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1969 (12) TMI 100
Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the contract: whether it is a contract of work and labour or a contract for the sale of goods.
2. Applicability of the relevant notification for tax purposes.
3. Validity of the notification under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Nature of the Contract:
The petitioner, a partnership firm operating an automobile service station, entered into a contract with the Deputy Director of Agriculture, U.P., to fabricate and supply two steel bus bodies on chassis provided by the Deputy Director. The petitioner claimed exemption from sales tax, arguing that the contract was for work and labour, not for the sale of goods. The court examined whether the contract was for the sale of goods or for work and labour by referring to the intention of the parties as gathered from the contract terms. The court relied on two Supreme Court decisions, Patnaik & Co. v. State of Orissa and McKenzies Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, which involved similar contracts for bus body fabrication and supply. The court noted that the bus bodies were treated as units to be delivered on chassis, and the property in the bus bodies did not pass to the government until delivery. Based on these considerations, the court held that the contract was for the sale of goods and thus liable to tax.
2. Applicability of the Relevant Notification:
The court then analyzed whether the bus bodies fell under the notification issued under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, which taxed certain commodities at a single point at 10%. The notification included "motor tyres and tubes and spare parts of motor vehicles." The court determined that a bus body could not be considered a "spare part" of a motor vehicle, as spare parts are typically duplicate parts kept for replacement. Bus bodies are custom-fabricated and not available as ready-made parts in the market. Therefore, the court concluded that the bus bodies did not fall under the notification, and the tax imposed at 10% was incorrect.
3. Validity of the Notification:
Since the petition succeeded on the second ground, the court did not find it necessary to adjudicate on the third contention regarding the validity of the notification under section 3-A of the Act. Consequently, no opinion was expressed on this point.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, quashing the assessment order dated 29th January 1969, for the assessment year 1967-68. The petitioner was entitled to costs. The judgment emphasized that the contract was for the sale of goods, not work and labour, and the bus bodies did not fall under the relevant tax notification.
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1969 (12) TMI 99
Issues:
Interpretation of the term "hardware" in a sales tax notification for taxation purposes.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to the assessment of tax on knives by an assessee under the U.P. Sales Tax Act for the assessment year 1962-63. The Assistant Sales Tax Officer initially taxed the turnover of knives at 7%, treating them as cutlery. Upon appeal, the rate was reduced to 3% for table-knives and 2% for penknives and kitchen-knives by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax. Subsequently, the Additional Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax held that table-knives were cutlery taxable at 7%, while penknives and kitchen-knives should be categorized as "hardware" and taxed at 3%. The reference was made to determine whether kitchen-knives and penknives should be taxed as "hardware" at 3% or as unclassified items at 2%.
The central issue in the case revolved around the interpretation of the term "hardware" within the context of a specific sales tax notification. The notification in question referred to the turnover of "mill-stores and hardware" to be taxed at 3% per rupee. The court analyzed the notification and concluded that the term "hardware" should not be interpreted in isolation but in conjunction with "mill-stores." The court emphasized that each entry in the notification represented a distinct category of goods, and "hardware" should be understood within the scope of the category it belonged to. Referring to a previous case, the court clarified that "hardware" typically encompassed items made of base metal like nuts, bolts, hinges, rivets, and latches, distinct from kitchen-knives and penknives.
Based on the interpretation of the notification and the nature of the goods in question, the court held that kitchen-knives and penknives did not fall under the category of "hardware" as intended in the notification. Therefore, the general tax rate of 2% under section 3 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act applied to these items. The court answered the reference accordingly, ruling in favor of the assessee. The assessee was granted costs amounting to Rs. 100, including counsel's fee.
In conclusion, the judgment provides a detailed analysis of the interpretation of the term "hardware" in a sales tax notification and its application to specific goods, clarifying the tax treatment of kitchen-knives and penknives under the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
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1969 (12) TMI 98
Issues Involved:
1. Whether 'gram chhilka' is covered by item No. 15 or item No. 54 of Schedule 'B' to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, relating to tax-free goods?
