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Showing 41 to 60 of 67 Records
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1970 (10) TMI 27
Whether for breach of a condition of the licence penalty may be imposed under Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, read with the Sea Customs Act, 1878?
Held that:- The High Court was right in holding that the scope of power under the Sea Customs Act was not enlarged by the amendment to Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, and there is nothing in the amended Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act which warrants the view that the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, may be invoked to punish the breach of a condition of a licence granted under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 26
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the requirements of proviso (b), clause (vib), of sub-section (2) of section 10, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for creation of development rebate reserve have been satisfied ?" - In our opinion it was open to the assessee to make these entries at any time before the assessment was completed. The entries only become final as and when they are accepted or rejected by the Income-tax Officer, i.e., when the assessment is made. Till then, they are in a fluid state and any error or defect in them could be corrected.For the reasons recorded above, we reply the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, against the department
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1970 (10) TMI 25
Whether on the true interpretation of the partnership deed, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee did not carry on any business activities and that it was not liable to be taxed under the Indian Income-tax Act,1922 - Tribunal was right in observing that the association formed by the ice manufacturers in the present case was not a partnership concern, as it was not carrying on any business activity within the meaning of section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, and as such it was not liable to be taxed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1970 (10) TMI 24
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of reassessment proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act of 1961.
2. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to reopen assessments.
3. Duty of the assessee to disclose material facts.
4. Interpretation of "reason to believe" for reopening assessments.
5. Specific grounds for reopening assessments for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Reassessment Proceedings under Section 147(a):
The primary question was whether the reassessment proceedings under section 147(a) were valid. The Income-tax Officer reopened the assessments for the years 1958-59 and 1959-60, alleging that the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts, leading to income escaping assessment.
2. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to Reopen Assessments:
The judgment referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, which outlined that to confer jurisdiction under section 34 (now section 147), two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the Income-tax Officer must have reason to believe that income was under-assessed, and (2) this under-assessment must be due to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. These conditions are precedent, and if not met, the Income-tax Officer lacks jurisdiction to reopen the assessment.
3. Duty of the Assessee to Disclose Material Facts:
The Supreme Court's interpretation in the Calcutta Discount Co. case emphasized that the assessee must disclose all primary facts necessary for assessment. The duty does not extend beyond disclosing primary facts; it is the Income-tax Officer's responsibility to draw inferences from these facts. A wrong inference by the officer does not justify reopening the assessment unless there was a failure by the assessee to disclose primary facts.
4. Interpretation of "Reason to Believe":
The "reason to believe" must be based on reasonable grounds and good faith, not merely a pretence. The belief must be founded on information, not suspicion. The court can review the existence and reasonableness of the belief but not the sufficiency of the reasons.
5. Specific Grounds for Reopening Assessments:
- Assessment Year 1959-60 (I.T.R. No. 4 of 1968):
- Rs. 2,80,513: The Income-tax Officer treated this as personal withdrawal for non-business purposes. However, it was found that the amount was covered by notional depreciation, and there was no material to suggest it was a withdrawal.
- Rs. 41,194: This amount was for constructing a tin printing factory, a business of the assessee, his wife, and minor children. The original assessment correctly inferred it as a business expense. The reopening officer's different inference was not a valid ground for reassessment.
- Loan to Sri S. N. Padmanabhan: The Appellate Assistant Commissioner noted that the original assessing officer was aware of the loan's nature. Thus, there was no failure to disclose material facts.
- Assessment Year 1958-59 (I.T.R. No. 3 of 1968):
- Rs. 10,000 advance to Sri S. N. Padmanabhan: The reopening was based on suspicion regarding the advance's nature. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Tribunal found that the relationship was disclosed, and the advance was part of regular business transactions. Mere suspicion was not a reasonable ground for reopening.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the reassessment proceedings were invalid as they were based on wrong inferences drawn from fully disclosed primary facts. The belief for reopening was not founded on reasonable grounds but on mere suspicion. The court answered the common question in the negative, favoring the assessee, and awarded costs to the assessee with a consolidated counsel's fee of Rs. 250.
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1970 (10) TMI 23
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the notice dated August 5, 1966.
2. Requirement of an order under section 19 of the Expenditure-tax Act.
3. Assessment of the petitioner as karta after partition.
4. Entitlement to allowance under section 6(1)(h) of the Expenditure-tax Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Notice Dated August 5, 1966:
The petitioner argued that the notice issued on August 5, 1966, was illegal because it did not provide the time fixed under section 13(2) of the Expenditure-tax Act for filing a return. The court found that the assessment proceedings had been pending since July 21, 1958, and the petitioner had ample opportunity to file the return and produce the accounts. The petitioner's consistent refusal to file a return or respond to notices was based on his contention that the illom was not liable to assessment as it ceased to exist before the Act came into force, and he was not liable as karta due to the partition. The court concluded that the petitioner did not specifically argue in the writ petition that the assessment order was vitiated for want of notice under section 13(2) of the Act. Therefore, the first point raised by the petitioner was not accepted.
