|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 493 Records
-
1998 (2) TMI 600
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 13(4) of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 as amended in 1992.
2. Validity of the appointment of the appellant as Principal under Section 13(4).
3. Locus standi of respondent No.1 to challenge the Director's order.
Summary:
1. Interpretation of Section 13(4) of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980:
The primary issue was the interpretation of Section 13(4) of the Act. The appellant argued that vacancies under this section include those occurring due to death, resignation, or otherwise, encompassing any vacancy until a new list is sent by the commission u/s 13(2). The court examined the legislative intent behind the amendments to the Act, which aimed to eliminate ad hocism and ensure appointments based on merit through wide publicity of vacancies.
2. Validity of the Appointment of the Appellant:
The appellant, a highly qualified individual, applied for the post of Principal pursuant to an advertisement by the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission. Although initially not appointed due to the unavailability of a suitable vacancy, the Director later directed the appellant's appointment to a vacancy that arose due to the retirement of a Principal. The High Court quashed this order, holding that the Director misapplied Section 13(4), which is intended for unforeseen vacancies and not for regular vacancies arising in subsequent academic years. The Supreme Court upheld this view, stating that the word "otherwise" in Section 13(4) should be read ejusdem generis with "death" and "resignation," thus covering only unforeseen vacancies.
3. Locus Standi of Respondent No.1:
The appellant contended that respondent No.1 lacked the locus standi to challenge the Director's order. However, the court found that respondent No.1, who was officiating as Principal under statute 13.20 of the Meerut University Act, had a legitimate interest in the matter. The court noted that the senior-most teacher had declined the position, and respondent No.1, being the next senior-most, was appointed, thus validating his standing to challenge the order.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the Director's order appointing the appellant was invalid. The court emphasized that appointments must adhere strictly to the advertised vacancies to ensure transparency and meritocracy, as intended by the amendments to the Act. Costs were imposed on the parties.
-
1998 (2) TMI 599
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Bank of Baroda had the authority to transfer the shares.
2. Validity of the transfer deed and its compliance with Section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956.
3. Whether the petitioners are entitled to rectification of the register of members and consequential reliefs.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Authority of the Bank of Baroda to Transfer the Shares:
The petitioners argued that the shares were in the possession of the Bank of Baroda but were not pledged or subject to any lien. They claimed that the bank had no authority to transfer the shares, as there was no pledge letter signed by the joint shareholders and no lien was given to the bank. The bank allegedly transferred the shares to unknown persons without the petitioners' consent, which the petitioners claimed was unlawful. The petitioners wrote to the respondent company to halt the transfer, but the transfer was still effected. The respondent company argued that the shares were under lien with the bank for an advance granted and were released on 31-12-1993. The company received duly executed transfer deeds and acted in the normal course of business. The Board noted that the petitioners did not explain why the shares with blank transfer deeds were given to the bank and held that the question of lien or security could not be verified without the presence of the Bank of Baroda, who were not made a party to the proceedings.
2. Validity of the Transfer Deed and Compliance with Section 108:
The petitioners contended that the transfer deed was defective and incomplete, lacking the stamp of the prescribed authority as required under Section 108(1) of the Companies Act. They argued that the transfer deed was not a "Blank transfer deed" as per the Supreme Court's ruling in Howrah Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT AIR 1959 SC 775. The petitioners also pointed out that the transfer deed did not clearly identify the transferee and was not duly stamped as per the Maharashtra State Stamp Rules. The respondent company countered that the transfer deeds were duly executed, certified, and lodged within the prescribed time. The Board noted that the validity of the transfer deed could not be determined without resolving the issue of the bank's claim of pledge or lien on the shares, which required factual verification.
3. Entitlement to Rectification of the Register of Members and Consequential Reliefs:
The petitioners sought rectification of the register of members and consequential reliefs, including rights and dividends accrued on the shares. The respondent company argued that the transfer was effected in the normal course of business and that the petitioners failed to obtain a court injunction. The Board observed that the shares had been duly transferred, and third-party interests had been created. Granting relief would require deleting the transferee's name from the register of members, but the transferee was not made a party to the proceedings. The Board held that resolving the dispute required determining the bank's authority to sell the shares and appropriate the proceeds, which could not be adjudicated without the bank's presence. Therefore, the Board decided to relegate the matter to a Civil Court, as the issues involved complicated questions of fact that could only be tested by a Civil Court.
