|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 450 Records
-
1958 (9) TMI 89
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the debt of the father was avyavaharika.
2. Effect of severance of status by the filing of the suit for partition.
3. Interpretation of the words "right, title, and interest of the defaulter" in Section 155 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the debt of the father was avyavaharika:
The term "avyavaharika" has been variously translated as "a debt for a cause repugnant to good morals." The appellants attempted to prove that the debt fell within this term by relying on the payment order and findings by the Deputy Registrar, which were based on a breach of trust. However, the Court held that the order of the Deputy Registrar was not admissible to prove the truth of the facts stated therein and could only be used to prove the existence of the judgment itself. The Court concluded that the liability incurred by the father as a managing director of the bank, due to negligence, could not be termed as "repugnant to good morals." Thus, the debt was binding on the sons.
2. Effect of severance of status by the filing of the suit for partition:
The Court examined the rights and liabilities of Hindu sons in a Mitakshara coparcenary family. It was established that the pious duty of the sons to discharge their father's debts not tainted with immorality or illegality continues even after partition, unless a provision has been made for the payment of such debts. The Court held that the right of the judgment creditor to seize the whole coparcenary estate for payment of the father's debt remains unaffected by partition. The sons' liability to pay the father's debt continues until the debt is paid off, and partition does not relieve the sons of their pious obligation. Consequently, the sale of the whole estate in execution of the decree cannot be challenged except on proof of the immoral or illegal purpose of the debt.
3. Interpretation of the words "right, title, and interest of the defaulter" in Section 155 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code:
The Court held that the phrase "right, title, and interest of the defaulter" in Section 155 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code has the same connotation as in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a question of fact in each case as to what was sold in execution of the decree. The Court found that the whole bungalow was put up for auction sale, was sold, and was purchased as such, indicating that the entire coparcenary estate was intended to be sold. The Court concluded that the sale under the Bombay Land Revenue Code has the same effect as a sale by the Civil Court.
Conclusion:
The Court held that:
1. The liability of the sons to discharge the father's debts continues even after partition.
2. The words "right, title, and interest" in Section 155 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code have the same connotation as in the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. It is not necessary to implead the sons in execution proceedings if severance of status occurs pending execution.
4. The debt incurred by the father due to negligence in his duties as a managing director is not avyavaharika.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
-
1958 (9) TMI 88
Issues:
Determining whether a particular expenditure constitutes a revenue or a capital expenditure.
Analysis:
The High Court of Bombay deliberated on the classification of an expenditure as either a revenue or a capital expenditure in a case where an assessee firm deposited an amount as security for a contract with a railway company, which was subsequently forfeited. The Tribunal deemed it a capital loss, disallowing deduction. The Court emphasized the commercial perspective in assessing profits and losses, quoting Lord's Dairy Farm Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax to support the deduction of trading losses. The Court rejected the argument that the deposit was made to acquire a business, stating it was incidental to the existing business of selling commodities. The Court distinguished two Privy Council cases cited by the Commissioner, emphasizing that the deposit in the present case was not for acquiring a new business or a capital asset but for conducting the existing business. The Court highlighted that the deposit was viewed as a business expenditure by the assessee at the time it was made, thus qualifying as a trading loss deductible to ascertain assessable profits.
The Court analyzed the Privy Council decisions in Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Motiram Nandram, emphasizing the distinction in the purpose of the deposits in those cases compared to the present case. The Court clarified that the deposit in the current scenario was not aimed at acquiring a new business or a capital asset but was an integral part of the ongoing business operations. The Court rejected the argument that the deposit was made to secure an enduring benefit of a capital nature, asserting that it was solely for earning profits within the existing business framework. The Court highlighted the absence of features like interest yield or temporary investment in the deposit, reinforcing its characterization as a business expenditure. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the assessee, allowing the deduction of the forfeited deposit as a trading loss to determine the assessable profits of the business. The Commissioner was directed to bear the costs of the proceedings.
In conclusion, the High Court of Bombay upheld the deductibility of the forfeited deposit as a trading loss, emphasizing the commercial nature of the expenditure and its direct relevance to the ongoing business activities of the assessee. The Court rejected the capital expenditure classification proposed by the Commissioner, citing precedents and commercial principles to support the allowance of the deduction. The judgment serves as a significant clarification on the distinction between revenue and capital expenditures in the context of business operations, providing guidance on determining deductible losses for assessing taxable profits.
-
1958 (9) TMI 87
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the act of the respondent constituted an offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted by Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the act of the respondent constituted an offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC):
The primary issue was whether the respondent's actions, particularly the aspersions made in the transfer application and affidavit, amounted to an offence under Section 228 of the IPC. Section 228 IPC addresses the intentional insult or interruption to a public servant while in any stage of a judicial proceeding.
The High Court believed that the respondent's actions were intended to insult the Magistrate, thereby constituting an offence under Section 228 IPC. The High Court's view was that the application and affidavit contained direct allegations of partiality and corruption against the Magistrate, which were submitted while the Magistrate was sitting as a court. This led the High Court to conclude that the act fell within the purview of Section 228 IPC, precluding the High Court from taking action for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act.
However, the Supreme Court found that the aspersions made by the respondent went beyond a mere personal insult to the Magistrate. The allegations included claims of conspiracy and bribery, which, if taken at face value, scandalized the court and impaired the administration of justice. The Supreme Court emphasized that such actions create distrust in the public mind and impair confidence in the judiciary, thus constituting something more than an offence under Section 228 IPC.
2. Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted by Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952:
Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, states that the High Court shall not take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the IPC.
The High Court interpreted this provision to mean that since the respondent's actions constituted an offence under Section 228 IPC, the High Court's jurisdiction was ousted. The High Court relied on previous decisions, including Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, to support its view.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this interpretation. It clarified that Section 3(2) of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the IPC, and not merely because they amount to offences of other descriptions under the IPC. The Supreme Court pointed out that the aspersions made by the respondent were much more than a mere insult and amounted to scandalizing the court, which is not covered by Section 228 IPC.
The Supreme Court concluded that the aspersions, by creating distrust in the public mind and impairing confidence in the judiciary, constituted an act of scandalizing the court rather than a mere intentional insult. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court was not ousted by Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and holding that the High Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the act complained of. The case was remanded to the High Court for a decision on merits in accordance with the law, emphasizing the need for expeditious handling given the passage of time since the act was committed in 1953.
-
1958 (9) TMI 86
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Cricket Association of Bengal was entitled to tax exemption under sections 4(3)(i) and 4(3)(ia) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52.
2. Whether the Cricket Association of Bengal was entitled to tax exemption under section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended in 1953, for the assessment year 1952-53.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Tax Exemption for Assessment Years 1950-51 and 1951-52
Legal Provisions:
- Section 4(3)(i) exempts "any income derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes."
- Section 4(3)(ia) exempts "any income derived from business carried on behalf of a religious or charitable institution when the income is applied solely to the purposes of the institution."
Key Findings:
1. Property and Legal Obligation:
- The Cricket Association of Bengal (CAB) is an unregistered and unincorporated body without a trust deed or document vesting property for its activities.
- The Tribunal found that the income in question was derived from organising cricket matches and charging admission fees, not from property held under any trust or legal obligation.
2. Charitable Purpose:
- The Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner concluded that promoting cricket is not a charitable object.
- The Tribunal upheld this view, noting that the activities of CAB could take directions other than charitable purposes.
3. Application of Income:
- The rules of CAB do not specify how the income should be applied, and there is no evidence that the income was used solely for charitable purposes.
Conclusion:
- The Tribunal was correct in holding that CAB was not entitled to the exemption under sections 4(3)(i) and 4(3)(ia) for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52. The promotion of cricket, as conducted by CAB, does not qualify as a charitable purpose, and the income was not derived from property held under a legal obligation for such purposes.
Issue 2: Tax Exemption for Assessment Year 1952-53
Legal Provision:
- Section 4(3)(i) as amended in 1953 requires that income must be derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for charitable purposes and applied or accumulated for such purposes.
Key Findings:
1. Application and Accumulation of Income:
- The amended section adds the requirement that the income must be applied or accumulated for charitable purposes.
- There is no evidence on record regarding the application or accumulation of the income by CAB for charitable purposes.
2. Property and Legal Obligation:
- Similar to the earlier years, there is no property held under trust or legal obligation by CAB.
Conclusion:
- The Tribunal was right in holding that CAB was not entitled to the exemption under the amended section 4(3)(i) for the assessment year 1952-53. The lack of evidence on the application or accumulation of income for charitable purposes further weakens CAB's claim.
Final Judgment:
- The answers to the questions referred were:
- Question (1): Yes.
- Question (2): Yes.
- The Commissioner of Income-tax was awarded costs of the reference.
Separate Judgments:
- Both judges, Chakravartti, CJ, and Guha, J., concurred in the judgment, with Guha, J. explicitly agreeing with the analysis and conclusions.
-
1958 (9) TMI 85
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the rejection of Jai Bhagawan's nomination paper.
2. Allegation of corrupt practice under Section 123(7)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
3. Preliminary objection regarding the appeal being filed beyond time.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the rejection of Jai Bhagawan's nomination paper:
The appellant's election was challenged on the ground that the nomination paper of Jai Bhagawan was improperly rejected by the returning officer. The returning officer rejected the nomination paper under Section 36(2)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, due to the candidate's failure to produce a copy of the electoral roll of his constituency or a certified copy of the relevant entries at the time of scrutiny. The High Court upheld the rejection, stating that the statutory requirement to produce the prescribed document was mandatory and the failure to comply with it justified the rejection of the nomination paper. The Supreme Court agreed with this view, emphasizing that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and any failure to comply with them leads to the specific consequence prescribed by the statute.
2. Allegation of corrupt practice under Section 123(7)(c):
The election petition also alleged that the appellant committed a corrupt practice by securing the assistance of Puran Singh, a member of the armed forces, as his polling agent. Both the tribunal and the High Court found that Puran Singh did not actively canvass for the appellant. However, they differed on whether Puran Singh was appointed as the appellant's polling agent. The High Court concluded that Puran Singh acted as the polling agent based on circumstantial evidence, including the similarity in handwriting on the forms appointing polling agents. The Supreme Court, however, found that there was no legal evidence to support the High Court's conclusion that the appellant had signed the form appointing Puran Singh. The Supreme Court emphasized that in cases involving allegations of corrupt practices, the evidence must be clear and conclusive. The circumstantial evidence presented did not irresistibly lead to the conclusion that the appellant had appointed Puran Singh as his polling agent. Therefore, the finding of the High Court on this point was reversed.
