|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 1090 Records
-
1971 (11) TMI 158
Issues Involved:
1. Necessity of providing a subsequent opportunity to the assessee in best judgment assessment.
2. Compliance with principles of natural justice in best judgment assessment.
3. Interpretation of Section 18 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act and Rule 33.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Necessity of providing a subsequent opportunity to the assessee in best judgment assessment:
The primary issue referred for the court's opinion was whether, in making a best judgment assessment, a subsequent opportunity to show cause against the proposed best judgment estimate is required over and above the initial opportunity to show cause against the proposal to assess the dealer to the best of judgment. The Tribunal had previously held that the assessee should be given an opportunity at both stages: before deciding to resort to the best judgment assessment and before making the actual estimate. The Commissioner of Sales Tax contended that Section 18 does not necessitate two opportunities, arguing that once the decision to resort to best judgment assessment is made, further opportunity to plead against the proposed assessment is unnecessary.
2. Compliance with principles of natural justice in best judgment assessment:
The court examined several precedents to determine the necessity of providing opportunities to the assessee. The principle emphasized in the decisions discussed is that when the assessing authority is required to assess any assessee to its best judgment based on any information, comparable cases, flat average rate, or any other material on record, it is only fair and proper that such information or material should be brought to the notice of the assessee to enable him to offer any explanation in his favor. This ensures compliance with the principles of natural justice, which mandate that the assessee should not be adversely affected without being heard.
3. Interpretation of Section 18 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act and Rule 33:
The court noted that Section 18 and Rule 33 do not compel the assessing authority to divide the process of assessment into two parts or stages. After rejecting the books of account on the grounds available under Section 18(4), the assessing authority is required to point out the discrepancy to the assessee and offer an opportunity to explain. The court clarified that it is not necessary for the assessing authority to announce its decision to resort to best judgment assessment first and then make a proposed estimate subsequently. The assessing authority must consider all available materials, apply its mind, and come to a fair conclusion after bringing the material on record to the notice of the assessee.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that in making the best judgment assessment, it is not always necessary to provide a subsequent opportunity to the assessee to show cause against the proposed best judgment estimate over and above the initial opportunity. However, if the assessment is based on any fact, information, comparable cases, or average rate, such material must be brought to the notice of the assessee to allow for an explanation. This opportunity need not be given in two stages but must adhere to the principles of natural justice to ensure the assessee is not adversely affected without being heard.
Final Judgment:
The court answered the reference by stating that a subsequent opportunity to show cause against the proposed best judgment estimate is not always necessary, provided the principles of natural justice are followed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs of the reference.
-
1971 (11) TMI 157
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Notification No. S.R.O. 3908 dated 7th December 1957.
2. Power of the Central Government to amend the schedule after the extension of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, to the Union Territory of Delhi.
3. Excessive delegation of legislative powers.
4. Reasonableness of the notice period for amending the schedule.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Notification No. S.R.O. 3908 dated 7th December 1957:
The primary issue was the validity of the notification that amended the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as extended to the Union Territory of Delhi. The notification modified the requirement of giving "not less than three months' notice" to "such previous notice as it considers reasonable." The learned single judge quashed this notification, holding it was ultra vires section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950. The appellate court, however, found that the Central Government had the power to make such modifications when extending the Act to Delhi, and Parliament's subsequent amendment in 1959 validated the notification.
2. Power of the Central Government to Amend the Schedule After Extension:
The respondents argued that the Central Government's power to modify the Act was exhausted once the Act was extended to Delhi in 1951. They contended that any further amendments should be made by the Delhi State Assembly or Parliament. The appellate court disagreed, holding that section 21 of the General Clauses Act allowed the Central Government to amend, vary, or rescind any notification, provided it did not alter the essential features or policy of the legislation. The court emphasized that the power to amend the schedule was necessary to implement the Act's policy effectively.