2. If not, whether 'gram chhilka' is taxable at the rate of 1 1/2 per cent., which was the rate of sales tax on foodgrains at the relevant time, or 6 per cent., which was the rate of sales tax on commodities other than foodgrains?
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Coverage of 'gram chhilka' under Item No. 15 or Item No. 54 of Schedule 'B'
The primary question was whether 'gram chhilka' (the brown skin taken off the gram seed) qualifies as 'husk of all foodgrains' under item No. 15 or 'fodder of every type (dry or green)' under item No. 54 of Schedule 'B' to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, which lists tax-free goods.
- Petitioner's Argument: The petitioner argued that 'gram chhilka' should be considered as 'husk' under item No. 15 or as 'fodder' under item No. 54, thus exempting it from sales tax.
- Respondents' Argument: The respondents contended that 'gram chhilka' is neither 'husk' nor 'fodder' as defined in the tax statute and therefore, its sales were rightly taxed at 6 per cent.
Court's Reasoning:
- Interpretation of 'Husk': The court referred to a Government of India publication which described 'gram husk' as the brown skin of the gram seed, and not the gram chaff separated during threshing. This commercial understanding aligns with the definition in common parlance.
- Dictionary Definition: The dictionary meaning of 'husk' includes the outer covering of a seed, which encompasses 'gram chhilka'. Therefore, 'gram chhilka' falls within the ambit of 'husk' as per item No. 15.
- Interpretation of 'Fodder': The court noted that 'fodder' is defined as coarse food for cattle, horses, and sheep. 'Gram chhilka' is primarily used as cattle fodder, thus fitting within the definition of 'fodder' under item No. 54.
Conclusion on Issue 1: The court concluded that 'gram chhilka' is covered by both item No. 15 and item No. 54 of Schedule 'B', making it exempt from sales tax.
Issue 2: Taxability of 'gram chhilka' at 1 1/2 per cent or 6 per cent
Given the conclusion on Issue 1, the second issue regarding the applicable tax rate did not arise. However, the court addressed it hypothetically.
- Petitioner's Argument: The petitioner argued that if 'gram chhilka' were taxable, it should be taxed at the rate applicable to foodgrains, i.e., 1 1/2 per cent, as per proviso (12) to Notification No. S.O. 175/P.A. 46/48/S-5/66.
- Court's Reasoning: The court clarified that 'churi' (mentioned in the proviso) is not the same as 'gram chhilka'. The proviso specifically lists commodities in their complete forms, not their individual components like 'gram chhilka'.
Conclusion on Issue 2: If 'gram chhilka' were not covered by items Nos. 15 and 54, it would be subject to sales tax at the rate of 6 per cent, applicable to commodities other than foodgrains.
Final Judgment:
The petition succeeded. The court quashed the impugned order to the extent that it taxed 'gram chhilka' and directed the respondents to refund the sales tax amount, if any, recovered from the petitioner for the assessment year 1967-68. The petitioner was also awarded the costs of the petition.
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1969 (12) TMI 97
The High Court of Madras determined that the agreement between a film producer and a company for producing a Hindi version of a Telugu film was a service agreement, not a sale. The court concluded that the company acted as a service provider and not a seller of the finished film. The court dismissed the tax case.
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1969 (12) TMI 96
Issues:
Whether twisted yarn qualifies for absolute exemption as 'hand-spun yarn' under a specific notification of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
Analysis:
The case involved a reference under section 11(1) read with section 11(3) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act regarding the exemption of twisted yarn as 'hand-spun yarn.' The assessee claimed exemption for the turnover of hand-spun yarn based on a notification dated March 31, 1956. The Sales Tax Officer granted partial exemption but refused for the portion representing twisted yarn, considering it as manufactured yarn post twisting. The Additional Revising Authority, however, allowed exemption for twisted yarn, stating that it did not lose its identity as hand-spun yarn even after twisting. The Commissioner challenged this decision, leading to the present reference before the court.
