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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 46 Records
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1956 (8) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but that the assessee should be treated as if he had not offered any explanation. If on such a notice in such a form the representations could be considered by the Officer, it stands to reason that a provision in the notice enabling this to be done cannot amount to deprivation of the assessee of the reasonable opportunity to be heard, which section 28(3) guarantees. Grant of a reasonable opportunity to the assessee to be heard is sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 28(3), whether or not that opportunity is availed of by the assessee, and whether or not there is a further direction in the notice that the assessee should present himself in person before the officer to be heard. The notices issued to the petitioner under section 28(3) were, in our opinion, in conformity with the law, and the penalties imposed were, therefore, lawful. These petitions fail and are dismissed, with costs in one (C.M.P. 3138/56). Counsel's fee ₹ 150. Petitions dismissed.
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1956 (8) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and severe with business people who seek to evade payment of tax, they should be equally considerate to those business people who honestly claim deductions to which they are entitled in law. This particular case is an illustration of how procedure and questions of limitation can defeat the just claim of an assessee because he has to proceed in the manner laid down in the Act and the Act does not give him the necessary relief in the particular situation in which he finds himself. But apart from expressing our sympathy and making the suggestion with regard to the reform of the law, as far as this particular reference is concerned we do not see how we can give any relief to the assessee without extending our limited jurisdiction. The result therefore is that our answer to the first question is Items 1 to 4 were not debts and items 5 to 9 did not become bad debts. The answer to the second question is in the negative. The assessee to pay the costs. Questions answered accordingly.
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1956 (8) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Parllament has done so then no effective charge can be made on the total income of the previous year of the assessee under the provisions of the Finance Act which deals with additional tax on excess dividend. 8. We will, therefore, proceed to answer the questions submitted to us. Question (1) was not pressed by Mr. Palkhivala and we need not answer it in our opinion questions (2), (3) and (4) should be reformulated and the one question that we are raising correctly brings out the controversy between the assessee and the Department, and the question is to the following effect "Whether additional income-tax has been legally charged under Clause (ii) of the proviso to para B of Part I of the Forest Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951, as applied to the assessment year 1953-54 by the Indian Finance Act, 1953 read with Section 3, Indian Income Tax Act?" We answer the question in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. 9. Reference answered in the negative.
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1956 (8) TMI 49 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... operty. The Custodian has no power to determine disputed questions of title Namazi v. Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property Madras, (1951) 2 Mad I,J 1 (AIR 1951 Mad 930) (B). or to determine whether a debt is barred by time or not Sahib Dayal-Bakshi Ram v. Asst Custodian of Evacuee Property, Amritsar. 54 Pun LR 313 (AIR 1952 Pnnj-389) (C) or to recover any debt under Section 48 when the debtor declares that the debt is barred by time, Parite-shah Sadashiv v Asst. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Amritsar, 54 PLR 468 (AIR 1933 Punj 21) (D). 10. As the amount which is firing demanded from the petitioner has not been admitted or proved to be due from him and as the amount is not due under the provisions of the Act, 1 dm of the opinion that it was not within the power of the Custodian to direct the Assistant Collector, Ambala, to issue a writ of demand. I would accordingly uphold the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the appeal with costs. Bishan Narain, J. 11. I agree.
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1956 (8) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... That, in our opinion, is a wrong approach to the question. What we have to consider is what are the commercial profits, the real profits, which have been earned in the year of account and which are liable to tax, and if those real profits can only be arrived at after taking into consideration the expenditure incurred in the prior years, then even though the expenditure may not strictly fall within the ambit of section 10, for the purpose of assessing the real profits credit must be given to the assessee in respect of the expenditure incurred in the prior years. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal was in error when it took the view that the only expenditure to which the assessee was entitled to be given credit was expenditure incurred in the year 1950-51. We will therefore answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. The assessee to pay the costs of the notice of motion. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1956 (8) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ubtedly, the Commissioner could have made an application for a reference, but there may be cases, as we have just pointed out, where the Commissioner could not have made an application for a reference because he had won before the Tribunal. We therefore overrule the preliminary objection taken by Mr. Palkhivala. Coming to the question raised by the Commissioner, which deals with the sum of ₹ 21,142 to which reference has been made, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in the view that it took that that amount cannot be considered to have been distributed when the distribution was made by the liquidator, and therefore that amount cannot possibly bear the impress of dividend in any view of the case. The result is that we will answer the question raised at the instance of the assessee in the negative, and the question raised at the instance of the Commissioner also in the negative. The Commissioner must pay the costs of the reference. Questions answered in the negative.
