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Showing 21 to 40 of 2871 Records
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1984 (12) TMI 319 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... om that one cannot conclude that he was insane. On this ground also, the belief of Shri Patel cannot be considered as bona fide. 17. Shri Desai had conceded that in the earlier application filed by the party and signed by the Advocate, sufficient cause had not been shown for the delay between 9-1-1984 to 26-3-1984. The new ground urged in the further application filed by the Advocate cannot be true for the reasons already stated by me. It is significant to note that the new ground came to light after the earlier application was rejected. The observation of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Supreme Court aptly apply to the present further application filed by the learned Advocate. This application is merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. 18. As the applicant had not shown sufficient cause for the delay between the period 9-1-1984 and 26-3-1984, his application for condonation of delay is rejected.
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1984 (12) TMI 318 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... of duty shall have to satisfy the authority which is empowered to order refund that the package in respect of which duty had been paid and .refund was claimed had not landed. The primary evidence to establish short-landing would be the certificate issued by the custodian of the goods. The Bombay Port Trust authority is constituted as custodians of the goods landed in the Customs area. The appellants were aware of this position and that they had undertaken to produce the certificate. They had slept over the matter for a period of three years. However just the claim of the appellants may be, they cannot seek the indulgence of the court for not being diligent in prosecuting their matter. The position this day remained the same in that the appellants have failed to produce the short-landing certificate which would conclusively prove their claim. In the circumstances I see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the authorities below and accordingly I reject this appeal.
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1984 (12) TMI 317 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... from seeking steamer’s survey within the stipulated period for establishing the shortage. The contention of Shri Gidwani that the steamer agent should have opted for holding the survey even accepted, would not be sufficient to call upon him to pay the penalty under Section 116. Primarily, it is the responsibility of the consignee to get the survey done particularly when the goods had landed in dented and damaged condition. If steamer’s survey was not sought within a reasonable time the Customs authorities cannot call upon the steamer agents to pay penalty solely based on the survey held behind their back after a lapse of considerable time. There should be unimpeachable evidence of short landing before a penalty could be imposed under Section 116 of the Customs Act. Such an evidence is lacking in the instant case. I, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the authorities below and direct that the appellants be granted consequential relief.
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1984 (12) TMI 316 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s reasons we have written and explained above, we adjudge these products to be slabs or blocks. The manufacturer, Anil Plastic Corporation’s products were charged in the show cause notice as not being entitled to exemption from duty, either wholly or in part, under notification No. 68/71-C.E. The Collector held the goods were rigid sheets. We have found the goods are not sheets and so the assessment under Notification No. 68/71-C.E. denied by central excise on the ground that the goods are rigid sheet is set aside. We direct assessment to be made by not denying the exemption as the goods are not sheets, but slabs or blocks. We also set aside the order of confiscation of goods valued at ₹ 12,700/-, and remit the penalty of ₹ 100,000/-. We forbid the recovery of duty on the goods worth ₹ 4,567,934.96/- mentioned in Para 9(iii) of the show-cause notice, as such recovery is not in accordance with Notification No. 68/71-C.E. 31. The appeal is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 315 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ice-list of the manufacturer. Their purchase was from a trader and they cannot be compelled to produce the price-list of the manufacturer. Nothing stopped the Customs from producing such a price-list and we are inclined to accept the reason given by the Importer for not producing the invoice of the manufacturer to their agent from whom the appellants purchased the goods. However, the basic position still remains that the importers have not produced all the documents, it was up to the Customs to produce evidence to prove the falsity of the documents so produced by the appellants. In our view this has not been done by the Customs and there is no evidence before us on the basis of which the Collector’s finding of under-valuation can be sustained. 22. We, therefore, hold that under-valuation of the imported goods has not been proved and that the Collector’s order in this regard is not sustainable. In the result this appeal must succeed, which is hereby accepted.
