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Showing 381 to 400 of 1510 Records
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2015 (1) TMI 1134
Demand for CENVAT credit - inputs were wrongly shown to have been used in the manufacture in the factory - MSWPL showed that these items were sent for job work to other manufacturers for conversion into billets without actually sending the same - Held that:- Additional Director was to conduct verification and send a confirmation report and also assessee was advised to approach DGCEI office. Subsequently in the letter dated 13.04.2013, a copy of which was produced before us today, in paragraph 4 it was stated that the appellants representative had visited the DGCEI office and the concerned officer had directed them to visit their office again in the week starting from 15.04.2013. - it was the Commissioner s office who directed the assessee to go to DGCEI office and also required the Additional Director to conduct verification and send a confirmation. That being the position, it was not proper for the Commissioner to simply adjudicate the matter ignoring his own office request to the Additional Director for a report and ignoring the fact that learned counsel for the appellants had stated that the DGCEI office had asked the appellants to come after 15th April for the purpose of verification of documents/supply of documents. Having written to the Additional Director to verify and confirm and having written to the assessee to go to the DGCEI office, passing an adjudication order without getting the complete reply/proper reply and without giving an opportunity to the appellants to go through the process of verification with DGCEI was not proper. - Matter remanded back - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1133
Valuation of the goods cleared by the job worker directly on payment of excise duty - Held that:- Appellants have adopted provisional assessable value on cost plus conversion charge basis and paid excise duty. It is also seen that the first appellant instead of returning the finished goods to the principle manufacturer directly cleared the goods to the consignment agents on payment of excise duty. Whereas, it is seen that the consignment agents in turn collected the excise duty and sales tax from the buyers. It is also noticed that SGF has already collected the excise duty as per the value from the customers as per the price at which it was cleared from the consignment agents. Therefore, the excise duty is payable on the goods manufactured and cleared from the job worker directly to the consignment agent on the price at which consignment agents have sold to the buyers. The judgment relied upon by the Ld. AR in the case of Loharu Steel Industries Ltd (2002 (1) TMI 111 - CEGAT, BANGALORE) and I.P.F. Vikram India Ltd (2002 (4) TMI 211 - CEGAT, COURT NO. I, NEW DELHI), rightly applicable to the present case. The appellants relying on the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ujagar Prints Etc. (1989 (1) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) is not applicable to the present case, as the facts are different in the present case. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the findings of the adjudicating authority in confirming the demand of differential duty. However, we reduce the penalty imposed on SSTL from ₹ 25,000/- to ₹ 5,000/- and the penalty imposed on SGF is set aside. - Appeal disposed of.
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2015 (1) TMI 1132
Authorized person for filing an appeal - CENVAT Credit - Penalty u/s 11AC read with Rule 15 - Held that:- Applicant had authorized Shri Naren Banerjee for signing all documents and also for appearing before the Excise Authorities in all Central Excise matters - No merit in the submission of the Revenue that specific authorization has to be given for filing the appeal. In my opinion , even the General Authorization in favour of an employee through a Board Resolution by a Private Limited Company would suffice the requirement for filing the appeal in compliance with Rule 3 of the Central Excise (Appeals) Rules, 2001. In the result, the impugned Order is set aside and the Appeal is remanded to the ld. Commissioner (Appeals) for deciding the issue afresh, after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the Appellant - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1131
CENVAT Credit - Capital goods - Transfer of unutilized credit - Held that:- it is only a case of leasing out of the inputs and capital goods and no removal has taken place and therefore provisions of Rule 3(5) are not applicable. The credit transferred by the appellant is to the balance 50% of the credit pertaining to capital goods procured by the appellant during 2009-10 and the unutilized credit can be transferred subject to utilization in the subsequent year - in the case of leasing out of the factory to another company, no liability arises to reverse CENVAT credit since there was no physical removal of such goods - Following decision of Dalmia Cements Bharat Ltd. v. CCE, Tiruchirapalli [2007 (11) TMI 211 - CESTAT, CHENNAI] - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1130