Conclusion:
The petition for rectification of the register of members and consequential reliefs was disposed of, with the Board relegating the matter to a Civil Court due to the complexity of the factual issues involved and the absence of the Bank of Baroda as a party to the proceedings. No orders were made as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 598
Issues involved:
1. Whether the provisions of Sections 45 and 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, dealing with the period of limitation for filing an application for grant of occupancy right, are clear and unambiguous.
2. Whether the appellant can rely on the Karnataka Village Officers Abolition Act, 1961, and related rules to contend that the limitation period under Section 48-A of the Land Reforms Act, 1961, does not commence until the rights of re-grant under the Village Officers Abolition Act are finally decided.
Summary:
Issue 1:
The Supreme Court examined whether the language in Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, fixing a period of limitation is clear and unambiguous. The court noted that the amended Section 48-A, which was introduced by Act 1 of 1979, fixed a specific date for the filing of applications by tenants, i.e., six months from 1.1.1979, expiring on 30.6.1979. The court emphasized that the legislature had clearly intended to do away with the power of condonation of delay by deleting the proviso that allowed for such condonation in the unamended Section 48-A. The court held that the language of Section 48-A is not ambiguous and does not admit of any liberal interpretation to extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the application filed by the 1st appellant on 7.3.1984 was barred by Section 48-A of the Land Reforms Act, 1961, and the High Court was right in dismissing the said application.
Issue 2:
The court addressed the alternative contention that the limitation for filing an application under Section 45 did not start until the proceedings under the Village Officers Abolition Act, 1961, as to re-grant, became final. The court noted that the appellant could have filed the application within the prescribed period by mentioning the dispute regarding the landlords in the application and relying on the provision for public notice under Section 48-A read with Rule 19(1). The court further held that the lands resumed under Section 4(3) of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961, did not become "government lands" and hence were not excluded from the purview of the Land Reforms Act, 1961, under Section 107. The court rejected the appellant's contention that the limitation period under Section 48-A did not commence until the rights of re-grant were finally decided. The court also clarified that the amendment to Section 126 by Act 1 of 1979 was classificatory and declaratory, indicating that the Land Reforms Act, 1961, was always applicable to lands attached to village offices after the abolition of the said offices.
For these reasons, the appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 597
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after finding no merit in it. No order was given regarding costs. (Case: 1998 (2) TMI 597 - SC)
-
1998 (2) TMI 596
Issues Involved:
1. Readiness and willingness to perform the contract.
2. Mistake of fact regarding the area and price of the land.
3. Forfeiture of earnest money.
4. Impact of mistake of fact on the agreement.
5. Applicability of Section 65 of the Contract Act.
Summary:
1. Readiness and Willingness to Perform the Contract:
The Lower Appellate Court found that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as he was only willing to pay Rs. 1,56,150/- instead of the full sale consideration of Rs. 2,35,750/-. This finding was upheld by the High Court.
2. Mistake of Fact Regarding the Area and Price of the Land:
The Lower Appellate Court and the High Court found that both parties suffered from a mistake of fact regarding the area of the land and whether the price was to be paid per "Bigha" or per "Kanal". This mutual mistake made the agreement void.
3. Forfeiture of Earnest Money:
The petitioner contended that the earnest money of Rs. 77,000/- should be forfeited as per the agreement. However, the court held that since the agreement was void due to mutual mistake, the forfeiture clause could not be enforced.
4. Impact of Mistake of Fact on the Agreement:
The court examined the effect of "Mistake of Fact" on the agreement. It was held that the mistake regarding the area and price of the land was essential to the agreement, making it void u/s 20 of the Contract Act. A void agreement cannot be enforced, including any forfeiture clause contained within it.
5. Applicability of Section 65 of the Contract Act:
The court referred to Section 65 of the Contract Act, which mandates the restitution of any benefit received under a void agreement. It was held that the petitioner, having received Rs. 77,000/- as earnest money, was bound to refund this amount to the respondent. The decree for refund of this amount was rightly passed by the Lower Appellate Court.
Conclusion:
The Special Leave Petition was dismissed, upholding the decree for the refund of Rs. 77,000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the contract till the date of actual refund.
