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Showing 101 to 120 of 2871 Records
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1984 (12) TMI 144 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ... ... ... ..... ews taken by the Madras High Court and the Special Bench of the Tribunal. It cannot, therefore, be held that the Madras High Court has overruled the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of J. Hemchand and Co. or that it has declared that the decision of the Special Bench is not good law. Each case has to be disposed of in accordance with its own facts and, so, in my opinion, the ld. Accountant Member has rightly directed the CIT (A) to re-examine the claim of the assessee in respect of certain specific items of expenditure after ascertaining further facts and then to re-decide the matter in accordance with law. 10. Thus, my answer to the question posed to me is that the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in J. Hemchand and Co. , is not contrary to the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Southern Sea Foods (P) Ltd. and hence it is good law. 11. The case will now go back to the Bench for disposal according to the opinion of the majority.
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1984 (12) TMI 142 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Levy Of Penalty, Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the learned Judicial Member that the revised return filed in this case satisfied all the requirements of section 139(5), all because the income disclosed in the revised return was accepted by the Tribunal, eventually. There may be no concealment of income in the revised return but compared with the original return, there was concealment of income in the original return which came to surface only as a consequence of the raid and the comparison that was sought to be made by the department and the cross-verifications that began after the raid. I, therefore, agree with the view expressed by the learned Accountant Member and hold that the assessee is guilty of concealment of income in the original return and that the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), upholding the levy of minimum penalty, could be upheld. 14. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for disposing of the appeal in accordance with the view of the majority.
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1984 (12) TMI 141 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Charitable Trust, Trusts Act ... ... ... ... ..... n a situation like this, the matter should not be referred to a Special Bench. On the contrary, a reference to a Special Bench, in such circumstances, was the course to be adopted as suggested by the Madras High Court in the above cases. What is more, in the earlier order of the Tribunal, there was no reference to any language as foreign language for the purpose of deciding the matter that arose before it but, what was said was that the hundi ought to be in vernacular language. In the circumstances, I find it extremely difficult to ignore the decision of the Tribunal in the assessee s own case for the earlier year and come to a contrary conclusion. I, therefore, agree with the learned Accountant Member s view and hold that the Commissioner (Appeals) was right in deleting the addition following the earlier order of the Tribunal in the assessee s own case. 6. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for disposing of the appeal in accordance with the view of the majority.
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1984 (12) TMI 140 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Bench Of Tribunal, Development Allowance, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... the Madras High Court and the Special Bench of the Tribunal. It cannot, therefore, be held that the Madras High Court has overruled the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of J. H. and Co. or that it has declared that the decision of the Special Bench is not good law. Each case has to be disposed of in accordance with its own facts and so, in my opinion, the learned Accountant Member has rightly directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to re-examine the claim of the assessee in respect of certain specific items of expenditure after ascertaining further facts and then to re-decide the matter in accordance with law. 10. Thus, my answer to the question posed to me is that the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in J.H. and Co. s case is not contrary to the decision of the Madras High Court in Southern Sea Foods (P.) Ltd. s case and, hence, it is good law. 11. The case will now go back to the Bench for disposal according to the opinion of the majority.
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1984 (12) TMI 139 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Initial Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... 32 of the Ninth and Fifth Schedules merely means thread spun out of cotton and not necessarily pucca thread after chemically processing kachha thread . In this view of the matter, I hold that the assessee-firm carries on the business of manufacture of Yarn and, hence, textiles within the meaning of the aforesaid entries. 13. For removal of doubts, I may state that in view of the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. North Arcot District Co-operative Spg. Mills Ltd. 1984 148 ITR 406 and the decision of the Tribunal in the case of the assessee itself, in IT Appeal No. 250 (Mad.) of 1981 for the assessment year 1976-77, the expression textiles appearing in entries 21 and 32 of the Ninth and Fifth Schedules includes cotton yarn . Accordingly, the assessee is entitled to initial depreciation and higher development rebate under section 32(1)(vi) and section 33(1)(b)(B)(i)(b) of the Act. 14. The case will now go to the Bench concerned for disposal according to law.
