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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 699 Records
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1966 (9) TMI 108
Whether for purposes of section 5(2) of the Act read with rule 4-A(iv)(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939 the respondents were the dealers who bought the cotton in the State and were the last dealers not exempt from taxation under section 3(3) of the Act on the amount for which the cotton was bought by them?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The liability to be taxed attaches if the purchase itself by the dealer is within the State. In the case of the sales in question, therefore, the buyers who purchased the cotton bales from the respondents were the last dealers who bought those cotton bales in the State and the single point tax under section 5(2) of the Act had to be levied from them and not from the respondents.
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1966 (9) TMI 102
Whether under section 52(1)(e) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 any tax was payable in respect of the sales of "patasa", "sakar ", "bura sugar", "harda" and "alchidana"?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. To be groundnut oil two conditions had to be satisfied-it must be from groundnut and it must be "oil". The hydrogenated oil was from groundnut and in its essential nature it remained an oil. It continued to be used for the same purpose as groundnut oil which had not undergone the process. It was further stated the mere fact that hydrogenated oil was semi-solid did not alter its character as an oil. For the reasons already expressed we hold that the decision of the Gujarat High Court dated December 11, 1962, is correct
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1966 (9) TMI 97
Whether Parliament can enact a law imposing tax on the supply of materials used in building contracts?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. We consider that the orders of assessment of sales tax made by the respondent for the two assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 are illegal in so far as the hire-purchase transactions are included in the computation of the taxable turnover of the appellant. We accordingly hold that these appeals should be allowed and a writ in the nature of certiorari should be granted for quashing the orders of assessment made by the respondent for the two assessment years in question and that a writ in the nature of mandamus should be issued ordering the respondent to make fresh assessments in accordance with law
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1966 (9) TMI 90
Issues:
Assessment of sales tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act - Determination of whether the transaction constitutes a sale or a works contract - Interpretation of the terms of the contract between the parties - Ownership of materials and coach bodies under the contract - Liability for loss or damage of materials during construction - Comparison with precedent cases to establish the nature of the transaction.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court heard an appeal regarding the assessment of sales tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, focusing on whether a transaction between an engineering concern and the Western Railway Administration constituted a sale or a works contract. The contract involved the construction of III class passenger coaches, with the respondent submitting a bill for the work done. The dispute arose when the tax authorities determined that the transaction was a sale subject to sales tax. The case revolved around the interpretation of the contract terms and the ownership of materials and coach bodies during construction.
The Gujarat Sales Tax Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the tax authorities, considering the ownership clause in the contract. However, the High Court overturned this decision, emphasizing that the contract was for the performance of work and did not involve the sale of materials or coach bodies. The High Court analyzed the clauses of the contract, highlighting that the ownership of materials vested in the Railway, indicating the respondent acted as an agent for the Railway in purchasing materials. The High Court concluded that the transaction was a works contract, not a sale, based on the comprehensive examination of the contract terms.
In comparing the present case to a precedent involving bus bodies supply, the Supreme Court noted key differences. The court highlighted that in the current contract, the respondent was not to be the owner of the coach bodies at any stage, with the property in the bodies automatically vesting in the Railway during construction. The terms of the contract clearly indicated a works contract scenario, where the respondent's role was limited to constructing and furnishing coach bodies on underframes owned by the Railway. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the transaction did not involve a sale, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
In conclusion, the judgment provides a detailed analysis of the contract terms, ownership provisions, and the nature of the transaction to determine whether it constituted a sale or a works contract under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The decision underscores the importance of interpreting contract clauses in determining the legal characterization of transactions for tax assessment purposes, establishing clarity on the distinction between works contracts and sales transactions in commercial dealings.
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1966 (9) TMI 82
Whether the turnover from the goods sold by the Company was taxable?
