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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 1083 Records
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1971 (11) TMI 157 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat by curtailing the period of three months notice to such period as the Government considered reasonable, would in a way amount to depriving the people of their democratic right of being heard before any tax was imposed on them. Besides, as already held in an earlier part of this judgment, Parliament while enacting the Amendment Act of 1959 (20 of 1959), put its seal of approval to the curtailed period of notice. As such the curtailed period of notice shall be taken to have been provided by Parliament on the ratio of the Supreme Court s decision in Venkatrao Esajirao Limbekar s caseA.I.R. 1970 S.C. 126. The impugned notification, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal, whimsical and arbitrary. For the reasons stated above, the Letters Patent Appeals are accepted and the Civil Writ No. 593 of 1971 is dismissed. So are the remaining writ petitions dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Appeals allowed and Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 156 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om the fact that there were sales of hides and skins without opening stock in, the years 1965-66 and 1966-67, the Tribunal held that unless there have been purchases and tanning during this period there could not have been sales of the tanned hides and skins and rejected the plea of the assessee. It is now contended that books have not been scrutinised. The sales of tanned hides and skins during this period may be from the old stock, and the sales alone will not show that the tannery was being worked during this period. There is need to investigate this question also further. On these grounds, we set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the Deputy Commissioner subjecting the turnovers for the three years with regard to purchase and sale of raw hides and skins to tax and direct the Deputy Commissioner to dispose of the matter afresh after giving an opportunity to the assessee to prove the contentions put forward by him. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Case remanded.
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1971 (11) TMI 155 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d of Revenue which could exercise suo motu powers of revision but, under the present Act, it is the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. This dictum, therefore, squarely applied to the facts of this case. The second respondent, therefore, has failed in his public duty in not having acted under section 32 of the Act and considered the propriety or necessity of exercising the power. It is for him to decide one way or the other but he cannot refuse to act. The petitioner also has asked for a direction for the refund of tax. I am not inclined to entertain such a request at this stage, because it is for the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to consider the application (1) Since reported at page 410 supra. for invocation of his power under section 32, bearing in mind all the processes and means of redress already availed of by the petitioner. The petitioner succeeds in part and the rule nisi is restricted to the purpose indicated above. No costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1971 (11) TMI 154 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ry. In this view, we cannot possibly accede to the contention of Sri G.V.R. Mohan Rao that under section 11 the principal cannot be assessed for the additional tax under section 5-A. The learned counsel has submitted that in these cases the agents have, in fact, paid additional tax under section 5-A, but it is a matter for verification by the taxing authorities. In view of the submission, we would, while upholding the assessments made on the principals, direct that the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Guntur, may receive proof of such payment and revise the assessments, if necessary, accordingly. In the result, the point raised before us is held against the petitioner-principals and they will have only the limited relief as stated by us for adducing proof of payment by their agents on the various transactions in regard to the additional tax under section 5-A. The revision cases are otherwise dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 153 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es Tax 1963 14 S.T.C. 51. after relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. State of MadrasA.I.R. 1959 S.C. 725. S.R. Das, C.J., in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. State of MadrasA.I.R. 1959 S.C. 725.said that It appears to be well established that the Supreme Court s powers under article 32 are wide enough to make even a declaratory order where that is the proper relief to be given to the aggrieved party. Following this, Grover, J., as he then was, issued a declaratory order in exercise of power under article 226 of the Constitution. I intend doing the same. I am of the view that the challenged notices served on the drivers on the assumption that the transports were irregular or in wilful contravention of section 44 of the Act, are without jurisdiction and it should be declared that the said notices (in both the writ petitions) are irregular and hence illegal. The rules are made absolute. No order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (11) TMI 152 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of this court should be exercised. As the petitioners have not been diligent and as they came to the court nearly three years after the rendering of the judgment in the Khosla s case 1966 17 S.T.C. 473 (S.C.). , I am unable to interfere and grant them the discretionary relief of making the rule nisi absolute. M/s. Abdul Subhan Abdul Razeek and Company v. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue, Government of Madras, Madras-5, and Another. The petitioners, however, have been prosecuting the subject-matter diligently in this court, having regard to certain apparent uncertainty in the case law on this question. They would, therefore, be entitled to avail themselves of the other remedies and plead that they have been agitating for their rights in another forum, like the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 and gain an advantage for themselves if it is possible for them. The petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 151 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e 3(a), namely, printing, publishing and distribution of Christian Literature ..... If the object of the Society, as it is, is merely to print, publish and distribute Christian Literature and is not, as I think, commercial in character, it is obvious that the object does not become commercial because it is to be achieved by the normal business means. I fail to see any trade or commercial motive in the objects of the Society. The court found that the Society was not carrying on the business of selling literature, because it was not engaged in a commercial activity. This decision supports the view that we are taking in this case. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the question referred to us is that the assessee is not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(c) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and it does not carry on the business of selling bhog. The assessee shall get costs which we assess at Rs. 100. There shall be one set of costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (11) TMI 150 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... follows that if a person indulges in inter-State sale, he has to get himself registered under section 7(1) and if he fails to do so, he exposes himself to the penalties prescribed under the law. The Board of Revenue was altogether in error in holding that the registration under sub-section (2) of section 7 can be deemed to be registration under sub-section (1) thereof. 6.. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the first question is that a dealer registered under sub-section (2) of section 7 of the Central Sales Tax Act cannot be deemed to be a dealer registered under sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act, and the answer to the second question is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the penalty imposed under section 18(6) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, read with section 9(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act was not rightly set aside. As the assessee did not put in appearance, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (11) TMI 149 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of the principles we have enunciated above. This has not been done. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis of the decision of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Dinabandhu Sahu and Sons(1), which in turn proceeded on the basis that section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, contained a definition of the term oil-seeds . We have held this is not so. We therefore set aside the decision of the Tribunal on this point and remit the case back to the Tribunal for reinvestigation of the question as to whether dhania (coriander seeds) are oil-seeds as is understood in common parlance. It is not sufficient that coriander seeds are capable of yielding oil when it is subject to the necessary process or that the oil extracted in that manner can be used for some purposes. The question is whether an ordinary man would understand coriander as an oil-seed or not. This will be determined by the Tribunal. 12.. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Case remitted.
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1971 (11) TMI 148 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d for such a purpose. Iron hoops are thin straps of steel used for tying big bundles of bales of cotton or other material to keep the bundles in shape. In our opinion, therefore, iron hoops are not included in the definition of iron and steel as given in clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. They are consequently chargeable at the rate specified in section 8(2)(b) and not under section 8(2)(a) of the Act. 5.. For the abovesaid reasons, the answer to the question is that the Tribunal was not justified in treating iron hoops as falling within the definition of iron and steel in section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, and as such the assessee was not liable to be taxed at the lower rate of 2 per cent. up to 30th June, 1966, and 3 per cent. thereafter, and that the assessee was properly taxed at 10 per cent. by the sales tax authorities. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Hearing fee Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (11) TMI 147 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iament cannot alter or change the rights in respect of pension vesting in him at the date of his appointment to the detriment, or loss or injury to the interest of the Judge. But every sort of alteration or change will not, I think, be to his disadvantage. Only such alteration or change as will materially and really diminish the value of any right in respect of pension is prescribed by the proviso ..... So a formal or unsubstantial change may be overlooked. Accordingly we are of opinion that in the instant case the infraction of law is too small and insignificant to be taken notice of. The omission to pay another three paise should have been overlooked and the assessee should have been held to have discharged his liability of admitted tax. For the reasons stated above, we answer the two questions in the following manner. Q. No. (1) in the negative. Q. No. (2) in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (11) TMI 146 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court, we can examine for ourselves whether the subject-matter of section 15 of our Act is covered by that entry. But the phrase under any entry in the third List in the passage quoted earlier plainly excludes entry 10. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashoka Marketing Limited 1970 26 S.T.C. 254 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 946. , we are bound to hold that the State Legislature has no power to enact section 29-A as inserted by section 15 of the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971. We hold that section 29-A is unconstitutional. Section 17 which is subordinate to section 15 which inserts section 29-A will inevitably become unconstitutional. The petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Sections 15 and 17 of the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971, are declared unconstitutional. The respondents shall now refund the amounts due to the petitioners in respect of various assessment orders in the light of our judgment. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (11) TMI 145 - SUPREME COURT
Tax on Chasis - merely because bodies were going to be attached by the ultimate purchasers, it cannot be said that the running of the chassis on the roads of Andhra Pradesh would not attract taxes.