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1984 (12) TMI 130 - ITAT MADRAS-A
... ... ... ... ..... ividual income of the Karta for the services rendered to the extent that it could be said to have no real and sufficient connection with the family funds invested in the firm. The AAC recorded a finding of facts in this connection. He noted the actual return to the assessee-family as share of profit and the salary income received by the Karta as an individual and then held that to the extent of 8,000 only there was no such real and sufficient connection between the family funds invested in the firm and the salary paid by the firm to the Karta. He does not use these very words but has merely put this conclusion in somewhat different language. He has held that only Rs. 5,099 out of the salary paid to the Karta from the firm has real and sufficient connection with the assessee-family funds invested in the firm. To this extern therefore, he confirmed the inclusion made by the ITO. I am unable to see such inclusion as bad in law. I decline to interfere. 8. The appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 127 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Hindu Undivided Family ... ... ... ... ..... Janakarajan which had nothing to do with the issue in appeal here. It follows that no real and sufficient connection had been established between the joint family funds and the remuneration received by Arunachala Nadar. On the other hand, the AAC has recorded factual details relating to the competence and experience of Arunachala Nadar and the nature of the services rendered by him, which go to show that essentially the remuneration was for services rendered by Arunachala Nadar. Hence, the salary income in question cannot be included in the assessment of the assessee-family here. Once the salary income is excluded, interest income also has to be excluded. This is because, there was no dispute before me that the interest income in question was wholly referable to the accumulated credit balance from the deposit of salary received by Arunachala Nadar in his account with the firm. I, therefore, see no room for interference with the order of the AAC. 8. The appeals are dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 125 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Assessment Year, Reopening Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... he WTO is entitled to act on information received by him does not permit fresh application of the mind to the same issue or enable him to correct his own or his predecessor s error of the judgment. The WTO cannot take action under section 17(1)(b) merely because he happens to change his opinion or to hold an opinion different from that of his predecessor on the same set of facts. This proposition of law is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Dinesh Chandra H. Shah 1971 82 ITR 367. To the same effect are the views of the Bombay High Court in Tulsidas Kilachand v. D.R. Chawla 1980 122 ITR 458 and the Madras High Court in Family of V.A.M. Sankaralinga Nadar v. CIT 1963 48 ITR 314. Thus, in our opinion, the department has no case even under section 17(1)(b). 8. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the order of the AAC is sound and calls for no interference. We, accordingly, confirm his order. 9. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 123 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... e forms a new procedure, alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective unless there is some good reasons or the other why, they should not be. In other words, if the statute merely is with the procedure inaction, and does not affect the rights of the parties, it will be held to apply Prima facie all actions, pending as well as future. To the same effect is the decision of the latest Karnataka High Court, reported as CWT vs. Vidyavathi Kapur (1985) 44 CTR (Ker) 174 (1984) 150 ITR 319 (Kar). In view of the Supreme Court decision as well as the latest Karnataka decision, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Kalia, the ld. Advocate for the assessee and accordingly we hold that as s. 36(3) of the ED Act was procedural in nature, it applies even to all pending matters irrespective of the fact whether they belong prior to the amendment or subsequent to them. Therefore, even on this account the appeal should succeed. 8. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 122 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... ss the relief under s. 80J as it substantially complied with the provisions of s. 80J(4) during the maximum period in the accounting year. The ld. Departmental Representative argued that the word lsquo worker rsquo is not defined in the IT Act and hence the dictionary meaning of the worker should be adopted instead of the meaning attached to the word lsquo worker rsquo under the Factories Act, 1948. We feel it very difficult to appreciate this argument when a word is defined in another legislation unless the word is differently defined in the impugned Act, it should carry the meaning given to it in the Act in which it is defined. We, therefore, hold that the word lsquo worker rsquo as defined in the Factories Act, 1948 can usefully be adopted for purposes of determining the worker within the meaning of s. 80J(iv). We, therefore held that the assessee is entitled to s. 80J relief as it substantially complied with the provisions of s. 80J(4)(iv). Therefore, the appeal succeeds.