3. Excessive Delegation of Legislative Powers:
The respondents claimed that the delegation of power to the Central Government to amend the schedule constituted excessive delegation of legislative authority. The appellate court referenced multiple Supreme Court decisions, including Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which upheld similar delegations as constitutional. The court concluded that the delegation in question was not excessive, as it did not involve any change of policy and was necessary for the Act's implementation.
4. Reasonableness of the Notice Period for Amending the Schedule:
The respondents argued that reducing the notice period from three months to a period considered reasonable by the Central Government deprived the public of their right to be heard. The appellate court evaluated whether a shorter notice period would impair the public's right to file objections. It found that the thirteen-day notice given in this case was reasonable, considering the limited area of the Union Territory of Delhi compared to Bengal. The court concluded that the modified notice period did not violate the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion:
The appellate court allowed the Letters Patent Appeals, reversing the learned single judge's decision. It held that the Central Government's notification and subsequent amendments were valid and did not constitute excessive delegation of legislative powers. The court also found the reduced notice period reasonable and in compliance with the law. Consequently, the Civil Writ No. 593 of 1971 and the remaining writ petitions were dismissed.
-
1971 (11) TMI 156
Issues:
Assessment of turnover regarding purchases and sales of raw hides and skins for exemption claimed during three assessment years 1964-65, 1965-66, and 1966-67.
Detailed Analysis:
The case involved an assessee, a firm engaged in the business of raw hides and skins, bones, and horns, with a tannery where hides and skins are tanned and exported. The firm claimed exemption from tax as they were not the last dealers in the State based on the Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax Act. The Commercial Tax Officer initially granted the exemption, but the Deputy Commissioner, in revision, withdrew the exemption, considering the purchases liable for tax as they were made by a tanner. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld this decision, rejecting the assessee's contention that they had closed the tannery and should not be treated as a tanner. The Tribunal subjected all exempted turnovers to tax, leading to the petitions before the High Court.
A previous Division Bench judgment highlighted that once untanned hides and skins are purchased by a tanner, they become taxable, regardless of subsequent sale as untanned products. The Supreme Court also affirmed a similar principle in a different case involving groundnuts. However, the assessee argued that they engaged in separate businesses of purchasing and selling raw hides and skins, distinct from tanning activities. They maintained separate accounts and registrations for these businesses, claiming that not all purchases were meant for tanning. The High Court emphasized that the assessment should consider the circumstances of each case to determine if purchases were solely for tanning or part of independent dealings in hides and skins sales.
Furthermore, the assessee contended that they ceased tanning operations on a specific date, implying that subsequent purchases were not as a tanner but as a dealer. The Tribunal, however, rejected this claim based on sales data and lack of tanning activities during the period. The High Court directed a fresh assessment by the Deputy Commissioner, instructing a thorough examination of the contentions raised by the assessee, including the cessation of tanning operations and the nature of purchases and sales of hides and skins. The Court set aside the Tribunal's orders subjecting turnovers to tax and remanded the case for further review, without imposing costs but specifying advocate fees.
In conclusion, the High Court's judgment focused on the distinction between purchases for tanning and independent sales activities, emphasizing the need for a case-specific assessment to determine tax liability on raw hides and skins transactions, considering the tanning operations and cessation of such activities by the assessee.
-
1971 (11) TMI 155
Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under section 32 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
2. Interpretation of "suo motu" powers under the Act.
3. Refund of tax and direction for the same.
Analysis:
The judgment deals with a writ petition filed against the Deputy Commissioner's refusal to exercise jurisdiction under section 32 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitioner sought revision of assessment orders for the years 1960-61 and 1962-63. The revenue contended that the power under section 32 could not be invoked by an assessee, as it was to be exercised voluntarily by the authority. However, the court disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the authority could be requested to exercise its power even if it failed to do so voluntarily. The court referred to a previous decision where it was held that a party could move the authority to exercise suo motu powers. The judgment emphasized that the Deputy Commissioner had a duty to consider the propriety of exercising the power under section 32 and could not refuse to act.