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1984 (12) TMI 314 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 19-8-1971 will stand quashed. We also hold that the order of cancellation dated 15-12-1970 passed by the fourth respondent is void. The fourth respondent is, however, given the liberty to issue a show cause notice to the appellant against the proposed cancellation of the licence and pass final orders after hearing its objections regarding the proposed cancellation of the licence. Fresh proceedings, if any, for cancellation of the licence should be initiated and completed by the fourth respondent within four months from this date. Any further proceedings contemplated by the third respondent will depend upon the final orders to be passed by the fourth respondent on the proposal to cancel the licence. In the event of the fourth respondent cancelling the licence of the appellant, it is open to the third respondent to initiate proceedings afresh under Sections 111(d) and 112 of the Customs Act. 6. The writ appeal is allowed accordingly and there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 313 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... pping Bills left no room for doubt that the export goods were of such high fineness as could not be manufactured out of old, used and waste fibres. We accept the appellants’ plea that Terry Wool blended yarn of such high fineness could be spun only by mixing the virgin wool tops and virgin polyester tops together before spinning. We also agree with the appellants that Drawback is an export promotion measure and its provisions ought to be interpretated in the proper perspective. We hold that in substance the declaration required under Entry 2503(C) of the Drawback Schedule could clearly be inferred from the description and high fineness of the goods available in the shipping documents. We note that the Appellate Collector also held similarly when she allowed the Drawback claim for the wool contents. 7. Accordingly, we allow all the 9 appeals and direct that consequential Drawback for the Synthetic Fibre contents in the goods exported should be granted to the appellants.
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1984 (12) TMI 312 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ner). He must hear those claiming to be affected if an order is made and consider any contention that may be put forward as an excuse for the import. He may consider any other relevant circumstance. Since all legitimate defences are open and the enquiry is quasi-judicial, no one can seriously complain.” The learned Barrister has also argued that if the benefit of the Notification No. 68-Cus. (G.S.R. No. 193-E), dated 25th March, 1978 (page 61 of the paper book) is given to the appellant, no duty is leviable and hence no penalty under Section 116 of the Customs Act can be levied, is not tenable. The goods are transhipped under bond procedure and this procedure has been duly accepted by the appellant. The learned Barrister’s argument that the Section 116 of the Customs Act, 1962 is a revenue yielding section, also does not help him. Keeping in view the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment reported in AIR 1984 S.C. 667. the above three appeals are dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 311 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ovement to the said power station under Chapter X Procedure of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. This was an error and everybody accepts it to be so. But in our opinion this error is not serious enough to invalidate the entitlement of the oil to concessional assessment under the Notifications. There is the fact that the consignment in dispute of the L.D.O. was actually delivered to Bihar Electricity Board Power House, Katihar on 10-2-1971 and this was duly entered in their Register and was used in the generation of electricity for public supply. 13. Under these circumstances, we find that the provisions of exemption Notification Nos. 162/63-C.E. and 163/63-C.E., both dated 21-9-1963 stand complied with in letter and spirit. The action of the authorities below in rejecting the refund claim filed by the appellants cannot be said to be justified and, therefore, we set aside the Order of the authority below and accept the Appeal. Consequential relief to the appellants will follow.
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1984 (12) TMI 310 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... at this appeal is to be treated as if it had been filed before us under the provisions of Section 35-P(2) of the Act. Further, in terms of the said provision of law, we are empowered to extend the time limit or condone the delays which power was not vested in the Board. According to the learned Counsel, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal should sympathetically consider technical delays of limitation and go into merits of the case. 5. Section 35-P(2) merely confers authority on the Tribunal to entertain as appeals what were preferred as revisions applications before the Central Government. We see no warrant for the interpretation placed by the learned Counsel that the said section empowers us to condone a delay which had occurred at the earlier stage of these proceedings, namely, at the stage of filing of the appeal before the Board. Accordingly, we also see no force in the alternative contention of the learned Counsel. 6. In the result, we dismiss the appeal.