The court analyzed the process of twisting, emphasizing that it does not change the essential nature of yarn. The notification aimed to exempt hand-spun yarn from sales tax, indicating a distinction from mill-spun yarn. The court noted that twisting does not alter the commercial identity of the yarn or its utility. Relying on precedents, the court highlighted that a process, even if termed as manufacturing, does not matter as long as the commodity remains the same commercially. Notably, the court cited Supreme Court cases where chemical changes in products did not alter their fundamental nature, supporting the view that twisting does not transform yarn into a different commodity.
The court dismissed the department's argument that twisting constituted a manufacturing process, clarifying that the critical aspect is whether the product becomes a distinct commodity post-processing. Referring to relevant judgments, the court distinguished cases involving significant changes in commodities, asserting that twisted yarn retains its identity as hand-spun yarn. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the assessee, affirming entitlement to exemption for twisted yarn under the notification. The judgment highlighted the importance of assessing whether a process results in a commercially distinct product when determining tax exemptions, emphasizing continuity in the essential nature of the commodity.
In conclusion, the court answered the reference in the affirmative, supporting the assessee's claim for exemption on twisted yarn under the specific notification. The judgment underscored the significance of maintaining the commercial identity of a product despite processing, aligning with precedents where fundamental characteristics of commodities were preserved despite manufacturing processes.
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1969 (12) TMI 95
The High Court of Mysore allowed the petition of the hotel proprietor "Ashok Hotel" in a tax assessment dispute for the year 1966-67. The court held that the assessing authority cannot reject sales turnover accounts supported by vouchers based on purchase turnover rules. The court set aside the assessment order and directed re-computation of tax based on the sales turnover. The petitioner was awarded costs. (Case citation: 1969 (12) TMI 95 - Mysore High Court)
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1969 (12) TMI 94
The High Court of Mysore quashed a demand notice for penalty issued to the son of a deceased dealer under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, as there was no provision to levy penalty on the legal representative of a dealer. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and allowed the petition, with no costs. (Case citation: 1969 (12) TMI 94 - Mysore High Court)
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1969 (12) TMI 93
The High Court of Mysore allowed the revision petitions under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957 for the assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64. The court held that scooter seat covers made of rexine cloth do not fall under serial No. 73 of the Act but should be taxed at 2 per cent under section 5(1) of the Act. The turnover should be assessed accordingly for the relevant years.
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1969 (12) TMI 92
Whether the supplies can be considered as "sales" under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The contention of the appellant relating to the inclusion of the excise duty in the total turnover is essentially a question that should have been urged before the appellate authority. The appellate authority is competent to go into questions of fact as well as of law. In particular the contention of the appellant that the department is estopped from including the excise duty paid in the total turnover is one that should have been appropriately taken before the appellate authority.
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1969 (12) TMI 87
Issues:
1. Validity of ex parte assessments for failure to append list of sales to registered dealers as required by rule 30 under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948.
2. Interpretation of the scheme of levy and assessment of tax under the Act.
3. Legality of quarterly assessments under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act.
4. Overruling of previous judgments by the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addressed the issue of ex parte assessments due to the failure of the assessee to append the list of sales to registered dealers as required by rule 30 under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Sales Tax Officer proceeded with the assessments for two quarters without the necessary information, leading to a petition in the High Court seeking to quash the orders of assessment.
2. The court examined the scheme of levy and assessment of tax under the Act, emphasizing that a registered dealer must file returns of turnover as prescribed and pay tax accordingly. The assessing authority has the discretion to accept the return or call for explanations and evidence from the taxpayer to support the turnover. The Act mandates periodical returns and tax payments based on the turnover.
3. The judgment delved into the legality of quarterly assessments under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, referencing a previous case where it was held that tax assessments could only occur at the end of the year. However, a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court overruled this, stating that sales tax assessments could be based on quarterly returns submitted by the dealer before the close of the financial year. The court affirmed that such assessments are not provisional but valid under the Act.
4. The judgment highlighted the overruling of previous judgments by the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court, emphasizing that assessment proceedings under the Act could commence before the end of the year if provision is made for submission of periodical returns. The court upheld the legality of such assessments and dismissed the petition, setting aside the High Court's order.
