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Showing 141 to 160 of 1456 Records
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2024 (1) TMI 1316
Disallowance u/s 40(a)(iib) - VAT in the nature of ‘‘any other fee or charge’’ - HELD THAT:- As the issue is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Beverages Manufacturing & Marketing Corporation Ltd. [2022 (1) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT] as finally held that the VAT is entirely distinct as that of ‘‘any other fee or charge’’ - we confirm the action of the CIT(A) deleting the disallowance and accordingly, dismiss the appeal filed by the Revenue.
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2024 (1) TMI 1315
Long term capital loss - transfer of land to Delhi Development Authority - HELD THAT:- Assessee claimed this loss by way of revised return in which it stated that this loss on surrender of land to DDA was claimed in A.Y 2001-02 wherein the claim has been disallowed and without prejudice to the claim in A.Y 2001-02, claim is made in A.Y 2004-05 as an abundant precaution.
The assessee explained the underlying facts which gave rise to the claim of loss. Since the claim of loss pertains to A.Y 2001-02, the same shall be considered in that A.Y and, therefore we do not find any fault in disallowing the claim in the year under consideration. Decided against assessee.
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2024 (1) TMI 1314
Validity of assessment u/s 153C without forwarding any draft of the proposed order of assessment to the assessee - effect of Non-issuance of draft assessment order u/s 144C - HELD THAT:- A plain reading of Section indicates that it is obligatory on the part of the AO to forward a draft Assessment Order as per the provisions of Section 144C(1) of the Act. The sub-Section (1) of Section 144C being a non-obstante clause overrides all the provisions of the Act if they are contrary to Section 144C of the Act. This provision is applicable from 1st October 2009 in all the cases where the Assessing Officer proposes any variation to the income returned by an ‘eligible assessee’.
We have examined the expression of ‘eligible assessee’ as per the Act. The expression ‘eligible assessee’ has been defined under sub-Section (15) of Section 144C of the Act. As per sub-Section (15)(b)(i) of Section 144C of the Act, ‘eligible assessee’ means any person in whose case the variation referred to in sub-Section (1) arises as a consequence of the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer passed under sub-Section (3) of Section 92CA of the Act.
Thus, on going through the provisions of Section 144C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 mandating forwarding of a draft Assessment Order, Explanatory notes to the Finance (2) Act, 2009, Circular No. 05/2010 and Circular No. 09/2013 of the CBDT, we hold that the Assessment Orders passed by the Assessing Officer are bad in law, hence, unsustainable for not passing the draft Assessment Order as per the provisions of Section 144C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Decided against revenue.
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2024 (1) TMI 1313
Third bail application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for grant of bail - offence punishable under Section 8 r/w 22 and 29 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 - illegal possession of Alprazolam Powder - contraband item - HELD THAT:- Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and also the nature and gravity of the allegation and also taking note of the fact that in the present case, seized quantity of the contraband is more than the commercial quantity and there is specific bar under Section 37 of NDPS Act and also considering the allegation levelled against the applicant that he has destroyed the material evidence regarding the aforesaid crime and his two applications on earlier occasions have been rejected on merits by this Court and later on, SLP (Criminal) No. 5271/2023 filed before the Apex Court has also been dismissed vide order dated 20.03.2023 by stating that applicant is not entitled for grant of bail at this stage. Although, 2 panch witnesses have been examined but, investigating officer is also Panch witness and he has not been examined yet, therefore, in view of the aforesaid, in the considered opinion of this Court, there are no material changes in the circumstances in which applicant may be entitled for grant of bail.
This repeated 3rd bail application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. is hereby dismissed on merits.
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2024 (1) TMI 1312
TDS u/s 194H - Discount offered by the appellant on sale of Prepaid SIM cards and Recharge coupons - relationship between appellant and its distributors was not that of a ‘Principal to Principal', but only a Principal-Agent relationship
HELD THAT:- An identical issue has already been taken up by a Division Bench of this Court [2013 (10) TMI 934 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] in respect of the same assessee and the dispute in the present appeal also is the same held that the provision of Section 194H is applicable in respect of amounts paid to the agents in connection with sale of SIM cards and other services is adaptable .
Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed,
As petitioner submitted that the order of HC [supra] is challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it is pending. Needless to say that the decision of this Court would be subject to the outcome of the order to be passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. No costs. Miscellaneous Petitions pending if any shall stand closed.
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2024 (1) TMI 1311
Maintainability of writ petitions against impugned order passed by PCIT (Central) Delhi-2 - retrospective application of Section 12AB(4) - as contended that the impugned order was appealable under Section 253(c) and should be tried by ITAT - HELD THAT:- We find that a substantial jurisdictional question which merits consideration stands raised. We also bear in mind the need to adopt a uniform and consistent approach insofar as interim orders are concerned. This since an identical challenge has been duly entertained by a coordinate Bench of this Court and interim protection accorded. The Court also bears in mind that pleadings in [2023 (10) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT] already stand completed and thus the issue can be decided finally on a short date.
We consequently hold that the petitioners shall be entitled to interim reliefs in terms identical to those provided in paragraphs 17-19 of the aforenoted order passed in [2023 (10) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT] subject to the clarification that the donations that may be accepted by the petitioners pursuant to the aforenoted interim directions shall be confined to domestic contributions only.
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2024 (1) TMI 1310
Condonation of delay in filing appeal - condition of predeposit towards litigated amount not fulfilled - HELD THAT:- On 22.06.2023 the Hon’ble High Court had directed them to file the appeal before the appropriate forum i.e. this Tribunal, which should consider the time spent before the Hon’ble High Court and condone the same. In view of the factual details explained by the appellant, the delay is condoned. It is also pointed out in the Defect Memo raised by the Registry that the Appellant has so far not fulfilled the condition of predeposit towards litigated amount of Rs.2,17,50,747/-.
The Appellant is further allowed 8 (eight) weeks time till 15.03.2024 to make the pre-deposit and fulfill the condition - Registry is directed to list this matter on 18 March 2024.
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2024 (1) TMI 1309
Miscellaneous Application against ex-parte order - assessee seeking the recall of order passed by this Tribunal [2023 (7) TMI 1442 - ITAT PUNE] for A.Y. 2021-22 on the ground of passing of ex parte order - HELD THAT:- Appeal was originally posted for hearing on 17.05.2023. Since there was no intimation of such date of hearing it was not attended. The matter was adjourned to 21-06-2023. Mr. Hemant Shah, Chartered Accountant was appointed vide power of Attorney dt. 19-06-2023.
Thereafter, the said Authorised Representative moved an application for adjournment deputing the staff with the impression that the Department would be filing paper book. Later on, the assessee came to know of passing of the order ex parte rejecting the adjournment sought by the assessee.
It was under such circumstances beyond the control of assessee, the matter could not be represented before the Tribunal. Accordingly, it is prayed that the matter may be recalled and heard afresh. On the other hand, DR has no objection for recalling the matter. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the assessee is prevented by sufficient and reasonable cause from causing the appearance before the Tribunal. Therefore, the order passed by this Tribunal is recalled and Registry is directed to post the appeal for hearing during normal course.
Miscellaneous Application filed by the assessee stands allowed.
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2024 (1) TMI 1308
Levy of service tax - Management, Maintenance or Repair Service - appellant has to provide their plant for exclusive use of M/s. Gharda Chemicals Limited for manufacture of various chemicals falling under Chapter 28, 29 and 38 of first schedule of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 - HELD THAT:- The matter is squarely covered by GUJARAT INSECTICIDES LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & ST, SURAT-II [2023 (3) TMI 1173 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] holding that the activity undertaken by the appellant is a manufacturing activity of the excisable goods. As per the definition of Business Auxiliary Service provided under Section 65 (105) (zzg) of the Finance Act, 1994, the manufacturing activity of excisable goods under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is clearly excluded from the definition of Business Auxiliary Service and therefore, the demand of service tax is not sustainable in this case.
The impugned order-in-original is without any merits and thus not sustainable. Hence, the impugned order is set-aside - appeal allowed.
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2024 (1) TMI 1307
Maintainability of petition - petition filed without exhausting the efficacious alternative remedy of appeal - imposing service tax and penalty under Finance Act - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the impugned order indicates that except stating that the services rendered are exempted from service tax, the petitioner has not produced any documents to substantiate that the services rendered by him were exempted from service tax. Therefore, respondent No.1, on the available material on record has rightly passed the impugned order after providing several opportunities of personal hearing to the petitioner, which the petitioner did not avail without any sufficient cause.