Furthermore, the petitioner also requested a direction for the refund of tax paid. The court declined to entertain this request at that stage, stating that it was for the Deputy Commissioner to consider the application for the invocation of power under section 32, taking into account the remedies already pursued by the petitioner. The court partially allowed the petition, restricting the ruling to the specific purpose mentioned, without awarding any costs. The judgment highlights the importance of the authority's obligation to consider exercising its powers under the relevant statutory provisions and the right of an aggrieved party to seek such intervention when necessary.
-
1971 (11) TMI 154
Issues:
Whether additional tax under section 5-A of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act can be assessed against the principal when sales are effected by an agent on behalf of the principal.
Analysis:
The petitioners, resident dealers, sold goods through local commission agents and submitted certificates indicating that tax on sales had been paid by the agents. However, the petitioners were assessed for additional tax under section 5-A of the Act. The main legal question was whether the principal could be held liable for this additional tax under section 5-A despite the provisions of section 11 of the Act. The court clarified that the additional tax under section 5-A is similar to the tax under section 5. The court emphasized that principals are primarily liable for tax on their turnover, and section 11 is a mechanism for tax collection. The section states that tax due in a transaction by an agent on behalf of a resident principal shall be collected from the agent, but the tax can also be recovered from the principal as per the proviso. The court examined the interpretation of the word "shall" in section 11 and concluded that it should be construed as directory, not mandatory, considering the context and purpose of the provision.
The court referred to legal principles regarding the interpretation of statutory provisions and highlighted that the recovery from the agent is a convenient mode of tax collection but does not absolve the principal of primary liability. The court rejected the argument that principals cannot be assessed for additional tax under section 5-A based on the interpretation of section 11. The court directed the taxing authorities to verify if the agents had paid the additional tax under section 5-A and revise the assessments accordingly. Ultimately, the court dismissed the revision petitions, holding against the petitioner-principals, with limited relief for providing proof of payment by their agents for the additional tax under section 5-A. The court also ordered the petitioners to pay costs and advocate's fees.
-
1971 (11) TMI 153
Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the notices served on the drivers under Section 44 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
2. Whether the petitioners have the standing to file the writ petitions.
3. Determination of wilful contravention of Section 44 of the Act.
4. Jurisdiction and authority of the Check Post Officer in issuing the notices.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legitimacy of the Notices Served on the Drivers:
The primary issue revolves around the notices served on the drivers for allegedly contravening Section 44 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The court examined whether the transportation of goods was accompanied by the requisite documents. In W.P. No. 455 of 1970, the consignment of 91 bags of buller seeds was sent for "commission sales" and was accompanied by a pro forma invoice, not a sale document. The Check Post Officer intercepted the goods and noted defects such as the absence of a bill or delivery note and lack of supporting documents for commission sales. Similarly, in W.P. No. 3581 of 1968, the goods were accompanied by a letter from the petitioners to the transport company. The court found that the Check Post Officer did not conduct a reasonable inquiry to establish that there was a wilful contravention of Section 44, leading to an assumption without foundation.
2. Standing of the Petitioners to File the Writ Petitions:
The revenue contended that the petitioners were not entitled to file the writ petitions as the notices were served on the drivers, not the petitioners. The court disagreed, stating that the petitioners had a perceivable interest in the subject matter since the goods belonged to them. The court emphasized that the petitioners' interests were directly affected by the notices, making them "persons aggrieved" and eligible to seek redress. The court cited precedents to support this view, including the decision in Asea Electric (India) P. Ltd. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, which highlighted that the determination of an "aggrieved person" depends on the specific facts of each case.
3. Determination of Wilful Contravention of Section 44:
The court scrutinized whether the transportation of goods was in wilful contravention of Section 44. The court noted that the Check Post Officer must establish or at least subjectively satisfy himself that there has been a wilful contravention. In both cases, the court found that the documents accompanying the goods indicated legitimate transportation without the intention of evading tax. The court criticized the Check Post Officer for not applying his mind to the documents and failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry. The court concluded that the assumption of tax evasion was without foundation and that the notices were issued without jurisdiction.
