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1994 (10) TMI 314
Issues:
1. Dispute over the use of the name "Sunder Nagar Dewali Mela" for a fair event.
2. Claim of passing off and potential irreparable injury to the plaintiffs due to the defendants' actions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment revolves around a dispute between two parties, the plaintiffs and the defendants, regarding the use of the name "Sunder Nagar Dewali Mela" for a fair event. The plaintiffs, two registered societies, have been organizing the fair for over 30 years, utilizing the proceeds for charitable projects. The defendants, another registered society, also planned to hold a fair under the same name, arguing that "Sunder Nagar" is a common geographical term and not exclusive to the plaintiffs. The court examined the timeline of publicity and found that the plaintiffs had initiated publicity first for the 1994 fair, establishing their association with the event's name and goodwill.
2. The court considered the legal principle of passing off, where a geographical name can acquire commercial significance associated with specific goods or services. Citing legal precedents, the court emphasized that the use of a name without adequate distinction, especially in conjunction with similar indicia, can constitute passing off. Referring to a previous Delhi High Court decision supporting a similar view, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had a prima facie case of passing off and were likely to suffer irreparable injury if not protected.
3. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' action was belated as they had already made significant preparations for the fair. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did not object to the fair itself but sought to prevent the defendants from using the specific name "Sunder Nagar Dewali Mela." The court granted an injunction restraining the defendants from associating the name "Sunder Nagar" with their fair, considering the potential confusion among visitors and the plaintiffs' established reputation. The judgment allowed for a full trial on the merits of the case in the future.
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1994 (10) TMI 313
Issues Involved:
1. Legality and necessity of filing replications/rejoinders.
2. Impact of filing replications/rejoinders on court proceedings.
3. Conditions under which replications/rejoinders are permissible.
4. Legal definitions and distinctions between replication and rejoinder.
5. Judicial precedents and practice directions regarding replications/rejoinders.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality and Necessity of Filing Replications/Rejoinders:
The judgment discusses the prevalent practice of filing replications/rejoinders in the Delhi High Court, which has no foundation in the rules of procedure or the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The court notes that this practice has outlived its utility and obstructs the smooth flow of justice. The judgment emphasizes that pleadings subsequent to the written statement, such as replications, are not statutorily contemplated by the CPC, except by leave of the court (Order 8 Rule 9 CPC).
2. Impact of Filing Replications/Rejoinders on Court Proceedings:
The court highlights that the practice of filing replications/rejoinders leads to unnecessary adjournments and delays in the trial process. Replications often merely restate denials of averments made in the written statements, adding to the bulk of the file and increasing the judge's workload. Moreover, unscrupulous plaintiffs may exploit this opportunity to introduce inconsistent cases, causing confusion and embarrassment at the trial.
3. Conditions Under Which Replications/Rejoinders Are Permissible:
A replication is permissible only in three situations:
- When required by law.
- When a counterclaim is raised by the defendant.
- When the court directs or permits a replication being filed.
The court may direct the filing of a replication when it feels the necessity for the plaintiff to join specific pleadings to a newly raised case by the defendant in the written statement. The plaintiff must seek the court's leave by presenting the proposed replication along with an application.
4. Legal Definitions and Distinctions Between Replication and Rejoinder:
The judgment clarifies that 'replication' is a pleading by the plaintiff in answer to the defendant's plea, while 'rejoinder' is a second pleading by the defendant in answer to the plaintiff's replication. The court refers to various legal dictionaries and texts, including Black's Law Dictionary, Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, and Halsbury's Laws of England, to define these terms and explain their usage in legal proceedings.
5. Judicial Precedents and Practice Directions Regarding Replications/Rejoinders:
The court discusses several judicial precedents and practice directions related to replications/rejoinders:
- The law does not require a plaintiff to file a replication merely denying the allegations made in the written statement (Veemsekhara v. Amirthavalliammal, Laxmansing v. Laxminarayan Deosthan, Bank of Behar Ltd v. Madhusudan Lal).
- A plaintiff can claim relief based on pleas in the plaint and not on pleas in the replication (Amarjeet Singh vs Bhagwati Devi).
- Replication, if allowed by the court, becomes a part of the pleadings (Moti Ram vs Baldev Krishan, Mateshwar Dayal vs Amar Singh, Jag Dutta v. Savitri Devi).
- A plea inconsistent with the case set out by the plaintiff in the plaint cannot be raised in replication (M.S.M. Sharma vs. Sri Krishna Sinha).
- Practice directions suggest that the court may call upon the plaintiff to file a written statement in reply for elucidating the pleas when necessary, especially in complicated cases.
Conclusion:
The court upholds the objection raised by the defendant regarding the replication filed by the plaintiff, directing it to be taken off the file and returned to the counsel for the plaintiff. The plaintiff is allowed time to move a fresh application seeking leave to file a replication confined to the plea introduced by way of amendment in the written statement. The judgment emphasizes the importance of adhering to the established legal framework and avoiding unnecessary delays in the judicial process.
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1994 (10) TMI 312
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the petition regarding Esemen.
2. Whether proceedings should be stayed due to a pending suit in the Calcutta High Court.
3. Establishment of a case of oppression and mismanagement.
4. Entitlement to the reliefs prayed for.
Summary:
1. Maintainability of the Petition Regarding Esemen:
The maintainability of the petition was questioned due to the issue of additional 5,000 shares and the transfer of some shares, increasing the total number of members to 11. The petitioner was unaware of these developments. The board held that it is not justified to disqualify the petitioner u/s 399 as the respondents failed to establish the total number of shareholders was 11 before the petition was filed. The transfers appeared to be an attempt to disqualify the petitioner.
2. Whether Proceedings Should Be Stayed Due to Pending Suit:
The respondents argued for dismissal due to a pending suit in the Calcutta High Court. The petitioner undertook to withdraw the suit, which was subsequently done. The board noted that the issues in the suit and the petition were not identical, and the petition raised additional issues. The suit's withdrawal resulted in no alternative remedy, and thus, there was no ground for dismissing or staying the proceedings.