-
1998 (2) TMI 595
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction and sentencing of Nahar Singh (A-1), Shishupal Singh (A-2), and Ram Gopal (A-6).
2. Acquittal of other accused by the trial court and the High Court.
3. Delay in lodging the FIR and its implications.
4. Identification of the assailants and the role of artificial light.
5. High Court's interference with the trial court's judgment.
Summary:
1. Conviction and Sentencing of Nahar Singh (A-1), Shishupal Singh (A-2), and Ram Gopal (A-6):
The trial court found Nahar Singh (A-1) guilty u/s 148, 302, 449, and 201 IPC, sentencing him to death u/s 302 IPC, and various terms of rigorous imprisonment for other offenses. Shishupal Singh (A-2) and Ram Gopal (A-6) were found guilty u/s 148, 302/149, 449, and 201 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment u/s 302/149 IPC, along with other terms of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court, however, acquitted A-2 and A-6, which was contested by the State.
2. Acquittal of Other Accused by the Trial Court and the High Court:
The trial court acquitted Liyaqat Ali (A-3), Rakshpal Singh (A-4), Durgpal Singh (A-5), Bhagat Singh (A-7), Hari Shankar Singh (A-8), Brijendra Pal Singh, and Satendra Pal Singh of all charges. The High Court upheld these acquittals, dismissing the State's appeals against them.
3. Delay in Lodging the FIR and Its Implications:
The High Court noted the delay in lodging the FIR and found the explanation unconvincing. However, the Supreme Court found the delay justified due to the assailants keeping watch throughout the night, making it unsafe for PW 1 to lodge the complaint earlier. The Supreme Court emphasized that the explanation for the delay was not cross-examined, making the High Court's reasoning unconvincing.
4. Identification of the Assailants and the Role of Artificial Light:
The High Court doubted the identification of the assailants due to insufficient light at 6.30 p.m. The Supreme Court, however, found that there was enough light for the witnesses to identify the assailants, as stated by PW 5, who mentioned that a lantern was burning at the time of the incident.
5. High Court's Interference with the Trial Court's Judgment:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasons for acquitting A-2 and A-6 were insufficient and not sustainable in law. It emphasized that the trial court's judgment was well-considered, based on credible eyewitness testimonies and corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court restored the trial court's judgment convicting A-2 and A-6 and directed them to be taken into custody to serve their sentences.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment acquitting Shishupal Singh (A-2) and Ram Gopal (A-6), restored the trial court's judgment convicting them, and directed their custody to serve their sentences. The appeals against other respondents were dismissed.
-
1998 (2) TMI 594
Issues:
1. Application of sec. 145 of the I.T. Act and net profit rate of 10% on gross receipts.
2. Treatment of cash credits and interest in the name of creditors.
3. Addition u/s. 40A(3) of the I.T. Act.
Analysis:
1. The appeal involved the application of sec. 145 of the I.T. Act and the imposition of a net profit rate of 10% on gross receipts. The AO rejected the books of accounts of the assessee and estimated the net profit rate at 10%, disallowing claims for depreciation and interest to third parties. The CIT(A) held that the appellant did not maintain proper accounts, leading to the acceptance of the 10% net profit rate. However, the Tribunal noted that in such cases, depreciation and interest paid to third parties should be deducted before arriving at taxable income, following consistent principles. Therefore, the grounds related to this issue were governed by this finding, allowing deductions for depreciation and interest paid.
2. Regarding cash credits and interest in the name of creditors, specific cases were discussed. In one instance, a credit in the name of Smt. Kusumlata was added to total income, but the Tribunal found the addition unreasonable as the creditor's identity and the genuineness of the transaction were established beyond doubt. Similarly, another credit in the name of Shri Vijay Mohata was also deemed genuine despite discrepancies in withdrawal and deposit dates. Additionally, a credit in the name of Smt. Ritesh Lahoti was upheld as genuine, supported by bank drafts and confirmations from the creditor's parents. These additions were deleted based on the established credibility of the transactions and the supporting evidence provided.
3. The final issue revolved around the addition u/s. 40A(3) of the I.T. Act. The assessee argued against further disallowances when a 10% net profit rate was already applied. The Tribunal agreed, stating that when the net profit rate is imposed due to rejected books of accounts, additional disallowances from claimed expenses are not justified. Therefore, this ground of appeal was allowed, leading to a partial allowance of the appeal overall.