Jurisdiction of Tribunal - Revenue makes an objection stating that when the goods came in baggage but not in cargo, the dispute relating to baggage shall not be subject to jurisdiction of Tribunal under first proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The jurisdiction lies to the Revisional authority for revision remedy. - Held that:- Tribunal has no power to compel an authority to act under its direction usurping power of that Authority unauthorisedly. Any direction in this regard will amount to unauthorised exercise of power and excessive exercise of jurisdiction not vested. Appellant may raise all legal pleadings before appropriate authority to consider his prayer if any made for condonation of delay if it seeks revisional remedy. - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1129
Duty demand u/s 11D - unit is situated in duty exemption zone - revenue argued that since the price includes excise duty, the appellant is recovering this element of duty through the pricing mechanism. - Interest u/s 11DD - Held that:- In the present case from the invoice raised by the appellant, it is seen that there is no mention of any collection of any amount as representing excise duty and it is the composite price fixed by the NPPA which has been indicated. This Tribunal had occasion to consider an identical matter in the case of IOCL (2015 (1) TMI 815 - CESTAT CHENNAI) wherein it was held that when a composite price under the administered pricing mechanism has been charged from the buyers under relevant invoices and no amount representing the same as duty of excise has been charged from the buyers, the necessary ingredients of Section 11D are not satisfied. In view of the above position, we are of the considered view that the appellant has made out a prima facie case for grant of stay. Accordingly, we grant unconditional waiver from pre-deposit of dues adjudged against the appellant and stay recovery thereof during the pendency of the appeal. - Stay granted.
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2015 (1) TMI 1128
Clandestine removal of goods - Penalty u/s 11AC - Held that:- The allegation of excess unaccounted production of sugar is purely based on the alleged excess production of molasses reported by the appellant themselves vide under letter dated 30-6-2009. There is no dispute that the quantity of molasses stored in the tank had been determined by dip reading. In my view, determining the quantity of molasses by dip reading is not a foolproof method as the volume of molasses may undergo change due to temperature during the summer season. As such, on the basis of excess molasses reported during stock taking, it cannot be alleged that there was excess production of sugar. The Supreme Court in the case of Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1962 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) has clearly held that allegation of clandestine production and clearance based upon calculations of raw material fed into the process are vitiated by error of law, being based only on inferences involving unwarranted assumptions apart from the fact of excess quantity of molasses, there is virtually no other evidence indicating any clandestine removal of the sugar. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1127
Denial of the benefits of the “Served from India Scheme”, as framed under the foreign trade policy - whether the petitioners could be denied the benefit of the SFIS only on the ground that they were subsidiaries of foreign companies. And, whether it was open for DGFT to interpret the foreign trade policy to exclude the petitioners from the benefit of the SFIS - Held that:- , it cannot be disputed that DGFT is empowered to interpret the foreign trade policy, such powers can be exercised only when the plain language of the policy presents an ambiguity. It would not be open for DGFT to introduce new conditions and criteria under the guise of interpreting the policy as that would, clearly, amount to amending the provision of the foreign trade policy. The words used in paragraph 3.12.2 of FTP 2009-14 are “Indian Service Providers”. There is no scope to read into these words the condition that for service providers to be Indian, its shareholders must also be Indian. This, clearly, would amount to introducing an additional eligibility condition which is extraneous to the eligibility criteria as spelt out in paragraph 3.12.2 of the FTP 2009-14. Introduction of such condition would, in effect, amount to amending the FTP 2009-14. The conclusion of DGFT that Indian companies having foreign equity cannot be considered as Indian, militates against well established canons of company law.
The petitioners are companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and are governed by the provisions of the statute (currently Companies Act, 2013). Insofar as the domicile of the petitioners is concerned, no distinction can be drawn between the petitioners and other companies incorporated under the said Act. It is also well established that the situs of shares is located in the country in which the register upon which they are registered is kept. (See: R. Viswanathan v. R.S. Abdul Wajid: [1962 (5) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT], Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India and Anr.: [2012 (1) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]. Companies incorporated under the laws of India and having their registered offices in India would undeniably be Indian companies.