Whether the services of the petitioner are exempted from service tax is a matter which requires consideration by the appellate authority, and since there is a dispute as to whether the services rendered by the petitioner are exempted from service tax, the same cannot be adjudicated in this petition, and it is open for the petitioner to approach the appellate authority for redressal of his grievances.
The petition stands dismissed, reserving liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal under section 85 and 86 of the Finance Act. The time spent in prosecuting this petition to be excluded for the purpose of computation of limitation period in preferring the appeal before the appellate authority.
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2024 (1) TMI 1306
Bogus loss in share trading & in F&O segment - AO treated the loss from share trading and from F&O segment as prearranged loss meant to evade the payment of legitimate taxes and disallowed the same by giving an observation that the assessee had taken accommodation entries to book this loss in share trading and F&O segment - HELD THAT:- Investigation wing of the department has unearthed a large scale manipulations on the stock exchange platform by the entry providers in connivance with the stock brokers which was carried out on the stock exchange platform by taking advantage of the loopholes in the system.
In the present case assessee has filed the copies of contract notes, bills/vouchers, evidences of payments and copies of D-MAT Accounts before the Assessing Officer. We also note that the Assessing Officer, instead of carrying out investigations/enquiries into these evidences either by issuing notice under section 133(6) of the Act to the purchaser/sellers or stock exchange or brokers, has merely relied on the investigation wing/SEBI reports.
We find no whisper in the assessment order disbelieving the evidences filed by the assessee or rejecting the same and the AO has merely proceeded on an assumption that the transactions entered into by the assessee during the year, which have resulted into the lossare bogus and fictitious intended to evade the legitimate taxes due to the assessee. See RENU AGGARWAL [2023 (7) TMI 288 - SC ORDER]
We are inclined to hold that the AO has failed to carry out any independent investigations/enquiries into the evidences filed by the assessee and has rejected the claim by the assessee qua loss from share trading in F&O segment only on the basis of surmises and conjectures and relying on the statements of entry operators who never named the assessee and their statements were recorded long before. Therefore, we set aside the order of first appellate authority and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the allow the loss. Assessee appeal allowed.
Addition u/s 14A of the Act r.w.r. 8D(2)(iii) - AO observed that the assessee made huge investments in equity shares, however, the assessee has not made any disallowance u/s 14A - HELD THAT:- We observe that during the year, the assessee has not earned any exempt income and accordingly the assessee has not made any disallowance u/s 14A of the Act. The well settled legal position on this issue is that when there is no exempt income earned during the year then there is no question of disallowance u/s 14A of the Act. Accordingly, we are inclined to hold that the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer is not correct and therefore cannot be sustained. The case of the assessee finds support from the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Chettinad Logistics (P.) Ltd. [2018 (7) TMI 567 - SC ORDER] and Maxopp Investment Pvt. Ltd. [2018 (3) TMI 805 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it has been held that no disallowance is to be made where there is not exempt income. Thus, we direct the Assessing Officer to delete the addition - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (1) TMI 1305
Seeking permission to withdraw Writ Petition - HELD THAT:- Today, when the matter is taken up for hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners seeks permission of this Court to withdraw this Writ Petition and he has also made an endorsement to that effect.
In view of the endorsement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Writ Petition stands dismissed as withdrawn. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
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2024 (1) TMI 1304
Rectification of mistake u/s 254 - addition made by the AO/TPO on account of adjustment in relation to the international transaction of payment of guarantee fees to AE - HELD THAT:- As gone through the impugned order of the Tribunal passed [2023 (6) TMI 175 - ITAT AHMEDABAD]. We find merit in the contentions of the ld. Sr. counsel that the issue of adjustment in relation to the international transaction of payment of guarantee fees to AE as raised in ground no. 4 require a re-consideration in view of the submissions of the assessee that in a comparable case for the earlier year i.e. Asst. Year 2009-10, the Tribunal had deleted the similar addition made by the AO/TPO.
This plea of the assessee was not taken into account by the Tribunal while rejecting the claim of transfer pricing adjustment in respect of guarantee fees in the present assessment year. This seems to be a mistake apparent from the impugned order, which requires to be recalled and re-adjudicated upon - Misc. Application of the assessee is allowed.