3. Establishment of a Case of Oppression and Mismanagement:
The petitioner alleged acts of oppression and mismanagement, including non-issue of notices, non-maintenance of minutes, wrongful transfer of shares, and issue of additional shares to dilute her holding.
- Non-Issue of Notices and Non-Maintenance of Minutes: The respondents provided sufficient proof of filing annual returns and balance sheets and dispatch of notices. The petitioner failed to establish her allegations.
- Wrongful Transfer of Shares: The board found that the shares were wrongfully transferred using a power of attorney, as established by various High Court orders. The respondents' conduct was deemed oppressive.
- Issue of Additional Shares: The additional shares were issued without justifiable need for funds, as reflected in the balance sheets showing no significant capital expenditure or new activities. The issue was seen as an attempt to dilute the petitioner's shareholding and was considered an act of oppression.
4. Entitlement to Reliefs:
The petitioner established oppression and mismanagement. The board directed that the fair value of the petitioner's shares be determined as of March 31, 1993, excluding the effect of the additional shares issued in 1990. P.K. Mitra and Co. were appointed for valuation, and the respondents were ordered to purchase the shares at the determined value. The board did not grant further reliefs but allowed the petitioner to approach the bench for additional reliefs if the shares were not purchased as ordered. All interim orders were vacated, and there was no order as to costs.
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1994 (10) TMI 311
Issues Involved
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Court in matters of property tax assessment under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976.
2. Adequacy and efficacy of the appellate remedy provided under the Act.
3. Allegations of arbitrary, unreasonable, and illegal property tax revision by the Municipal Corporation.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Court
The primary issue was whether the suit filed by the appellants in the civil court questioning the revision of property tax in 1984 is barred by Rule 25 in Part-I of Schedule-III of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976. The trial court dismissed the suit as not maintainable in civil court due to Rule 25. However, the first appellate court held the suit maintainable and remitted the matter to the trial court for disposal on merits. The High Court, upon appeal by the Municipal Corporation, reversed the first appellate court's decision, reinstating the trial court's dismissal.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing the principles laid down in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which state that the jurisdiction of civil courts is excluded if the statute provides an adequate remedy. The Court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege non-compliance with any statutory provisions or fundamental principles of judicial procedure, which are necessary grounds for a civil court to assume jurisdiction.
2. Adequacy and Efficacy of the Appellate Remedy
The appellants argued that the condition of depositing the entire property tax for a second appeal to the District Court rendered the appellate remedy inadequate and ineffective. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, clarifying that the onerous nature of the appellate condition might justify a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but does not justify maintaining a civil suit. The Court distinguished between the constitutional remedy under Article 226 and the statutory jurisdiction of civil courts, governed by Section 9 of the CPC and Rule 25 of the Act.
3. Allegations of Arbitrary, Unreasonable, and Illegal Tax Revision
The plaintiffs alleged that the property tax revision was arbitrary, unreasonable, and illegal, citing a significant increase in property valuation and tax amounts from 1979 to 1984. They also claimed that assessors took measurements without prior notice and were pressurized to increase taxes. The Supreme Court found these allegations too general and sweeping to merit consideration, noting the lack of specific details or evidence.
The Court reiterated that the plaintiffs did not pursue the available statutory remedies, such as appeals to the Taxation Appeals Committee or the District Court. The mere assertion that filing numerous appeals was impracticable did not justify bypassing the statutory mechanism.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court concluded that the suit was not maintainable in civil court, as none of the grounds for challenging an assessment under the Karnataka Act were alleged in the plaint. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the statutory bar under Rule 25 could not be overridden by general allegations of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. The appeal was dismissed, and the Court expressed doubts about the continued relevance of determining property tax based solely on fair rent, suggesting that this principle might need reconsideration in future cases.
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1994 (10) TMI 310
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in a case regarding promotion to the post of Chief Engineer in U.R Jal Nigam. The Court held that government servants must first avail themselves of the statutory remedy before approaching the High Court. The High Court was requested to transmit the case to the Tribunal for consideration.
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1994 (10) TMI 309
Issues Involved:
1. Authority of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to sanction building plans with conditions.
2. Validity of the condition to transfer open spaces for parks and schools to the Corporation free of cost.
3. Interpretation of Section 313 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
4. Fiduciary relationship and ownership rights in the context of sanctioned layout plans.
5. Legal implications of the Corporation's resolution regarding the transfer of land.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Authority of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to Sanction Building Plans with Conditions:
The primary legal issue was whether the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (the Corporation) could sanction building plans with the condition that open spaces for parks and schools be transferred to the Corporation free of cost. The court examined the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (the Act) and concluded that the Corporation did not have the authority to impose such conditions. The court emphasized that the Corporation's power to impose conditions must align with the objectives and provisions of the Act.
2. Validity of the Condition to Transfer Open Spaces for Parks and Schools to the Corporation Free of Cost:
The court found that the condition imposed by the Corporation requiring the transfer of open spaces for parks and schools free of cost was invalid. The trial court had initially held this condition invalid, and the appellate court had partially agreed. The High Court, however, had interpreted the condition as a transfer of the right of management rather than ownership. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, stating that the condition amounted to an unlawful deprivation of property rights.
3. Interpretation of Section 313 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957:
Section 313 of the Act was central to the case. The court analyzed the section, which outlines the requirements for layout plans, including the reservation of sites for public purposes. The court clarified that while the Act allows the Corporation to impose conditions to ensure compliance with the layout plan, it does not authorize the Corporation to demand the transfer of ownership of land to itself free of cost. The court emphasized that the Corporation's role is to regulate and manage public amenities, not to acquire ownership without compensation.
