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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 412 Records
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1956 (12) TMI 34 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... start with, the petitioner took advantage of the order of transfer to the fullest extent but later on turned round to say that Shri Kolhe had no jurisdiction to make the assessment. The petitioner s application challenging the validity of the order of assessment passed by Shri Kolhe does not appear to have been made in good faith and indicates his mala fides. In this view of the matter, I am of opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in exercise of the discretionary power vested in this Court by Article 226 of the Constitution. 40.. As the petitions fail on merits, it is not necessary for me to consider the further contentions raised by the opponents, namely, that the petitioner had an equally efficacious alternative remedy and that there should be no interference by this Court for that reason. 41.. The result is that the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with costs. Advocate s fees shall be taxed as Rs. 100. NEVASKAR, J.-I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1956 (12) TMI 33 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ve applied for a writ without exhausting those remedies. In the first place, I am not satisfied that the dealer has not already pursued his appropriate remedies under the law. But even if he had not, an application for a writ is not altogether barred. In appropriate cases, this Court can always interfere by prerogative writs when it finds that manifest injustice is likely to result by unauthorised and unwarranted acts of the taxing authorities purporting to tax under cover of a law, which is ultra vires and in excess of constitutional sanctions. A rule nisi had been already issued by this Court on the facts stated above and when the Court is satisfied on hearing parties that the assessments were quite unauthorised to the extent indicated earlier, the Court will not refuse to interfere and allow that injustice to continue. The application must, therefore, be allowed and appropriate writs issue as prayed for. I make no order as to costs of the application. Application allowed.
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1956 (12) TMI 32 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y way of tax within the meaning of section 11 as held in Kunju Moideen Kunju s case 1954 5 S.T.C. 462. But the petitioners case was clear at all stages that it was only as tax that they made the collections at all and the only point raised was that the collections were not made under the Travancore-Cochin Act. 12.. The third ground as to refund already made was not pressed and, therefore, does not arise for consideration. But I should say that the observations in the orders impugned that the petitioners had no right to do this, and if they had done so, they did it at their risk, is certainly wrong. A claim preferred by the person who had paid the amount to the registered dealer would lie against the Government without doubt. If so, an earlier payment over by the registered dealer himself to the rightful claimant would be unobjectionable. 13.. In the result the petition has no merit. It is therefore rejected with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 (one set only). Petition rejected.
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1956 (12) TMI 31 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... scharge so far as the plaintiff is concerned. 4.. As regards the last ground, namely, that the State cannot be made liable for the fraudulent act of the Proverthicar, we are unable to accept the conclusion reached by the learned Judge. The Proverthicar was acting within the scope of his authority, and if he embezzled the money later, the State cannot plead that the payment is not valid so long as it is not alleged or proved that the plaintiff was a party to such fraud. The fraud, if at all, was committed by the Proverthicar after receipt of the amounts and the plaintiff cannot be held liable for the same. In these circumstances, it must be held that the payment of Rs. 1,900 by the plaintiff was a valid payment which must be given credit to by the State. 5.. In the result, the appeal is allowed reversing the decree of the court below and decreeing the suit in terms of the plaint. The appellant will get his costs here and in the court below from the respondent. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (12) TMI 30 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g under this Act before the Commissioner or any person appointed to assist him under sub-section (1) of section 3 shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (XIV of 1860). The language of section 22 also lends support to the view that we have expressed that the power of the Commissioner under section 21 to determine a question is a power of a judicial or quasi judicial character and the determination of a question by the Commissioner in exercise of that power under section 21 is liable to be revised by the Board of Revenue. For these reasons we hold that the Board of Revenue has jurisdiction to entertain a petition against the order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax passed under section 21 of the Act We, accordingly, answer the question of law in favour of the petitioner and against the State of Bihar. We assess the hearing fee at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (12) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... ity. Even otherwise there is a distinction between a set-off claimed by the liquidator and a set-off under the Civil Procedure Code. For while the latter should be of a legally claimable debt, the former need not fulfil that condition. See Thakur Prasad v. Benares Bank 1941 11 Comp Cas 298 . The claim of the bank is therefore allowed to be set off against the claim of the debtor under his staff security. The claim will therefore be removed from the list but the defendant will be entitled to proceed only for balance after set-off against the claim herein. No costs.