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1971 (11) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the notification No. 3483-E & T.54/723(C11) dated August 5, 1954, issued by the State Government is valid?
Whether the assessment orders are in conflict with the decision of this court in Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. ?
Held that:- Appeals allowed in part and the judgments and orders of the High Court are modified by declaring that the impugned notification is valid and it has effect from September 11, 1956, and sales tax on edible oils can be levied after that date. In other respects, the appeals are dismissed
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1971 (11) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT
whether the assessee comes under clause, for levy of purchase tax?
Held that:- As in all the appeals, except in Civil Appeal No. 1466 of 1969, the learned single judge has directed the assessing authority to reconsider and vary the order of assessment. That direction has been confirmed by the Letters Patent Bench in the said appeals. These directions, in our opinion, do not require any interference by this court, except to make it clear that the fresh assessments will have to be made under section 11AA of the Amendment Act, and subject to the directions contained in this judgment.
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1971 (11) TMI 142 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the turnover of Rs. 3,87,200 estimated to be the value of the stock of mill cloth held by the appellant on December 14, 1957, was exigible to tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The limitation on the power of the Legislature of Mysore in 1964 when it enacted Act No. 9 of 1964 was that on the sale of declared goods it could not have imposed sales tax at a rate higher than that specified in section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act as it stood then. There was no limitation on its power to impose tax on the turnover of sales of textiles before April 1, 1958, when they were not declared goods.
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1971 (11) TMI 141 - SUPREME COURT
Although the definition of "business" was substituted by the Second Amendment Act of 1964 it was not made retrospective by the usual words that it should be deemed to have been always substituted nor was any other language employed to show that the substantive provision, namely, the definition of "business" was being amended retrospectively. Section 9, therefore, can be of no avail to the revenue. It has been pointed out that in the other decision rendered by this court, in which similar validation provision appeared, the substantive section had not been amended at all. That, in our judgment, will not make any difference because the essence of the matter is that the definition of the word "businesss" which was material was amended only prospectively and not with retrospective effect - Appeal dismissed
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1971 (11) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT
Levy of sales tax - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The appellants cannot impeach the imposition or levy of sales tax on the ground that the appellants could not collect from the purchasers of sugar the purchase tax paid by the appellants on purchase of sugarcane.
Another contention was raised on behalf of the appellants that the authorities had not taken into account the varying rates of tax on purchase of sugarcane levied by different States while computing the cost of production of sugar in different States and fixing different selling prices of sugar. The High Court rightly did not entertain this contention because there were no material to support the contention.
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1971 (11) TMI 110 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... the appellant was given a charge over the properties sold by him. It is not open to this court to go into this contention and it would be improper for this court to express any opinion at this stage. The contention would be considered by the learned Additional District Judge and I have no doubt that he will give suitable directions to the official liquidator. The learned Additional District Judge has taken into consideration all the relevant factors before ordering the transfer of the suit to his court. He has passed the order in the exercise of his discretion vested in him under sub-section (3) of section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. An appellate court ought not to interfere with the order passed by a court unless the discretion has not been exercised judiciously. I cannot say in this case that the learned district judge has not exercised his discretion judiciously in ordering the transfer of the suit. In the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1971 (11) TMI 109 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... her authority. Counsel for the appellant, however, stated that the only point on which winding-up petition has to be considered by this court and also perhaps the Petition No. 5 of 1965 under sections 397 and 398 of the Act which are pending now in this court, is the inability of the respondent-company to pay its liabilities. We do not know how far that contention of the appellant is correct. It may be so or it may not be so, but in any event, we are of the view that F.A.O. No. 11 of 1966 has to be allowed and the petition which gave rise to it, has to be admitted. It will now be for the company judge hearing that petition and also other connected matters, e.g., Company Petition No. 10D of 1966 and Company Petition No. 5 of 1965, to make necessary orders. As this matter has been before this court for nearly about five years, we expect that the company judge will dispose of this matter and the other connected matters without any undue delay. There will be no order as to costs.
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