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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 941 Records
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1970 (11) TMI 88 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sales Tax Officer has very clearly stated in his order that he has relied upon the assessment case of the petitioner for the previous year. Nothing could be a better guide or yardstick for this purpose. We are unable to see how the record of the previous year was taken as a yardstick for the present assessment order or how that assessment could be a substitute for information regarding the increase in assessment by the impugned order. The matter has been most carelessly dealt with by the sales tax authorities. It has been repeatedly said that even a best judgment assessment must be a bona fide assessment and must be based on some material which could reasonably lead to the conclusion arrived at. 4.. The assessment order as well as the order in revision are accordingly quashed. The sales tax authorities may however proceed according to law. There will be no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1970 (11) TMI 87 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and severally liable for the tax assessed on the firm where the firm is dissolved. While sub-section (3) of section 13 has been amended by adding the words or any other person after the words from a dealer , no corresponding amendment has been made in section 14(1) of the Act. It is clear from the language of section 14(1) that only a debtor of the dealer can be directed to pay the money due to the dealer but not the debtor of a partner of an assessee-firm. The impugned notice states that it has come to the knowledge of the respondent that Messrs Hindusthan Drug House are due or will become due certain sums of money to the partners Messrs P. Kapurchand and P. Balchand of Messrs Hindusthan Jewellery Mart. P. Balchand referred to therein is the petitioner. It is therefore clear that the impugned notice is clearly illegal and without jurisdiction. Consequently this writ petition is allowed and the impugned notice dated 8th February, 1968, is quashed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1970 (11) TMI 86 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cision of this court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury 1962 1 Supp. S.C.R. 983., wherein it was held that the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers was not entitled to reassess the value of the evidence and to substitute its own conclusions of fact in place of those reached by the courts below. But the revisional power of the High Court in that case was exercised under section 35(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952) which is different in language from section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, with which we are concerned in the present case. These observations also demolish the validity of the contention advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the assessee. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The State will be entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 150. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (11) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... turn that-is submitted late is also one that is furnished under section 17(1) and, therefore, if a return is submitted late by a dealer, it cannot be said that the dealer has failed to furnish return under section 17(1). For this reason, a dealer who has merely furnished his returns late cannot be subjected to penalty under section 17(3). As the petitioner was made liable to penalty for late filing of his returns, it must be held that the penalties imposed under section 17(3) were unauthorised. 9.. The learned counsel did not challenge the penalty imposed under rule 69-A. 10.. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the petitions are partly allowed and the penalty imposed under section 27(2) in the assessment orders for the year 1963-64 and the penalty imposed under section 17(3) in the assessment orders for both the years are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs of these petitions. The security deposits shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petitions partly allowed.
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1970 (11) TMI 84 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it seems to us only right that lassi should also be included within that scope. Lassi, after all, is prepared by merely adding water to dahi and churning it. It is beyond dispute that dahi is a milk product and, in our opinion, the addition of water to it results in a preparation which cannot but be considered as a milk product also. We should be guilty of indulging in hair-splitting if we did not treat lassi as a milk product merely because it was produced from dahi and not directly from milk. In the circumstances, we hold that lassi is a milk product and is exempt from sales tax by reason of Notification No. ST-911/X dated 31st March, 1956. The first question is answered in the affirmative. In view of the answer to the first question, learned counsel for the assessee does not press for an answer to the second question. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 50 in each case. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 83 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e direction or arrangement for distribution of business arising from the circle, but both the officers continue to have jurisdiction throughout the circle in spite of such an administrative arrangement. It is not necessary that the jurisdictional area of these officers should again be divided under the Act before any of them can exercise their powers in the circle. That will in effect amount to creating a circle within a circle and to hold that in one circle, there can be only one Sales Tax Officer. But that is not the correct legal position as there is nothing in the Act to indicate that there can be only one Sales Tax Officer in a circle. In our opinion, Shri Mishra has jurisdiction throughout Raipur Circle 2 and the assessment proceedings against the petitioner can be continued by him. 6.. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 82 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erframes does not pass to the assessee and it cannot be said, therefore, that when the assessee completes the coach what it delivers to the railway is an article in which it held the entire property. What it delivers to the railway is a coach, an essential part of which has always been railway property. It cannot, therefore, be said to sell the coach to the railway. We are in respectful agreement with these observations and we find that they completely cover the facts of the case under our consideration. 35.. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal about the nature of the contract is not correct and that the three contracts in question were really works contracts and not contracts for sale of goods. We accordingly answer the question which is referred to us by the Tribunal and dispose of this reference. The costs of this reference shall be borne by the Commissioner of Sales Tax who is the opponent. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 81 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... find that the facts of this case are greatly similar to the facts of another decision of this court in A.A. Jariwala and Bros. v. State of Gujarat 1965 16 S.T.C. 942. Since we have considered even this decision in the above-referred Sales Tax Reference No. 5 of 1969Since reported as Variety Body Builders v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat 1971 28 S.T.C. 339., we do not propose to discuss the facts of that case in detail. 8.. In view of this, our answer to the first question is that the contracts in question are indivisible contracts for work and labour for repairing work and not a composite agreement in which two contracts, one of labour and the other of supplying of materials is contemplated. So far as the second question is concerned it does not arise in view of the answer given by us to the first question. We accordingly dispose of this reference. The applicant-Commissioner shall bear the costs of the opponent-assessee in this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 80 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n to his client who belongs to a class of persons that do not charge any sales tax separately in the bills for sale of articles of food or drink in the hotel. It is now settled law that equitable considerations or presumptions or assumptions are entirely out of place in interpreting a taxing statute. The court has to look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. The court cannot either imply something not expressed in the statute or import something into the statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency. We, therefore, for the reasons stated, hold that the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in so far as it relates to the applicability of the rate of sales tax at 2 per cent. for the sales during the first period is erroneous and liable to be set aside. In the result, the tax revision case is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal to the extent indicated above and restoring that of the Commercial Tax Officer. There will be no order as to costs.
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1970 (11) TMI 79 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t, because this entry refers even to iron scrap and steel scrap. If the word scrap includes within its ambit even the articles which have once undergone a manufacturing process, then obviously this view is incorrect. Under the circumstances, we find that the articles regarding which the assessee has paid purchase tax, which the assessee now wants to claim as a set-off under rule 41, clause (e), were the articles covered by entry 3 of Schedule B. That being so, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal is not correct. Therefore, our answer to the question, which is referred to us, is that the machinery purchased by the opponent, does not fall within the residuary entry 22 of Schedule E but falls under entry 3 of Schedule B attached to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. This reference is, therefore, disposed of accordingly. The cost of the applicant-Commissioner of Sales Tax shall be borne by the opponent-assessee in this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 78 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... puting the prescribed minimum of the gross turnover or not under the circumstances of the case? In that case, it was held that the gross turnover means aggregate turnover of such sales as are taxable or would be taxable but for some exemption provided in the Act. The same principle would apply to the facts of the present case. An inter-State sale is entitled to exemption from tax not under the U.P. Sales Tax Act but by virtue of the provisions contained in article 286 of the Constitution. The inter-State sales are now taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act of 1956. Such sales, therefore, are completely outside the purview of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Under the circumstances, such sales cannot be included in the gross turnover under the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the view taken by the Judge (Revisions), in our opinion, is right. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there is no order as to costs. The counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 77 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that Nycil powder is medicine within the meaning of entry 13 of Schedule C. We are fortified in our conclusion by the fact that even for the purposes of administration of Indian Drugs Control Act, Nycil powder is treated as a drug, and a licence is required to be taken for manufacturing, stocking and selling Nycil powder and further that for the purposes of Central Excise Act also the appropriate authorities have treated Nycil powder as medicine and assessed it to duty accordingly. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the question whether Nycil powder falls within the residuary entry, does not at all arise for our consideration. To the question referred to us for our opinion, our answer, therefore, is that Nycil medicated powder is medicine covered by entry 13 of Schedule C to the Act. The opponent-Commissioner of Sales Tax will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee-firm and bear his own. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (11) TMI 76 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aid on the 8th of August, 1967. Therefore, a proper application would only be deemed to have been made on 8th of August, 1967, and, in any event, even if the application be taken to have been filed on the 7th August, 1967, it is beyond the period of limitation prescribed. The period prescribed expired on the 5th August, 1967. The view we have taken of the matter finds support from the following decisions (1) Govindji v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh 1955 6 S.T.C. 183., (2) Director of Supplies and Disposals, Calcutta v. Member, Board of Revenue, Government of West Bengal 1960 11 S.T.C. 589. and (3) State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan BegumA.