4. Fiduciary Relationship and Ownership Rights in the Context of Sanctioned Layout Plans:
The High Court had held that a fiduciary relationship in the nature of a trust arose when the layout plan was sanctioned, modifying the appellant's ownership rights. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the fiduciary relationship did not entitle the Corporation to claim ownership of the land. The court held that the appellant retained ownership and that the Corporation's role was limited to management and supervision for public benefit.
5. Legal Implications of the Corporation's Resolution Regarding the Transfer of Land:
The Supreme Court found that the Corporation's resolution requiring the transfer of land for parks and schools was not supported by any provision in the Act. The court noted that while public purpose is crucial, it does not justify the transfer of private property without compensation. The court highlighted that the Corporation could manage the land for public benefit but could not claim ownership without proper legal authority.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court modified the High Court's order to ensure substantial justice while protecting the interests of the residents. The court directed that:
1. The Corporation has the right to manage the land earmarked for schools and parks.
2. The Corporation cannot change the land's use, ensuring it remains for the residents' beneficial enjoyment.
3. The Corporation can acquire ownership of the land by paying the market price as of the date of the layout plan's sanction.
The appellant was awarded costs throughout the litigation.
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1994 (10) TMI 308
Issues Involved:
1. Freedom of press vs. right to privacy of citizens.
2. Parameters of press criticism and comments on public officials' acts and conduct.
3. Government's ability to maintain an action for defamation and impose prior restraint on the press.
4. Authority of prison officials to prevent publication of a prisoner's life story.
Summary:
Issue 1: Freedom of Press vs. Right to Privacy
The petitioners, editors of a Tamil weekly magazine, sought to restrain the respondents from interfering with the publication of the autobiography of Auto Shankar, a condemned prisoner. The court examined whether a citizen can prevent another from writing their life story without consent, which infringes on the right to privacy. The court held that the right to privacy is implicit in Article 21, allowing individuals to safeguard their personal life from unauthorized publications. However, this right does not subsist if the information is part of public records. The court emphasized that public officials cannot claim privacy for their official acts, and publications regarding their official conduct are protected unless made with reckless disregard for truth.
Issue 2: Government's Action for Defamation and Prior Restraint
The court held that neither the government nor its officials have the legal authority to impose prior restraint on the press to prevent the publication of defamatory material. The court referenced the New York Times v. United States case, which established a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of prior restraints. The remedy for defamed public officials lies in post-publication actions, governed by the principles of defamation law.
Issue 3: Authority of Prison Officials
The court found no evidence that Auto Shankar authorized prison officials to protect his privacy rights. It stated that prison officials cannot act on behalf of the prisoner to prevent publication unless explicitly authorized. The court also noted that any action to protect privacy or defamation claims must occur post-publication.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, stating that the petitioners have the right to publish the autobiography of Auto Shankar based on public records. However, if the publication extends beyond public records, it may invade the prisoner's right to privacy, making the petitioners liable for legal consequences. The state and its officials cannot prevent the publication, and their remedy lies in post-publication actions.
Principles Summarized:
1. Right to privacy is implicit in Article 21, protecting personal life from unauthorized publications.
2. Publications based on public records are unobjectionable, except in cases involving female victims of sexual crimes.
3. Public officials cannot claim privacy for their official conduct, and defamation claims require proof of reckless disregard for truth.
4. Government entities cannot maintain defamation suits.
5. No prior restraint on the press is permissible by the state or its officials.
The writ petition was allowed in these terms, with no costs imposed.
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1994 (10) TMI 307
Issues:
1. Violation of principles of natural justice in dismissal of respondent.
2. Conduct of enquiry and opportunity for inspection of documents.
3. Setting aside of the order of dismissal and holding of a fresh enquiry.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The respondent, a principal of the appellant's institution, was dismissed for misappropriating funds without being provided with an opportunity to inspect the documents mentioned in the charge sheet. The respondent was not given a chance to explain or participate in the enquiry, leading to his dismissal. The respondent challenged the dismissal in the High Court, which set aside the order and suggested a fresh enquiry if necessary.
2. The appellant contended that there was no violation of natural justice as the respondent did not cooperate in the enquiry and did not request to examine any witnesses. However, the Supreme Court held that the respondent had the right to inspect documents relied upon by the management and should have been given the opportunity to do so. The Court emphasized the importance of providing the delinquent with copies of relevant documents or allowing inspection to ensure a fair enquiry process.
3. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's decision to set aside the dismissal order due to procedural irregularities in the conduct of the enquiry. It directed the appellant to conduct a fresh enquiry, provide the respondent with an opportunity to inspect the documents, and ensure compliance with principles of natural justice. The Court also highlighted the importance of completing the enquiry within six months and granting the respondent his pensionary benefits based on the outcome of the fresh enquiry.
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1994 (10) TMI 306
Issues:
1. Interpretation of provisions regarding market fee exemption for agricultural produce under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act and Rules.
2. Compliance with submission requirements for exemption certificates under the Act and Rules.
3. Applicability of the Haryana Rural Development Fund Act on agricultural produce fees.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a public limited company, engaged in manufacturing yarn, challenging the requirement to pay market fee twice for raw materials purchased from market committees within the State of Haryana. The company contended that since it had already paid fees to the committees of purchase origin, it should be exempt from paying again at the processing location. The dispute centered around the submission of Form-LL, as mandated by Rule 30(5) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (General) Rules, 1962, within 20 days of bringing the produce for processing. The court interpreted the provisions of the Act and Rules to determine the company's entitlement to exemption based on compliance with submission requirements.
2. The court analyzed Section 23 of the Act, which allows market committees to levy fees subject to rules, and Rule 30(5) which outlines the exemption criteria for agricultural produce already subject to market fees in other areas of the State. The court emphasized the importance of submitting Form-LL, duly attested, within the prescribed timeframe to claim exemption under the proviso of Rule 30(5). Despite the company's delay in submitting the form, the court held that the substantive right to exemption should not be denied solely based on procedural delays. The court deemed the 20-day period for submission as directory rather than mandatory, ensuring the company's entitlement to the claimed exemption.