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1956 (8) TMI 46 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the construction of the college and Mass stipends are "income" within the meaning of the Income-tax Act. They were clearly under a misapprehension as to the effect of the deletion of clause (iii) of section 5, sub-section (3), of the Cochin Income-tax Act, 1117, by the Amendment Act of 1122. They misunderstood the character of Mass stipend. They misconceived the meaning of the expression "receipt of a casual and non-recurring nature" in clause (vii) of section 5, sub- section (3). These are errors apparent on the face of the record which go to the root of the matter, and we think that this is a fit case in which we should interfere in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in us under article 226 of the Constitution. We therefore allow this petition and order the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the respondents assessing the petitioner to income-tax for the years 1123, 1124 and 1125. We make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1956 (8) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... But this question does not arise here because, as already pointed out, no further aspect of the case has to be considered under this head different from what we have already considered under section 10(2)(xv). A rather faint argument was advanced that the income of Rs. 7,519 which has been brought to tax falls under section 12 and under section 12(2) the payment of interest of Rs. 4,554 should be allowed. It is difficult to understand why the assessee company had to commit default and pay Rs. 4,554 in order to earn the interest of Rs. 7,519. He could have earned the same interest with the same ease and perhaps with a clearer conscience if he had not committed the default and was liable to pay the sum of Rs. 4,554. Mr. Palkhivala did not press the point which he had urged before the Tribunal and which forms part of the question referred to us, that his case fell under section 10(2)(iii). Therefore we must answer both the questions in the negative. The assessee to pay the costs
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1956 (8) TMI 44 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... clause (g), sub-clause (ii). We are unable to accede to this contention. Charges for packing and delivery and other such like services contemplated by sub-rule (ii) have relation only to those expenses incurred in connection with the delivery of the article sold and have no reference to expenses incurred prior to the article reaching the place of business of the dealer. It is conceded by Shri Mallikharjuna Rao that the cooly in dispute was paid by his clients for the purpose of having the goods transported to the place of business. Such being the case, it is difficult to extend the benefit of clause (g), sub-clause (ii), to cases of this description. Therefore, this submission also fails and is rejected. No other point is argued before us. In the result, this revision case is dismissed with costs. This decision applies to T.R.C. Nos. 57 of 1956 and 58 of 1956 and they are also dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 200 in each of the cases. Petitions dismissed.
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1956 (8) TMI 43 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... itled to a credit for such exportation in his report made in the next month, and the mere fact that he cannot claim an anticipatory credit for gasoline not yet exported, but intended so to be, seems to us to be too slight a burden to be of any moment, or to raise a substantial constitutional question Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson 292 U.S. 86 78 L.Ed. 1141 (1148). The attack on rule 15(2) must accordingly fail. No doubt these observations were obiter in that case, but on a careful consideration of all the arguments advanced to us relating to this question which actually arises for consideration in the present case we respectfully agree with his Lordship s observations. 7.. We therefore hold that rules 9 to 11 do not offend or contravene section 3 of the Act and are not ultra vires of that section or of the powers of Government. Rules 10 and 11 have to be treated as valid and integral parts of the Sales Tax Act. Reference is answered accordingly. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (8) TMI 42 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d by him, then an embarrassing position will be created inasmuch as an appeal lies to the Commissioner from the order of the Commercial Tax Officer, and obviously the appeal will be frustrated. This, in my opinion, also is in support of the view that I have taken in the matter. In the premises, the notice that had been served is perfectly in order and I find nothing wrong with it. The Commercial Tax Officer, Lyons Range Charge, says that he has been satisfied from information which had come into his possession that the petitioner was liable to pay sales tax for a certain period and yet the petitioner had not been registered. In view of my interpretation of the Act and the Rules, this notice is quite in order. I however say nothing as to the merits of the case. This being the only point which has been pressed, the application fails and must be dismissed. The rule is accordingly discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (8) TMI 41 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the range of taxation by confining it to a single occasion. The rule leaves no room for doubt that the concession may be availed of only by licence-holders and this is consistent with what is stated in section 7. The combined effect of sections 5 and 7 and rule 5 is that unlicensed dealers in hides and skins are not entitled to seek restriction of taxation to a single point. Consequently rule 23(5) which relates to transactions of such persons cannot be held to be repugnant to section 5 of the Act. For the purpose of assessment a difference is made between licensed and unlicensed dealers under the Act. The differentiation is not shown to be unreasonable and not held to be so in Syed Mohamed and Co. v. State of Madras 1952 3 S.T.C. 367 A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 105. The petitioners cannot therefore complain that the rules affecting them are invalid because these are not as favourable to them as to licensed dealers. The petitions are dismissed but without costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1956 (8) TMI 40 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed. The liability for taxation cannot be decided solely by answering the questions formulated as only the provision of the Sales Tax Act is referred to in one and sub-article (2) of Article 286 is referred to in the other. The Supreme Court has laid down that the validity of the imposition depends on its not being hit by any of the four conditions mentioned in Article 286 and that these are independent of one another. In our opinion, the ban under the first clause read with the Explanation applies to the case and so the assessees are not liable to pay sales tax with respect to goods sold and exported outside the State of Mysore and that the Continuance Order of the President under sub-clause (2) will not lift the ban placed by clause (1). The answers to the questions are therefore in the negative. As the conclusion arrived at is due to the decision of the Supreme Court subsequent to the reference, we direct parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1956 (8) TMI 39 