Held that:- As already set out in dealing with "kolsi", we are of the view that waste caustic liquor may be regarded as a by-product or a subsidiary product in the course of manufacture and the sale thereof is incidental to the business of the Company and the turnover in respect of both "kolsi" and "waste caustic liquor" would be liable to sales tax.
The answer recorded by the High Court on the first question will be modified as follows: "In the negative, except as to 'kolsi' and waste caustic liquor."
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1966 (9) TMI 70
Issues:
Interpretation of clause 6 of the scheme of arrangement regarding payment of arrears of wages to employees, determination of legal relationship between the applicants and the company based on the agreement dated 10th April, 1961.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around a summons filed by the applicants seeking payment of Rs. 39,619.87 from the respondent company under clause 6 of a sanctioned scheme of arrangement. The applicants claimed to be employees entitled to arrears of wages for the period they acted as dalals for the company. However, the court delved into the legal relationship established by the agreement dated 10th April, 1961, to ascertain if the applicants were indeed employees or agents of the company.
The agreement appointed the applicants as exclusive cloth dalals for the company, granting them the right to sell the company's cloth throughout India. Various clauses in the agreement outlined the responsibilities and limitations of the applicants, including guaranteeing the offers brought, obtaining company's consent for sales, and following company instructions. The court analyzed these clauses to determine the nature of the relationship between the parties.
The court rejected the contention that the applicants were employees based on the agreement's provisions. It emphasized that the relationship was that of principal and agent, not employer and employee. The court highlighted that the agreement clearly designated the applicants as selling agents, with the company retaining control over certain aspects of the sales process. The court emphasized that the clauses relied upon by the applicants did not grant the company the authority to dictate the manner of work execution by the applicants.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the summons, ruling that the applicants were not employees of the company as claimed. The judgment emphasized that the legal relationship between the parties, as per the agreement, established the applicants as agents of the company, precluding them from being considered employees entitled to arrears of wages under the scheme. The court upheld the principal-agent relationship based on the agreement's terms and conditions, ultimately denying the applicants' claim for payment under clause 6 of the scheme.
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1966 (9) TMI 69
Issues Involved:
1. Delay in filing the petition to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased 4th defendant.
2. Whether the right to sue survives against the legal representatives of the deceased 4th defendant.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Delay in Filing the Petition to Bring on Record the Legal Representatives of the Deceased 4th Defendant:
The plaintiff-company filed an application on 17th February 1964 to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased 4th defendant. The proposed legal representatives opposed this, stating that the 4th defendant had died about 11 months prior, and the plaintiff had not filed the petition within the 90 days prescribed by the Limitation Act. Additionally, there was no sufficient reason for the delay in filing the petition to set aside the abatement, which should have been filed within 60 days after the expiry of the initial 90 days.
The lower court excused the delay, holding that there was sufficient cause for not filing the petition in time. The High Court, upon revisiting the objections, noted that the counter-affidavit dated 24th March 1964 contained only a vague statement about the death of the 4th defendant without specifying the exact date. The plaintiff-company was based in Tirupathi, while the 4th defendant resided in a village in Chingle-put District, which justified the delay. The High Court found no jurisdictional error by the lower court in excusing the delay and bringing the legal representatives on record.
2. Whether the Right to Sue Survives Against the Legal Representatives of the Deceased 4th Defendant:
The claim in the plaint was to recover money against all defendants jointly and severally under section 86D of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. The court examined whether such a suit would abate upon the death of the 4th defendant. Section 86D prohibits a company from making loans to its directors or their associated firms and holds directors jointly and severally liable if there is a default in repayment.
The High Court rejected the argument that the suit would abate against the 4th defendant upon his death. It differentiated between the general right of suit under section 86D and the special procedure under section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Section 235, which deals with the misfeasance of directors during the winding up of a company, was cited by the petitioners, who relied on a decision by the Madras High Court in Peerdan Juharmal Bank Ltd., which held that proceedings under section 235 could not continue against the legal representatives of a deceased director.