3. Additionally, the court addressed the company's challenge regarding the Haryana Rural Development Fund Act, 1986, which imposed a fee on agricultural produce bought or processed within the State. The company argued that it had already paid the fee to the assessing authority in the purchase area and should be exempt from double payment. The court referred to Rule 3(12) of the Haryana Rural Development Rules, 1987, which required submission of Form-E for exemption within a week of bringing produce to the notified area. Despite the company's failure to submit Form-E within the prescribed period, the court ruled in favor of the company, emphasizing that procedural lapses should not override substantive rights to exemption.
4. Ultimately, the court allowed both writ petitions, quashing the notices requiring the company to pay market fee and Haryana Rural Development fee for the second time. The judgments highlighted the importance of substantive rights to exemption under the Acts and Rules, emphasizing that procedural delays in form submission should not hinder legitimate claims for fee exemptions.
Judgment:
- Both writ petitions allowed, impugned notices quashed.
- No order as to costs.
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1994 (10) TMI 305
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional Validity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 (Act No. 33 of 1993)
2. Maintainability of Special Reference No. 1 of 1993 under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India
3. Impact on Secularism, Right to Equality, and Right to Freedom of Religion
4. Legislative Competence
5. Acquisition of Religious Places
6. Management and Administration of Acquired Property
Summary:
1. Constitutional Validity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 (Act No. 33 of 1993):
The Act's primary focus was challenged on grounds of secularism, equality, and freedom of religion. The acquisition of the area, including the disputed site where the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid stood, was examined. The court found that the Act aimed to maintain public order and communal harmony. However, Section 4(3), which abated all pending suits and legal proceedings without providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, was declared unconstitutional and invalid. The remaining provisions of the Act were upheld as valid.
2. Maintainability of Special Reference No. 1 of 1993 under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India:
The Special Reference sought the Supreme Court's opinion on whether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existed prior to the construction of the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid. The court found the Reference to be superfluous and unnecessary in light of the revival of the pending suits and legal proceedings. Consequently, the court declined to answer the Reference and returned it.
3. Impact on Secularism, Right to Equality, and Right to Freedom of Religion:
The court emphasized that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution. The Act was scrutinized to ensure it did not favor one religious community over another. The court found that the Act aimed to maintain communal harmony and did not violate the principles of secularism, equality, or freedom of religion. The provision in Section 7(2) to maintain the status quo as of January 7, 1993, was found to be reasonable and just.
4. Legislative Competence:
The legislative competence of the Parliament to enact the Act was upheld, finding it traceable to Entry 42, List III of the Constitution. The court rejected the argument that the Act fell under Entry 1, List II, relating to public order.
5. Acquisition of Religious Places:
The court addressed the argument that a mosque, as a place of worship, could not be acquired. It held that under the Mahomedan Law applicable in India, a mosque does not enjoy any greater immunity from acquisition than places of worship of other religions. The acquisition of the disputed area was found to be for a larger national purpose of maintaining communal harmony.
6. Management and Administration of Acquired Property:
The court found that the Central Government, as a statutory receiver, was required to manage and administer the disputed area, maintaining the status quo until the final adjudication of the dispute. The power of the Central Government to transfer the acquired property under Section 6 was upheld, subject to the final adjudication of the pending suits.
Conclusion:
1. Section 4(3) of the Act was declared unconstitutional and invalid.
2. The remaining provisions of the Act were upheld as valid.
3. The pending suits and legal proceedings were revived for adjudication.
4. The Central Government was to act as a statutory receiver, maintaining the status quo until the final adjudication.
5. The Special Reference was returned unanswered.
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1994 (10) TMI 304
Seeking redetermination for higher compensation - Validity of applications u/s 28-A to awards made before and after the Amendment Act - Limitation period - Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - establishment of thermal power plant - term "aggrieved persons" - HELD THAT:- We of the view that the beneficiary is not an aggrieved person and the Collector/L.A.O. has no power to make, at the instance of the beneficiary or the State, to make a reference under Sub- section (3) of Section 28-A read with Section 18 subject to local amendments as was done by Haryana and the Himachal Pradesh Legislatures. This factor may be an additional reason for the Collector to await the decision of the High Court or of this Court, when the award of the court under Section 26 was carried in appeal under Section 54 or the latter under Article 136. Pending decision, he should stay his hands and take up the matter only after the decision is rendered by the High Court or by this Court. Yet, in view of the local amendments to the Act like that made by Haryana Legislature, the State may seek reference under Section 28-A(3), since Section 18 gets attracted by operation of Sub-section (2) -A of Section 18 of Haryana local amendment. When the land was acquired for and on behalf of the State, it becomes also entitled to a reference under Section 28-A(3) and all the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall apply to such a reference.
It is true that there arises an anomalous situation when an award is made under Section 28-A(2) the Collector may award compensation in excess of the amount given under Section 26, while the claimant was provided with remedy under Section 28(3) the beneficiary or the State are left with no remedy under the Act. However, the Collector being an authority under the Act, the award of the Collector made under Section 28A is not totally immune from jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, if required to be challenged by the State or the beneficiary, who have no other legal remedy in the matter.
After becoming aware of introduction of Section 28-A, it would appear that several antedated applications under Section 18 to make use of the awards to be made thereon under Section 26 by the civil court to get the benefit of Section 28-A. Therefore, when application made under Section 28- A create a doubt that the award under Section 26 which forms the basis for such application had been secured on an antedated or fraudulent applicant purported to have been made under Section 18, it shall be open to the State to have the matter thoroughly examined by an officer of the status of the District Collector/Commissioner to find the truth and such officer on enquiry made with reference to the relevant records and finds that the applications under Section 28A(1) are genuine and was/were made within limitation or the award under Section 26 is found on genuine application under Section 18 made within limitation and he could cause applications properly made under Section 28A(1), so that such award under Section 26 of cause may become unavailable for supporting the application, made fraudulently or collusive made under Section 28A be closed. However, it has to be remembered by the Collector/L.A.O. deciding Section 28A application that the compensation for land given in the award under Section 26 or judgment in appeal should form the basis of re-determination of compensation for the applicants' land; the same amount of compensation need not be given where there are differences in nature and quality and situation of the comparable land.