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2024 (1) TMI 1303
Money laundering - proceeds of crime - issuance of summons - whether the respondents can issue summons to anyone under the garb of investigation to examine whether there exists proceeds of crime on the basis of the four First Information Reports relating to the scheduled/predicate offence and to call everyone in this State on mere assumption that every case registered for offence relating to illegal mining coupled with scheduled offence is capable of generating proceeds of crime as a result of crime committed under the schedule?
HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to record the statement of the learned Additional Solicitor General while deciding the case in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT] that the Enforcement Directorate had taken up 2086 cases for investigation in the last five years under the PMLA, 2002 out of registration of approximately 33 lakh First Information Reports relating to predicate offences by the police and other enforcement agencies. That means only 0.063% of cases registered for predicate offence is being investigated under the PMLA, 2002. If an investigation is permissible on mere assumption of commission of predicate offence in lakhs of cases based on registration of similar cases, that requires summons being issued to lakhs or even crores of persons throughout the country. Therefore, this Court should step in to draw the lakshman rekha by prescribing a well-defined and guarded procedure in the matter of investigation. The investigation cannot be like an unruly horse with the possible mischief and misuse of power by irresponsible officers who can be politically motivated or can act with ulterior motive causing immense hardships and irretrievable damage to many innocent.
When the involvement of any of the petitioners either in the commission of predicate offence or the suspected generation of proceeds of crime as a result of criminal activity relating to the scheduled offence or about petitioners' knowledge is not shown by any verifiable material, the question to be considered is whether the proceedings under the PMLA, 2002 would survive at all against petitioners when no criminality is suspected connecting the petitioners either to the scheduled offence or about the involvement of the petitioners through anyone who is shown as accused in the PMLA proceedings.
The offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002 is dependent upon illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence that there can be no offence of money-laundering against anyone claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him. When the criminal case against any individual for the predicate offence is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction or the person accused for the predicate offence is finally discharged or acquitted, this Court has to quash the PMLA proceedings - Though absolute power is given to respondents under the PMLA, 2002, when such power is exercised in a manner affecting the civil right and liberty of individuals especially when the power is exercised with oblique motive or the impugned proceedings suffer from legal mala fides.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that all properties recovered or attached through investigating agency even in connection with the criminal activity relating to scheduled offence in the general law cannot be regarded as proceeds of crime.
This Court finds prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the petitioners and hence, considering the serious prejudice that is likely to be caused on account of repeated summons being issued by the respondents to the petitioners in these writ petitions, is inclined to grant interim protection - Petition disposed off.
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2024 (1) TMI 1302
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - sundry credits as claimed by the assessee has not been substantiated before the AO - HELD THAT:- Sundry credits as claimed by the assessee has not been substantiated before the AO. The assessee had not produced any evidence but for the addresses furnished of the creditors. As was noticed by the AO, the invoices which led to the credits were also not produced by the assessee. Despite that, the Assessing Officer gave an opportunity to the assessee by way of issuing summons in the addresses furnished and also a further opportunity to produce the creditors before the AO.
It cannot be said that the penalty was levied only on the creditors having not turned up and confirmed the credits. There was absolutely no evidence produced to substantiate the credit that was recorded in the books of accounts; when there can be inferred a deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. This is a clear case falling u/s 271(1)(c) since the assessee had merely doctored its books of accounts to show sundry credits without even the invoices leading to such credits being produced. The certificates furnished, of the so called creditors, also did not show the credits; thus bringing in mens rea.
As decided in Saheli Leasing and Industries Ltd. [2010 (5) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the burden under Section 271(1)(c) is found entirely on the assessee and there cannot be any shifting of burden on to the revenue, especially in the context of no material having been placed before the AO to substantiate the sundry credits claimed.
The mere disclosure of the name and address of the sundry creditors cannot lead to substantiation of the credits especially when there was no evidence produced regarding the transactions which led to the credit. The mere acceptance of the entirety of the purchases would not lead to substantiation of the credits claimed; since the purchases which led to the credit, has not been established before the Assessing Officer. There was no material available on record before the Assessing Officer, the First Appellate Authority or the Tribunal, which would have persuaded them to take a contrary decision with respect to penalty. Decided against assessee.
