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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 2871 Records
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1984 (12) TMI 299 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the increased duty or new levy would take effect in accordance with the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act. In other words, the undertaking would bind the assessee to pay, in a situation of the present type, special excise duty on clearances effected after the mid-night hour. It would not have the effect of binding himself to pay special excise duty on clearances between 17.00 hours and 24.00 hours on 28-2-1978 for the simple reason that the levy of special excise duty itself came into force only after the mid-night hour. 10. In this view of the matter, there is no question of Rule 224(2A) being rendered nugatory. 11. In the present case, we hold that the appellants were not liable to pay special excise duty on the clearances of urea fertilizer effected by them during the period 17.00 hours to 24.00 hours on 28-2.1978. We allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants which shall begranted within 3 months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (12) TMI 298 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... product falling under heading No. 39.01/06 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. 11. As regards additional duty of customs, both the consignments have been imported prior to 1-3-1981 when the Central Excise Tariff Item No. 16AA did not contain a statutory definition of “synthetic rubber”. The item itself covered Synthetic Rubber without any explanation of the expression. Since Hypalon 40 is a synthetic rubber (though not conforming to the requirements of Note 4 in Chapter 40), it is a Synthetic Rubber falling under Item No. 16AA CET. The respondents are entitled to the refund of the excess additional duty collected. 12. In the result, the appellants’ claim that the product Hypalon 40 is classifiable under Heading No. 39.01/06 of the C.T.A. 1975 is upheld. However, it shall be classified under Item No. 16AA CET as a Synthetic Rubber and the excess additional duty collected shall be refunded. 13. The appeal is disposed of with the above directions.
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1984 (12) TMI 297 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... essarily, for that reason alone, fall under heading 39.01/06. On page 574 of the C.C.C.N. explanatory notes are given examples of polyethers classified under heading 39.01. Two examples are polyoxyethylenes and polyoxypropylenes. The review notices say that PEG and PPG belong to these families of polymers. It need not be doubted that polyethers including polyoxyethylenes and polyoxypropylenes conforming to the stipulations in Chapter note 2 would fall under heading 39.01, C.C.C.N. and 39.01/06 of CTA, 1975. In the case before us, we have seen how PEG and PPG are not hit by the mischief of Chapter 2. 29. The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that PPG 1010 and PPG 2020 are not hit by the mischief of Note 2(c) and are, therefore, outside the scope of Chapter 39. Like PEG 300, they are also appropriately classifiable as miscellaneous chemical products, not elsewhere specified, under heading 38.01/19(1). 30. In the result, the appeals have no merit and are rejected.
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1984 (12) TMI 296 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... hich the assessee was to meet in accordance with law. 13. The Appellate Collector has correctly restricted the demand only for six months from the date of the last show cause notice dated 7-3-1981 and we find no ground to interfere with these findings of the Appellate Collector. Regarding the order of the Appellate Collector in waiving the penalty imposed, he has given valid reasons for this. The record shows that the Excise authorities had accepted classification list filed by the assessee twice under sub-item 1 of Tariff Item No. 17 subject to the test report of the Chemical Examiner, Madras. The report of the Chemical Examiner, Madras was never made available to the assessee at any time. We are not at all satisfied that the explanation given by the learned departmental representative that the respondents were guilty of having contravened the provisions of Rule 173-B. As a result of our above discussion we find no merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 295 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... as it is a chemically saturated rubber. Chapter 38 asked by the learned counsel is unsuitable because it is a chapter that covers Chemical products and preparations of the chemical or allied industries (including those consisting of mixtures of natural products) not elsewhere specified or included; residual products of the chemical or allied industries, not elsewhere specified or included. Unless the goods can be housed in no other headings/chapter, they cannot be accommodated in this chapter. Chapter 39 which covers artificial resins and plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers; articles thereof. is a head which suits Hycar 4021 more accurately than Chapter 38 since Hycar is a synthetic high polymer. Hence Chapter 38 is ruled out. 16. We set aside the Appellate Collector’s order and direct assessment under Chapter 39.01/06. For countervailing duty. Item 10AA Central Excise Tariff is the only suitable heading and this duty should be assessed under this item.
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1984 (12) TMI 294 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ne more legal obligation on him before his appeal could be heard on merit. That being, to deposit the duty demanded or penalty levied see Section 129E of the Customs Act. It is true that section vests discretion in the Tribunal to dispense with the pre-deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied if the Tribunal is of opinion that the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to the appellant. This discretion has to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The Tribunal is also enjoined to safeguard the interests of the Revenue. 7. After balancing the various obligations of the appellant and bearing in mind the interests of the Revenue I grant stay of the recovery and dispense with the pre-deposit of ₹ 25,000/-, the penalty levied on the applicant, on his depositing in cash a sum of ₹ 5,000/- within 8 weeks from this date. He shall report compliance within 9 weeks failing which his appeal is liable to be rejected.