Our conclusion in each appeal/appeals on their facts, would be as under:
In Babua Ram's case, though we hold that the appellants are persons aggrieved within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A to avail the right under Section 28-A(1) yet the High Court is right in directing that the Collector/L.A.O ought to have awaited the decision of the High Court. After the receipt of the decision of the High Court, the Collector/L.A.O:, after issuing notice to the respondents and giving reasonable opportunity of hearing, should enquiry into (i) whether the application/applications was/were filed written application/applications satisfying the requisites of Section 28A and within limitation, and (ii) in case those findings recorded are in favour of the applicants, still the Collector should decide whether the applicants are persons interested in other lands covered by the same notification and the award made by the Collector under s. 11. He should, therefore, enquiry into and record findings in this behalf. In case, the Collector/L.A.O. records findings in favour of the claimants then the should consider whether enhancement of compensation can be made on the basis of the award under Section 26 by the civil court or High Court and redetermine the same in accordance with law. If he records findings in favour of the claimant/claimants, he shall make the award under Sub-section (2) of Section 28-A and follow the procedure under s-28-A and the relevant provisions in Part HI in that behalf. The order of the High Court is set aside and writ petition is disposed of accordingly. The appeals, therefore, are allowed subject to the above directions.
In Goa, Daman & Diu Industrial Devi. Corporation and State appeals, though we uphold the order of the High Court in its finding that the respondents are persons aggrieved, it is not the end of the journey. The direction issued in the impugned judgment is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Collector/L.A.O. He should issue notice to the applicant in each petition and give reasonable opportunity of being heard in person/counsel. He should consider whether the written applications satisfy the requirements of Section 28A(1) and were, in fact, filed the written applications within the limitation. Before proceeding as above, he could satisfy himself whether the award under Section 26 relief upon in support of the application made under Section 28A, was not made on the basis of antedated or fraudulent application under Section 18 or the applications themselves find under Section 28A(1) are antedated or fraudulently brought on record to claim the benefit under Section 28A(1). In case the findings are in favour of the claimant/claimants, then it is not necessary that there should be a second application, since the application already filed for redetermination of the compensation after the earlier award and decree of the civil court under Section 26 is sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 28-A(1). On the basis of the judgment and decree of. the High Court which has become final i.e. later one, the Collector/L.A.O. should re-determine the compensation taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances enumerated in Section 23 and Section 28-A(1) and other related provisions applicable to the facts.
In Union of India and connected appeals, though the appellants are the persons interested in under Sub-section (2) of Section 28-A for the purpose of enabling them to adduce evidence in redetermination of the compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer acted as an agent on behalf of the State as well as the beneficiary-Union of India. The appellant is bound by the offer made by the Collector/L.A.O. Therefore, the question of their accepting the award made under Section 28-A(2) does not arise. It cannot seek reference under Section 28-A(3) or under Section 18 of the Act. However, it would be open to the appellant to challenge the correctness of the award made under Section 28-A(2) in a writ petition under Article 226 and 227. However, in view of our finding that the Collector should await the final decision of the High Court or of this Court, the Collector/L.A.O. committed grievous error of law in proceeding to make an award under Section 28-A(2). He should have awaited the decision of the High court in the pending appeal. The order of the High Court and that of the Collector are set aside. The cases are remitted to the Collector to keep them back pending disposal of appeal by the High Court. In case the decree of the High Court granting compensation is in excess o the award of the Collector/L.A.O., under s. 11, then the Collector should enquire whether the application satisfy the requirements of Section 28A and whether the application had been properly made and within limitation.
In case the finding/findings is/are in favour of the applicants, then he should redetermine the compensation on. the basis of the award under Section 26, and made the award under Section 28- A(2) and should follow the procedure prescribed in Part III. Therefore, the orders of the Collector and that of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in revisions are set aside and the Collector shall follow the procedure indicated hereinbefore and decree as per the law and the judgment. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.
All appeals in this judgment are disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (10) TMI 303
Issues Involved:
1. Whether it is open to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) to differ from the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC).
2. If so, whether reasons must be given for differing from the recommendations of the DPC.
3. Whether the Tribunal's order of "deemed promotion" was justified.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Whether it is open to the ACC to differ from the recommendations of the DPC
The judgment clarifies that the recommendations of the DPC are advisory in nature and not binding on the appointing authority. The ACC, being the appointing authority, has the discretion to differ from the recommendations of the DPC in the public interest. This principle is supported by the Recruitment Rules dated 6-1-1975 and the instructions contained in the O.M. dated 30-12-1976 issued by the Cabinet Secretariat, which state that the DPC is a recommendatory body and its recommendations are subject to approval by the appointing authority. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that the ACC can differ from the DPC's recommendations.
Issue 2: Whether reasons must be given for differing from the recommendations of the DPC
The judgment emphasizes that while the ACC has the authority to differ from the DPC's recommendations, it must provide reasons for doing so to avoid any accusations of arbitrariness. These reasons must be recorded in the file. The court found that in the instant case, no reasons were recorded for differing from the DPC's recommendations, which led to the Tribunal's observation of arbitrariness. However, the judgment also clarifies that these reasons do not need to be communicated to the officer concerned but must be available in the file for judicial review if challenged.