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1956 (12) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Transfer of Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal and Directors - Power of
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1956 (12) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
General provisions with respect to memorandum and articles - Effect of memorandum and articles, Directors – Power of
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1956 (12) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Articles of association - Regulations required in case of unlimited company, company limited by guarantee or private company limited by shares, General provisions with respect to memorandum and articles - Effect of memorandum and articles and Managing director – Tenure of appointment
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1956 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 5(7A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, hereinafter called the Act, is ultra vires the Constitution as infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in article 14 and article 19(1)(g)?
Held that:- Section 5(7A) of the Act is not violative of article 14 of the Constitution and also does not impose any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade or business enshrined in article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. If there is any abuse of power it can be remedied by appropriate action either under article 226 or under article 32 of the Constitution and what can be struck down is not the provision contained in section 5(7A) of the Act but the order passed thereunder which may be mala fide or violative of these fundamental rights. This challenge of the vires of section 5(7A) of the Act, therefore, fails. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... /2, Lansdowne Road, his enjoyment is further restricted inasmuch as it is subject to the right of residence of Ramendra and his heirs in the said premises until the obligation to provide alternative accommodation is discharged by Rajes or his heirs. 23. We are clearly of the opinion that the objection raised to the execution (1) on the ground that the properties charged are to be proceeded against, in the first instance, and (2) on the ground that the interest which Rajes gets under the trust deed either as regards the general properties covered by the deed or as regards premises No. 44/2, Lansdowne Road, is contingent, are untenable. If, as a fact, either the debts remain undischarged or the alternative accommodation has not so far been provided, how the rights of persons affected thereby are to be safeguarded is not a matter that arises for consideration before us and we express no opinion thereupon. 24. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. 25. Appeal dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it is reasonable to assume that standardization of retrenchment compensation and doing away with a perplexing variety of factors for granting retrenchment compensation may well have been the purposes of Section 25F though the basic consideration must have been the granting of unemployment relief. However, in our view of the construction of Section 25F. no compensation need be paid by the Appellants in the two appeals. It is unnecessary therefore to decide whether, in other cases of a different character Section 25F imposes a reasonable restriction or not. In the result we must allow the two appeals and set aside the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the two cases. Wo hold that the Appellants in the two appeals are not liable to pay any compensation Under Section 25F of the Act to their erstwhile workmen who were not retrenched within the meaning of that expression in that section. In the circumstances of these two cases, the parties must bear their own costs throughout.
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1956 (11) TMI 47 - THE CHANCERY DIVISION
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... ... ..... that in consideration of those deductions of rent the tenants agreed to do work which otherwise the landlord might have been required to do, and they did work which represented a capital expenditure required on the acquisition of the premises by them for the purposes of their trade. It was work and expenditure of a capital nature, being in respect of the accumulation of repairs or alterations (of a small nature, perhaps, but none the less alterations) of the premises to suit their business. It had, therefore, nothing in common with the current expenditure on repairs of the property which call to be made normally under a lease. Consequently, the only possible and reasonable conclusion on the facts in this case is that this work and expenditure was of a capital nature, and the commissioners must have misdirected themselves in law, as it is not a conclusion which seems to me a reasonable one in the circumstances of the case. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on." It is difficult to escape the conclusion that there was here a process of give and take, and a settlement of the matter via media. If so, it ought not to be open to any one side to resile unilaterally. Analogy may, if necessary, be drawn from section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure precluding appeal from decisions passed by court with the consent of parties. Such decisions could be set aside only on grounds which would invalidate an agreement such as misrepresentation, fraud or mistake and that again, by suit. In the absence here of any exceptional case of this sort, it should follow that the order of the Tribunal must, as between the parties to it, stand. That means, that the Income-tax Officer had no authority to modify the order by himself and on the ground ascribed. 8. I, therefore, issue a writ of certiorari as prayed for, quashing Exhibit F order. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondents, with counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nder s. 14 and that his case should not go to the Advisory Board. We see no warrant for the contention that this decision of the Government must be communicated to the detenue. It has not been shown how the communication of this decision would have been beneficial to the detenue. Indeed in the case of Achhar Singh v. The State of Punjab (1) this Court has expressed the opinion that the omission to convey the order made under s. 1 1 of the Indian Preventive Detention Act does not make the detention illegal or result in infringement of the petitioner's fundamental right. If that be the position under s. 1 1 of the Indian Preventive Detention Act, which provides for the making of a formal order, all the more must the position be the same under s. 14 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, which does not in terms require any formal order to be made. In our opinion there is no substance in this application, which must accordingly be dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n is based on the ground that the petitioner was engaged in unlawful smuggling activities relating to three commodities, cloth, zari and mercury of which two are found not to be essential articles. No material is placed before us enabling us to say that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury and that the smuggling as regards the other two commodities was of an inconsequential nature. On the other hand the fact that the particulars furnished to the detenu on the 31st May, 1956, relate only to cloth and zari (we understand that tila referred to in paragraph 3 is zari) indicates that probably the smuggling of these two items was not of an inconsequential nature. 10. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the order of detention in this case is bad and must be quashed. We have accordingly quashed the order and directed the release forthwith of the detenue on the conclusion of the hearing on the 29th October, 1956. 11. Petition allowed.