However, the High Court clarified that section 235 provides a limited right specific to the winding-up process and does not extinguish the general liability of a director under section 86D. The decision in Peerdan Juharmal Bank Ltd. was limited to the scope of section 235 and did not apply to the general right of suit under section 86D. Therefore, the suit to recover money from the defendants based on section 86D did not abate upon the death of the 4th defendant.
Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the civil revision petitions, upholding the lower court's decision to excuse the delay in filing the petition to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased 4th defendant and confirming that the right to sue survives against the legal representatives. The petitions were dismissed with costs in C.R.P. No. 872 of 1966, and no order as to costs was issued for the other revision petitions.
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1966 (9) TMI 68
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
2. Applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. Appointment of an Arbitrator for dispute resolution.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940:
The primary contention raised by the Bihar State Electricity Board was that the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is not maintainable in this court as it is not a "civil court" within the meaning of the Arbitration Act. The definition of "court" under Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act was cited, which states: "'Court' means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under section 21, include a Small Cause Court." The Board argued that the expression "civil court" should not be synonymous with any court that has jurisdiction to decide civil rights. The official liquidator, however, relied on Section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, which states: "The court which is winding up the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of-(a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company." The court concluded that under Section 446(2) of the Companies Act, it has jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of suits and proceedings by the company, notwithstanding any other law, thus allowing the present application.
2. Applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The Board contended that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to this case and that the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is barred under Article 137, which prescribes a three-year limitation period from when the right to apply accrues. The Board argued that the right to apply accrued in 1960. The official liquidator countered that Article 137 does not apply to applications under the Arbitration Act and even if it did, the right to apply had not accrued before 9th June 1962. The court examined the relevant dates and correspondence, including letters dated 9th January 1960, 12th March 1960, and 18th May 1960, which indicated ongoing negotiations and no definitive accrual of the right to apply. The court concluded that the right to apply did not accrue before 9th June 1962, making the application timely under Section 458A of the Companies Act. The court also held that Article 137 does not apply to applications under the Arbitration Act, maintaining the interpretation from previous Supreme Court decisions.
3. Appointment of an Arbitrator for dispute resolution:
The court directed the Bihar State Electricity Board to file the original agreement dated 6th July 1956 within two weeks. The dispute, as per paragraph 6(ii) of the agreement, was to be referred to an arbitrator mutually agreed upon by the parties. If no agreement on an arbitrator was reached within three weeks of filing the original agreement, the court would appoint an arbitrator. The court clarified that the parties involved are the Monghyr Electric Supply Company Limited (in liquidation) through the official liquidator and the Bihar State Electricity Board. No order was passed against the Government of Bihar due to Section 60(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.
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1966 (9) TMI 46
Whether on a true interpretation of section 10(1), section 10(2)(xi) and section 10(2) (XV) of the Indian Income-tax Act, the claims for the losses of ₹ 48,891 and ₹ 1,21,760 were permissible in the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 respectively?
Held that:- The settlements with the constituents and the consequent posting of entries in the books of account cannot be regarded as forbearance to enforce the claim of the bank to recover the loans advanced. The settlement consisted of two constituent elements---paying by the bank of the value of the jewellery pledged with it against receipt from the constituent the amount which was recoverable by the bank. The first element of the transaction would appropriately be deemed expenditure and such expenditure having been laid out for protecting and furthering the business of the bank was properly admissible under section 10(2) (XV) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 45
Issues:
Assessment of dividend income as the income of a Hindu undivided family. Interpretation of section 2(6A)(e) of the Income-tax Act. High Court's jurisdiction in a reference under section 66 of the Income-tax Act.