-
1998 (2) TMI 593
Issues Involved:
1. Deduction of redemption fine imposed by customs authorities.
2. Disallowance of incentive paid to workers.
3. Disallowance of telephone expenses at the residence of partners.
4. Disallowance of car expenses for personal use by partners.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Deduction of Redemption Fine Imposed by Customs Authorities:
The primary issue revolves around whether the redemption fine paid by the assessee for the clearance of imported goods can be deducted as a business expense. The assessee, a diamond exporter, had imported goods under an additional import license granted following a Supreme Court order. However, the legality of importing certain items was challenged, leading to the confiscation of goods and imposition of a redemption fine under Section 125 of the Customs Act.
The Assessing Officer (AO) added the redemption fine to the assessee's income, treating it as a penalty for infraction of the law, relying on the Bombay High Court decision in T. Khemchand Tejomal vs. CIT. Conversely, the CIT(A) held that the assessee acted in good faith, based on the legal understanding at the time, and thus the fine should be treated as an additional cost of goods, citing CIT vs. Pannalal Narottamdas & Co.
The Tribunal reconciled the conflicting decisions of the Bombay High Court (Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. vs. CIT and Pannalal Narottamdas & Co.), concluding that since the assessee acted in good faith without intent to contravene the law, the redemption fine qualifies as a deductible business expense. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, allowing the deduction.
2. Disallowance of Incentive Paid to Workers:
For the assessment year 1988-89, the Revenue contested the deletion of a disallowance of Rs. 1,03,512 on account of incentives paid to workers. The CIT(A) found that the incentives were linked to extra production and treated as part of the salary for PF and ESIS contributions. The Tribunal, noting the absence of contrary evidence, upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, affirming that the incentives were justifiable business expenses.
3. Disallowance of Telephone Expenses at the Residence of Partners:
The assessee challenged the disallowance of 50% of telephone expenses at the partners' residences as excessive. The Tribunal considered the nature of the expenses and reduced the disallowance to one-third, deeming it a reasonable allocation between personal and business use.
4. Disallowance of Car Expenses for Personal Use by Partners:
Similarly, the assessee contested the disallowance of one-fourth of car expenses for personal use by partners. The Tribunal found that a disallowance of one-fifth would be more appropriate and directed accordingly.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal's decision comprehensively addressed the issues, providing relief to the assessee on the redemption fine and incentives while partially allowing the disallowance of telephone and car expenses. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, and the cross-objections of the assessee were partly allowed.
-
1998 (2) TMI 592
Issues:
Conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC, Chain of Circumstantial Evidence, Death Sentence Confirmation, Substitution of Death Sentence with Life Imprisonment
Analysis:
The judgment involves an appeal against the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC and the confirmation of the death sentence by the High Court. The prosecution's case was based on circumstantial evidence, and the trial court and the High Court found the chain of circumstances complete, leading to the guilt of the appellants. The appellants argued that the chain of circumstantial evidence was not sufficient for conviction. However, both courts concluded that the evidence clearly established the guilt of the appellants, leaving no reasonable ground for innocence.
The prosecution's case rested solely on circumstantial evidence as there were no eyewitnesses to the murders. The circumstances pointed towards the appellants' involvement, as they did not show any interest in the whereabouts of the deceased persons despite living with them. The police found the bodies buried in the Dhaba, with medical evidence confirming homicidal deaths caused by sharp objects. The High Court concluded that no outsider could have committed the murders and buried the bodies in the Dhaba, indicating the appellants' involvement.
The Supreme Court analyzed the circumstantial evidence and found all links in the chain of circumstances unbroken and complete, leading to the appellants' guilt. Regarding the death sentence, the Court noted that special reasons must be given for awarding death penalty, reserved for rarest of rare cases. The trial court and the High Court justified the death sentence based on the cruelty of the act and the motive to grab property. However, the Supreme Court found no evidence of a cold-blooded murder or extreme brutality, leading to the decision to substitute the death sentence with life imprisonment under Sections 302/34 IPC.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal by setting aside the death sentence and sentencing the appellants to life imprisonment while upholding their conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC. The judgment emphasizes the importance of complete chain of circumstantial evidence for conviction and the exceptional nature required for imposing the death penalty.