3. Preliminary objection regarding the appeal being filed beyond time:
A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Doabia, arguing that the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed time limit. The judgment under appeal was delivered on May 13, 1958, and the petition for leave to appeal was filed on September 2, 1958. The appellant had applied for leave to the Punjab High Court within the prescribed time, and his application was dismissed on August 22, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the time occupied by the application for leave in the High Court should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The Court noted that it was a common practice for parties aggrieved by orders under Section 116A of the Act to apply for leave under Article 133 of the Constitution. Even if this practice was erroneous, the appellant had followed it in good faith, and the delay in filing the appeal was excused.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and dismissed the election petition filed by respondent 1. The Court held that the rejection of Jai Bhagawan's nomination paper was valid and that there was no legal evidence to support the allegation of corrupt practice against the appellant. The appeal was not dismissed on the ground of limitation as the delay in filing was excused.
-
1958 (9) TMI 84
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the State Government could delegate its powers under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, to the Additional Director Consolidation with retrospective effect.
2. The legality of the notification dated 12-2-1958 regarding the delegation of powers.
3. The validity of the order dated 21-7-1957 made by the Additional Director Consolidation.
4. The applicability of the principle of ratification in the context of the delegation of powers.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Delegation of Powers with Retrospective Effect:
The primary question was whether the State Government could delegate its powers under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, to the Additional Director Consolidation with effect from a prior date, namely, 17-6-1957. The court examined the nature of the delegation and concluded that the act of delegation is executive or administrative and does not involve any exercise of subordinate legislative functions. The court emphasized that only a sovereign legislature can enact laws with retroactive or retrospective operation, and such power does not extend to executive actions unless expressly conferred by the legislature. The court cited the principle that retrospective force is not ascribed to new laws affecting rights unless explicitly intended by the legislature.
2. Legality of the Notification Dated 12-2-1958:
The notification issued on 12-2-1958 purported to delegate the powers of the State Government under Section 42 of the Act to the Additional Director Consolidation with retrospective effect from 17-6-1957. The court analyzed the provisions of the Punjab Consolidation Act, particularly Sections 41 and 42, and concluded that the delegation of powers with retrospective effect was not permissible. The court noted that the notification did not fall within the category of a rule or regulation, which could potentially have retrospective effect if explicitly stated. The court held that the notification was ultra vires and illegal to the extent that it purported to delegate powers with retrospective effect.
3. Validity of the Order Dated 21-7-1957:
The order dated 21-7-1957 made by the Additional Director Consolidation was challenged on the ground that the officer did not have the authority to exercise the powers of the State Government under Section 42 at that time. The court found that the Additional Director was not competent to exercise these powers on 21-7-1957, as the delegation of such powers with retrospective effect was not valid. Consequently, the order was deemed without jurisdiction and void.
4. Principle of Ratification:
The State contended that even if the delegation of powers with retrospective effect was not permissible, the principle of ratification should apply, and the acts of the Additional Director should be considered ratified by the State Government. The court rejected this argument, stating that ratification applies to acts that were capable of being done by the principal himself and were not void in their inception. The notification of 12-2-1958 did not purport to ratify any specific acts but rather conferred powers in general terms. The court held that delegation of powers is distinct from ratification under the Law of Agency.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the State Government could not delegate its powers under Section 42 of the Act with retrospective effect. The notification dated 12-2-1958 was declared ultra vires and illegal to the extent it purported to delegate powers with retrospective effect. Consequently, the order dated 21-7-1957 made by the Additional Director Consolidation was quashed. The petition was allowed, and there was no order as to costs.
-
1958 (9) TMI 83
Issues Involved: Grant of L-2 liquor license, Competent authority, Validity of the order, Non-production of records, Jurisdiction and power.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Grant of L-2 Liquor License:
The appellants, who had been dealers in foreign liquor since 1922, sought an L-2 license in Delhi after the partition of India. They initially held licenses in various forms in Amritsar, Sialkot, and Multan. In 1951, they applied for L-1 and L-2 licenses in Delhi and were granted an L-2 license for Karolbagh, Delhi, which was renewed annually. In 1954, they applied for another L-2 license due to a vacancy created by the closure of Messrs. Army and Navy Stores. Despite securing premises in Connaught Place, their application was not considered favorably, and the license was granted to Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj.
2. Competent Authority:
The appellants contended that their application and those of other applicants were never placed before the Chief Commissioner, the only authority empowered to grant L-2 licenses under the Delhi Liquor License Rules, 1935. They argued that the Chief Commissioner did not apply his mind to the applications, and the decisions made by the respondents lacked the Chief Commissioner's concurrence as required by the Government of Part C States Act.
3. Validity of the Order:
The respondents, including the Chief Minister and the Excise Commissioner, purported to exercise jurisdiction not vested in them by law. The appellants sought writs to quash the order granting the L-2 license to Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj and to direct the Chief Commissioner to properly consider their application. The respondents failed to produce any specific order by the Chief Commissioner, leading to suspicion about the validity of the license grant.
4. Non-Production of Records:
The respondents were evasive in producing the original order or any records indicating that the Chief Commissioner had made the decision. Despite court orders, the respondents only produced a letter from the Under Secretary, Finance, which was insufficient to prove that the Chief Commissioner had made the order. The court emphasized that non-production of records defeats the purpose of certiorari writs, which aim to bring up records for examination by a superior court.