Analysis:
The case involved the assessment of dividend income as the income of a Hindu undivided family under the Income-tax Act. The assessee, a Hindu undivided family, held shares in a limited company, and the dividend earned on these shares was considered as the family's income. Additionally, the managing director's remuneration from the company was also treated as the family's income. In the assessment years 1955-56 and 1956-57, the family was charged tax on sums advanced as loans, claimed to represent dividend income under section 2(6A)(e) of the Act. The Tribunal held that since the family was not the registered shareholder of the company, the loans could not be treated as dividend income of the family.
The matter was referred to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which set aside the Tribunal's order and directed a reconsideration of whether the payments were made on behalf of or for the benefit of the shareholders. The High Court emphasized the need to assess payments made by a company for the individual benefit of a shareholder. However, the Supreme Court found the High Court's procedure erroneous, stating that in a reference under section 66 of the Income-tax Act, the High Court's role is advisory, not appellate. The High Court was required to answer the question posed and remit the case back to the Tribunal for further action based on its opinion.
Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the case to be remanded to the High Court for proper consideration and disposal in accordance with the law. The appeals were allowed, and the case was remanded without any order as to costs.
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1966 (9) TMI 44
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the payment of ₹ 42,480 by the assessee to the Travancore Government under the agreements dated Jane 18, 1937, and January 28, 1947, was allowable under section 10 of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- It is not, however, possible for us to finally determine this appeal because the High Court has not dealt with the other questions arising in this reference. Even if the payment of the commission to the Government by the assessee is not capital but revenue payment, certain other questions arise for consideration in this case.
It is necessary that the High Court should consider all these aspects of the case before furnishing an answer to the question of law referred to it. For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court of Kerala dated August 20, 1963, and remand the case for being reheard and dealt with in accordance with the directions given in this judgment. Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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1966 (9) TMI 43
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the show cause notices issued under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
2. Interpretation of Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
3. Validity of the notification dated 4-8-1947 under Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
4. Applicability of Section 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 after its amendment by Act 55 of 1964.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Show Cause Notices:
The show cause notices were issued by the Deputy Collector of Customs, Visakhapatnam, alleging that the petitioners had exported manganese ore without making a proper declaration as required under Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The respondents contended that the documents seized during the searches indicated under-invoicing of mineral ores, constituting offences under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The court held that contravention of Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is punishable not only under Section 23(1)(a) of the same Act but also under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
2. Interpretation of Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947:
The petitioner argued that Section 12(1) merely required an undertaking that the full export value of the goods would be paid in the prescribed manner, and did not necessitate the declaration of the true export value. The court rejected this argument, stating that Section 12(1) requires a declaration that the amount given is the full export value of the goods and that the value has been paid in the prescribed manner. The court emphasized that the purpose of the enactment is to safeguard the economic and financial interests of the country by ensuring that the best price for exported goods is remitted to India.
3. Validity of the Notification Dated 4-8-1947:
The petitioner contended that the notification prohibiting the export of all goods was beyond the powers conferred under Section 12(1) of the Act, which allowed the prohibition of any goods or class of goods specified in the notification. The court dismissed this contention, interpreting the word "any" to include all goods unless limited by the context. The court relied on the definition of "any" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and the High Court of Australia's interpretation in Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v. The Commonwealth, concluding that the Central Government acted within its powers.
4. Applicability of Section 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 After Amendment:
The petitioner argued that after the amendment by Act 55 of 1964 and the repeal of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, no further proceedings could be taken for contraventions that occurred before the amendments. The court referred to Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which states that the repeal of an enactment does not affect any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment. The court held that the legal proceedings could continue as if the repealing Act had not been passed, thereby rejecting the petitioner's contention.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petitions, upholding the validity of the show cause notices and the interpretation of Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The notification dated 4-8-1947 was deemed valid, and the applicability of Section 23A after its amendment was confirmed. The petitions were dismissed with costs.
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1966 (9) TMI 42
The High Court held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to release the truck in question to the opposite party. The Central Excise authorities suspected smuggling and had specific rules for seizure and release of property, which the opposite party did not follow. The Magistrate's order was deemed illegal, and the vehicle will be released to the opposite party pending adjudication upon execution of a personal bond and furnishing security.