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1956 (11) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ument. A Court in order in find out what has pushed at a Sheriff's sale looks into the order directing the sole, the proclamation of sale and the surrounding circumstances. The surrounding; circumstance in this case is the higher value paid and the appellant never applied to set aside such sale on the ground of any alleged irregularity and defect. All these factors taken individiually find together leave no doubt in our mind that the goodwill of the business oe D. Mullick & Co. of 46/A, Netaji Subhas Road as a going concern including the monthly tenancy rieht of that shop room was In fact sold in this particular instance. We see nothing in the decision of Das J., in the matter of - 'H. C. Gupta v. Mackertich John', 49 Cal WN 322 (AIR 1946 Cal 140) CE), which supports Mr. Das's contention in this appeal. In fact, Das J., refers to some of the decisions that we have mentioned above. 18. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs. Bachawat, J. 19. I agree.
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1956 (11) TMI 42 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rpose of that rule. We are of opinion that seven clear days' interval is required between the date of announcement of the notice and the date of election under Rule 4. and as in the present case the interval comes to only six days even if 14th of October, 1955, is taken to be the date of announcement, a case of contravention of Rule 4 has been made out. Dis-regard of the provision of Rule 4 which is a mandatory provision renders the proceedings of election illegal. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the election, in the present case, cannot be regarded as valid on account of disregard of the mandatory provision of Rule 4. 13. This petition succeeds. The proceedings of election of the Panchas and Sarpanch held on the 21st of October, 1955 of Village Panchayat, Choru are quashed and a direction is issued to the Chief Panchayat Officer to hold fresh elections in accordance with the provisions of law. Under the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1956 (11) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o accused acted in concert by virtue of a common intention and of a criminal conspiracy, their entire activities cannot, in the very nature of things, be brought out in evidence. Obviously such daring offences would necessarily have called for active planning and co-operation of both these appellants together and probably of others We are, therefore, not able to make any distinction between them even as regards the sentence. We accordingly maintain the convictions and sentences against both the appellants under Sections 364 and 386, Penal Code taken with Sections 120B-B and 34, Penal Code. 12. In the result the convictions of both the appellants under Sections 302/34 and 201/34, Penal Code and the sentence of death, and rigorous imprisonment for seven years there for, are hereby set aside and the appellants are acquitted of these charges Their convictions and sentences in respect of the other charges are confirmed. Subject to this modification both the appeals are dismissed.
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1956 (11) TMI 40 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... o ; as, however, on the true construction of the agreement, some part at least of the £1,00,000 related to the imparting of information as to the secret processes, that part, in my judgment, reflects the diminution in value of a capital asset of the company and is, accordingly, not subject to tax. The case should therefore be remitted to the commissioners so as to afford to the company an opportunity for proving what proportion of the £100,000 should be treated, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, as referable to the secret processes which were imparted to the Government ; and that part, when ascertained, should be deducted from the assessment which has been made upon the company. Case remitted to commissioners to call further evidence and to determine what part, if any, of the amount of £100,000 should be attributed to the imparting of the secret processes, such part to be treated as a capital receipt, and to adjust the assessment accordingly.
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