Issue 3: Whether the Tribunal's order of "deemed promotion" was justified
The court held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering "deemed promotion" for the respondent. The Tribunal's decision was based on the ACC's failure to provide reasons for differing from the DPC's recommendations. However, the court noted that granting "deemed promotion" was not within the Tribunal's purview, as it is essentially a matter for the ACC to decide. The court set aside the Tribunal's order of "deemed promotion" but directed the ACC to reconsider the case of the respondent on merits within three months, taking into account the observations made in the judgment. If the respondent is found suitable, the ACC may grant promotion with consequential benefits of seniority and salary.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeals, setting aside the Tribunal's order of "deemed promotion" but directing the ACC to reconsider the respondent's case within three months. The ACC must provide reasons for differing from the DPC's recommendations and consult the UPSC if necessary before making a final decision. The judgment underscores the importance of transparency and accountability in the promotion process while reaffirming the discretionary powers of the ACC.
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1994 (10) TMI 302
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Right of the local authority to participate in acquisition proceedings.
3. Legal remedies available to the local authority if aggrieved by the determination of compensation.
4. Obligation of the Collector and reference court to notify the local authority.
5. Impleadment of the local authority as a necessary or proper party in compensation proceedings.
Summary:
Issue 1: Interpretation of Sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
The appeals involve the interpretation of Sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (L.A. Act). The court held that sub-section (2) of Section 50 enables a local authority to appear and adduce evidence in any acquisition proceeding at the stage of determination of compensation before the Collector or the reference court. This provision safeguards the interests of the local authority, which is required to pay the compensation determined by the Collector or the Reference Court.
Issue 2: Right of the Local Authority to Participate in Acquisition Proceedings
The court concluded that sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the L.A. Act must be construed as conferring a right on the local authority for whom the land is being acquired to participate in the acquisition proceedings at the stage of determination of the amount of compensation before the Collector as well as the reference court. This right includes the obligation of the Collector and the reference court to give adequate notice to the local authority regarding the proceedings.
Issue 3: Legal Remedies Available to the Local Authority if Aggrieved by the Determination of Compensation
The court recognized that the proviso to Section 50(2) precludes the local authority from demanding a reference under Section 18. However, it does not deprive the local authority of invoking remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution or other provisions of the L.A. Act if aggrieved by the determination of compensation by the Collector or the reference court.
Issue 4: Obligation of the Collector and Reference Court to Notify the Local Authority
The court held that the right to participate in the proceedings carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector and the reference court. The failure to provide such notice would result in the denial of the right unless the local authority had knowledge of the proceedings and did not suffer any prejudice due to the lack of notice.
Issue 5: Impleadment of the Local Authority as a Necessary or Proper Party in Compensation Proceedings
The court opined that the local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party. This allows the local authority to defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose any enhancement of the compensation sought before the reference court by the person interested in the land.
Conclusion:
1. Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority the right to appear in acquisition proceedings and adduce evidence.
2. The right carries with it the obligation of the Collector and the reference court to notify the local authority.
3. The proviso to Section 50(2) does not preclude the local authority from seeking remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. The local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 if denied the right to participate.
5. The local authority is a proper party in reference court proceedings and is entitled to be impleaded.
6. The local authority can file an appeal against the award if the government does not.
7. In appeals seeking enhancement of compensation, the local authority should be impleaded.
8. Companies have the same rights as local authorities under Section 50(2).
9. Matters that are finally concluded will not be reopened.
The court allowed the applications submitted by the Board for being impleaded as a respondent in the appeals filed by the landowners and remitted the appeals to the High Court for a decision in accordance with the law.
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1994 (10) TMI 301
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of Section 3(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
2. Interpretation of Section 3(c) regarding its prospective or retrospective application.
3. Definition of "rent" in the context of Section 3(c).
Summary:
1. Constitutional Validity of Section 3(c):
The primary issue was whether Section 3(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which exempts premises with monthly rent exceeding Rs. 3500 from the Act's provisions, is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. The appellant argued that this classification was arbitrary and discriminatory, failing to consider factors such as locality, size, and the period of tenancy. The court, however, upheld the classification, stating that it was a matter of legislative policy aimed at balancing the interests of landlords and tenants and boosting house-building activity. The court emphasized that legislative classifications need not be mathematically precise and are permissible if they have a rational nexus with the statute's objectives.
2. Prospective or Retrospective Application of Section 3(c):
The appellant contended that Section 3(c) should not apply to tenancies created before the amendment came into force on 1-12-1988, as it would affect vested rights. The court rejected this argument, stating that the amendment partially repealed the Delhi Rent Control Act, withdrawing protection from tenants paying Rs. 3500 or more as monthly rent. The court noted that tenants only had a right to take advantage of the statute while it was in force, and this right did not constitute a vested right that could not be altered by subsequent legislation.
3. Definition of "Rent" in Section 3(c):
The appellant argued that "rent" in Section 3(c) should be construed as "standard rent" rather than the actual rent paid. The court dismissed this argument, clarifying that the legislature did not use the term "standard rent" in Section 3(c). The court stated that the term "rent" should be understood in its ordinary meaning and that the provision aimed to exclude tenants who could afford to pay more than Rs. 3500 per month from the Act's protection. The court emphasized that the exact amount of monthly rent paid on the relevant date was the determining factor for applying Section 3(c).
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the constitutional validity of Section 3(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and clarifying its prospective application and interpretation of "rent." The court emphasized the legislative intent to balance the interests of landlords and tenants and to boost house-building activity.
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1994 (10) TMI 300
Issues involved: Land acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Jurisdiction of Civil Court in entertaining suit for compensation; Compliance with procedures under Sections 18 to 20 of the Act.
Summary:
1. The Supreme Court considered a case where land in District Aizawl was acquired for Assam Rifles' accommodation u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The respondent received compensation under protest but no reference was made to Civil Court u/s 18 of the Act.
2. The respondent filed a Civil Suit for compensation, which was challenged by the appellant citing lack of jurisdiction. The High Court upheld the decree, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.