Decisions of DGFT/PIC, denying the benefit of the SFIS to the petitioners reflected in the impugned minutes, as well as separate communications sent to the petitioners withdrawing/recalling the said benefits (i.e. Duty Credit Scrips), are set aside. - Decided in favour of appellants.
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2015 (1) TMI 1126
Benefit of section 125 - Confiscation of currency - Currency belonged to third party - Assessee carrying the currency only as a carrier - Imposition of penalty - Held that:- Applicant had initially in his statement under Section 108 of the Act, admitted that the currency was given to him by Vinod Kumar Saini, resident of Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan for handing over to one Rakesh, who was to collect the same from Dubai. He had also given the mobile number of Rakesh and Vinod Kumar Saini. The applicant had also named Tulsi Ram, the owner of the vehicle and that he along with Vinod Kumar Saini had dropped him at the Jaipur Airport. Statement of Vinod Kumar Saini was recorded wherein he admitted that he had gone to the airport at Jaipur to see off the applicant. Vinod Kumar Saini accepted that incoming and outgoing calls were exchanged between him and Rakesh. Similar calls have been also received by Tulsi Ram, his relative.
Revisionary Authority held that the applicant was merely a carrier of the said currency, which the applicant wanted to take out of India for monetary considerations. The Indian currency was concealed to avoid being detected. It is clear from the aforesaid finding that the applicant was not treated as the owner of the said currency and as far as ownership is concerned, it was clearly implied that the ownership belonged to Vinod Kumar Saini, who had given the said currency to the applicant for being taken to Dubai. It was meant to be delivered to Rakesh.
Neither with the writ petition nor with the present application, any details or particulars of any order/s against Vinod Kumar Saini have been filed. It is also not indicated whether any proceedings were initiated against Vinod Kumar Saini and the effect thereof. In view of the aforesaid position and the above discussion, we do not think that the applicant is entitled to benefit of Section 125 of the Act. In our order dated 22nd July, 2013, we had noticed that there was a delay and laches in filing of the writ petition. The impugned order is dated 9th October, 2012 and the writ petition was filed in July, 2013. Before us, it was contended that the applicant was a poor man and had to arrange for resources for filing the writ petition. The aforesaid stand, we had observed, confirms and reinforces the finding that the applicant was merely a carrier. The currency belonged to a third person. The reference to the third person obviously was to Vinod Kumar Saini. It is quite apparent that the paltry fine of ₹ 2 lacs imposed on the applicant was in view of the fact that he was not the owner. No merit in the present application - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1125
Confiscation of goods - Attempt to smuggle gold biscuits - at the point of import; import of gold was free - Held that:- When the situation is that importation of gold was free, a higher onus was on the Revenue to prove that the gold bars, which were seized from the possession of the appellant, were illegally imported or “smuggled”. More so, when there was no dispute that the petitioner was carrying on the business of jewellers. Appellant was able to adduce some evidence regarding the legal source of the goods under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1961 under which the petitioner had the burden of proof, since gold items were seized. But unfortunately the Revenue has not been able to disprove the facts brought on record by the petitioner. - tribunal was acting on no evidence and if an authority acts on no evidence, the High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to set aside an order. - Order of Tribunal is set aside - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1124
Confiscation of goods - Import of prohibited goods - Imposition of penalty - held that:- All the authorities found that the goods and considering their quantity can never be said to be brought for personal consumption or use. If they were imitation articles or goods and the quantity was like 40 Sunglasses, 40 pairs of gents shoes, 30 pairs of ladies shoes, 30 wallets and there was an admission that the goods are brought for sale in India, then, all the more the conclusion reached and concurrently cannot be said to be perverse or vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record. The writ petitions are devoid of any merits, frivolous and wastage of precious judicial time. They are dismissed with costs quantified at ₹ 25,000 - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1123