4. Jurisdiction and Authority of the Check Post Officer:
The court examined the jurisdiction and authority of the Check Post Officer in issuing the notices. The court held that the officer's actions were not justified as there was no reasonable inquiry or application of mind to establish a wilful contravention of Section 44. The court emphasized that each case must be decided on its own merits and that the officer must be satisfied, at least subjectively, that there has been a wilful contravention. The court found that the officer's actions were flippant and unsatisfactory, leading to an erroneous assumption of tax evasion.
Conclusion:
The court declared that the notices served on the drivers were without jurisdiction and illegal. The court made the rules absolute and allowed the petitions, emphasizing that the petitioners had real interests in the subject matter and were entitled to seek redress. The court's decision underscores the importance of a reasonable inquiry and proper application of mind by the authorities before issuing notices for alleged contraventions.
-
1971 (11) TMI 152
Issues:
1. Entitlement to a refund of sales tax collected and paid over to the revenue.
2. Delay in seeking refund and failure to avail statutory remedies.
3. Exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Analysis:
1. The petitioners sought a refund of sales tax collected and remitted to the revenue for the assessment year 1966-67. They relied on a Supreme Court decision in Khosla and Co. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, claiming entitlement to a refund based on a mistake of fact in the levy of tax. The court noted that the petitioners did not claim any exemption or challenge the final assessment order's legality. Previous decisions indicated that a refund might be granted even after the final assessment, but recent judgments emphasized the need for timely action and expression of grievance. The court highlighted the importance of not circumventing other remedies and the discretion of the court in granting refunds, considering factors like delay and lack of earlier complaints by the petitioners.
2. The court emphasized that considerable time had passed since the final assessment order, and the petitioners had not availed themselves of statutory remedies like filing appeals. The delay in seeking a refund and the lack of earlier grievances against the assessment order were seen as significant factors in denying the refund claim. The court cited precedents where failure to utilize statutory remedies precluded seeking relief under Article 226, as it would bypass established legal procedures. The petitioners' failure to act promptly and their delay in approaching the court were key reasons for rejecting their refund request.
3. Despite the petitioners' arguments that there was no undue delay and they had diligently pursued the matter in court, the judge declined to exercise discretion under Article 226 to grant the refund. The court considered the overall circumstances, including the petitioners' lack of complaints earlier, their failure to settle similar matters with authorities in the past, and the delay in seeking relief after the Khosla case. The judge concluded that the petitioners' actions did not warrant upsetting a settled final assessment order and denied the discretionary relief sought, ultimately dismissing the petition without costs.
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the importance of timely action, expression of grievances, and adherence to statutory remedies in seeking refunds of taxes paid. It highlights the court's discretion under Article 226 and the need to consider various factors, including delay and lack of earlier complaints, in deciding on refund claims. The judgment serves as a reminder of the legal principles governing refund requests and the court's role in balancing the interests of parties involved in tax matters.
-
1971 (11) TMI 151
Issues: Whether the activity of the managing committee, in selling bhog, constitutes business?
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a reference made under the U.P. Sales Tax Act regarding the activity of a managing committee selling bhog at a temple. The appellate authority found that the primary objective of the committee was to provide for the worship of the Deity, with the offering of bhog being incidental. It was observed that devotees did not come to the temple with the intention of making purchases, and there was no bargaining involved in the transaction. The quantity of bhog offered did not correlate with the cash deposited by the devotees, indicating a lack of intention for buying and selling. However, the judge in revision held that the continuous activity of selling bhog constituted a business, making the committee liable for tax.