5. Jurisdiction and Power:
The court found that the Chief Commissioner did not make any order granting the L-2 license to Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj. The records showed that the decision was made by the Chief Minister and communicated by the Under Secretary, Finance, without the Chief Commissioner's concurrence. The court held that the letter from the Under Secretary could not be treated as the Chief Commissioner's order and did not meet the authentication requirements.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that there was no valid order granting the L-2 license to Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj. The vacancy created by the closure of Messrs. Army and Navy Stores remained unfilled. The court directed the Chief Commissioner to fill the vacancy by inviting applications from all interested parties, including the appellants and Messrs. Gainda Mall Hem Raj, and to grant the license to the most suitable party. The appeal was allowed, and the respondents were ordered to pay the appellants' costs.
-
1958 (9) TMI 82
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant was rightly convicted and sentenced for the murder of Nirmala Devi.
2. Admissibility and relevance of Prem's retracted confession against the appellant.
3. Corroboration of Prem's confession in material particulars.
4. Recovery of the deceased's ornaments and its connection to the appellant.
5. The conduct of the appellant post-murder.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the appellant was rightly convicted and sentenced for the murder of Nirmala Devi:
The court examined whether the evidence established that the appellant, with the assistance of Prem, murdered Nirmala Devi. The prosecution's case was based on the confession of Prem, the appellant's statement leading to the recovery of Nirmala Devi's ornaments from Raj Rani, and the recovery of a blood-stained dagger from the appellant's belongings.
2. Admissibility and relevance of Prem's retracted confession against the appellant:
The court considered whether Prem's retracted confession was admissible and relevant against the appellant. According to Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, a confession made by one accused affecting himself and his co-accused can be taken into consideration by the court against both. The court noted that although a retracted confession is admissible, it requires the fullest and strongest corroboration on material particulars to convict a co-accused.
3. Corroboration of Prem's confession in material particulars:
The court examined whether Prem's confession was voluntary and true and whether it received full and strong corroboration in material particulars. Prem's confession included details about his association with the appellant, the appellant's intention to commit rape and robbery, and the events leading to the murder. The court found Prem's confession to be voluntary and corroborated by various pieces of evidence, including the presence of a blood-stained pajama in Banwari Lal's house and the presence of Prem at the police station with Nirmala Devi's child.
4. Recovery of the deceased's ornaments and its connection to the appellant:
The court found significant corroboration in the recovery of Nirmala Devi's ornaments from Raj Rani, the appellant's mistress. The appellant's statement led to the recovery of these ornaments, which Banwari Lal identified as belonging to his wife. The evidence of Charan Dass and Gori Shanker, who witnessed the recovery, was believed by the court. This recovery strongly indicated that the appellant was in possession of the stolen ornaments soon after the murder, corroborating Prem's confession.
5. The conduct of the appellant post-murder:
The court noted the appellant's disturbed state of mind post-murder, which was consistent with his having committed the crime. The appellant was seen calling out the name "Nirmala," which he explained as being related to a love affair with a girl named Nirmala, daughter of Assistant Sub-Inspector Rikhi Ram. The court did not accept this explanation and found the appellant's conduct to be incriminating.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that Prem's confession was voluntary, true, and corroborated in material particulars. The recovery of Nirmala Devi's ornaments at the instance of the appellant provided the strongest corroboration of Prem's confession. The appellant's possession of the ornaments soon after the murder indicated his involvement in the crime. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the appellant's conviction and sentence for the murder of Nirmala Devi.
-
1958 (9) TMI 81
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Section 8(1)(a) of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act, 1952.
2. Applicability of Section 8(1)(a) to coal consumed by the appellant in its own power house.
3. Legislative competence of Parliament to impose the excise duty under the Constitution.
4. Method of collection of the duty by the Coal Board.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Section 8(1)(a) of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act, 1952:
The primary issue was whether Section 8(1)(a) of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act, 1952, which imposes a duty of excise on all coal raised and despatched from collieries in India, is a valid piece of legislation. The appellant argued that the duty imposed was not authorized by the Constitution and thus the section was invalid. The court held that the imposition of the duty is authorized by Entry No. 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which allows Parliament to make laws regarding duties of excise on goods manufactured or produced in India. Coal, being a material or commodity, falls within this definition. The court concluded that the duty imposed by Section 8(1)(a) is valid under Entry No. 84.
2. Applicability of Section 8(1)(a) to coal consumed by the appellant in its own power house:
The court examined whether the duty applied to coal consumed by the appellant in its own power house. The appellant contended that the duty should not apply to coal consumed internally and that the section did not intend to cover such coal. The court held that the term "despatched" in Section 8(1)(a) implies sending coal from one place to another, and in the context of the appellant's operations, coal moved from the colliery to the power house within the same compound cannot be considered "despatched." Therefore, the court concluded that the duty under Section 8(1)(a) does not apply to coal consumed by the appellant in its own power house.
3. Legislative competence of Parliament to impose the excise duty under the Constitution:
The appellant argued that no entry in the Legislative Lists authorized Parliament to impose an excise duty on coal raised from mines. The court rejected this argument, stating that Entry No. 84 of List I clearly authorizes the levy of duties of excise on goods produced in India. The court also clarified that coal, despite being a natural product, requires significant human activity to be brought to a usable state, and thus can be considered "produced" for the purposes of excise duty. The court held that the duty imposed by Section 8(1)(a) is within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entry No. 84.