Conviction under Sections 132 and 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act - illegal possession of diamonds - Quantum of sentence - Held that:- A reading of the judgments of the Courts below reflects the position that the sentence of 1 year R.I. and fine of ₹ 5,000/- i/d 2 months S.I. for offence u/s. 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act has been passed upon the erroneous impression that a minimum sentence of one year was mandatory except for special and adequate reasons. It presently is. However, offence under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act did not attract mandatory minimum sentence as on the date of offence viz., 10-2-2007, the provision there regards having been introduced under Act 22 of 2007 and having come into force on 11-5-2007. Even if an order of quash against the petitioner had been passed on the reasoning that no sanction for prosecution under Section 137 of the Customs Act had been obtained, the prosecution could have moved afresh after obtaining the same. In the circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that interests of justice would be better met in reducing the sentence of imprisonment against the petitioner to the period of 80 days already undergone by him. The fine imposed by the trial Court is confirmed. - Decided partly in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1122
Contravention of Section 8(3) and 8(4) read with Section 68 of FEMA read with para-7A, 20(i) of Exchange Control Manual, 1995 (ECM) - Held that:- Impugned order of the appellate tribunal and the order-in-original suffer from serious infractions of the principles of natural justice and, even on merits, it appears that the appellants were able to provide sufficient material on record to raise a serious doubt about the alleged violation of FEMA. - In the present case, the order in original, as noticed above, is primarily founded upon the response dated 03.02.2004 received from Bank of India by the ED to its communication of 08.01.2004. It is not clear as to what is the nature and content of the information elicited by the ED from the Bank of India in its communication of 08.01.2004. It also remains in suspense as to what was the nature and content of the response sent by Bank of India in its communication dated 03.02.2004. It is not clear as to who sent the said alleged communication - i.e. whether it was sent by an authorized officer of the Bank or not.
The appellants should have then approached the Bank of India and enquired about the same. This argument has only to be stated, to be rejected. Pertinently, when the appellant company demanded copies of the said communications vide their letter dated 29.03.2004, the same were not provided. Without having copies of the said communication, this Court fails to appreciate as to how the appellants could be expected to gather any information from the said Bank, or get them verified. In fact, the appellants were not even obliged to do so, and it was the primary obligation of the adjudicating authority to place all incriminating material - which was intended to be relied upon to condemn the appellants and penalize them in a quasi-criminal proceedings, before the appellants to elicit their response. The order imposing penalty is undoubtedly a prejudicial order as it entails quasi criminal and penal consequences. No such order could have been passed behind the back of the appellants, without confronting them with all the material which was sought to be relied upon and granting adequate opportunity to them to deal with the same. It was obligatory for the adjudicating authority to thereafter consider the response of the appellants, if any, and after consideration of the entire matter, pass the adjudication order.
Reasoning adopted by the Appellate Tribunal in para 19 borders of perversity, when it observes that the appellant company had not approached the Bank of India to seek clarification about the said letter dated 03.02.2004. Pertinently, it appears that the Appellate Tribunal also did not even consider it necessary to go through the said correspondences dated 08.01.2004 and 03.02.2004 between the ED and the Bank of India. The Appellate Tribunal did not consider it necessary to satisfy itself as to the nature of information sought from, and provided by the Bank of India. On this short ground, the order in original and the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal are liable to be quashed and set aside.
Respondents have not established the violation of provisions of FEMA as alleged against the respondent beyond all reasonable doubt. There is likelihood of the appellant company having utilized the remittances for import as claimed by it. The situation has to be viewed from the context that the initial inquiry pertained to 64 remittances. Eventually, the same was narrowed down to only four, and thereafter in respect of the fourth alleged remittance, the respondents were satisfied with the appellants explanation. According to the appellants, remittances to the tune of ₹ 700 crores have been made in relation to the business of the appellant company. If one were to keep the entire conspectus of facts in view, it does not stand to reason that the appellant company would fall foul of the law in respect of such miniscule amounts as claimed by the respondent, compared to the total remittances made by it. - The amounts deposited by the appellants in pursuance of the original order of adjudication before the Appellate Tribunal, shall be refunded without any delay. Similarly, the amounts, if any, deposited in this Court shall also be refunded to the appellants without any delay. - Impugned order is set aside - Decided in favour of Appellant.