2. Requirement of an Order Under Section 19 of the Expenditure-tax Act:
The petitioner claimed that the illom had been partitioned on March 30, 1958, and the respondent failed to pass an order under section 19 of the Act. The court noted that the respondent did not entertain the claim because the partition occurred after the end of the accounting year. Section 19(1) requires the Expenditure-tax Officer to record an order if satisfied that the joint family property has been partitioned and to make assessments on the expenditure of the undivided family for the relevant assessment year. The court referred to decisions from the Punjab High Court and a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, which held that section 19 applies even if the partition occurred after the close of the accounting year. Consequently, the court held that the respondent was bound to make an inquiry into the partition claim and record an order as required by section 19. The failure to comply with this mandatory provision led to the quashing of the assessment order.
3. Assessment of the Petitioner as Karta After Partition:
The petitioner's status as karta depended on whether there had been a partition as claimed. If the partition was valid, the petitioner ceased to be karta, and the assessment proceedings should have been taken against all the members of the illom. The court referred to a Full Bench decision supporting this view. The court emphasized that the assessment order was invalid because it did not address the partition claim properly.
4. Entitlement to Allowance Under Section 6(1)(h) of the Expenditure-tax Act:
The petitioner raised this issue at a late stage, and the respondent did not file a counter-affidavit regarding the claim. The court noted that the assessment order did not show that the allowance under section 6(1)(h) was considered. However, since the assessment order was being set aside, the court did not express an opinion on this issue. The respondent was instructed to consider the claim if properly raised by the petitioner in future proceedings.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the impugned assessment order and allowed the respondent to take up the assessment proceedings afresh in accordance with the law and the observations made in the judgment. No order as to costs was made.
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1970 (10) TMI 22
Whether the Income-tax Officer's order 'proceedings filed ' was an order of reassessment under the provisions of section 34 and, consequently, the Commissioner of Income-tax was precluded from revising the order by reason of sub-section (2)(a) of section 33B of the Income-tax Act, 1922
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1970 (10) TMI 21
Interest on excess profits tax refunded to the assessee - Whether,the interest was liable to be assessed under the head 'Other sources' - Whether,the assessee continued to be the owner of the property for the purposes of computation of income under section 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1970 (10) TMI 20
Trade association - objects of general public utility - charitable purpose - Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of exemption provided in section 4(3)(i) of the Act of 1922 and in excluding the property income from the assessment of the assessee
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1970 (10) TMI 19
Issues:
1. Interpretation of section 297(2)(k) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding the validity of a notice issued under the corresponding provision of the 1922 Act.
2. Validity of penalty proceedings under sections 271 and 274 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 initiated after the completion of assessment proceedings.
Analysis:
The case involved the interpretation of section 297(2)(k) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the validity of penalty proceedings initiated under the new Act after the completion of assessment proceedings. The assessee, a Hindu undivided family engaged in timber trade, received a notice under section 22(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the assessment year 1958-59. Despite extensions, the return was filed late. Subsequently, a notice under section 28(3) of the 1922 Act was issued in 1959, followed by another notice under sections 274 and 271 of the 1961 Act in 1963. The issue was whether the penalty proceedings were validly initiated under the new Act.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings initiated after the completion of assessment were not sustainable under the new Act. However, the High Court analyzed the provisions of section 297(2)(g) and (k) in conjunction with the recent Supreme Court ruling in Iain Brothers v. Union of India. The Court emphasized that for penalties related to assessments completed after April 1, 1962, proceedings should be in accordance with the new Act. It was acknowledged that the assessment year being prior to April 1, 1962, attracted section 297(2)(g), making the penalty provisions of the new Act applicable.
Regarding the interpretation of section 297(2)(k), the Court held that a notice issued under section 28(3) of the old Act could be deemed valid under the new Act. The Court referred to the wide language of section 297(2)(k) and a Rajasthan Division Bench judgment supporting the continuity of notices issued under the old Act. The Court found substantial identity between the penalty provisions of the old and new Acts, dismissing arguments of inconsistency. The Court rejected the contention that a notice under section 28(3) did not fall within the scope of section 297(2)(k), emphasizing the broad language used in the provision.