-
1998 (2) TMI 591
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as the principle of mutuality applied, and the income earned by the assessee from rooms let out to its members could not be taxed. The High Court had already decided this issue in favor of the assessee in other cases.
-
1998 (2) TMI 590
Issues:
1. Validity of reassessments made under section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1972-73 and 1973-74.
2. Whether the assessee omitted to disclose the correct area of the property and shares valuation.
3. Validity of the report under section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act submitted by the Valuation Officer in the reassessment process.
Analysis:
1. The case involved the reassessment of the assessee's property value and shares valuation for the assessment years 1972-73 and 1973-74. The Wealth-tax Officer initiated reassessment based on discrepancies in the property valuation and shares value. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found that the reassessment proceedings were not valid under section 17(1)(a) as the assessee had provided all relevant particulars during the original assessment.
2. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's decision, stating that the assessee had not knowingly omitted to disclose the correct area of the property or shares valuation. The Tribunal found that the Wealth-tax Officer lacked the authority to refer the property valuation to the Valuation Officer after the original assessment was completed. The Tribunal concluded that the reassessment under section 17(1)(a) was not justified as the assessee had provided adequate information during the original assessment.
3. The Tribunal's decision was challenged by the Department, leading to the High Court's review. The High Court concurred with the Tribunal's findings, emphasizing that the assessee had disclosed all relevant particulars during the original assessment. The Court held that the Wealth-tax Officer's failure to determine the correct property value and shares valuation cannot be attributed to the assessee. The Court ruled that the reassessment under section 17(1)(a) was unwarranted and that section 17(1)(b) did not apply due to time limitations.
4. The High Court also addressed the issue of the Valuation Officer's report under section 16A, stating that its relevance would only apply to reassessment under section 17(1)(b), which was not the case here. The Court declined to provide an answer to the third question raised by the Tribunal, as it was unnecessary given the circumstances of the reassessment. The Court awarded costs to the assessee, highlighting the successful defense against the reassessment.
Conclusion:
The High Court affirmed that the reassessment under section 17(1)(a) was invalid, as the assessee had provided all necessary particulars during the original assessment. The Court emphasized the Wealth-tax Officer's duty to ascertain accurate property values and shares valuation based on the information available. The decision highlighted the importance of disclosing full and true particulars during assessments to avoid unwarranted reassessments.
-
1998 (2) TMI 589
The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the revision filed by the Commissioner of Trade-tax against the Trade-tax Tribunal's order in a dispute related to the Assessment Year 1985-86. The Tribunal found the reassessment based on vague information to be unsubstantiated and set it aside. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's order did not raise any legal or factual issues, and therefore, the revision was rejected.
-
1998 (2) TMI 588
Issues:
1. Rejection of account books under U.P. Trade Tax Act.
2. Discrepancy in turnover and purchase details.
3. Validity of remand order by Trade Tax Tribunal.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment involves two connected revisions against a common order by the Sales Tax Tribunal for the assessment year 1988-89 under the U.P. Sales Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act. The dealer, engaged in manufacturing electrical goods, had its account books rejected due to non-maintenance of stock books and discrepancies in turnover figures. The assessing authority proceeded with best judgment assessments resulting in higher turnovers than disclosed by the dealer.
2. The dealer appealed these assessments, which were allowed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) Trade Tax, directing acceptance of the disclosed turnover. The revenue then appealed to the Trade Tax Tribunal, which remanded the case back to the assessing authority. The dealer contested this remand, arguing that the Tribunal had no valid grounds for interference and should have dismissed the revenue's appeals.
3. The judgment references a previous case to establish that rejection of account books under Section 12(2) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act does not automatically necessitate an increase in turnover unless supported by adverse material. The assessment on best judgment should be a separate process from account book rejection. The Tribunal's power to remand for further investigation is acknowledged, but in this case, the Tribunal's reasons for remand were deemed unjustified. The discrepancies in purchase details were considered trivial, and the Tribunal's decision was overturned in favor of confirming the first appellate authority's order.
In conclusion, the Trade Tax Tribunal's orders were set aside, the revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the dealer was to be assessed based on the first appellate authority's orders. The revisions were allowed with no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 587
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Notification dated 15.12.1993 as a Rule or Regulation.