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2015 (1) TMI 1121
Constitutional validity of section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to the extent the words "enquiry or" have been added thereto, also incorporating "second proviso" - Held that:- The fact that the petitioners' Bank is a society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act/Rules and that there is a separate procedure for incorporation/registration/functioning/control and regulation including auditing of funds etc., are not at all germane to the course and proceedings to be pursued in terms of Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act. The provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act/Rules may be relevant in so far as the day-to day activities of the Society are concerned . But scope of the enquiry under the Income Tax Act is entirely different and so also is the object/purpose to be achieved . The said enquiry is not in relation to the particulars of loans given, but in relation to the particulars of the deposits made by the depositors or as to the extent of interest received by them, to the extent it is relevant under the provisions of the Income Tax Act. In so far as 'Explanation (2)' to Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, dealing with search and seizure, categorically states that the word 'proceeding' includes a future proceeding as well; the inclusion of the word 'enquiry or' under Section 133(6) of the Act, by the law makers as per the Finance Act, 1995, is having more significance and it is incidental to the scope and object to be achieved , which cannot be nullified.
A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has held in Vivian Joseph Ferreira and another v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others [2002 (11) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) that, taxing statute will become valid, if it is within the legislative competence, if it is for public purpose and further, if it does not violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. All the said three requirements are satisfied in the instant case and as such, the challenge raised by the petitioners cannot be held good; more so when the Apex Court has made it clear in R.K. Garg v. Union of India. [1981 (11) TMI 57 - SUPREME Court], that the laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude, than the laws touching civil rights, such as freedom of speech or religion etc. Further, in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in Punjab Distilling industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab [ 1965 (2) TMI 6 - SUPREME Court], constitutional validity of an Act can be supported on the ground that it was enacted to prevent evasion of tax. The amendment brought about as per the Finance Act 1995, adding the words 'enquiry or' and also the 'second proviso' is quite incidental to the 'main provision' and hence beyond challenge.
The apprehension expressed from the part of the petitioners that, if the information as sought for is given to the respondent Department, there is a chance for misuse/abuse, is without any basis. The confidentiality of the information gathered by the Income Tax Department is well taken care of by Section 138 of the Income Tax Act.It is well settled that the 'taxation entry' confers powers upon the legislature to legislate for matters 'ancillary or incidental', including the provisions for evasion of tax. This has been made clear by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Commercial Tax v. R.S. Jhavar [1967 (8) TMI 37 - SUPREME Court]. This Court finds that the petitioners have not succeeded in establishing any constitutional infirmity, to hold the statute/amendment as ultra vires to the Constitution. Accordingly, interference is declined and all the writ petitions are dismissed. - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1120
Entitlement to claim deduction under section 80-IA - Held that:- All the business undertakings are wind mills and they have claimed the benefit of deduction under Section 80IA of the Income Tax Act for the assessment years in question and for the subsequent years as well. Having exercised their option and their losses have been set off already against other income of the business enterprise, the assessee in this appeal falls within the parameters of Section 80IA of the Income Tax Act. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1119
Addition under Section 68 - Accommodation entries - Held that:- There is an order of the Settlement Commission as well as the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 144A holding that Shri S.K. Gupta was providing accommodation entries, he used various companies as conduit for providing the accommodation entries, cash was received through mediators from the persons who wanted to avail the accommodation entries, such cash was deposited in the bank account of the conduit companies and thereafter, cheque of the similar amount was being issued to the beneficiaries (i.e. the person who wanted to avail the accommodation entry) within a day or so. The Assessing Officer himself in the assessment order has accepted these facts. Considering the totality of these facts and the logical consequences of the order of the Settlement Commission as well as of Additional CIT under Section 144A, we have no hesitation to hold that the addition under Section 68 cannot be made in the case of the conduit companies. Therefore, we delete the addition made under Section 68 in the case of all the nine companies, which are admittedly conduit companies of Shri S.K. Gupta. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1118
Disallowance on interest made u/s 36(1)(iii) in respect of interest free loans/advances given to its sister concerns - CIT(A) deleted part addition - Held that:- The revenue was not justified in agitating the reduction in the disallowance of interest in the year under consideration on the same facts, which was accepted by them in the immediately preceding year. - Decided in favour of assessee.