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2024 (1) TMI 1301
Seeking permission to travel abroad - HELD THAT:- It is evident that, at the present moment of time, there are no criminal charges against the petitioner, nor is he required for the purpose of answering any penal imputation. He has been acquitted by at least two Courts; though, the stand of the 4th respondent is that they intend to challenge Ext.P3 judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, through a Special Leave Petition.
This Court cannot find the stand of the 4th respondent - that the petitioner should continue to be detained, solely because they intend to file a Special Leave Petition against Ext.P2 judgment, to be tenable.
The 3rd respondent is directed to take necessary steps to allow the petitioner to travel to Ireland as per law and subject to all other statutory and imperative requirements being satisfied, without any avoidable delay, but not later than two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment - Petition allowed.
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2024 (1) TMI 1300
Deduction u/s 36(1)(viii) - loans given for a period of less than 5 years and nonresidential loans being eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(viii) - AR explained that the residential loans for period less than 5 years are mainly granted to individuals for construction or purchase of house where the borrower is of an advanced age and his age of retirement from employment does not justify a loan for a period beyond five years - HELD THAT:- The assessee through a note to the return of income had included the following incomes eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(viii)
i. income from housing finance for residential purposes for a period of less than 5 years;
ii. income from housing finance for non-residential purposes; and
iii. income from temporary deployment of funds [“treasury operations”]
AO and the CIT(A) has denied the benefit of section 36(1)(viii) to the income from (i) and (ii) above on the ground that these two incomes do not fall within the definition of long term finance as defined in clause (e) of the Explanation to section 36(1)(viii). The income from (iii) is denied the benefit of 36(1)(viii) for the reason that the same is not "derived" from the business of long term finance and that it would not fulfill the test of immediate and effective source of direct and proximate source and hence they cannot be said to be derived from the business of providing long term finance for residential purposes. So for the purpose of adjudication we will consider the income derived from (i) & (ii) above and income from (iii) separately.
Income from housing finance for residential purposes for a period of less than 5 years - The profits from business of long term finance for construction or purchase of houses for residential purposes is what should be considered for deduction under section 36(1)(viii) and not the profit from lending long term finance. In assessee's case it was submitted that the total interest income earned by the assessee from lending loans with terms less than 5 years is around 8.33% of the total interest income and therefore the same cannot be excluded from the profits of the business of the long term finance for the purpose of deduction under section 36(1)(viii). We in this regard notice that in the case of Goodricke Group Ltd [2011 (4) TMI 863 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] while holding that the entire profits should be considered for allowing deduction under section 33AB had held so also for the reason that the tea purchased from outside is very insignificant amount of tea as compared what is grown by the assessee in its garden.
The income, on which deduction is claimed by the assessee, is not from other business activities but from the core business of long term finance and the source of income is the said business. The purpose for which the loans on which the impugned interest is earned are granted for construction or purchase of house and this fact is not disputed by the lower authorities - the interest income earned from loans extended for construction or purchase of house for a period of less than 5 years should also be included in the profits for the purpose of deduction under section 36(1)(viii).
Income from housing finance for non-residential purposes - assessee has added a sum as part of income for the purpose of claiming deduction under section 36(1)(viii) which was denied by the assessing officer for the reason that the interest is earned from loans that are given for non-residential purposes - HELD THAT:- The main purpose of allowing deduction under section 36(1)(viii) is to encourage financial corporations/approved public companies to lend for construction or purchase of residential houses. The income derived from the business of providing long-term finance for construction or purchase of houses in India for residential purposes is eligible for deduction under section 36(1)(viii).
In the given case the claim of the assessee is towards interest on loans given for nonresidential purposes. Therefore the same cannot be said to be from the business activity of long-term finance for construction or purchase of houses. The assessee has made the claim separately through notes to the return of income from which it is clear that the assessee is able to identify the income as from separate business activity. Therefore we are unable to agree with the contention that lending loans for non-residential is an integral part of the loans lent for residential purposes. The interest income earned by the assessee from loans given for non-residential purposes are not eligible for deduction under section 36(1)(viii). To this extent we uphold the order of the CIT(A).