2. Harmonious construction of the Notification and Rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules.
3. Justification of the Notification based on Tribunal directions.
4. Appropriate direction for doing complete justice between the parties.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Notification dated 15.12.1993 as a Rule or Regulation:
The Notification dated 15.12.1993, though issued under Section 3(1) of the All Indian Service Act, 1951, is essentially an amendment to the Indian Administrative Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations, 1955. The Notification increased the cadre strength to accommodate 14 State Civil Service officers excluded from the 1987 Select List. Despite being issued under Section 3(1) of the Act, it cannot be considered a Rule but rather an amendment to the Regulation.
2. Harmonious construction of the Notification and Rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules:
The Notification cannot be harmoniously construed with Rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules. Rule 9 prohibits promotion exceeding 33 1/3 per cent of the posts shown in items 1 and 2 of the Cadre. The Notification increasing posts under item 3 without corresponding increase in items 1 and 2 contravenes Rule 9. Therefore, the Notification dated 15.12.1993 violates the Recruitment Rules and the Cadre Strength Regulation.
3. Justification of the Notification based on Tribunal directions:
The argument that the Notification was issued to implement Tribunal directions in favor of the State Civil Service officers is unsustainable. The Tribunal's directions conferred a right of reconsideration, not promotion. The Central Government's act of promoting all officers included in the revised 1987 Select List contravenes the integrated scheme of the Rules and Regulations governing the IAS. Thus, the Notifications dated 15.12.1993 and 16.12.1993 were beyond the competence of the Central Government and rightly struck down by the Tribunal.
4. Appropriate direction for doing complete justice between the parties:
The appointments of the 14 officers promoted under the Notification dated 16.12.1993 stand invalidated. However, their appointments need not be disturbed. Their seniority and year of allotment in IAS should be re-determined. Only the first 13 officers of the revised 1987 Select List will be treated as promoted based on the 1987 Select List, and their year of allotment will be accordingly determined. Officers from serial no. 14 to 40 will continue in IAS, but their seniority and year of allotment will be adjusted in subsequent years based on available vacancies. The seniority of officers promoted on the original 1987 Select List will also be re-determined. The appeals are disposed of with these directions. No order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 586
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of termination of services under Clause 17(g) of the Certified Standing Orders.
2. Whether the termination amounted to "retrenchment" under Section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Summary:
1. Legality of Termination under Clause 17(g):
Respondent 1, a permanent employee, was terminated by the petitioner for overstaying leave without permission, invoking Clause 17(g) of the Certified Standing Orders. The Industrial Tribunal and the High Court held that the termination was illegal as it did not provide an opportunity of hearing to the respondent, violating principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, stating that Clause 17(g) confers discretion on the management to terminate services, which must be exercised objectively and fairly, ensuring the employee is given an opportunity to explain the reasons for overstaying leave.
2. Termination as "Retrenchment" u/s 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The Tribunal and the High Court found that the termination amounted to "retrenchment" as defined u/s 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, since it was not a result of disciplinary action, voluntary retirement, superannuation, non-renewal of a fixed-term contract, or continued ill-health. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, noting that the respondent was a permanent employee without a fixed-term contract, and thus, the termination did not fall under the exceptions listed in Clause (bb) of Section 2(00). Consequently, the statutory provisions, particularly those in Section 25F, were applicable, and their non-compliance rendered the termination invalid.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the decisions of the Industrial Tribunal and the High Court that the termination was illegal and amounted to "retrenchment," entitling the respondent to reinstatement and back wages.
-
1998 (2) TMI 585
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement towards medical expenses of Punjab government employees and pensioners.
2. Validity of the new policy dated 13th February, 1995.
3. Violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
4. Reimbursement at AIIMS rates vs. actual expenses incurred at private hospitals.
Summary:
Entitlement towards medical expenses:
The primary issue was the entitlement of Punjab government employees and pensioners towards medical expenses as per the relevant rules and Government policy. The Court examined whether the reimbursement for medical expenses incurred in non-governmental hospitals is admissible under the new policy dated 13th February, 1995, which replaced the old policy of 1991.