The court analyzed the definitions of "dealer" and "sale" under the U.P. Sales Tax Act to determine tax liability. It was highlighted that for the committee to be assessed, it must be shown that they sell bhog and carry on the business of selling bhog to devotees. The court emphasized that a sale involves a contract, which necessitates a bargain between parties. In this case, the absence of negotiation and settlement regarding the quantity of bhog offered indicated a lack of a contractual agreement. The court inferred that devotees made cash offerings to the Deity and received Prasad in return, emphasizing the spiritual nature of the transaction rather than a commercial sale.
Furthermore, the court examined whether the managing committee engaged in the business of selling bhog. It was noted that the activity of providing bhog was incidental to the worship and offerings at the temple, with no commercial motive involved. Drawing parallels to a previous case involving the sale of religious literature, the court emphasized that a non-commercial objective does not transform into a commercial activity based on the means employed. Ultimately, the court concluded that the committee was not a dealer under the Sales Tax Act and did not conduct the business of selling bhog, thereby ruling in favor of the assessee.
In conclusion, the judgment provides a detailed analysis of the nature of the transaction involving the sale of bhog by a temple managing committee. By interpreting the legal definitions and considering the absence of a commercial motive, the court determined that the committee's activities did not amount to a taxable sale or business under the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
-
1971 (11) TMI 150
Issues:
1. Whether a dealer registered under section 7(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act will be deemed to be a dealer registered under section 7(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act?
2. Whether the penalty imposed under section 18(6) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act read with section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act has been rightly set aside?
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dealer engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling water for injections and medicines. The dealer was registered under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act and had obtained registration under section 7(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act but not under section 7(1). The dispute arose regarding the dealer's classification as an unregistered dealer for assessment purposes. The Tribunal set aside the penalty imposed, considering the dealer's registration under section 7(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act. However, the High Court disagreed, emphasizing the distinct purposes of registration under section 7(1) and section 7(2). The Court held that registration under section 7(2) does not equate to registration under section 7(1) for inter-State sales, thereby upholding the penalty.
2. The Court delved into the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act to differentiate between registration under section 7(1) and section 7(2). It highlighted the mandatory nature of registration under section 7(1) for dealers liable to pay tax under the Act, contrasting it with the voluntary nature of registration under section 7(2) for dealers not liable to pay tax under the Act. The Court elucidated that the concessional rate of tax under section 8 of the Act is linked to registration under section 7(1), emphasizing the distinct purposes and advantages associated with each type of registration. Consequently, the Court concluded that a dealer registered under section 7(2) cannot be deemed as registered under section 7(1) and upheld the penalty imposed under section 18(6) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act read with section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act.
3. In conclusion, the High Court answered the first question in the negative, ruling that registration under section 7(2) does not fulfill the requirement of registration under section 7(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Subsequently, the Court answered the second question by affirming that the penalty imposed under the relevant sections was rightfully upheld. The Court directed the parties to bear their own costs due to the absence of the assessee during the proceedings, thereby concluding the reference accordingly.
-
1971 (11) TMI 149
Issues:
1. Determination of whether coriander seeds are classified as "oil-seeds" for the purpose of sales tax assessment.
The judgment by the Kerala High Court addressed the issue of whether coriander seeds should be considered "oil-seeds" under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had previously ruled that coriander seeds fell under the definition of oil-seeds based on a decision by the Orissa High Court. The Central Sales Tax Act defines oil-seeds as seeds yielding non-volatile oils used for various purposes. The Tribunal's decision was challenged by the revenue, arguing that coriander seeds should not be classified as oil-seeds and should be taxable at all points of sale. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, emphasizing that oil-seeds are taxable at the point of first sale in the state. The court noted that previous decisions had interpreted the term "oil-seeds" broadly, considering the definition provided in the Act. However, the revenue contended that the Act did not contain a strict definition of oil-seeds and that common parlance understanding should apply. The court referred to decisions by the Federal Court and the Privy Council regarding interpretative words like "that is to say," concluding that they are illustrative rather than limiting. The court also cited Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the common understanding of terms in sales tax statutes. Ultimately, the court remitted the case back to the Tribunal to determine whether coriander seeds are commonly understood as oil-seeds, emphasizing that the ordinary perception of the term should guide the classification. The parties were directed to bear their respective costs, and the case was remitted for further investigation.