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1984 (12) TMI 293 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the termination of services of Shri Manas Kumar Mukherjee is justified ?
To what relief, if any is he entitled?
Held that:- Once we hold that there was DO justification for dispensing with the enquiry, imposition of penalty of dismissal without disciplinary enquiry as contemplated by S- O 31 would be illegal and invalid.
The amount of ₹ 1, 50,000 directed to be paid to the appellant by the respondent comprises backwages, and all other allowances admissible to him from year to year from 1970 upto the end of 1984. The amount shall be spread over from year to year. If because of the lump sum payment as directed herein the respondent is required to deduct Income- tax as enjoined by Sec. 192 of the y Income-tax Act, 1961, the appellant shall be entitled to relief under Sec. 89 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
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1984 (12) TMI 292 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e considered as immovable property, they will not be exigible to tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. Their exclusion will not be on account of their not falling within entry 47 of Schedule C. It will be on account of the fact that they are not goods , and therefore, not taxable under a legislation concerning sale of goods. Components or parts of such plants are certainly goods and hence exigible to tax. They would fall under entry 47 of Schedule C since they are covered by the description in the entry. In the absence of any relevant finding, however, and in view of the decision that we have come to earlier, it is not necessary to decide this aspect of the matter. 15.. In the premises, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessees. 16.. Respondent will pay to the applicants the costs of the reference. 17.. Applicants will be entitled to a refund of Rs. 100 deposited with the Sales Tax Tribunal. Reference answered in the negative.
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1984 (12) TMI 291 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... per given in other statutes cannot be looked into. The Central Excise Tariff is a Central legislation. The commodities taxable under the Central Excise Act are mentioned under various tariff items for the purpose of levying Central excise duty at different rates. Since the mill board has also been included in the definition of paper by the Central Government, it may lend support for holding that mill board would also be covered under the entry of paper of all kinds including hand made paper, whether meant for writing, printing, copying, packing or for any other purpose . The stand of the respondent-assessee, in my opinion, finds support from the decision of this Court in the case of Poney Brothers 1983 UPTC 1065. In view of the aforesaid facts the second question is answered in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the respondent-assessee. In the result the revisions fail and are dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 290 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f of the petitioners has now argued that because of the pendency of the writ petitions, some of the petitioners have not filed any appeals, and that if any appeals are filed, the appellate authority should be directed to condone the delay and deal with the appeals on merits. Such a request cannot be granted by this Court. The power of condonation of delay is vested with the appellate authority. It is that authority which has to exercise that power. We cannot direct the appellate authority to condone the delay. If and when appeals are filed, it is for the appellate authority to consider on its own merits whether the delay should be condoned or not. Since there is a common argument advanced, we think that it will be proper to award costs in the main writ petition W.P. No. 3968 of 1982. Having regard to the questions involved and the argument advanced at the Bar, we are inclined to fix the counsel fee at Rs. 1,500. There will be no order as to costs in the other writ petitions.
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1984 (12) TMI 289 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pply of such forms as a matter of right, on the other hand, Here italicised. it is in the discretion of the Sales Tax Officer. The Sales Tax Officer cannot be compelled to issue the forms applied for see Krishna Coal Concern, Ballia v. Sales Tax Officer, Ballia 1976 38 STC 257 1975 UPTC 721. In view of this Division Bench decision of this Court there appears to be no legal infirmity in the direction for demand of security, which is being made prior to the issue of the forms. Morever, this power is fully contained in section 8-C of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and, therefore, the demand does not appear to be incompetent. Further, it is significant that a person aggrieved by an order passed under this provision is entitled to file an appeal under section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Thereafter a still further remedy is available by preferring a second appeal under section 10 of the aforesaid Act. In these circumstances, we find no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 288 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ltd., the petitioner may adopt appropriate proceedings to get relief from Caltex (India) Ltd. in respect of that grievance. We are not concerned with that grievance in these petitions. Moreover, there is no material on record to show this. Mr. Sequeira made one further grievance that the Government was not supplying to the petitioner the information which it wanted regarding the tax paid by Caltex (India) Ltd. to the Government under the Motor Spirit Taxation Act in respect of the aforesaid assessment years. We are sure that if the Government has any such information available and is in a position to supply it to the petitioner, the Government will do so. We are, however, not concerned with that question either. 5.. In the result, the petitions are dismissed and rule discharged in all the cases. Looking to the fact that the petitioner-company has appeared through one of the Directors and not a lawyer and all other facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 287 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der in question by an aggrieved party has expired. In our view, it will not be correct to contend that although an assessee cannot make an application for revision because there is a provision of appeal from the impugned order and/or the period of limitation for making revisional application has expired, the aggrieved party can still set the revisional power in motion by simply drawing the attention of the revisional authority about illegality and impropriety of the impugned order. If the initiation of revisional proceeding is made at the instance of a party, it cannot be held that such initiation has been made suo motu by the revisional authority. In our view, exercise of power at the instance of a party runs counter to the exercise of such power on its own motion by an authority. In the aforesaid circumstances, this appeal is allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial judge is set aside. There will be, however, no order as to costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN, J.-I agree.