Validity of the new policy dated 13th February, 1995:
The new policy stipulates that reimbursement for medical expenses incurred in private hospitals is only admissible if the treatment is not available in any government hospital, and requires a no objection certificate from the Civil Surgeon or Director of Health Services. The Court upheld the new policy, stating that it is more liberal as it allows employees to choose any private hospital in India but limits reimbursement to rates fixed by the Director, Health and Family Welfare, Punjab, or the actual expenditure, whichever is less.
Violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India:
The respondents argued that the new policy violated Article 21, which guarantees the right to life, as it restricted reimbursement for life-saving treatments. The Court reiterated that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and that the State has an obligation to provide medical facilities. However, the Court also acknowledged the financial constraints of the State and held that the new policy is not arbitrary or unreasonable and does not violate Article 21.
Reimbursement at AIIMS rates vs. actual expenses incurred at private hospitals:
The Court considered whether the new policy's restriction of reimbursement to AIIMS rates is justified. It concluded that no State can have unlimited resources, and the policy of fixing rates for reimbursement is reasonable and not violative of constitutional rights. The Court emphasized that the State's obligation to provide medical facilities must be balanced with its financial capacity.
Judgment Details:
1. SLP (C) Nos. 13167/97 and 12418/97: The respondents are entitled to reimbursement only at AIIMS rates for surgeries conducted after the introduction of the new policy.
2. SLP (C) Nos. 12143/97 and 12144/97: The appeals were dismissed as the amount claimed had already been paid at Escorts rates.
3. SLP (C) No. 11968/97: The respondent is entitled to the difference between what was paid and the rate admissible at Escorts due to the specific circumstances of the case.
The Court upheld the new policy dated 13th February, 1995, and set aside the impugned High Court orders to the extent indicated. The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 584
Issues Involved:
1. Whether "judicial obstinacy" can be treated as a form of "bias".
2. Whether the Assistant Computers were entitled to promotion and arrears of salary from 13th March 1980.
3. Whether the judge who had previously decided a related matter should have recused himself from the Division Bench hearing the appeal.
Summary:
Issue 1: Judicial Obstinacy as Bias
The Supreme Court examined whether "judicial obstinacy" could be considered a form of "bias". The judgment emphasized that bias, including judicial obstinacy, disqualifies a judge from acting impartially. The court noted that if a judge's earlier decision is overruled, judicial discipline requires that judge to submit to the higher court's judgment and not reiterate their overruled views in the same or related proceedings.
Issue 2: Promotion and Arrears of Salary
The case involved the promotion of Assistant Computers to the West Bengal Subordinate Labour Service. Initially, a single judge had directed their promotion with effect from 13th March 1980, but this was modified by a Division Bench to consider promotions in accordance with the prescribed rules. Despite this, the Assistant Computers filed another writ petition seeking arrears of salary from 13th March 1980. The Division Bench, including the same judge who had given the initial direction, ruled that the Assistant Computers should be treated as promoted from 13th March 1980 but without arrears of salary. The Supreme Court found this to be a reiteration of the overruled judgment.
Issue 3: Recusal of the Judge
The Supreme Court held that Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta, who had previously decided the related matter, should not have sat in the Division Bench to hear the appeal. The court emphasized that a judge must disassociate from cases where they have previously expressed a strong opinion, to maintain the principle that "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done".
Conclusion:
The appeals were allowed, and the judgment and order dated 21.7.1992 by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court were set aside. The second writ petition (Matter No. 1449 of 1987) was dismissed without any order as to costs.
-
1998 (2) TMI 583
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) regarding forged documents produced in court.
3. Relevance of previous judgments under the old Code of Criminal Procedure.
Summary:
1. Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
The primary issue in this appeal is whether prosecution can be maintained for a forged document produced in court without a complaint filed by the concerned court, as per the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) regarding forged documents produced in court:
The court examined whether the prohibition in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) applies to cases where the forgery occurred before the document was produced in court. The court emphasized that Section 195 restricts the general powers of the magistrate and the right of a person to move the court with a complaint. It is a well-recognized canon of interpretation that provisions curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must receive strict interpretation unless the statute or context requires otherwise.
3. Relevance of previous judgments under the old Code of Criminal Procedure:
The court referenced previous judgments, including Patel Laljibhai Somabhai vs. The State of Gujarat and Gopalakrishna Menon & anr. vs. D.Raja Reddy & anr., to address the issue. The court noted that the slight change in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the new Code vis-a-vis the old Code was not intended to deviate from the legal position settled in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai. The court concluded that the bar in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) does not apply to cases where the forgery was committed before the document was produced in court.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to cases where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court.