4. Method of collection of the duty by the Coal Board:
The appellant contended that the provision for the collection of the duty by the Coal Board was invalid, arguing that under Article 272 of the Constitution, Union duties of excise should be levied and collected by the Government of India. The court held that the Act and the rules framed under it provide for the collection of the duty by the Government or its agents, including the Coal Board. The court found no substance in the appellant's contention and upheld the validity of the collection method prescribed by the Act and the rules.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the appellant's application to the extent that a writ of mandamus would direct the respondent to forbear from levying and collecting any duty of excise under Section 8(1)(a) on coal taken from the appellant's colliery to its power house within the same compound for consumption therein. The court set aside the judgment and order of the trial judge, and there was no order for costs.
-
1958 (9) TMI 80
Issues Involved:
1. Are the properties in suit governed by the United Provinces Muslims Waqfs Act (U.P. XIII of 1936)?
2. Is the suit filed by the appellants barred by limitation under Section 5(2) of the Act?
3. Is the suit maintainable without the statutory notice required by Section 53 of the Act?
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Are the properties in suit governed by the United Provinces Muslims Waqfs Act (U.P. XIII of 1936)?
The appellants, members of the Waqf Committee, Darga Sharif, Bharaich, claimed that the properties in question were not covered by the provisions of the United Provinces Muslims Waqfs Act. They sought a declaration that the properties were outside the operative provisions of the Act and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Sunni Central Board of Waqf, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (respondent 1). The trial court held that the properties in suit could not be considered waqf as defined by the Act, as the profits from the village Singha Parasi were not vested in the Almighty and were subject to the condition of resumption. However, the High Court reversed this finding, holding that the properties constituted waqf as defined by the Act. The Supreme Court did not decide on the merits of this issue, as it upheld the findings on limitation and notice, rendering the question moot.
2. Is the suit filed by the appellants barred by limitation under Section 5(2) of the Act?
Section 5(2) of the Act prescribes a one-year limitation period for suits challenging the decisions of the Commissioner of Waqfs. The notification declaring the properties as waqf was issued on February 26, 1944, and the suit was filed on October 18, 1946. The appellants argued that Section 5(2) did not apply to their suit because they were not mutawallis or persons interested in the waqf, and they claimed the properties did not constitute a waqf under the Act. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the expression "any person interested in a waqf" must be construed to include persons interested in what is held to be a waqf. Thus, the suit was governed by Section 5(2) and was barred by time unless saved by Section 15 of the Limitation Act. The Court found that Section 15 did not apply, as there was no injunction or order staying the institution of the suit, and the order relied upon by the appellants did not create any difficulty against the institution of the present suit. Therefore, the suit was barred by limitation.
3. Is the suit maintainable without the statutory notice required by Section 53 of the Act?
Section 53 of the Act requires a two-month notice before instituting a suit against a Central Board in respect of any act purporting to be done under the Act or for any relief in respect of any waqf. The appellants conceded that they had not given the requisite notice but argued that the notification did not refer to the Darga and offerings made by devotees. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the tomb of Syed Salar Mahsood Ghazi was expressly mentioned in the notification, and the offerings, by their nature, constituted the income of the Darga. Therefore, the suit properties had been duly notified, and the appellants were required to give notice under Section 53. The failure to comply with this requirement rendered the suit not maintainable.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings that the suit was barred by limitation under Section 5(2) and was not maintainable due to the lack of notice under Section 53 of the Act. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
-
1958 (9) TMI 79
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Admissibility and voluntariness of the confessional statement.
3. Compliance with Sections 337 and 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the tender of pardon.
4. Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for conviction.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code:
The appellants were convicted for the murder of Malchand Bhadani. The Sessions Judge found that the murder had been committed in the furtherance of their common intention. Bipin Behari Sarkar was convicted under Section 302 IPC, and Bishnu Charan Saha under Section 302/34 IPC. Both were sentenced to death. The High Court upheld the conviction and confirmed the death sentence.
2. Admissibility and voluntariness of the confessional statement:
The High Court did not rely upon the confessional statement made by Bishnu Charan Saha to a Magistrate, as it was not considered a voluntary statement. The court focused on circumstantial evidence to uphold the conviction.
3. Compliance with Sections 337 and 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the tender of pardon:
The defense argued that the trial was vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as Bishnu Charan Saha was tendered a pardon under Section 337 but was not tried separately. The court clarified that for Section 339 to apply, the pardon must be accepted and the person must be examined as a witness. In this case, Bishnu Charan Saha did not accept the pardon, and hence, the provisions of Section 339 did not apply. The court found no foundation for the submission that the trial was vitiated.
4. Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for conviction:
The High Court relied on the following circumstantial evidence to uphold the conviction:
- The appellants were local men who had the means and opportunity to know the state of things at Malchand's shop.
- Association of the appellants and Sanatan Das immediately prior to the murder.
- Movements of the appellants towards Malchand's shop.
- Presence of the appellants in Malchand's shop shortly before the murder.
- Bipin Behari Sarkar hurrying away from Malchand's shop, followed by Bishnu Charan Saha.
- Injuries on the palms or fingers of the appellants found at the time of their arrest.
- Presence of human bloodstains on Bishnu Charan Saha's shirt and bloodstains on Bipin Behari Sarkar's wrapper.
- Cash memoes with the signatures of Bishnu Charan Saha.
- The nature of the injuries on Malchand indicated that he was overpowered by someone first and then another person pressed the weapon against his neck.