Disallowance u/s 14A - Held that:- There is no finding by the lower authorities whether during the year under consideration, there was any exempt income or not,. In view of above, we deem it proper to set aside the order of the authorities below on this point and restore the matter back to the file of AO. We direct the AO to verify whether during the year under consideration, assessee received any exempt income and if no exempt income is earned then following the above decision of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in CIT Vs. Holcim India Ltd.[2014 (9) TMI 434 - DELHI HIGH COURT], no disallowance u/s 14A would be made. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1117
Justification to the proceedings u/s 153C - unaccounted and in genuine gifts - Held that:- The total income shall be determined in respect of assessment year for which original assessments have already been completed on the date of search by restricting additions only to those which flow from incriminating material found during the course of search. If no incriminating material is found in respect of such completed assessment, then the total income in the proceedings u/s 153A shall be computed by considering the originally determined income. If some incriminating material is found in respect of such assessment years for which the assessment is not pending, then the total income would be determined by considering the originally determined income plus income emanating from the incriminating material found during the course of search. In respect of assessment pending on the date of search which got abate in terms of second proviso to section 153A(1), the total income shall be computed afresh uninfluenced by the fact whether or not there is any incriminating material.
As already observed that no incriminating material has been found relating to the year in which the assessee has received gifts. Therefore, in our opinion, no addition on account of the gifts can be sustained. Accordingly, on this basis itself, we delete the addition on account of gifts. We accordingly allow the additional grounds. Since we have deleted the addition on the basis of the additional grounds taken by the Assessee, therefore, in our opinion, the grounds taken by the Assessee on merit does not require adjudication. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (1) TMI 1116
Interest on land acquisition compensation assessed on receipt basis - CIT (A) deleted the addition - nature of interest, whether it is interest paid u/s. 28 or u/s. 34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.? - Held that:- Taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the issue as analysed in the foregoing paragraphs and also in conformity with (i) the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009 (7) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT] and (ii) the findings of the Hon’ble Delhi Bench of the ITAT in the case of Ajay Sharma (2010 (12) TMI 548 - ITAT, Delhi ); we are of the view that the CIT (A) was not justified in allowing the assessee’s appeal. - Decided in favour of revenue.
Capital gains computed on protective basis - Held that:- The additional compensation and interest received thereon is proposed to tax in the year of receipt. As the assessee has erroneously declared additional compensation and interest on accrual basis, the said returns will be assessed on a protective measure. The assessee’s claim on this count is not valid and, accordingly, the issue of ‘Capital gains computed on protective basis’ is not adjudicated. - Decided in favour of revenue.
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2015 (1) TMI 1115
Penalty levied under Section 271D - assessee firm accepted loans/deposits of ₹ 20,000/- each from 13 parties totalling to ₹ 2,60,000/- in cash, in contravention of the provisions of Section 269SS - Held that:- Looking to the facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that the loan/deposits taken to meet urgent and immediate requirements of business and the impression gathered as taxpayers from the aforesaid circular and the advertisement did constitute a reasonable cause for accepting the said loans/deposits of ₹ 20,000 from each party in cash within the meaning of 273B of the Act. It is found therein that loans/deposits raised were to meet exigencies of business. Thus the penalty levied was cancelled. Thus as relying on case of Madhukar B. Pawar (2008 (6) TMI 321 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT ), we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal has rightly cancelled the penalty imposed on the assessee. - Decided in favour of assessee
Whether the ignorance of law was a proper excuse - Held that:- This issue is answered in negative i.e. in favour of the revenue and against the department. Therefore, we hold that ignorance of law was not a proper excuse. - Decided in favour of revenue.
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