-
1998 (2) TMI 582
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the appointment of Assistant Commissioners of Labour as Judges of the Labour Court.
2. Compliance with Article 234 and Article 235 of the Constitution in appointing Judges of the Labour Court.
3. Interpretation of "judicial service" under Article 236 of the Constitution.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Appointment of Assistant Commissioners of Labour as Judges of the Labour Court:
The Labour Law Practitioners' Association challenged the appointment of respondents 2 and 3, Assistant Commissioners of Labour, as Judges of the Labour Court at Pune and Sholapur u/s 9 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court set aside the Notification dated 8.3.1979 and directed the State of Maharashtra to comply with Article 234 of the Constitution. The Division Bench upheld this decision, leading to the present appeal.
2. Compliance with Article 234 and Article 235 of the Constitution:
The Court examined whether the Labour Court Judges fall within the scope of "judicial service" as defined in Article 236. It was held that Labour Courts perform judicial functions and are courts that adjudicate disputes of a civil nature. The Court emphasized that appointments to judicial service must be made by the Governor after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court, as mandated by Article 234. The High Court's interpretation that Labour Court Judges are part of the judicial service was upheld.
3. Interpretation of "Judicial Service" under Article 236:
The Court referred to the extensive definition of "District Judge" and "judicial service" in Article 236, which includes judges of specialized civil courts like Labour and Industrial Courts. The Court cited previous judgments, including Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Statesman (Private) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb, to emphasize the importance of maintaining the independence of the judiciary. The Court concluded that Labour Court Judges and Industrial Court Judges belong to the judicial service, and their recruitment must comply with Article 235.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the appointment of Labour Court Judges must adhere to the constitutional provisions ensuring judicial independence. The recruitment of Labour Court Judges should be in accordance with Article 235, and the High Court's interpretation was upheld. No order as to costs was made.
-
1998 (2) TMI 581
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellants are entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 1/93.
2. Whether the repacking of Scented Supari into pouches/containers amounts to manufacture.
3. Whether the appellants are using the brand name of another person as per Explanation 9 of Notification No. 1/93.
Summary:
Issue 1: Entitlement to the Benefit of Notification No. 1/93
The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeals and held that the appellants are not entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 1/93, confirming the orders of the Assistant Commissioner. The lower authorities held that the appellants are ineligible for the exemption under Notification 1/93 due to para 4 and Explanation 9, which states that if any trader uses the brand name of another trader in relation to the specified goods, the benefit is not available.
Issue 2: Repacking as Manufacture
The appellants procured Scented Supari in bulk and repacked it into pouches/containers, marketing it under the brand name "ARR" with logos and a photograph of Shri A.R. Ramasami. The lower authorities held that repacking in unit containers amounts to manufacture, thus denying the benefit of Notification 1/93.
Issue 3: Use of Brand Name
The learned Consultant argued that for Explanation 9 to apply, it must be established that the appellants are using the brand name of another person on such goods sold by the other person. The Consultant contended that the goods sold by M/s. ARR Seeval (raw betelnut in chipped form) and the goods sold by the appellant (Scented Supari) are not the same. The brand name of M/s. ARR Seeval is different from the brand name used by the appellant, and the mere use of some logos and photographs does not amount to using the same brand name.
The Tribunal considered the submissions and referred to the principles laid down by the Madras High Court in Union of India v. Pillaiyar Soda Factory, which emphasized that the word "same" in the notification must be understood according to its plain and ordinary meaning. The Tribunal concluded that the appellants are not using the same trade mark as M/s. ARR Seeval, and at best, it can be said that it is deceptively similar.
The Tribunal also relied on the CBEC Circulars, which clarified that it is permissible to have the same trade mark for different classes of goods owned by different persons. The goods sold by M/s. ARR Seeval (raw betelnut) and the goods sold by the appellant (Scented Supari) are different and known in the market differently.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal held that the decision of the lower authorities is not sustainable and allowed the appeals with consequential relief, stating that the appellants are not using the same brand name as M/s. ARR Seeval and the goods marketed by both are different.
........
|
9911796707