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1984 (12) TMI 309 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... sought to be appealed against; but the Appellate Collector has gone wrong in dismissing the appeal before him as nullity. He should have given option to the appellants to either file four separate appeals against the four assessment orders with the requisite court fee stamps, etc., or restrict the scope of the single appeal filed before him to one of the assessment orders in dispute. 9. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order, passed by the Appellate Collector, Central Excise, Calcutta, and remand the case back to the Collector (Appeals), Calcutta who will dispose of the appeal filed before him in respect of only one of the R.T. 12 Returns in dispute. The appellants may, if so advised, file three more appeals against the remaining three assessment orders before the Collector (Appeals), Calcutta in accordance with law. The question of limitation regarding those three appeals, if filed before him, would be decided by the said Collector (Appeals). Ordered accordingly.
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1984 (12) TMI 308 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... that by virtue of subsequent events no duty became payable if duty was to be paid as on the date of the confirmation of the demand by the Assistant Collector. 8. Shri Mookherjee had also contended that principles of natural justice had been violated in the adjudication proceedings and for this reason also the orders of the lower authorities were to be set aside. The basis for this argument was the reasons earlier discussed, that is, the demands were not addressed to the appellants and that no show cause notice had preceded the issue of the demands. For the reasons stated earlier we have held that these two contentions are themselves not valid, therefore, the contention of violation of principles of natural justice does not also require any further consideration. 9. In the circumstances, on a careful consideration of the submissions of both sides, we hold that the orders of the lower authorities do not require any interference. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 307 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nder Item 68. The ruling reported in 1977 CEN CUS 31(d) also does not apply to the present issue. In that ruling hours meter and wheel weights were considered as accessories of a tractor. An additional water tank cannot be considered as such. On the present facts, it is manifest that the water tank supplied by the appellants formed an integral part of the main unit and provided for the supply of water to the functioning of the cooler for a longer duration. As rightly pointed out by the Appellate Collector there is no evidence to show that a separate water tank has been supplied to any party without the cooler. The water tank by itself has no independent use and formed an inbuilt system for storing additional quantity of water. Though in one of the previous cases, another Appellate Collector has taken a different view that does not advance the case of the appellants in any way. 8. For the reasons stated above we find no merit in all the four appeals and dismiss the same.
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1984 (12) TMI 306 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... r directing the Assistant Collector to go into the matter. Further, in pursuance of the said order of the Appellate Collector, fresh proceedings were drawn up by the Assistant Collector resulting in the issue of order-in-original dated 31-7-1981. The appellants thereafter agitated the same issue before the Appellate Collector for a second time and the Appellate Collector issued a second order dated 22-6-1982. We can take cognisance of the order dated 22-6-1982 only if an appeal against it is preferred by the appellants. Record shows that no appeal against the order dated 22-6-1982 passed by the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi has been filed in this Tribunal. It is for the appellants, if they so desire, to pursue that matter. So far as the appellate order dated 2-5-1981 is concerned, as we have observed earlier, the same does not survive and, therefore, the appeal before us is not maintainable in law, 5. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal as not maintainable.
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1984 (12) TMI 305 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... aks of bona fide baggage. The bona fide baggage comes into picture only for the purpose of claiming free allowance. As a matter of fact the expression baggage’ is interpreted to mean luggage’. It permits temporary detention of baggage at the request of the passenger of the goods which are dutiable, and the import of which are prohibited provided a true declaration had been made. In the circumstances, and having regard to the fact that there was a true declaration and also the request for detention, the authorities below have committed an error in law in holding that the appellant was not entitled for detention of gold which he had brought. I, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the orders passed by the authorities below and direct that the gold be returned to the appellant for taking back with him when he leaves India. The appellant shall exercise this right of taking back from India within a period of 2 months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (12) TMI 304 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... cognition, it is reasonable to say that the same would be true of the rate of duty also. 22. The above two rulings of the Supreme Court will enable us to say that the rate of duty should be the rate of duty on the day of removal of the goods and not any rate of duty that may have been current or applicable before that event. The decisions of the Bombay High Court in the Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills case and of other High Courts also support this reasoning and conclusion (i) Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills (1978 E.L.T. 680) (Bombay) dated 20-1-1978. (ii) Alembic Chemical Works Company Ltd. v. Union of India (1979 E.L.T. 258) (Gujarat) dated 18-7-1975. (iii) Kesar Sugar Works v. Union of India (1983 E.C.R. 139) (Allahabad); and (iv) Shree Synthetics Limited v. Union of India (1982 E L.T. 97) (Madhya Pradesh) dated 16-1-1982. 23. I am accordingly of the view that the action of the lower authorities was correct, I, therefore, reject the appeal.
