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Showing 61 to 80 of 941 Records
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1970 (12) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944 - determining the market value for unsold paddy ... ... ... ... ..... rawn our attention to Order No. 397 F.D./F/P 4P-21/52, dated the 14th January, 1953 which was published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary , dated the 14th January, 1953 (Part I, pages 41, 42). By this order the Governor of West Bengal with the concurrence of the Central Government had also fixed the maximum prices per maund at which rice in husk (paddy) of different varieties may be bought or sold in wholesale quantities in several districts. In the premises aforesaid, it is purely academic to argue about procurement rate and market rate operating simultaneously in the accounting year with which we are concerned in this reference. Our answer to the question in this reference is, therefore, in the negative and in our opinion the Tribunal should apply the maximum rate fixed by the order aforesaid to the entire quantity of paddy possessed by the assessee in the accounting year. Each party will bear and pay its own costs. K. L. Roy J.-I agree. Question answered accordingly.
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1970 (12) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Whether tax liability outstanding from previous years, should be considered for determining the availability of surplus money, for distribution of dividends u/s 23A
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1970 (12) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Validty of reassessment proceedings when status was wrongly described in the notice u/s 148 ... ... ... ... ..... while the description of the status the other way would be referable to another assessee. Where such is the case, the description of the status may be indicative of the fact that a particular assesee is sought to be proceeded against and if sanction of the Commissioner is obtained for proceeding against that assessee, such sanction cannot be availed of for the purpose of initiating proceedings against another assessee who would be indicated by the description of the status the other way. In my opinion, this is a case where the status of the assessee was wrongly described in the impugned notices and it was corrected by the Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment proceedings on the application of the assessee and on the assessee s filing revised returns. There is absolutely no merit in this application and it must be dismissed. The rule is discharged. Interim order, in any, is vacated. The petitioner would pay one set of costs of this application to the respondents.
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1970 (12) TMI 12 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Benami transaction - income from properties which are in name of wife which were bought with moneys given by the husband - whether such property belongs to husbands family and whether income from such property can be included in income of family
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1970 (12) TMI 11 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
In its books of account for the current year which were maintained on the mercantile system of accounting the assessee made the provisions for its liability under the Sales Tax Act - demand notice for the sales tax of earlier years were received by the assessee in the accounting year - demand was not disputed by assessee - held that amounts demanded have to be allowed as deduction
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1970 (12) TMI 10 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that there was no partial partition as claimed by the assessee - whether the share of profit paid to Ghanshyam and the interest paid to Rameshwar Lal and Saraswati Devi by the firm M/s. Brij Mohan Lal Rameshwar Lal was rightly included in the income of the assessee, Hindu undivided family
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1970 (12) TMI 9 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Same business - Carry forward and set off of loss ... ... ... ... ..... under which the assessee acquired the managing agency. (4) Ninety-five per cent. of the shares held by the assessee related to Meyer Mills Ltd. (5) There was no allocation of interest between the managing agency and the shares of the managed-company. (6) The shares were acquired and managing agency was obtained in the year 1946. After a few years the assessee started liquidating the shares. The assessee soon gave up the managing agency. (7) The Tribunal has found that the company in fact combined the two activities under consideration. It will be seen that the probabilities of the case are in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal was right in concluding that the two activities of the assessee under consideration constituted one business. We, therefore, answer the question referred to the court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P., shall pay the assessee Rs. 200 as costs of this reference. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (12) TMI 8 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Whether the exception under section 7(2)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was a bar to the deductibility of the entertainment allowance or any portion thereof received by the assessee
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1970 (12) TMI 7 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Trust - building of residential quarters for workmen in general - but trustees had discretion to spend the entire income for the benefit of the workmen belonging to a particular company - whether object of the trust cannot be said to be a charitable object
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1970 (12) TMI 6 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Petitioner preferred an appeal before the AAC - in the meantime ITO forwarded a certificate to the Tax Recovery Officer - held that when the assessee had already been granted a stay without imposing any condition, the Income-tax Officer cannot exercise his discretion any further unless there is anything in the conduct of the assessee which disentitled him to further stay till the disposal of appeal
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1970 (12) TMI 5 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Distribution of dividends - Dividend income - Income Tax Return - In which year it is assessable
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1970 (12) TMI 4 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Concealed income found in income tax - whether it is deductible for wealth-tax purposes - Held, yes - undoubtedly the tax liability is a debt. It has to be deducted from the wealth of the assessee in order to arrive at the net wealth
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1970 (12) TMI 3 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Notional depreciation - computation of depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... Income-tax Act, 1922, did not include any notional allowance. As explained above, the same principle should govern the interpretation of section 43(6)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the present case notional allowance for depreciation appears to have been allowed to the assessee for the earliar assessment years 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62. For none of these three years was any deduction actually allowed on account of depreciation. Consequently, there is no room for any deduction from the cost price as contemplated by clause (b) of sub-section (6) of section 43 of the Act. The written down value for the assessment year 1962-63 had to be accepted at the figure of the cost price (Rs. 30,000). Our answer to the question referred to the court is, therefore, that depreciation on the motor truck had to be calculated on Rs. 30,000. The question is answered in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P., shall pay the assessee Rs. 200 as costs of this reference.