The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove the participation of the appellants in the murder of Malchand. The evidence against Bishnu Charan Saha included his presence at the crime scene, injuries on his person, and bloodstains on his shirt. For Bipin Behari Sarkar, the evidence included his movements towards and away from the crime scene, injuries on his person, and bloodstains on his wrapper. The court found no reasonable doubt about the guilt of both appellants.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and confirmed the death sentence. The appeals were dismissed.
-
1958 (9) TMI 78
Issues Involved:
1. Justification of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in making out a new case for the assessee in respect of the peak credit.
2. Whether the sum of Rs. 10,300 ascertained by the Tribunal as a peak credit is based on an obvious mistake.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Justification of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in making out a new case for the assessee in respect of the peak credit
The Tribunal had rearranged the cash credits in the assessee's accounts to determine the peak credit, which resulted in a reduced peak credit of Rs. 10,300. The Tribunal opined that this amount should not be added to the assessment since intangible additions of over Rs. 30,000 were made for the assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48. It concluded that part of these additions should be available to cover the peak credit of Rs. 10,300. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the entire addition of Rs. 19,968.
The High Court observed that the Tribunal's approach lacked any basis or justification. The Tribunal's rearrangement of the cash credits was not supported by any reasons in its order, nor was it the case of the assessee that the transactions in the four ledger accounts constituted a single account. The High Court emphasized that the accounts standing in the names of different individuals could not be regarded as one account for the purpose of arriving at the peak credits. Thus, the Tribunal had no foundation for treating them as the same account and should not have attempted to make out a new case for the assessee.
The High Court also noted that the explanation offered by the assessee for the cash credits was found unsatisfactory by the Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and the Tribunal. The assessee ultimately admitted that several entries were fictitious. Therefore, the Department was entitled to treat these cash credits as income amounts. The High Court rejected the contention that the cash credits were genuine and upheld the view that the Tribunal's rearrangement of the credits was unjustified.
Issue 2: Whether the sum of Rs. 10,300 ascertained by the Tribunal as a peak credit is based on an obvious mistake
The Tribunal's determination of the peak credit at Rs. 10,300 was questioned for being potentially based on an obvious mistake. The High Court examined whether the Tribunal's opinion that these sums might have been included in the intangible additions for the previous years was sustainable. The Tribunal had concluded that it was not unreasonable to assume that part of the intangible additions made in the previous years could cover the peak credit of Rs. 10,300.
The High Court held that once the explanation for the cash credits was rejected, the Revenue was at liberty to treat them as income amounts derived in the year the entries were made. It was for the assessee to prove that these amounts were part of the intangible additions from previous years. No such case was put forward by the assessee at any stage. The High Court found that the Tribunal's indulgence in guesses and conjectures was unwarranted. The burden of proof was on the assessee to show that the cash credits were not of an income nature, and the deletion of the entire addition of Rs. 19,968 by the Tribunal was unwarranted.
Conclusion:
The High Court answered both questions in favor of the Department. It found that the Tribunal was not justified in making out a new case for the assessee by rearranging the cash credits and determining the peak credit. The Tribunal's deletion of the entire addition of Rs. 19,968 was also unwarranted. The High Court emphasized that the burden of proof was on the assessee to show that the cash credits were not income amounts, and the Tribunal's approach lacked any basis or justification. The respondent was directed to pay the costs of the petitioner, fixed at Rs. 150.
-
1958 (9) TMI 77
Whether the High Court was wrong in its view that the award disclosed an error on the face of it
Whether the portion of the award which held that his dismissal had no effect on his status and that he continued to be a professor was merely consequential and hence a surplusage and therefore an error disclosed in it would not vitiate the award?
Whether the appointment of Professor Saha as the sole Arbitrator was illegal?
Held that:- We are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the High Court. There is no doubt that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced. Section 21, Cl. (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and the second illustration under this clause given in the section make it so clear that further elaboration of the point is not required. It seems to us that the present award does purport to enforce a contract of personal service when it states that the dismissal of the appellant " has no effect on his status", and " He still continues to be a Professor of the University ". When a decree is passed according to the award, which if the award is unexceptionable, has to be done under s. 17 of the Arbitration Act after it has been filed in Court, that decree will direct that the award be carried out and hence direct that the appellant be treated as still in the service of the respondent. It would then enforce a contract of personal service, for the appellant claimed to be a professor under a contract of personal service, and so offend s. 21 (b).
We are also clear in our mind that the contention about the offending portion of the award being a mere surplusage affords no assistance to the appellant for it was not said on his behalf that the offending portion was severable from the rest of the award and should be struck out as a mere surplusage. It, therefore, has to remain as a part of the award and so long as it does so, it would disclose an error on the face of the award and make it liable to be set aside as a whole.
All considerations that apply to an award under the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be said to apply to an award made under the Arbitration Act. Furthermore, under s. 45 of the University Act, the arbitration held under it is to be governed by the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the validity of an award made under such an arbitration has, therefore, to be decided by reference to the rules applying to that Act, one of such rules being that the award should not disclose an error on its face. For these reasons, in our view, this argument is unfounded.
It was said that the respondent claimed to appoint Professor Saha the sole arbitrator under s. 9 of the Arbitration Act but that section could only apply where the reference was to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party, while the proper interpretation of s. 45 of the University Act was that the arbitration was to three Arbitrators, one nominated by each of the parties and the third by the Chanceller of the University. This point was decided against the respondent by the High Court. As, however, the appeal must be dismissed for the reason that the award contains an error on the face of it, as we have earlier found, it becomes unnecessary to decide the point raised by the resp.ndent.Appeal dismissed.