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1966 (9) TMI 41
Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs, Calcutta to issue a show cause notice.
2. Authority of the Collector of Customs, Madras to transfer the case to the Collector of Customs, Calcutta.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner, a dealer in kirana and chemicals, had goods seized by the Central Intelligence Unit of the Collectorate of Central Excise, Madras, which were despatched from Calcutta. The petitioner sought the return of the goods and challenged the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs, Calcutta to issue a show cause notice. The Customs Act delineates officers' jurisdiction by territorial boundaries and pecuniary limits. While the Collector of Customs, Calcutta issued the notice, the contention was that as the goods were seized in Madras, the Calcutta Collector lacked jurisdiction. However, the Act empowers Customs officers to act subject to conditions imposed by the Board or the Act, without territorial restrictions. The Act's provisions on confiscation and penalties do not limit the Collector of Customs, Calcutta's jurisdiction based on the location of goods. The goods' origin in Calcutta and the alleged offense there support the Calcutta Collector's jurisdiction, despite the seizure in Madras.
2. The petitioner also challenged the authority of the Collector of Customs, Madras to transfer the case to the Collector of Customs, Calcutta. The Madras Collector's communication indicated a transfer of cases to the West Bengal Collector. The Act does not explicitly grant the Madras Collector the power to transfer cases to another jurisdiction. However, it was interpreted that the Madras Collector intended to hand over files to the appropriate jurisdiction rather than transfer jurisdiction itself. The decision on the Madras Collector's jurisdiction over the goods would depend on investigation findings. Ultimately, the contention that the Collector of Customs, Calcutta lacked jurisdiction was rejected, leading to the dismissal of the Writ petitions.
In conclusion, the High Court of Judicature at Madras upheld the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs, Calcutta to issue a show cause notice and clarified the Madras Collector's action as a transfer of files rather than jurisdiction. As a result, the Writ petitions were dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 40
Issues Involved:
1. Liability under Section 9(a) and 9(b) of the Central Excises & Salt Act.
2. Liability under Rule 151(c) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
3. Interpretation of mens rea in the context of Rule 151.
4. Vicarious liability for acts committed by employees.
5. Applicability of Rule 225 to Rule 151.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Liability under Section 9(a) and 9(b) of the Central Excises & Salt Act:
The prosecution argued that the respondent, a licensed tobacco dealer, had removed goods from his warehouse without adhering to the Central Excise Rules and without paying the duty levied on them, thereby contravening Section 9(a) and 9(b) of the Central Excises & Salt Act. The learned City Magistrate acquitted the respondent on the grounds that the prosecution failed to prove that the respondent was personally or through his servant liable for the shortages.
2. Liability under Rule 151(c) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944:
The prosecution contended that the respondent was liable under Rule 151(c) for removing goods from the warehouse otherwise than as provided by the rules. The City Magistrate, however, found that the prosecution did not establish the respondent's personal liability or that of his servant's actions, leading to the acquittal.
3. Interpretation of mens rea in the context of Rule 151:
The core issue was whether Rule 151 imposed absolute and unconditional liability on the owner of warehoused goods or required proof of mens rea. The judgment referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Nathoo Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which established that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offense unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded by statute. The court found that Rule 151 did not expressly exclude mens rea, and its exclusion could not be implied as it was not absolutely clear that the object of the statute would be defeated otherwise.
4. Vicarious liability for acts committed by employees:
The prosecution argued that the respondent was vicariously liable for the acts of his servant, who allegedly committed the theft during the respondent's absence. The court, however, interpreted Rule 151 to mean that the owner could only be held liable for acts committed by employees if it was proven that these acts were done at the owner's behest, with his knowledge, or with his connivance. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish such proof, and therefore, the respondent could not be held vicariously liable.