-
1971 (11) TMI 148
Issues:
Interpretation of whether iron baling hoops fall within the definition of 'iron and steel' under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.
Analysis:
1. Interpretation of Relevant Provisions:
The case involved determining whether iron baling hoops could be classified as 'iron and steel' under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. The Act defines certain goods as of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, including iron and steel. The relevant section, 14(iv), lists specific items falling under this category, such as pig iron, steel scrap, and rolled steel sections. The tax rate applicable to these declared goods is limited to 2% or 3% under section 15 of the Act.
2. Examination of Clause (iv) of Section 14:
The court analyzed the provisions of clause (iv) of section 14 in detail. It was observed that iron baling hoops could potentially be considered under the category of 'rolled steel sections,' the only subclause that might apply to these items. However, the court concluded that iron hoops did not fit the description of 'rolled steel sections' as they are thin straps used for bundling materials, not structural construction.
3. Misinterpretation of Concession:
The court noted that a concession made by the department's counsel was misinterpreted. The concession only pertained to the tax rate applicable if the iron hoops were treated as declared goods, not to their classification under 'iron and steel.' Circular letters from the Government of India were deemed non-binding for interpreting the Act.
4. Judgment and Conclusion:
Based on the interpretation of the relevant provisions and the nature of iron baling hoops, the court held that these items did not fall within the definition of 'iron and steel' under section 14 of the Act. Consequently, the assessee was not liable to be taxed at the lower rate applicable to declared goods. The court upheld the tax assessment at 10% by the sales tax authorities, ruling in favor of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.
In conclusion, the court answered the reference by stating that the Tribunal was not justified in treating iron baling hoops as falling within the definition of 'iron and steel' under the Central Sales Tax Act. The assessee was properly taxed at 10%, and costs were awarded to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.
-
1971 (11) TMI 147
Issues:
1. Competency of appeal due to shortage in deposit of admitted tax.
2. Interpretation of provisions related to refund and adjustment of tax liability.
3. Application of de minimis principle in tax law.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a reference under section 11(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act involving an assessee dealing in iron and other furniture goods for the assessment year 1964-65. The primary issue was whether the appeal filed by the assessee against the assessment order was competent despite a minor shortage of three paise in the deposit of admitted tax. The appellate authority had allowed the appeal, considering the shortage could be adjusted against the refund due to the assessee. However, the revising authority set aside the appellate order, contending that the appeal was wrongly entertained due to the incomplete tax deposit. The revising authority raised two questions of law, seeking clarification on the justification of setting aside the appellate order and the correctness of entertaining the appeal under section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
The court analyzed the provisions of section 9, emphasizing that no appeal against an assessment could be entertained without satisfactory proof of payment of the admitted tax. The court noted that the assessee had applied for a refund of Rs. 620, which could have covered the three-paise shortage if adjusted against the tax liability. Referring to section 29 dealing with refunds, the court highlighted the duty of the assessing authority to adjust any refundable amount towards the outstanding tax liability of the dealer. The court reasoned that in cases like the present one, an automatic adjustment should be deemed to have taken place, as provided by the law.
The revising authority's reliance on a previous decision was discussed, where the court had not considered the specific provision of section 29 allowing for adjustments. The court also invoked the de minimis principle, stating that the law does not concern itself with trifles. Citing legal maxims and previous judgments, the court emphasized that minor irregularities or deviations should not lead to severe penalties, especially when the deviation is insignificant. Drawing parallels from other legal cases, the court concluded that the three-paise shortage in this case was too trivial to invalidate the appeal or deem the assessee non-compliant with tax payment obligations.
In conclusion, the court answered both questions in favor of the assessee, holding that the appeal was rightly entertained by the appellate authority and the revising authority was not justified in setting aside the appellate order. The court awarded costs to the assessee and resolved the reference accordingly.