-
1958 (9) TMI 76
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to deal with the revision petition.
2. Validity of the transfer of the revision petition by the Mysore Board of Revenue.
3. Ultra vires contention regarding sub-section (2) of section 40 of Act 25 of 1957.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes:
The petitioner contended that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had no jurisdiction to deal with the revision petition. The argument was based on the provisions of Act 25 of 1957 and Act 24 of 1957. Sub-section (1) of section 40 of Act 25 of 1957 repealed the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, but included a proviso that preserved any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired under the repealed enactments. Sub-section (2) of section 40 allowed the State Government to specify an authority to exercise functions under the repealed enactments. Section 4 of Act 24 of 1957 transferred appellate and revisional powers from the Mysore Board of Revenue to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal. Section 11 transferred pending proceedings to the Tribunal. The petitioner argued that the revision petition should have been transferred to the Tribunal, not the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.
The court held that the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 40 kept alive the right to continue legal proceedings as if Act 25 of 1957 had not been passed. Therefore, the Mysore Board of Revenue was initially competent to deal with the revision petition. However, the State Government specified the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes as the authority on 8th December 1957, under sub-section (2) of section 40, making the Commissioner the competent authority to deal with the revision petition. The court concluded that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had jurisdiction to deal with the revision petition.
2. Validity of the Transfer of the Revision Petition:
The petitioner argued that the Mysore Board of Revenue could not transfer the revision petition to the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes because the Commissioner was not specified as the competent authority at the time of transfer. The court noted that the transfer occurred on 12th October 1957, before the Commissioner was specified as the authority on 8th December 1957. However, the court held that the critical factor was whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction at the time of dealing with the matter, which he did on 2nd April 1958. The court dismissed the petitioner's contention as a mere technical objection, stating that the Commissioner had jurisdiction when he dealt with the revision petition, regardless of how the matter came before him.
3. Ultra Vires Contention Regarding Sub-section (2) of Section 40:
The petitioner contended that sub-section (2) of section 40 was ultra vires the powers of the Legislature as it delegated essential legislative functions to the State Government. The petitioner relied on a decision of the Assam High Court, which was later overruled by the Supreme Court. The court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Assam State v. Sristikar, which held that the delegation of functions to specify the authority did not constitute excessive delegation of legislative power. The court concluded that there was sufficient indication in the Act regarding the type of persons to be appointed to discharge such duties, and therefore, the delegation was valid. The court dismissed this contention as well.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, holding that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had jurisdiction to deal with the revision petition, the transfer of the revision petition by the Mysore Board of Revenue was valid, and sub-section (2) of section 40 of Act 25 of 1957 was not ultra vires the powers of the Legislature. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
-
1958 (9) TMI 75
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the term "sale price" under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953.
2. Whether railway freight can be considered as a cash discount according to trade practice.
3. Validity of claiming deduction for railway freight in the sale price assessment.
4. Comparison between cash discount and concession in the context of sales tax assessment.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of the term "sale price" under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. The applicants argued that the amount of railway freight should be excluded from the sale price for assessment purposes. The definition of "sale price" in section 2(14) was crucial in determining whether the railway freight could be considered as a cash discount according to trade practice.
2. The primary contention raised by the applicants was that the amount of railway freight paid by them should be treated as a cash discount according to trade practice. However, the court analyzed the definition of "sale price" and emphasized that for a deduction to qualify as a cash discount, it must be in accordance with trade practice. The court noted that the expenses of transport borne by the applicants did not have the sanction of trade practice, and therefore, could not be considered a cash discount.
3. The court further elaborated that the deduction claimed by the applicants for the railway freight should be viewed as a concession allowed by a dealer to customers, rather than a cash discount. It emphasized that the Sales Tax Authority is bound by the provisions of law and can only allow deductions that fall within the statutory definition of sale price. Since the railway freight did not meet the criteria of a cash discount according to trade practice, the applicants were not entitled to claim it as a deduction in the turnover for assessment.
4. In support of its decision, the court referenced a previous judgment by the Nagpur High Court, highlighting the importance of adhering to statutory definitions and legal principles in sales tax assessments. Ultimately, the court dismissed the applications, affirming that the railway freight could not be considered a cash discount as per trade practice, and therefore, could not be deducted from the sale price for assessment purposes.
In conclusion, the judgment clarified the distinction between cash discounts and concessions in the context of sales tax assessment, emphasizing the importance of adhering to statutory definitions and trade practices in determining allowable deductions in the sale price.
-
1958 (9) TMI 74
Character of the grant under Exhibit B - whether it amounts to a new Patni with reference to the Chaukidari Chakaran lands as contended for by the appellant, or whether it incorporates those lands in the Patni of lot Ahiyapur, so as to make them part and parcel of the lands comprised therein, as is maintained by the respondents?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Exhibit B creates a distinct Patni, that the sale thereof on May 15, 1937, is valid, and that the plaintiff has therefore acquired a good title to the suit lands under the grant dated February 13, 1941. In this view, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the point that was the subject of considerable argument before us as to whether it is open to the defendants to raise the invalidity of the sale held on May 15, 1937, in answer to this action, they not having taken steps to have set it aside, as provided in s. 14 of the Regulation.