Income from temporary deployment of funds - main contention of the assessee with regard to this income is that there is first degree nexus between the business of the assessee and the source of income, thus the income is part of the income "derived from" the business of providing long finance - revenue denied the benefit on the ground that the investment activity should be considered separately and accordingly the income arising is not eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(viii) - HELD THAT:- We applying the ratio of case of Meghalaya Steels Ltd [2016 (3) TMI 375 - SUPREME COURT] hold that the income earned by the assessee from deployment of surplus funds on a short term basis is to considered as derived from the business of providing long-term finance for construction or purchase of houses in India for residential purposes since there is a direct nexus between the income earned and the business of the assessee. Accordingly the same shall be included for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s.36(1)(viii).
Exemption u/s.10(33) against the dividend income earned - HELD THAT:- As admitted fact that the cost of shares yielding dividend income is lower than that of the own funds of the assessee. Further the Assessing Officer himself while arriving at the profit eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(viii) had not allocated any interest expense to the vertical "income from capital gains / dividend".
It is a settled position that when sufficient own funds are available then, the presumption should be that such investments have been made out of the same and not out of borrowed funds - no interest cost need to be adjusted against the dividend income for the purpose of exemption u/s.10(33).
With regard to other expenses, we notice that the AO has applied an adhoc percentage of 80% to housing finance and balance 20% is allocated among other verticals of business in their income ratio. In this regard we issue a direction to the AO re-allocate administrative expenditure’ based on the actual ratio of the investments yielding exempt income to the total average assets for the relevant financial year and consider the same for the purpose of exemption u/s.10(33).
Disallowance u/s 14A - expenses incurred earning exempt income - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted position that the assessee is having own funds more than the amount invested in the tax free bonds. Further the impugned investments as per the submissions of the assessee are resulting in both exempt as well as taxable income. We place reliance on the decision of the coordinate bench in the case of Prakash K. Shah Shares & Securities Pvt. Ltd [2016 (12) TMI 47 - ITAT MUMBAI] to hold that no disallowance is warranted u/s.14A. The disallowance made in this regard is deleted.
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2024 (1) TMI 1299
Rejection of appeal - rejection of books of accounts - best judgement assessment - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, an adverse inference has been drawn against the revisionist due to survey dated 23.12.2008 in which 14 loose papers were found as well as variation in the stocks, on the said basis, the assessing authority while framing the assessment order has rejected the books of accounts and made a best judgment against the revisionist against which first appeal was preferred which was partly allowed as 12 loose papers out of 14 loose papers got tallied only two papers, i.e. 13 & 14, an adverse inference was drawn against the revisionist granting partial relief, against which second appeal was filed by both the revisionist as well as by the respondent. Further, an adverse inference has been drawn against the revisionist with regard to Parcha Nos. 13 & 14 as well as variation of stocks, which could not properly been explained even before the appellate authority while rejecting the appeal.
Once, the finding of fact with regard to variation of stocks has not been challenged which was also basis for rejecting the books of accounts and make the best judgment assessment, therefore impugned order cannot said to be bad in the eye of law.
The present revision fails and is dismissed accordingly.
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2024 (1) TMI 1298
Issuance of the cryptic notice and order for cancellation of registration - HELD THAT:- The respondents are directed to provide list of all the similar matters so that such matters can be listed on the next date of hearing. Registry to list all the matters of the list to be provided by the learned advocate on the next date of hearing.
Stand over to 1st February, 2024.
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2024 (1) TMI 1297
Seeking quashing an F.I.R. registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 & 409 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 - financial irregularities detected in a Cooperative Bank of which the appellant was posted as a Branch Manager - chargesheet had been submitted subsequent to filing of the quashing petition.
HELD THAT:- The reasoning of the High Court for dismissing the writ petition of the appellant, not agreed upon, having regard to the ratio of the judgment of this Court in the case of JOSEPH SALVARAJ A. VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. [2011 (7) TMI 1378 - SUPREME COURT]. That was a case arising from the quashing plea of an F.I.R., where chargesheet was submitted after institution of the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. A Coordinate Bench of this Court opined that even if the charge sheet had been filed, the Court could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the F.I.R., chargesheet and other documents.
The impugned order set aside - matter remanded to the High Court. Let the High Court hear the criminal writ petition on merit - appeal allowed.
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