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot legally right in including the cost of freight in the taxable turnover of the assessee. It was argued by the AdvocateGeneral that the petitioners have been unable to show before the taxing authorities that the freight was separately charged. This position is controverted by Mr. Baldeva Sahay on behalf of the petitioners. This is manifestly a question of fact and we do not propose to go into that question in this reference, but we are of the view that if the petitioners satisfy the taxing authorities as to what amount was spent towards the cost of freight and collected as such, the petitioners are entitled to the deduction of that amount from the calculation of the turnover. That is our answer to the seventh question referred by the Board of Revenue to the High Court. As the State of Bihar has succeeded in this reference only in four out of the seven questions, we do not propose to pass any order as to costs of the hearing of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (8) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r who is only an intermediary and it is not for him to establish, as has been suggested by the learned District Judge in his judgment, that he is the agent appointed by the Government. He is not a dealer and it is not necessary for him to show that he was the agent of the Government. It is enough for him to establish that by virtue of the scheme of distribution adumbrated in the several circular orders, his position is that of any other person who passes the goods from one hand to another under the directions of the Government in pursuance of the control regulations they have laid down for enforcement. He is simply in the position of an intermediary and his function is correctly described, even in the circulars, as being only for distribution of the goods and not for effecting sale. He can in no view of the case be a dealer and therefore he is not liable for being taxed under the Sales Tax Act. The result is this second appeal is allowed with costs. No leave. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (8) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rnover, which was held to have been suppressed, it was enough if the assessee was called upon to pay at the concessional rate to which he would have been entitled had he not broken any condition of the licence held by him. The Tribunal apparently overlooked the scope of section 6-A when it gave that direction. The Tribunal no doubt regarded that the suppression had not been wilful. But the Tribunal did not even go into the question, in the first instance, whether the suppression of the turnover constituted a breach of the condition of the licence held by the assessee. Since a really relevant factor was not taken into account, we are unable to hold that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal is entitled to that sanctity, which we must normally accord to an order passed based on a discretion vested in a statutory Tribunal. We set aside the order of the Tribunal, and direct that the appeal be remanded for disposal afresh by the Tribunal. No order as to costs. Appeal remanded.
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1956 (8) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ioners are not at all liable in respect of any liability to pay tax under the provisions of that Act. We can quite understand and appreciate the contention of the Advocate-General that the Legislature could never have intended that the transferee, the petitioners, should under these circumstances escape liability to pay tax. But, this, according to us, is one of the many instances where the Legislature has misfired and has failed to achieve its object. As this is a taxing statute, if there is any doubt or ambiguity, we must give the benefit of that doubt or ambiguity to the subject. But we are of the opinion that this is not a case of a doubt or ambiguity at all. The provisions of law are quite clear and the Taxing Authority was in error in trying to recover the dues by the transferor company from the petitioners. The result is that the petitioners succeed. Notices dated 13th of July, 1956, will be set aside. Respondents to pay the costs of the petitioners. Petition allowed.
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1956 (8) TMI 35 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... goods has, by reason of such sale, passed in another State. 14.. It is agreed that if our conclusion is as stated above it is un- necessary to consider the scope and meaning of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, or of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Ordinance, 1956, which it replaced. It is also unnecessary to consider the contention of the petitioner that K.J. Mathew v. Sales Tax Officer, Alwaye(1), and Kunju Moideen Kunju v. State of Travancore Cochin(2) require reconsideration and of the learned Government Pleader that the words sale by the person who in the State is the first dealer occurring in rule 6 of the Travancore Cochin General Sales Tax Rules, 1950, indicate a sale by a resident dealer and not by a non-resident dealer like the Imperial Tobacco Company of India, Ltd., Coimbatore. 15.. It follows that the petition has to be dismissed and it is here- by dismissed with costs, advocate s fee Rs. 150. (1) 1954 5 S.T.C. 58. (2) 1954 5 S.T.C. 462. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (8) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the tax. In The Government of Andhra v. N. Nagendrappa(1) a Divisional Bench of this Court held that though the sale was held through a commission agent outside the State, the turnover was liable to be taxed. No doubt, that case may be distinguished on the ground that the sales effected through the commission agents were sales for export to foreign buyers, whereas in the present case, the commission agents sold the goods only in the Mysore State. Even so, for the reasons given by us, we hold that as the sales through the commission agents were effected by export, the dealer would be liable to tax. (1) 1956 7 S.T.C. 568. If the turnover of the said transactions effected by the commission agents is added, the total turnover would be more than Rs. 10,000 and therefore not exempted under section 3(3) of the Act and is liable to tax. The order of the Tribunal is therefore set aside. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Petition allowed.
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1956 (8) TMI 33 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for consumption. It is on that basis that the purchase tax has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the purchase was in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Now, having held that the validating Act is valid and these sales and purchases can be taxed by reason of the validating Act, it would be open to the petitioner to establish any question of fact which would not render him liable to pay tax even though the Sales Tax Act has been duly and properly validated. These questions can only be agitated before the Tribunals set up under the Sales Tax Act itself and not before us. We only say this in order not to prejudice the right of the petitioner to put forward his contentions at the proper time and before the proper authority. Therefore, as far as this petition is concerned, the petition in view of our judgment must fail and must be dismissed. The petitioner to pay the costs of the respondents. Cost fixed at Rs. 1,000 for each party. Petition dismissed.
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