-
1958 (9) TMI 73
Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to hear the application for the restoration of a revision petition.
2. Jurisdictional authority post-abolition of the Mysore Board of Revenue.
3. Nature of the application for the restoration of a revision petition.
4. Validity of the order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Competence of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to Hear the Application:
The primary contention by the petitioner was that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes lacked the competence to hear the application for the restoration of the revision petition. The petitioner argued that under section 11 of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal Act, all proceedings pending before the Board of Revenue at the time of its abolition should be transferred to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal. The court, however, referred to its previous decision in C.P. 200 of 1958, which established that revision petitions pending before the Board of Revenue should be heard by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes as per the notification under section 40(2) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957. Consequently, the court held that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was competent to hear the application.
2. Jurisdictional Authority Post-Abolition of the Mysore Board of Revenue:
The court examined the jurisdictional authority following the abolition of the Mysore Board of Revenue. It was noted that section 40 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, and the corresponding notification empowered the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to exercise the functions previously held by the Board of Revenue. The court reaffirmed its stance from C.P. 200 of 1958, indicating that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had the jurisdiction to hear pending revision petitions. Additionally, the court distinguished between revision petitions and review petitions, as discussed in C.P. 197 of 1958, clarifying that the latter should be transferred to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal.
3. Nature of the Application for the Restoration of a Revision Petition:
The petitioner argued that the application for the restoration of the revision petition was not a revision petition but a distinct application, thus falling outside the purview of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. The court rejected this argument, stating that the application for restoration was not a review of the order but a request to consider whether there was sufficient cause for non-appearance. The court emphasized that such an application was part of the revisional jurisdiction, which the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was competent to exercise.
4. Validity of the Order Passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes:
The court scrutinized the order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, who had dismissed the application on the grounds that he lacked the power to restore a revision petition dismissed by the Board of Revenue. The court found this reasoning flawed, noting that the Commissioner had the jurisdiction to restore the revision petition as part of his revisional powers. The court concluded that the Commissioner had failed to exercise his jurisdiction properly and set aside his order.
Conclusion:
The writ petition was allowed, and the court quashed the order of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. The application for the restoration of the revision petition was remitted to the Commissioner for disposal according to law, with no order as to costs. The court clarified the jurisdictional competence of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and emphasized the need for proper exercise of revisional powers.
Separate Judgments:
MALIMATH, J. concurred with the judgment, agreeing with the conclusions and reasoning provided.
Final Order:
Petition allowed.
-
1958 (9) TMI 72
Issues:
1. Justification of Excise and Taxation Officer in requiring payment of sales tax.
2. Challenge to the order of assessment under Article 226 of the Constitution.
3. Preliminary objections raised by the State regarding invoking extraordinary jurisdiction.
4. Dispute over facts related to sales tax assessment.
5. Availability of alternative remedy and delay in presenting the petition.
6. Validity of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956.
Analysis:
The petition raised the issue of whether the Excise and Taxation Officer was justified in demanding a significant sum as sales tax from the petitioner. The petitioner, an industrial company with branches in Calcutta, challenged the assessment order on various grounds, including the location of sales and delivery of goods. The petitioner contended that sales were made outside Punjab, while the respondent argued otherwise. The High Court emphasized that a writ should not substitute the procedures outlined in tax statutes and should not be used to resolve disputed rights that have adequate alternative remedies. The court noted conflicting claims regarding the sales transactions and jurisdiction of the respondent, indicating that such disputes should be resolved by administrative authorities.
The petition invoked Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the assessment order, but the State raised preliminary objections, citing provisions for appeal and revision under the statute. The State argued that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court should not be invoked to bypass statutory procedures. The petitioner, however, argued that the assessment violated its fundamental right to conduct business without undue tax imposition. Legal precedents were cited to support the petitioner's stance on challenging the order on constitutional grounds. The court considered the availability of an alternative remedy and the delay in filing the petition, ultimately dismissing it due to factual disputes and the existence of adequate remedies.
Additionally, the validity of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, was initially challenged but later abandoned during the proceedings. The court highlighted the importance of not using writs to resolve tax-related disputes where statutory remedies exist. The judgment dismissed the petition, emphasizing the presence of alternative remedies, lack of jurisdictional overreach by the respondent, absence of apparent errors in the record, and the need for administrative bodies to address factual disputes. The decision also disposed of related civil writs, as the main issues were common across multiple petitions.
In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the petition under Article 226, emphasizing the availability of alternative remedies, the presence of factual disputes, and the inappropriate use of writs to resolve tax assessment matters. The judgment underscored the importance of following statutory procedures and allowing administrative authorities to address factual controversies in such cases.
-
1958 (9) TMI 71
The High Court of Madras ruled that the assessee was not liable to pay sales tax on charges for retreading old tires as there was no element of sale involved. The sales tax collected from customers and remitted to the government was also exempt. The revision petition was partly allowed. Reported as Sundaram Motors (Private) Ltd. v. The State of Madras [1958] 9 S.T.C. 687.
-
1958 (9) TMI 70
The High Court of Madras ruled in favor of the assessee in a sales tax dispute regarding turnover from works contracts for embroidery work. The Tribunal had previously determined that 70% of the turnover was taxable, but the High Court set aside the assessments based on principles established in previous judgments. (Case citation: 1958 (9) TMI 70 - Madras High Court)
............
|
9911796707