In conclusion, the Court answered the first question in the negative, favoring the revenue. As a result, the second question was deemed redundant and not addressed. The judgment was delivered jointly by the judges PREM CHAND PANDIT and S. S. SANDHAWALIA, with the latter providing the detailed analysis and reasoning.
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1970 (10) TMI 18
Issues:
Challenge to order transferring cases from Indore to Bombay under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard and without recording reasons for transfer.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to two writ petitions challenging the transfer of cases from Indore to Bombay under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioners contended that the order of transfer did not comply with the requirements of the Act as it did not provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard or record reasons for the transfer. The respondents argued that such transfers are administrative in nature and consider factors like convenience. However, the court held that the power conferred by the Act is quasi-judicial, requiring a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the recording of reasons for transfer.
The court referred to the provisions of section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, emphasizing the importance of compliance with its requirements. It was argued that failure to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to record reasons for transfer would render the order of transfer invalid. The court highlighted that the order of transfer must be quasi-judicial in nature, and non-compliance with the statutory provisions could lead to judicial intervention.
The judgment cited precedents from the Supreme Court emphasizing the quasi-judicial nature of such orders and the necessity of passing speaking orders with recorded reasons. It was noted that any violation of statutory provisions or principles of natural justice cannot be permitted, especially in light of the specific requirements of section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
The court also discussed a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court where the order of transfer was challenged on the grounds of not being passed collectively by all members of the Central Board of Revenue and lack of recorded reasons. The court disagreed with the reasoning that "facility of investigation" was a sufficient reason for transfer, emphasizing the need for specific reasons in the order of transfer itself.
Ultimately, the court found the impugned order of transfer to be in contravention of section 127(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as it lacked a proper reason for transfer. Consequently, the court allowed the writ petitions, quashed the order of transfer in each case, and awarded costs to the petitioner.
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the importance of procedural fairness, quasi-judicial nature of transfer orders under the Income-tax Act, and the necessity of providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard and recording specific reasons for transfer to ensure compliance with statutory requirements.
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1970 (10) TMI 17
Issues Involved
1. Legality of penalty imposition under section 28(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, on a Hindu undivided family (HUF) post-partition.
2. Applicability of section 25A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, to penalty proceedings.
3. Interpretation of "person" under section 28 and its existence at the time of penalty imposition.
4. Impact of partition recognition date on penalty imposition.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis
1. Legality of Penalty Imposition Under Section 28(1)(c)
The core issue was whether the penalty imposed on November 4, 1957, on a Hindu undivided family (HUF) that had partitioned on October 31, 1957, was legal. The court held that the penalty could not be imposed on a family that had ceased to exist by the date of imposition. The judgment emphasized that for a penalty to be valid under section 28(1)(c), the "person" (which includes an HUF) must be in existence at the time of penalty imposition.
2. Applicability of Section 25A to Penalty Proceedings
The court analyzed whether section 25A, which deals with the assessment after the partition of an HUF, also applied to penalty proceedings. The court concluded that section 25A does not provide for the imposition of penalties. It is concerned solely with the assessment of a partitioned HUF. The court stated, "Section 25A has nothing to do with the imposition of penalty. It concerns with the assessment of a Hindu undivided family wherein a partition has taken place."
3. Interpretation of "Person" Under Section 28
The court interpreted the term "person" under section 28, which includes an HUF. The judgment clarified that for a penalty to be imposed, the "person" must be in existence at the time of the penalty imposition. The court stated, "If there is a disruption or a partition in such a family, its existence as a legal entity and as a 'person' comes to an end." Therefore, if the HUF had ceased to exist by the date of penalty imposition, no penalty could be levied.
4. Impact of Partition Recognition Date on Penalty Imposition
The court examined the significance of the partition recognition date under section 25A. It was held that the date of actual partition, as recorded by the order under section 25A(1), is crucial. The court stated, "It must, therefore, be proceeded on the basis that the actual partition in the family came about on October 31, 1957." Hence, the penalty imposed on November 4, 1957, was on a non-existent entity, rendering it illegal.
Conclusion
The court concluded that:
1. Penalty proceedings must be taken under section 28, not section 25A.
2. The "person" must exist at the time of penalty imposition.
3. The date of actual partition, as recorded under section 25A(1), determines the cessation of the HUF.
4. The penalty imposed on a disrupted HUF is invalid.
The reference was answered in favor of the assessee, holding that the Income-tax Officer could not levy the penalty by his order dated November 4, 1957, on an HUF that had partitioned on October 31, 1957.