3. The appellant argued that a specific reference u/s 18 was necessary when compensation was received under protest. However, the respondent contended that the Deputy Commissioner's referral to the Civil Court was akin to a reference u/s 18.
4. The Court emphasized the importance of following the Act's procedures, stating that a valid reference u/s 18 is essential for the Civil Court to have jurisdiction. The Collector's failure to make a reference was highlighted.
5. It was clarified that the Civil Court cannot entertain objections for higher compensation without compliance with procedures u/s 18 to 20 and 31. The High Court and Civil Court's decisions were deemed erroneous.
6. The Supreme Court set aside the previous judgments, directing the Collector to make a reference to the Civil Court based on the respondent's application. The Civil Court was instructed to expedite the matter, and the appeal was allowed without costs.
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1994 (10) TMI 299
Issues:
1. Competency of State Legislature to enact Amendment Act
2. Repugnancy of Amendment Act with Industries Development Regulation Act and Molasses Control Order
3. Interpretation of relevant constitutional entries and provisions
Competency of State Legislature to enact Amendment Act:
The case involved a challenge to the validity of an Amendment Act passed by the State Legislature under Entry 33(a) of the concurrent list of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court had previously declared the Amendment Act valid, except for certain conditions of licenses. The appellants contended that the State Legislature lacked the competence to enact the Amendment Act as it related to the regulation of Molasses, which they argued fell under the purview of the Central Government's control. However, the Supreme Court held that the State Legislature was competent to enact the Amendment Act under Entry 33 of the concurrent list, as Molasses is a by-product of the sugar industry, which is covered by the State List entries relating to intoxicating liquors. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the competence of the State Legislature to enact the Amendment Act.
Repugnancy of Amendment Act with Industries Development Regulation Act and Molasses Control Order:
The appellants further argued that the Amendment Act was repugnant to the Industries Development Regulation Act and the Molasses Control Order, both enacted by the Central Government. They contended that the addition of Molasses in the Rajasthan Excise Act through the Amendment Act conflicted with the provisions of the Molasses Control Order. However, the Supreme Court found no inconsistency between the two laws, as they operated in different fields and did not collide. The Court held that the State Legislature had the authority to regulate the import, export, transport, or possession of Molasses within the state, and the Amendment Act did not encroach upon the domain of the Molasses Control Order. Consequently, the Court concluded that both laws could coexist harmoniously without any conflict, upholding the validity of the Amendment Act.
Interpretation of relevant constitutional entries and provisions:
The Supreme Court analyzed the constitutional entries under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India to determine the legislative competence of the State Legislature in enacting the Amendment Act. It highlighted the distinction between the powers of the Parliament and the State Legislature in regulating industries and trade under different lists. The Court emphasized that the State Legislature's authority to legislate on intoxicating liquors, including Molasses, was distinct from the Central Government's control over industries like sugar production. By interpreting the relevant constitutional provisions, the Court affirmed that the State Legislature's enactment of the Amendment Act fell within its legislative competence under Article 246(3) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals challenging the validity of the Amendment Act, ruling in favor of the State Legislature's authority to regulate Molasses within the state.
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1994 (10) TMI 298
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the dealer-revisionist is entitled to exemption if the purchasing dealer's registration was cancelled or the Form III-A was not genuine.
2. Examination of specific transactions in dispute for assessment years 1978-79, 1979-80, and 1980-81.
Summary:
Issue 1: Entitlement to Exemption
The dealer-revisionist deals in iron and steel, taxable at the point of sale to the consumer u/s 3-AAA of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The dealer claimed exemptions for sales made against Form III-A issued by purchasing dealers. The assessing officer denied these exemptions, citing that some purchasing dealers' registrations were canceled, or the forms were not genuine. The Tribunal upheld this decision. The primary question was whether the dealer, acting in bona fide belief, was entitled to exemption if it was later found that the purchasing dealer's registration was canceled or the Form III-A was not genuine.
Issue 2: Examination of Specific Transactions
1. M/s. Bansal Traders, Bareilly (1978-79): The dealer's sales were made when the purchasing dealer's registration was canceled. The court held that the forms were genuine and issued by the department, and the dealer acted bona fide. Therefore, the sales were exempt from tax.
2. M/s. Kishori Lal Padam Kumar, Muzaffarnagar (1978-79): The Tribunal did not specify the exact date of registration cancellation. The court held that the dealer acted bona fide, and the sales were exempt from tax.
3. M/s. Associated Traders, Shahjahanpur (1978-79): The Tribunal's enquiry was deemed perfunctory. The court held that the dealer acted bona fide, and the sales were exempt from tax.
4. M/s. Kumar Steel Corporation, Fatehpur (1978-79 and 1979-80): The Tribunal's enquiry did not show that the forms were issued to a different dealer. The court held that the dealer acted bona fide, and the sales were exempt from tax.
5. M/s. Paras Nath Kamal Kumar, Rampur (1979-80): The forms were not signed by a Sales Tax Officer and were in a different format. The court upheld the denial of exemption.
6. M/s. United Traders, Aligarh (1979-80): Similar to the above, the court upheld the denial of exemption.
7. M/s. A. S. Steel Corporation, Kanpur (1979-80 and 1980-81): The forms were issued in a preceding year, and the registration was canceled later. The court held that the sales were exempt from tax.
8. National Iron and Steel, Kanpur (1980-81): The purchasing dealer had closed its business, but the court held that the sales were exempt from tax as they were covered by Form III-A.
Conclusion:
The revisions for assessment years 1978-79 and 1980-81 were allowed, and the revision for assessment year 1979-80 was partly allowed. The Sales Tax Tribunal was directed to modify its order in accordance with the directions contained in this judgment.
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1994 (10) TMI 297
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the sale of evacuee properties.