-
1971 (11) TMI 146
Issues:
- Constitutionality of section 17 of the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971
Analysis:
The judgment of the court primarily revolves around the constitutionality of section 17 of the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971. The key question at hand is whether the State Legislature has the power to enact this provision. The background legal position is crucial for understanding this issue, particularly the evolution from section 8-A(4) to section 29-A in the principal Act. The petitioners sought refunds of excess tax realized and deposited, which led to a challenge of the constitutionality of section 29-A, subsequently referred to a larger Bench.
The enactment of the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971, introduced changes to section 29-A, notably emphasizing the deposit of realized amounts into the Government treasury. Section 17, the focal point of contention, deems payments made under the previous section as deposits under the new provision. The interdependence of sections 15 and 17 is highlighted, with section 17 being declared unconstitutional if section 15 is deemed so.
The court delves into the provisions of section 15, emphasizing the deposit of amounts not due as tax into the Government treasury for later refund to the payer. The constitutional validity of section 15 is scrutinized, with arguments based on entries in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Drawing parallels with a previous Supreme Court case, the court concludes that the State Legislature lacks the authority to enact section 29-A, rendering it unconstitutional. Consequently, section 17 is also declared unconstitutional due to its reliance on the invalidated section 15.
In conclusion, the court allows the petitions, declaring sections 15 and 17 of the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971, unconstitutional. It orders the respondents to refund the amounts due to the petitioners in accordance with the judgment, thereby resolving the issue of constitutionality surrounding the specified provisions.
-
1971 (11) TMI 145
Issues:
Appeals against imposition of taxes under Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act; Interpretation of provisions regarding levy on motor vehicles and chassis; Exemption under Section 9 of the Act; Constitutional validity under Article 301 and Article 304(b) of the Constitution.
Analysis:
The appeals challenged taxes imposed under the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. The first two appeals involved Automotive Manufacturers (P.) Ltd., a dealer of motor chassis and vehicles received from manufacturers outside Andhra Pradesh. The appellants contested the levy on motor chassis from Ashok Leyland Ltd. and vehicles from Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. and Bajaj Auto Ltd. The High Court rejected their contentions, leading to the appeals before the Supreme Court.
The primary contention revolved around Section 3 of the Act, which authorizes tax levy on motor vehicles "used or kept for use in a public place in the State." The appellants argued that a chassis cannot be considered "used" until a body is attached. However, the Supreme Court held that a chassis can be used on public roads even without a body, attracting the levy. The definition of "motor vehicle" under the Act includes a chassis without a body, supporting the imposition of tax.
Another argument focused on Section 9, which provides exemptions for chassis "driven to another place in order that a body may be attached." The appellants claimed exemption based on this provision, asserting that all chassis require bodies to be attached. The Court disagreed, emphasizing that the exemption applies only when a chassis is driven for the explicit purpose of attaching a body, not for general transportation.
Furthermore, the appellants raised constitutional concerns under Article 301, arguing that the tax impedes free trade and commerce. The Court noted that while registration under the Motor Vehicles Act is effective throughout India, states can impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest under Article 304(b). The appellants did not pursue the argument regarding the lack of the President's sanction for the tax bill, leaving it open for future proceedings.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the imposition of taxes under the Act. The judgment was delivered after a re-hearing following the demise of one of the judges. The appellants were directed to bear the costs of the proceedings.
-
1971 (11) TMI 144
Whether the notification No. 3483-E & T.54/723(C11) dated August 5, 1954, issued by the State Government is valid?
Whether the assessment orders are in conflict with the decision of this court in Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. ?
Held that:- Appeals allowed in part and the judgments and orders of the High Court are modified by declaring that the impugned notification is valid and it has effect from September 11, 1956, and sales tax on edible oils can be levied after that date. In other respects, the appeals are dismissed
-
1971 (11) TMI 143
whether the assessee comes under clause, for levy of purchase tax?