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1969 (12) TMI 74
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the resolution appointing Motilal on February 8, 1942.
2. Applicability of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
3. Existence of an implied agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant-company.
4. Entitlement of plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 3 to 6 to the moiety of commission for the years 1940 and 1941.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Resolution Appointing Motilal on February 8, 1942:
The plaintiffs contended that the general meeting on February 8, 1942, appointing Motilal was invalid as it continued post-dissolution by Seth Sobhag Mal. The court examined the agreement dated July 6, 1906, and the subsequent incorporation of the Edward Mills Co. Ltd. The court noted that the shareholders had the right to elect the chairman in the absence of a permanent chairman or managing director. Seth Sobhag Mal's dissolution of the meeting was unauthorized as he was not the permanent chairman. The court cited precedents establishing that a chairman cannot arbitrarily dissolve a meeting without the majority's consent. The court concluded that the remaining shareholders were within their rights to continue the meeting and appoint Motilal, making the resolution valid.
2. Applicability of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932:
The plaintiffs argued that the agreement of 1906 was between two individuals, not joint family firms, and thus Section 69 did not apply. The court found that the suit was filed on behalf of the firm, Kamal Nayan Hamir Singh, which, after the partition suit in Calcutta High Court, became a partnership subject to the Indian Partnership Act. The court held that Section 69 barred the suit as the firm was not registered. The court referenced multiple precedents affirming that a suit by an unregistered firm is incompetent and must be dismissed.
3. Existence of an Implied Agreement Between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant-Company:
The plaintiffs claimed an implied agreement based on the company's actions post-incorporation. The court held that a company cannot ratify a pre-incorporation contract but can enter into a new contract on the same terms. The court found no evidence of a new contract between the company and the plaintiffs. The court cited legal principles and precedents, including Kelner v. Baxter and In re Northumberland Avenue Hotel Company, to support its conclusion that the company was not bound by the pre-incorporation agreement.
4. Entitlement to the Moiety of Commission for the Years 1940 and 1941:
The plaintiffs sought Rs. 23,061 as their share of the commission for 1940 and 1941. The court noted that the trial court found the claim uncontested by the defendants but did not pass a decree. The court referenced Order 12, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows for judgment on admissions. The court concluded that the trial court should have passed a decree for the uncontested amount based on the defendants' admission during arguments.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly accepted, and the court passed a decree for Rs. 23,061 in favor of the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 3 and 4 against defendant No. 1, the company, for the commission of 1940-41. The appeal was dismissed in other respects, and the parties were left to bear their own costs.
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1969 (12) TMI 65
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the petitioners are entitled to a winding-up order under section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956, on the ground that it is just and equitable to do so.
2. Whether the petitioners have alternative remedies available and have acted unreasonably in seeking a winding-up order instead of pursuing those remedies.
3. Whether the petitioners have suppressed material facts and, if so, whether this affects their entitlement to relief.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to a Winding-up Order under Section 433(f):
The petitioners, who are contributories of the company, sought a winding-up order on the ground that it is just and equitable to do so under section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioners argued that the company, initially a small family concern, had evolved into a joint venture between two family groups, akin to a partnership. They contended that the joint management was denied to them, constituting a substantial ouster of the minority group, and cited various acts of misconduct and mismanagement by the majority group. However, the court emphasized that the company was a solvent, sound, and flourishing concern, and mere allegations of mismanagement or misconduct were insufficient to justify a winding-up order. The court also noted that the company had evolved beyond a small family concern to a larger venture with significant capital participation from the East African Company, making the partnership analogy inapplicable.
2. Availability of Alternative Remedies:
The court highlighted that under section 443(2) of the Companies Act, it could refuse a winding-up order if an alternative remedy was available and the petitioners were acting unreasonably in seeking to wind up the company instead of pursuing that remedy. The petitioners had alternative remedies under sections 397 and 398 of the Act, which provide for relief in cases of oppression and mismanagement. The court pointed out that the petitioners had not availed of these remedies and had failed to disclose their previous application under section 408 for the appointment of government directors, which had been rejected. The court concluded that the petitioners had not acted reasonably in seeking a winding-up order without pursuing these alternative remedies, especially given the potential irreparable damage to the solvent company.