2. Adjudication of right, title, and interest in the property under Order 21, Rule 97 of CPC.
3. Execution of the decree and resistance to possession.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Sale of Evacuee Properties:
The properties bearing Khasra Sakni Nos. 13 and 14 were declared as evacuee properties and sold to the respondent, Dr. K.L. Anand, through public auction. The sale certificates were issued on 26-9-1968. Rehmatullah and Wazu challenged the sales in WP No. 960 of 1969, claiming an interest in the properties and alleging the sale was illegal. The writ petition was dismissed, and the decision was affirmed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 95 of 1978, which became final.
2. Adjudication of Right, Title, and Interest in the Property under Order 21, Rule 97 of CPC:
The appellant resisted the execution of the decree, claiming that his family had not migrated to Pakistan and that the land in question (Khasra No. 179) was not part of the properties sold to the respondent. The executing court dismissed the appellant's application, and the High Court upheld this decision, stating that the controversy was concluded in WP No. 960 of 1969. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that under Order 21, Rule 97, the court must adjudicate upon the right, title, and interest claimed in the property. The scheme of the Code mandates that such adjudication is conclusive and not subject to separate suits.
3. Execution of the Decree and Resistance to Possession:
The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession should be protected pending adjudication. The executing court must determine whether Khasra No. 179 is part of Khasra Sakni Nos. 13 and 14 and if the respondent is entitled to take possession of Khasra No. 179. The orders of the lower courts were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the executing court for adjudication. The court may appoint a Commissioner to demarcate the properties and submit a report.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the executing court was directed to dispose of the application within six months, ensuring the adjudication of the appellant's claim regarding Khasra No. 179. The respondent may apply for the appointment of a Commissioner for property demarcation.
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1994 (10) TMI 296
Issues involved: Delay in launching prosecution, condonation of delay, taking cognizance of offence based on incomplete police report.
Summary:
The Supreme Court addressed the issues arising from a case where the Prohibition and Excise Department, along with other departments, conducted raids on a brewery for alleged offences related to excise duty. Subsequently, cases were registered against the respondent under various sections of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The prosecution filed applications before the Chief Judicial Magistrate seeking condonation of delay and permission for further investigation. The CJM took cognizance of the offence and issued process against the respondents, which was challenged in the High Court. The High Court quashed the proceedings, citing lack of reasons for condonation of delay and taking cognizance based on an incomplete police report.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the High Court's concern regarding condonation of delay without notice to the respondents but disagreed with the decision to quash the proceedings based on the incomplete police report. The Court emphasized that the Magistrate has the discretion to take cognizance based on the material before him, regardless of the label given by the investigating agency. The Court highlighted the importance of the Magistrate's independent assessment of the material presented. The Supreme Court directed the case to be remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for a fresh decision on condonation of delay, while setting aside the High Court's ruling on taking cognizance based on an incomplete police report.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the need for proper procedures in condoning delay and emphasized the Magistrate's authority to take cognizance based on the material before him. The case was remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for further proceedings in accordance with the law, without expressing any opinion on the case's merits.
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1994 (10) TMI 295
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the exercise of power under proviso to Clause (3) of Article 320 of the Constitution.
2. Regularization of services of temporary appointees and its compliance with the Special Rules.
3. Determination of seniority between PSC candidates and temporary appointees.
4. Application of Rule 10(a)(i)(1) and its implications on seniority.
5. Compliance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution regarding regularization and seniority.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the exercise of power under proviso to Clause (3) of Article 320 of the Constitution:
The Tribunal expressed its unhappiness and held that the exercise of the power under proviso to clause (3) of Article 320 of the Constitution and relaxation of recruitment by PSC is bad. It emphasized that all appointments should be made in accordance with the Special Rules conformable to the zonal regulation made by the President exercising the power under Article 371-D of the Constitution.
2. Regularization of services of temporary appointees and its compliance with the Special Rules:
The government, through G.O. Ms. No. 413 dated August 29, 1983, directed the regularization of services of temporary appointees subject to certain conditions. Condition (iii) specified that the services of temporary employees should be regularized without subjecting them to any tests, written or oral, from the date subsequent to the last regular candidate appointed from the PSC list. The Chief Engineer regularized the temporary services of the appellants with conditions, including that the orders of regularization were provisional and subject to future modifications and that the appellants would not be entitled to seniority based on their initial temporary appointment.
3. Determination of seniority between PSC candidates and temporary appointees:
The Tribunal upheld the G.O. giving seniority to the PSC candidates over the temporary appointees. The Court noted that temporary appointees, appointed under Rule 10(a)(i)(1), were not made on the basis of selection by PSC and, therefore, were not in accordance with the Special Rules. Consequently, they could not be considered members of the service unless appointed in accordance with the Special Rules. The seniority of PSC candidates was determined from the date they started discharging their duties, while temporary appointees' seniority was determined from the date of their regular appointment.
4. Application of Rule 10(a)(i)(1) and its implications on seniority:
Rule 10(a)(i)(1) allows for temporary appointments in the public interest to fill emergent vacancies, but such appointees are not regarded as probationers and do not have any preferential claim to future appointments. Rule 23(a) specifies that the probation of a person first appointed temporarily shall commence from the date of subsequent appointment in accordance with the rules. Rule 33(a) determines seniority based on the date of first appointment to the service, class, or category, but excludes temporary service unless it counts towards probation.
5. Compliance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution regarding regularization and seniority:
The Court reiterated that appointments must be made in accordance with the rules to avoid violating Articles 14 and 16, which ensure equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. The practice of regularizing temporary appointments without following the prescribed rules was criticized as it undermines the constitutional mandate and denies eligible candidates their legitimate right to apply and be selected. The Court upheld the government's direction that PSC candidates should be given seniority over temporary appointees, as the latter were not appointed in accordance with the rules.
In conclusion, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's decision that PSC candidates are entitled to seniority over temporary appointees, and the regularization of temporary appointees must comply with the Special Rules and constitutional provisions.
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