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1604. Therefore, there is no error in the order of the Tribunal in rejecting the application under section 22(1) of the Act as barred by limitation. In this situation, the present applications fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in either of these two applications. Applications dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 75 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mposed by the Assessing Authority were waived. If that be so, the petitioner-firm should have gone further in revision to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner and thereafter to the Financial Commissioner or the Sales Tax Tribunal so that the facts could be found to determine whether any of the entries in Schedule B to the Act applied or not. In 1965, by inserting item 71 in Schedule B to the Act, poultry feed was declared tax-free goods. That entry does not make mention of the grains, etc., but of the different contents in the form of proteins, etc., from which it is quite clear that the poultry feed is a product entirely different from the foodgrains which are tax-free goods. Merely because the foodgrains are exempt from payment of tax does not mean that the products in which foodgrains are used are also exempt from the payment of tax. For the reasons given above, I find no merit in this writ petition which is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 74 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rections. The purchases in respect of which the petitioner claimed exemption consisted of 31 consignments. The respondent held that seven out of these consignments, which accounted for a turnover of Rs. 1,01,452.91 bore the marks of the sellers, while the remaining 24 consignments were packed and shipped by the petitioner himself. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this finding is not supported by any material. The respondent has not referred to any material in support of the above finding and counsel for the petitioner is well founded in his submission that the above finding cannot be sustained. But this does not vitiate the impugned order of assessment, since section 5(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act has no application on the admitted facts of this case and that is the only matter which arises for decision. This writ petition cannot, therefore, succeed and it is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (11) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee is entitled, upon the facts found by the Board of Revenue with regard to these categories of sales, to exemption from liability under the Bihar Sales Tax Act because of the provision of article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution as it stood at the relevant date read with the explanation to that article?
With regard to the sales which took place in the period from 7th September, 1955, to 31st March, 1956, whether the assessee is entitled, upon the facts found by the Board of Revenue with regard to these categories of sales, to exemption from liability under the Bihar Sales Tax Act on the ground that the sales took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce under article 286(2) of the Constitution as it stood at the the relevant period?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As under the terms of the contracts of sale, the purchasers were required to remove the goods from the State of Bihar to other States. Hence the sales with which we are concerned in this case must be held to be sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
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1970 (11) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the goods are sold or not is not incidental or ancillary to the power to levy sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In the present case, however, the power to confiscate the goods and to levy penalty in lieu of confiscation, when in respect of the goods found in a vehicle the driver of the vehicle is not carrying with him the documents specified therein is not a provision which is ancillary or incidental to the power to tax sale of goods.
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1970 (11) TMI 57 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up – Declaration of solvency ... ... ... ... ..... 1879 11 Ch. D. 140. In the circumstances, however, I do not think I need pursue these submissions, beyond saying that the argument that I have indicated seems to me to have considerable force. As regards the former director, for whom Mr. Lightman appeared, Mr. de Courcy accepted that the success of the former liquidator also involved the success of the former director the first head of claim against the former director is A declaration that the declarations of solvency made by her were in error and of no effect. Mr. de Courcy accepts that whatever may happen in any other proceedings, he cannot sensibly proceed in this action against the former director on the two remaining heads of claim against her, and he therefore accepts that, given my decision on the former liquidator s motion, the former director s motion should succeed on the same grounds. Accordingly the former director s motion also succeeds, with costs. Solicitors Herbert Smith and Co. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp and Co.
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1970 (11) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... a temporary nature, it would undoubtedly be an improvement so as to make it a part of the hypotheca. The intention of the parties in making such a clear and unambiguous stipulation was on account of the fact that at the time of the execution of the mortgage there was only an unfinished superstructure and the parties could not have comprehended what additions and improvements were going to be made to the incomplete superstructure, for the completion of which a sum of Rs. 3,50,000 was borrowed. As I have already pointed out, the nature of the constructions which the official liquidator wants to be excluded from the hypotheca cannot be said to be temporary, but are definitely additions, improvements and accessions falling squarely within the terms of the mortgage deed. These items cannot, therefore, be excluded from the hypotheca to be sold for the purpose of realising the mortgage amount. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1970 (11) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE ANDERA PRADESH HYDRABAD
Manufacturer ... ... ... ... ..... definition of manufacture in the Section is to be following effect. 2(f) manufacture includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product and the word manufacture shall be construed accordingly and shall include not only a person who employs hired labour in production or manufacture of excisable goods, but also any person who engages in their production or manufacture on his own account. The definition is comprehensive enough to include the petitioner within its ambit. It cannot be denied that the petitioner was engaged in the production of M.F. rounds and as such cannot accept the liability sought to be imposed on him. We are not concerned here with the contractual relation between the petitioner and the 5th respondent nor it is necessary to express any opinion on that aspect. 11. In the view we have taken the petitioner is not entitled to the relief asked for. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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