3. Suppression of Material Facts:
The court found that the petitioners had suppressed material facts by not disclosing their previous application under section 408. This lack of candor was significant because it deprived the court of the opportunity to consider whether the petitioners were acting unreasonably in seeking a winding-up order. The court emphasized the importance of full disclosure in petitions under section 433(f), as the admission of such petitions and the consequent public advertisement could cause irreparable damage to a solvent company. The petitioners' failure to disclose material facts was a ground for dismissing the petition.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the winding-up petition at the admission stage, emphasizing that the petitioners had alternative remedies available under sections 397 and 398, which they had not pursued. The court also noted that the petitioners had suppressed material facts and had not acted reasonably in seeking a winding-up order. The petitioners were ordered to pay the quantified costs to the company and the remuneration of the Additional Registrar appointed as Commissioner.
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1969 (12) TMI 57
Shares – Allotment of, Shares – Power, to discount, Share capital - Further issue of, Reduction of , Reduction of share capital – Application to Tribunal for confirming order, objections by creditors, and settlement of list of objecting creditors, Meetings and Proceedings - Representation of Corporation at Meetings of Companies & Creditors, Ordinary and special resolutions, Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served, Compromise and arrangement, Winding up – Fraudulent preference.
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1969 (12) TMI 55
Issues:
1. Validity of a mortgage deed due to registration requirements under section 125 of the Companies Act, 1956.
Analysis:
The judgment by Harbans Singh, J. pertains to an application filed by the voluntary liquidator of a company under voluntary liquidation regarding the validity of a mortgage deed executed by the company in favor of the Punjab Financial Corporation. The company had taken a loan from the corporation, secured by the mortgage deed. The company contended that the mortgage was void as it was not registered within the prescribed time limit under section 125 of the Companies Act, 1956. The company argued that the charge created by the mortgage was not registered within 21 days as required by law, rendering it void against the liquidator and creditors.
The court examined the provisions of section 125 of the Act, which state that a charge created by a company must be registered within 21 days of its creation to be valid. However, a proviso allows for a grace period of seven days if the company can provide sufficient cause for the delay in registration. The evidence presented showed that the company had sent the required documents for registration to the Registrar within the stipulated time frame, but they were received after 21 days. The Registrar issued a certificate of registration, which is considered conclusive evidence of compliance with registration requirements under section 132 of the Act.
The court rejected the argument that the delay in the Registrar receiving the documents invalidated the registration, citing legal precedent that the certificate of registration is conclusive evidence of compliance. The court emphasized that once the Registrar issues the certificate, the court cannot question the timing or process of registration. The judgment concluded that the mortgage deed was valid, and the corporation held a charge on the company's property as a secured creditor. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the corporation, and did not award any costs in the proceedings.
In summary, the judgment clarifies the importance of timely registration of charges created by companies under the Companies Act, 1956. It underscores the significance of the registration certificate issued by the Registrar as conclusive evidence of compliance with registration requirements, thereby upholding the validity of the mortgage deed and confirming the corporation's status as a secured creditor.
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1969 (12) TMI 44
Issues:
The judgment involves the following issues:
1. Whether the accused was in conscious possession of contraband foreign gold found in a room.
2. Whether the room in question was in the exclusive possession of the accused.
3. The sufficiency of evidence to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Conscious Possession of Contraband Gold
The accused was tried for offences under the Customs Act and Defence of India (Amendment) Rules for being in possession of contraband foreign gold. The prosecution claimed that the accused was conscious of the gold found in the room. However, the court found that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the accused's conscious possession of the gold. The key evidence of the prosecution, including the testimony of witnesses, did not conclusively prove the accused's awareness or control over the contraband gold.
