Parliament as required under Section 8A(2) read with Section 7(3) and (4), the Court emphasized that mere parliamentary approval does not exclude judicial review. The Court held that the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue failed to demonstrate the existence of circumstances justifying the notification, rendering it arbitrary and invalid.
Conclusion:
The writ petitions were allowed, and the notification was set aside for not satisfying the requirements of Section 8A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Court emphasized the necessity of material evidence and proper procedural compliance for issuing such notifications.
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2013 (1) TMI 925
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed the appeal in light of the Supreme Court judgment in Vikram Cement v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore. The impugned order of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal was confirmed.
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2013 (1) TMI 924
Issues involved: Bail application u/s 21 of the NDPS Act, suspension of sentence, interpretation of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Judgment Summary:
The criminal appeal was filed against the High Court's decision denying bail to the appellant who was convicted u/s 21 of the NDPS Act. The Trial Court had sentenced the appellant to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000. The appellant's appeal was pending before the High Court, along with an application for suspension of sentence, which was also rejected. The appellant had already served more than half of the sentence as per the custody certificate issued by the jail authority. The appellant sought suspension of sentence, while the ASG argued against it citing Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since the appeal was pending and unlikely to be heard soon, the appellant was entitled to suspension of sentence. The Court allowed the appeal, suspended the appellant's sentence during the appeal's pendency, and directed the appellant's release on bail, subject to the Trial Court's satisfaction. The appellant was also instructed to pay the fine imposed by the Trial Court. Importantly, the Court clarified that its decision did not reflect any opinion on the case's merits.
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