Held that:- As in all the appeals, except in Civil Appeal No. 1466 of 1969, the learned single judge has directed the assessing authority to reconsider and vary the order of assessment. That direction has been confirmed by the Letters Patent Bench in the said appeals. These directions, in our opinion, do not require any interference by this court, except to make it clear that the fresh assessments will have to be made under section 11AA of the Amendment Act, and subject to the directions contained in this judgment.
-
1971 (11) TMI 142
Whether the turnover of Rs. 3,87,200 estimated to be the value of the stock of mill cloth held by the appellant on December 14, 1957, was exigible to tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The limitation on the power of the Legislature of Mysore in 1964 when it enacted Act No. 9 of 1964 was that on the sale of declared goods it could not have imposed sales tax at a rate higher than that specified in section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act as it stood then. There was no limitation on its power to impose tax on the turnover of sales of textiles before April 1, 1958, when they were not declared goods.
-
1971 (11) TMI 141
Although the definition of "business" was substituted by the Second Amendment Act of 1964 it was not made retrospective by the usual words that it should be deemed to have been always substituted nor was any other language employed to show that the substantive provision, namely, the definition of "business" was being amended retrospectively. Section 9, therefore, can be of no avail to the revenue. It has been pointed out that in the other decision rendered by this court, in which similar validation provision appeared, the substantive section had not been amended at all. That, in our judgment, will not make any difference because the essence of the matter is that the definition of the word "businesss" which was material was amended only prospectively and not with retrospective effect - Appeal dismissed
-
1971 (11) TMI 140
Levy of sales tax - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The appellants cannot impeach the imposition or levy of sales tax on the ground that the appellants could not collect from the purchasers of sugar the purchase tax paid by the appellants on purchase of sugarcane.
Another contention was raised on behalf of the appellants that the authorities had not taken into account the varying rates of tax on purchase of sugarcane levied by different States while computing the cost of production of sugar in different States and fixing different selling prices of sugar. The High Court rightly did not entertain this contention because there were no material to support the contention.
-
1971 (11) TMI 110
Issues:
Transfer of winding-up proceedings to the Court of the Additional District Judge under section 435 of the Companies Act, 1956. Application under section 446 of the Companies Act for permission to proceed with Suit No. 100/55 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Agra. Appeal against the order of the learned Additional District Judge directing the transfer of the suit to his court.
Analysis:
The appellant filed Suit No. 100/55 against the respondent-company for the recovery of the unpaid sale price of a factory. A petition for winding-up of the company was filed, leading to the transfer of winding-up proceedings to the Court of the Additional District Judge. The appellant sought permission under section 446 of the Companies Act to continue the suit in Agra, which was opposed by the official liquidator. The learned Additional District Judge ordered the transfer of the suit to his court, prompting the appellant's appeal.
The appellant's counsel argued that permission for the suit's continuation should be granted unless exceptional circumstances exist, citing past decisions under the Companies Act, 1913. However, section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, requires court permission for legal proceedings against a company in liquidation. Sub-section (3) of section 446 allows the transfer of suits pending in other courts to the winding-up court, a provision absent in the previous Act.
The court clarified that the discretion to transfer cases under sub-section (3) must be exercised judiciously and in the interest of all parties. While the appellant claimed the suit was ready for disposal due to a compromise, the official liquidator repudiated the compromise, necessitating the suit to proceed to trial. The court emphasized the importance of trying the suit in the winding-up court to safeguard the interests of creditors and shareholders.
The appellant contended that being a secured creditor, the suit should not be transferred. However, the court deferred judgment on this issue to the Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge's decision to transfer the suit was deemed judicious, and the appeal was dismissed without costs.
In conclusion, the court upheld the transfer of the suit to the winding-up court, emphasizing the need to protect the interests of all parties involved in the liquidation process. The appellate court found no reason to interfere with the learned district judge's discretionary decision.
............
|
9911796707