Issue 2: Exclusive Possession of the Room
The defence argued that the accused was not in exclusive possession of the room where the gold was found. The Rent Collector's testimony indicated that the room was not solely occupied by the accused but was also used by 2 or 3 servants. This raised doubts about the accused's exclusive possession of the room and, consequently, his connection to the contraband gold. The court noted that the room's status as shared accommodation weakened the prosecution's claim of the accused's conscious possession.
Issue 3: Sufficiency of Evidence
The court analyzed the evidence presented by witnesses, including the Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise and the panch witness. It highlighted discrepancies in the testimonies, such as the absence of crucial details in the panchanama and the non-production of the key allegedly used to access the gold. These inconsistencies cast doubt on the prosecution's case and failed to establish the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court upheld the acquittal by the lower court, emphasizing that the evidence did not support a conviction.
In conclusion, the High Court confirmed the order of acquittal, stating that the evidence did not sufficiently prove the accused's conscious possession of the contraband gold. The court found that the room was not exclusively occupied by the accused, undermining the prosecution's case. The judgment emphasized the importance of evidence and the need to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases.
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1969 (12) TMI 43
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Rule 175 (3) of the Central Excise Rules regarding obtaining separate licenses for distinct factories under the same company.
2. Application of the proviso to Rule 175 (3) in cases of unmanufactured products.
3. Determination of whether separate licenses are required for factories situated in the same town but with distinct operations.
Analysis:
The judgment deals with the interpretation of Rule 175 (3) of the Central Excise Rules concerning the issuance of separate licenses for distinct factories owned by the same company. The case involved a company that operated two separate factories in the same town but with distinct operations. The company had historically obtained separate licenses for each factory. However, in 1967-68, the Assistant Collector expressed the intention to grant only one license for both factories, prompting the company to seek legal recourse. The company argued that the factories were distinct and separate entities, justifying the need for separate licenses. The court noted that while the factories belonged to the same company, they were not at the same business location, and each factory had its own operations. The court upheld the company's claim, emphasizing that Rule 175 (3) allows for the issuance of separate licenses when a person or company has more than one place of business. The court rejected the argument that the factories should be treated as one due to their proximity or common features, emphasizing the right of a person to apply for separate licenses for each place of business.
The judgment also addressed the application of the proviso to Rule 175 (3) concerning cases of unmanufactured products. The court clarified that the proviso specifically pertained to unmanufactured products alone and did not restrict the right to obtain separate licenses for manufactured products. The court highlighted that Rule 175 (3) grants individuals the right to apply for separate licenses for each place of business, without limitations based on the type of products manufactured or the proximity of the business locations. Therefore, the court dismissed the argument that the proviso restricted the company's ability to obtain separate licenses for its distinct factories.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the company's right to obtain separate licenses for its two distinct factories, emphasizing the provisions of Rule 175 (3) that allow for such licensing arrangements. The judgment clarified that the location or proximity of factories in the same town does not negate the company's entitlement to separate licenses for each place of business. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal brought by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, upholding the decision to grant separate licenses to the company for its two factories.
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1969 (12) TMI 42
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for disposal in accordance with the law. No costs were awarded. (Case Citation: 1969 (12) TMI 42 - SC)
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1969 (12) TMI 41
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order for rejecting an application under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, stating that the High Court should have provided reasons for its decision. The case is remanded back to the High Court for proper consideration. No costs were awarded. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (12) TMI 40
Gift tax - Petition for the issue of a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ prohibiting the respondent from further proceeding with his proposal to assess the petitioner to gift-tax pursuant to his notice under section 16(1) - Petitioner’s case is that all he had done was to throw into the hotchpot of his family his self-acquired property making a declaration to that effect, that there was no transfer of property within the meaning of the Gift-tax Act and that, therefore, no liability was incurred under the Act – having declared the law in the connected cases, we must leave the petitioner to make out his case on the merits before the appropriate authorities.
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1969 (12) TMI 39
Estate Duty Act - Petitioner prays for cancellation of an order imposing penalty by the Assistant Controller - Whether assessee can approach the High Court under Art. 227 against levy of penalty for non-compliance of notice under section 73 of Estate Duty Act
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