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1970 (10) TMI 16
Recovery proceedings - Since we have taken the view that the Sub-Divisional Officer's order in appeal refusing to set aside the sale has become final and the sale is not liable to be set aside, we do not think it necessary to go info this question whether the failure on the part of the petitioner to deposit the amount recoverable from him disentitles him to make an application for setting aside the sale or disentitles the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the same
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1970 (10) TMI 15
Issues:
1. Classification of loss as business loss or capital loss.
2. Determination of whether the company was an investor in securities or a dealer.
Analysis:
1. The case involved the classification of a loss suffered by a company on the sale of Government securities as either a business loss or a capital loss. The company claimed the loss as a business loss, but it was disallowed by the Income-tax Officer, who considered it a capital loss. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the company's appeal, stating that the company was a dealer in shares and securities as per its memorandum of association. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal then remanded the case to gather further evidence, including details of previous securities transactions and how profits and losses were treated. The Tribunal ultimately concluded that the loss was a capital loss, not a revenue loss, based on the company's motive of investing surplus funds to earn interest.
2. The main issue was to determine whether the company was an investor in securities or a dealer. The details of securities transactions over the years showed that the company had made few transactions over an eleven-year period. The company explained that the securities were purchased to invest surplus funds and earn interest, not for trading purposes. The Tribunal considered various factors, including the absence of evidence showing regular securities trading by the company, treatment of securities as non-trading investments in balance sheets, and the motive behind the sale of securities. The Tribunal concluded that the company's actions indicated investment of surplus funds rather than regular securities trading business. The absence of evidence showing active trading and the motive behind the transactions supported the Tribunal's decision that the company was an investor, not a dealer in securities.
In conclusion, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision that the company was an investor in securities and not a dealer. The Court agreed with the findings that the company's motive was to earn interest on surplus funds, and the transactions did not indicate a regular business of dealing in securities. The Court affirmed that the loss on the sale of securities was a capital loss, not a revenue loss. The Commissioner of Income-tax was awarded costs, and the question was answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (10) TMI 14
Issues:
Assessment of income from undisclosed sources in addition to the share income from a firm.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, involving the assessment of an individual, a partner in a registered firm, for the assessment year 1960-61. The individual's share in the firm was 8 annas, and deposits amounting to Rs. 8,500 were noticed during assessment, along with a withdrawal of Rs. 500 from the firm's accounts. The Income-tax Officer added Rs. 2,000 to the deposit, inferring a total income of Rs. 10,500 from undisclosed sources. The firm's profit was estimated at Rs. 44,000, with the individual's share fixed at Rs. 21,975, to which the Rs. 10,500 was added, resulting in a total assessment of Rs. 32,475.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the individual's contention that assessing Rs. 10,500 as income from undisclosed sources in addition to the firm's share was unfair and deleted the sum from the assessment. However, the Tribunal, relying on a Supreme Court decision, reversed this decision, restoring the Income-tax Officer's assessment. The Tribunal referred a question of law to the High Court regarding the correctness of assessing the Rs. 10,500 as undisclosed income.
The High Court analyzed previous Supreme Court judgments, emphasizing that the burden of proving the source of cash credits lies with the assessee. In this case, the explanation offered by the individual for the Rs. 8,500 credit was rejected, allowing authorities to infer it as income from undisclosed sources. The question then arose whether this undisclosed source was related to the firm's business or another source, with conflicting arguments presented by the department and the assessee.
The High Court considered relevant case law, including a decision regarding the treatment of unexplained income in business profits. Despite the assessee's reliance on a previous High Court decision, the Supreme Court's reversal of that decision was noted. Citing the Supreme Court's stance on unexplained cash credits, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, ruling in favor of the department. Both parts of the question referred to the court were answered affirmatively against the assessee, who was directed to pay costs to the Commissioner of Income-tax.
In conclusion, the judgment addresses the assessment of undisclosed income in addition to a partner's share in a firm's profit, highlighting the burden of proof on the assessee and the application of relevant legal principles to determine tax liability.
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1970 (10) TMI 13
Whether a certain amount received by the assessee on liquidation of a private limited company incorporated in Uganda, in respect of 192 shares held by him in that company to the extent to which it exceeded the value of those shares, represents capital gain within the meaning of section 45 read with section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 -
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1970 (10) TMI 12
Issues:
1. Interpretation of whether a partnership existed for registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act.
2. Determination of whether the leasing of a factory constitutes a business activity.
3. Analysis of legal provisions regarding partnership registration and income classification under the Income-tax Act.
Interpretation of Partnership Existence:
The case involved a dispute regarding the renewal of registration of a firm under section 26A of the Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Officer initially rejected the application, claiming that no partnership existed. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner overturned this decision, stating that the factory being leased out did not negate the existence of a business activity. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal later reversed the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's decision, emphasizing that the asset no longer maintained its commercial character and was merely a capital investment for rental income. The Tribunal concluded that since the partnership did not carry on any business activity, it was not entitled to registration.