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1984 (12) TMI 303 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the above reasons we cannot maintain the order of the Appellate Collector in respect of the loading of the assessable value of the product qua freight, transit insurance and cost of regulators. 20. In the result we partly accept the appeal and modify the impugned order in the above terms. Consequential relief flowing therefrom be made available to the appellants. EDITOR’S COMMENTS The Andhra High Court in the case of Jay Engineering Works - 1982 E.L T. 378, has held that cost of the Regulator is includible in the assessable value of the fan because it is an indispensable part of the fan. As per the Appellate Tribunal this view of the Andhra H.C. is stated to have been followed by the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No. 2274/82, dated 7-2-1984. The Appellate Tribunal while following Andhra H.C decision has wrongly ordered for exclusion of the cost of the Regulator from the assessable value of the fan. This decision of the Tribunal cell for notification of the matter.
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1984 (12) TMI 302 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ing a concept of Stamping Control’, as Shri Gupta would have liked us to do). If the words “from time to time” are given their normal significance, the amendment brought about by Notification No. CER/1/69, dated 4-10-1969 cannot be ignored while interpreting provisos (iv) and (v). 25. In the view that we have taken, it is clear that at the relevant time “4 harness drill” was not covered by proviso (v) to Notification No. 226/77-C.E; dated 15-7-1977. The order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) taking a contrary view was not correct, as it did not take into account the amendment made with effect from 1-11-1969 to Notification No. CER/1/68, dated 2-5-1968. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Order-in-Appeal No. 52/CE/IND/84, dated 23-2-1984 of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), New Delhi, and restore the Order-in-Original No. V(18)30-99/81/ 1196-99, dated 28-1-1983 of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Gwalior.
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1984 (12) TMI 301 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... bad in law and patently illegal or not ? 3. Whether not following the well settled tests of marketability, a law laid down by the Supreme Court, will not be error apparent from the records ? 4. The test of marketability to attract the levy of excise, which is the law laid down by the Supreme Court, in Delhi Cloth and General Mills case and South Bihar Sugar Mills case, referred to above and followed by the various High Courts, can be said to be the debatable point of law ? 5. Did the Tribunal not err in law for not examining all the technical literature as desired by the High Court of Delhi in their order in the SCA No. 1207 of 1981 ? 6. Whether the Act of Tribunal in not taking into consideration, the details of the documents attached to the case records, or the act of not assigning any reasons for doing so, can be said to be a mistake apparent on the face of records or not ? 7. Did the Tribunal not err in law in not following its own decision reported in 1983 E.L.T. 2410 ?
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1984 (12) TMI 300 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... 5 lakhs quota for the factory and that quota had already been reached by the previous manufacturer by Shree Hubli Chemical Works; the principal. It is, therefore, clear that Shree Hubli’s clearances are not entitled to the exemption. 12. Shree Hubli Chemical Works claims that it had registered itself under Notification 305/77-C.E. This notification exempts the manufacturer from the operation of Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, that is, the necessity to obtain a licence, if he gets his goods manufactured on his account from any other person, subject to certain conditions. Shree Hubli did not get its goods manufactured on its account by any other parson and, therefore, we are not clear how this notification operates in its case. It seems to us that the appellants have not understood the terms of this notification. 13. In any case, we have seen the clear words of the notification and we will have to go by it whereby the appeal must fail. We, accordingly, dismiss it.
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