5. Applicability of Rule 225 to Rule 151:
The State argued that Rule 225, which holds producers or manufacturers liable for the removal of goods by any person, should be applied to interpret Rule 151. The court rejected this argument, stating that applying Rule 225 would render the specific language of Rule 151 redundant. Rule 225 pertains to removals in violation of conditions laid down in Rule 224, which are distinct from those in Rule 151. Therefore, Rule 225 could not be used to interpret Rule 151.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the acquittal of the respondent on all counts. It held that mens rea was an essential ingredient for liability under Rule 151 and Section 9(a) and 9(b) of the Act. Since the prosecution failed to prove mens rea or the respondent's knowledge or connivance in the acts committed by his servant, the respondent was not criminally liable for the shortages or the evasion of duty. The appeal was dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 39
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the salary paid or credited to a karta of the family for looking after the family's business was a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) in computing the income of the family business?
Held that:- If a remuneration is paid to the karta of the family under a valid agreement which is bona fide and in the interest of, and expedient for, the business of the family and the payment is genuine and not excessive, such remuneration must be held to be an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the family and must be allowed as an expenditure under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act.
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1966 (9) TMI 38
Whether the Tribunal was not competent to go into the question whether the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws?
Held that:- It was certainly open to the department, in the appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal, to support the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with regard to the written down value on any of the grounds decided against it. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the action of the Tribunal in remanding the case is not strictly justified by the language of rule 27 or rule 12. Even assuming that rules 12 and 27 are not strictly applicable, we are of opinion that the Tribunal has got sufficient power under section 33(4) of the Act to entertain the argument of the department with regard to the application of paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws Order and remand the case to the Income-tax Officer in the manner it has done. It is necessary to state that rules 12 and 27 are not exhaustive of the powers of the Appellate Tribunal.
We are accordingly of the opinion that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the argument of the department in this case and to direct the Income-tax Officer to find whether any depreciation was actually allowed under the Industrial Tax Rules and whether such depreciation should be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the written down value. Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 37
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rupees forty thousand two hundred and forty-seven could not be deemed to be profits of the assessee-company under the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- In the present case it is true that the entire assets of the appellant-company were sold to Messrs. Phelps & Co. Ltd. There was no separate sale of different items, but the consideration of each item of property sold was expressly mentioned in the agreement of sale. The contention that the transaction of sale was a mere attempt to readjust the business position of the transferor was never raised before the Tribunal and does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal.
We decide this appeal on the narrow ground that the appellant-company sold the property in the second schedule for a stated consideration which was not shown to be notional, and since the consideration was in excess of the original cost of the building, the difference was profit within the meaning of section 10(2)(vii), second proviso. Appeal dismissed
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1966 (9) TMI 36
Whether the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for the assessment year 1951-52 under the provisions of section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 ?
Held that:- The Tribunal has found that there was direct connection or nexus between the assessee's omission or failure to make a return and the under-assessment made by the Income-tax Officer for the year 1951-52. The High Court has affirmed this finding and concluded that the proceedings under section 34(1)(a) of the Act were not defective in law. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 35
Whether in view of rule 13 framed by the U. P. Government in exercise of the rule-making power under the Act, the assessing authority was incompetent to allow as expenses any amount other than the amounts actually paid by the assessee on account of agricultural operations metioned in that rule?
Held that:- The expenses by the respondent had been claimed on the basis of a yield which, according to the assessing authority, was lower than the actual yield. The assessing authority, therefore, estimated the produce at a higher figure, and we do not see any reason why, when the assessing authority estimated that the produce was higher than that shown by the respondent, he could not also estimate that the expenses incurred in respect of that higher produce must have been larger than the amount actually shown by the respondent. The assessing authority, in thus estimating the allowable expenditure at a figure higher than the amount claimed by the respondent, had full justification in the circumstance that he had estimated the produce also at a higher figure. The answer returned by the High Court was, therefore, perfectly correct. The appeal fails
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9911796707