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1984 (12) TMI 121 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... of the authorities of the Indian Air lines Corporation, on fulfilment of conditions. Taking the special circumstances into consideration, the A. P. High Court held that the property under the accident policy does not pass on the death of the pilot, who was the deceased in that case. However, this case is quite distinct and different from the one considered by the A.P. High Court. The decisions reported in M. CT. Muthiah and Anr. vs. CED (1974) 93 ITR 435 (J and K) (1974) 94 ITR 323 (Mad) and (1974) 93 ITR 42 (Guj) (sic) were all decisions rendered after construing the accident policies. None of the cases were cited by the counsel for the accountable person, dealing with the simple life insurance policy. Therefore, we reject the contentions of the counsel of the accountable person and hold that there are no grounds established in order to interfere with the finding given by the ld. Appellate CED. 3. In the result we hold that the appeal bears no merits and hence we dismiss it.
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1984 (12) TMI 120 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... pected to be produced in that regard. Absence of finalisation of accounts before filing the return by the firm is a sufficient and reasonable cause for the delay in filing the return, because the firm has not only to fill up the IT Form but also expected to append balance-sheet, P and L a/c and several statements along with it. The error or discrepancy in the trial balance should be found out and reconciled before any meaningful balance-sheet was to be filed. We are satisfied in his case that the cause put-forward for the delay is genuine. Further, even assuming that there was some minor latches or delay on the part of the assessee-firm, we hold that there was only a technical or venial breach for which no penalty is called for. There is an Authority of Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC) in support of our stand. 4. In the result, the appeals are allowed and penalty of Rs. 2,152 for 1976-77 and Rs. 2,900 for 1977-78 are knocked off.
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1984 (12) TMI 119 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... ad been sent through an accountant who had been unable to submit it in time due to the serious illness of his wife an affidavit was filed in support of explanation, no counter-affidavit or other material was filed on behalf of the Department to controvert the affidavit. The Tribunal observed that the firm was genuine and no defect in the constitution of the firm had been pointed out by the department. There was sufficient cause for delay in making the application and the firm was entitled to registration. 8. The facts of the case before their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court and the facts of the present case with us are similar. In our view when it is an admitted fact by the accountant and partners of the firm before the ITO that due to the ignorance of the accountant and more particularly when the deed of partnership was misplaced by the accountant the delay is reasonable and that should be condoned. We direct the ITO to grant the registration. 9. The appeal is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 118 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... artment. In that case the ld. members clearly held that the assessee cannot be penalised for the mischief or the otherwise of the Inward clerk and it was held that the registration cannot be refused. In the instant case, the receipt issued by the department is not available. However, the Inward Register had contained entry of having received Form No. 11 and the partnership deed on 20th Nov., 1976. The explanation of the Record Keeper dt. 20th Jan., 1981 is clearly fallacious as he merely mentioned that the entry seems to be doubtful. On these facts we have no hesitation but to uphold the finding of the AAC that the assessee cannot be penalised for the doubts in the minds of the department. The order of the AAC for asst. yr. 1977-78 is, therefore, upheld. In the second year the AAC has directed to ITO to pass an order under s. 184(7) after considering Form No. 11 also. We see no reason for interfering with this finding. 5. In the result, the departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 117 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ... ... ... ..... e assessee and his wife received salary by virtue of their employment in a concern which is their family concern. by applying s. 64(1)(ii) it seems apparent that the assessee has substantial interest in the concern. The various judgments of the tribunal filed by the assessee indicate that s. 64(1)(ii) cannot apply to a case where the assessee s spouse has technical qualification. It also has been held that the experience of the spouse would also amount to technical or professional qualification. Applying this logic to the instant case we find that the qualification as a science graduate is good qualification which could be sufficient enough for carrying out supervisory work and other administrative work relating to manufacture of scientific instrument. We, therefore, hold that the salary paid to the wife of the assessee cannot be clubbed with the hands of the assessee. The addition of Rs. 11,213 is, therefore, deleted. 3. In the result, the assessee s appeal is fully allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 116 - ITAT JAIPUR
Life Insurance ... ... ... ... ..... e authorities of the Indian Airlines Corporation, on fulfilment of conditions. Taking the special circumstances into consideration, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the property under the accident policy does not pass on the death of the pilot, who was the deceased in that case. However, this case is quite distinct and different from the one considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The decisions in Kasturi Lal Jain s case, M. Ct. Muthiah v. CED 1974 94 ITR 323 (Mad.) and 93 ITR 42 (Guj.) (sic) were all decisions rendered after construing the accident policies. None of the cases were cited by the counsel for the accountable person, dealing with the simple life insurance policy. Therefore, we reject the contentions of the counsel of the accountable person and hold that there are no grounds established in order to interfere with the findings given by the learned Appellate Controller. 3. In the result, we hold that the appeal bears no merits, and, hence, we dismiss it.