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1970 (12) TMI 2 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Validity of proceedings relating to the search and seizure of their account books and other documents under section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
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1970 (12) TMI 1 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Whether the income from the letting of the building by the assessee to the Export Promotion Council is assessable under the head 'Income from house property 'and not under the head " Income from other sources " - held that question referred is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee
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1970 (11) TMI 113 - HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI AND NAGALAND
... ... ... ... ..... whether the sanctioning authority at all considered the facts of the case before lie accorded the sanction. That apart, the sanction in the instant case appears to have been made as recommended by the S. R. P., which shows that it was simply a stereotyped order of the Additional District Magistrate without applying his mind to the facts of the case. 8. In the circumstances I hold that the sanction order, which appears in the record of the case, is not a sanction order as contemplated Under Section 39 of the Arms Act, and since there was no sanction in accordance with law the Court had no jurisdiction to try the accused at all and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner must be quashed. 9. In the result the petition is allowed and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner Under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, are quashed. 10. Since the petition is allowed on this important point, I do not think it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the learned Counsel.
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1970 (11) TMI 112 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... cash credit in question with any undisclosed income of the assessee, it is clear that no question of law arises out of our order and we decline to make a reference on any question to the High Court." The application has been made under section 66(2) of the Act for directing the Tribunal to refer the question of law, set out above, to this court for opinion Under section 28 of the Act, there is no statutory obligation on the Income Tax authorities to impose a penalty in very case. A case for the imposition of penalty has to be found on the material on the record and it is essentially a question of fact whether in a certain case penalty is called for or not. The Tribunal gave valid reasons in support of its order cancelling the order of penalty imposed by the Income Tax Officer and upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We agree with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that no question of law arises. We, accordingly, dismiss this petition with no order as to costs.
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1970 (11) TMI 111 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ugatory by the contrary interpretation, and the property of the debtor which could be attached and sold in execution of the decree not made available for the satisfaction of the debt. I am fortified in this view by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Buta Ram v. Sayyad Mohammad ILR (1935) Lah 328 AIR 1935 Lah 71, where the opposite view as accepted by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kochuponchi Varughese's Case AIR 1952 ker 467 (supra) an the cases cited therein for the aforesaid reasons was not followed. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in Buta Ram's case ILR 16 Lah 328 AIR 1935 Lah 71 The executing Court erred in relying on Kochuponchi Varughese's case AIR 1952 ker 467. 6. The revision petition is consequently allowed with costs and the condition attached to the order releasing the property from attachment whereby the petitioners were directed to pay ₹ 3,000/- before the attachment was lifted is set aside. 7. Petition allowed.
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1970 (11) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he Swetamberies are held to have the right to worship it according to their tenets by placing Chakshus in the idol or by erecting their Dhwajadand or Kalash over the Temple. 20. Lastly it is urged that the High Court ought not to have entertained the cross objection by extending the time for worship from 1 hour to 3 hours. In our view the directions of the High Court are not unreasonable nor do they in any way affect the right of the Respondents to worship because the directions clearly enable the Swetamberies who wish to worship the deity within that period without disturbing the Digamberies to be at liberty to do so and likewise it will be open to Digamberies to go and worship in the temple during the period it is kept open. In view of the acute controversy between these 2 sects and their reluctance to arrive at an amicable settlement the directions given by the High Court are manifestly reasonable just and proper. In this view the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (11) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... It was said that though the power was discretionary but it was not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could not be easily assumed. There was moreover a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with rules of law. Lastly an effort was made to agitate the point that s. 3 (2) (d) of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. This question is no longer at large. In The Union of India & Others v. Messrs. Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal & Others( 1960 2 S.C.R. 627) the attack on s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 which was similar in terms to s. 3 of the Act on the ground of excessive delegation was repelled. It was held- that the Central Government had been given sufficient and proper guidance for exercising its powers in effectuating the policy of the statute. In the result the writ petition and the appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing-fee. Appeals dismissed
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