Leasing of Factory as Business Activity:
The Tribunal's decision hinged on whether the leasing of the factory constituted a business activity. It was determined that the partnership acted as a "rentier" and never engaged in business operations. Despite the partnership's ability to lease the factory as per the partnership deed, the Tribunal found that the asset was not exploited for profit generation. The Tribunal highlighted the economic distinction between business activities and rentier activities, concluding that the leasing of the factory did not qualify as a business pursuit. As a result, the partnership was deemed ineligible for registration due to the absence of a valid business operation.
Legal Provisions and Income Classification:
The legal dispute primarily revolved around the validity of the partnership for registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act. The learned counsel for the assessees argued that the partnership's purpose of leasing property for income generation did not render it illegal under the Partnership Act. The Tribunal emphasized that the income classification under sections 10 and 12 of the Act was irrelevant to the registration process. Reference was made to legal precedents to support the notion that a partnership could engage in leasing activities as a business pursuit. The Tribunal clarified that the determination of income assessability under specific sections was beyond the scope of the registration issue. Ultimately, the Tribunal affirmed that the partnership did not meet the fundamental requirement of carrying on business, leading to the denial of registration.
In conclusion, the judgment highlighted the importance of engaging in business activities for partnership registration under the Income-tax Act. The decision underscored the distinction between business operations and rentier activities, emphasizing that mere property leasing may not qualify as a business pursuit for registration purposes. The legal analysis focused on the partnership's lack of business engagement, leading to the denial of registration despite the partnership's leasing activities.
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1970 (10) TMI 11
Assessee construdt a house - more than half of the building had been let out to tenants soon after the completion of construction - it cannot be said that the new building had been constructed by the assessee for the purposes of his own residence - exemption u/s 54 not given
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1970 (10) TMI 10
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - properties left by Rajagopala Reddiar (Mitakshara Hindu) were partitioned by the widow and her children into four schedules - Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the full value of the C schedule properties in the partition deed could be included in the dutiable estate of the deceased
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1970 (10) TMI 9
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the sum of Rs. 83,624 was rightly assessed under section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
2. Whether the transfer of goodwill amounting to Rs. 50,000 should be considered as capital gain under section 12B of the Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Assessment of Rs. 83,624 under Section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922:
The primary question referred to the court was whether the sum of Rs. 83,624 was rightly assessed under section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The case pertains to the assessment year 1947-48, with the assessee being an individual who transferred his business to a private limited company. The Income-tax Officer initially held that there was a capital gain of Rs. 83,624 in the hands of the assessee, stating that the assets were acquired by the company at an enhanced price compared to their book value.
The Tribunal considered whether converting a proprietary business into a limited company and receiving shares in lieu of business assets constituted a realization of capital gains. The Tribunal remanded the case to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for an enquiry into the market value of the assets. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner reported that the market value of the assets was the same as disclosed, and the value of the shares was Rs. 100 each.
Upon review, the Tribunal agreed that the assessee "sold" the assets and received adequate compensation in the form of shares, thus constituting a capital gain. The court upheld this view, emphasizing that a company is a separate legal entity distinct from its members. It was concluded that the machinery and furniture acquired by the company at a price exceeding their book value by Rs. 33,624 constituted a capital gain and was liable to tax under section 12B of the Act.
2. Transfer of Goodwill Amounting to Rs. 50,000:
The court examined whether the amount of Rs. 50,000 received for the transfer of goodwill should be considered a capital gain under section 12B. Goodwill was defined as an intangible asset, representing the advantage acquired by a business due to public patronage and reputation. The court referred to the Madras High Court's decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Rathnam Nadar, which held that the amount received on the transfer of goodwill was not liable to tax under section 12B, as goodwill does not have an actual cost in terms of money.
The court agreed with this reasoning, stating that goodwill is created by the trading activities and reputation of the business, and does not have a tangible cost. Therefore, the amount of Rs. 50,000 received for the transfer of goodwill could not be taxed as capital gain under section 12B.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that out of the Rs. 83,624 assessed, only Rs. 33,624 was rightly assessed under section 12B as capital gain. The remaining amount of Rs. 50,000, received for the transfer of goodwill, was not liable to be taxed as capital gain under section 12B. The reference was answered accordingly, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 8
Assessee, a partnership firm took the cinema hall, with shops and out-houses on lease - damage to the stage and screen by collapse of lintel - whether expenditure incurred for reconstruction of lintel, stage and screen and also widening the stage and screen is a permissible deduction
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