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1984 (12) TMI 115 - ITAT INDORE
... ... ... ... ..... he amount in question, had not fallen as bad debt during the relevant year as the assessee has not lost all hope of recovery of the amount in question. This decision would however, not support the case of the department for the reason that the assessee s claim has been disallowed by the AAC mainly on the technical ground that the amount, in question, had not been properly written off in the books of account since the necessary credit entry has not been passed in the account of the debtor, but the suspense account has been credited. We have already referred to the decisions of the Bombay and Gujarat High Courts to the effect that passing of necessary entries, as done by the assessee in its books of account, would clearly entitle it to the claim of bad debt, since the amount, in question, has been properly written off as bad debt in the books of account. 11. In the result, we accept this appeal and allow the assessee s claim of deduction of bad debt to the extent of Rs. 59,882.
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1984 (12) TMI 114 - ITAT INDORE
Gratuity Fund, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ssessee) may be entitled to some refund or may have to pay extra amount on account of economic rent at the rate of Rs, 1,000 per month. There is no clause in the agreement whatsoever entitling the hirer to any amount, in case the hirer wants to terminate the agreement. Therefore, the assessee has no right of refund of any amount on her own choice and, therefore, the amounts paid by the assessee to the Housing Board cannot be treated as her property. The result, therefore, is that if the house is treated as belonging to the assessee, we have to grant her exemption under section 5(1)(iv). On the other hand, if the house is not treated so, the amounts paid to the Housing Board cannot be treated as the assessee s wealth, because the assessee has no right to get them back. In either case, therefore, the sum of Rs. 49,897 deserved to be excluded from the assessee s wealth. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the sum of Rs. 49,897 is hereby deleted from the assessee s wealth.
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1984 (12) TMI 113 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
A Firm, Standard Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... the partner is to be assessed in his individual assessment, the principle laid down in the case of R.M. Chidambaram Pillai, will have to be followed. 3. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.M. Chidambaram Pillai, there cannot be a contract of service, as employer and employee, between a firm and one of its partners and the payment of salary to a partner represents a special share of the profits. So the remuneration received by a partner for the services rendered by him to the firm is not assessable under the head Salaries under section 15. In this view of the matter, such an assessee is not entitled to standard deduction under section 16(i). 14. On the facts, therefore, the computation made by the ITO assessing the entire income obtained from the firm as share income without making any bifurcation, is in order. Accordingly, the order of the AAC is reversed and the order of the ITO is restored. 15. The result is, the appeal of the revenue is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 112 - ITAT DELHI-D
... ... ... ... ..... is party. In these circumstances the assessee was not entitled to any investment allowance on the cost of machinery of Rs. 1,50,026 as per provisions contained in s. 32A r/w s. 43(1) of the IT Act, 1961. For this reason and for the reasons given by us in our order dt.23rd Feb., 1984referred to above, we reject the Grounds No. 5, 5.1 and 5.2 in the assessee rsquo s petition of appeal. 12. Ground No. 6 is of general nature and needs no comments. 13. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed in part. 14. In Cross Objection No. 119 arising out of ITA No. 2107 the assessee has merely supported the order of the CIT(A) allowing the deduction of Rs. 23,694 paid as incentive bonus. For the reasons given while deciding ITA No. 2107 filed by the Revenue, the cross objection field by the assessee shall stand allowed. 15. In the result while the appeal by the Revenue is rejected the cross objection and the appeal by the assessee are respectively allowed and partly allowed.
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