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1984 (12) TMI 286 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ring aspect in the earlier case, should therefore fail. What we are concerned in these writ petitions is the validity of the notices issued under section 25-A of the Act. Whether there is sufficient legal basis for the authority to revise the order is the only question that arises in these writ petitions. It is, therefore, unnecessary to deal elaborately with the other contentions of Shri Indrakumar, he has put forward. It is suffice to say that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar s case 1979 44 STC 159 (SC) could form a legal basis to initiate proceedings to revise the earlier orders. The Deputy Commissioner need not have waited till the decision of this Court in Raghurama Shetty s case 1975 35 STC 360 was reversed later on, in the year 1981. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the impugned notices suffer from any other vice, including limitation. The writ petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 285 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... officer who is delegated with that power by the Collector. 17.. In this case the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax (III), Enforcement, Bombay, has filed an affidavit to the effect that he was authorised to sign the certificate by the Collector of Bombay. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the certificate for recovery forwarded by the Collector of Bombay to the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, is illegal and unenforceable has to be negatived. By the combined reading of sections 3 and 5 of the Act any recovery of a public demand is treated as arrear of land revenue payable to the Collector of the district under section 3 of the Act. As a consequence the delegation by the Collector of the district to sign the certificate on his behalf is also valid. Therefore, all contentions urged by the counsel for the petitioner are rejected. 18.. For the reasons stated above this writ petition is dismissed, and the rule issued is discharged. No costs. Writ Petition dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 284 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... present case. There is no question here of splitting up the integrity of any item which is being classified. We are concerned only with parts of oil engines. There is an express exclusion of oil engines and its parts from agricultural machinery and its parts. Therefore, parts of oil engines are not covered by the entry in question. 14.. It is true that if there is any ambiguity or doubt in relation to the interpretation of an entry, the benefit of such a doubt should go to the assessee. But, in our view, in the present case the entry in question is quite clear. Parts of oil engines in question would fall under the residuary entry 22 of Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, since there is no argument advanced that they fall under any other entry. 15.. In the premises, the question which is referred to us is answered in the negative and against the respondent. 16.. The respondent will pay to the applicant the costs of the reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1984 (12) TMI 283 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pproved the same. With respect, the principles enunciated in Manohar Brothers case 1962 13 STC 686 (Mad.) is sound and I am in respectful agreement with the same. 16.. On the principle enunciated in Manohar Brothers case 1962 13 STC 686 (Mad.) also the CTO should have allowed registration except for those items that are not pressed, which however, does not prevent him to take action against any misuse by the petitioner. 17.. In the light of my above discussion, I quash the impugned order except to the extent of building materials and stones and issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the respondent to include all other items refused in that order in the certificate of registration already issued to the petitioner under the CST Act. 18.. Writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. 19.. Let this order be communicated to the respondent within 10 days from this day. Writ petition allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 282 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be regarded as a false certificate rendering the registered dealer issuing the same liable to penalty and prosecution. In the alternative, it was submitted by Mr. Jetly that, in any event, once such certificate was issued by a registered dealer, the registered dealer should be held bound by an implied admission that the sale in question was not a casual sale, but effected by him in the course of his business. We do Prima facie see some substance in Mr. Jetly s submission that the registered dealer issuing the certificate would be precluded from contending that the sale in question in respect of which the certificate was issued was a casual sale. However, these aforesaid questions are not before us and we do not feel called upon to consider the same exhaustively, much less to decide them. 11.. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the respondent-dealer. 12.. The applicant to pay to the respondent the costs of the reference.
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1984 (12) TMI 281 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no sales tax is leviable on the royalty amount paid by the petitioners to the State under section 6-A of the A.P.G.S.T. Act, inasmuch as it cannot be said that the mineral is purchased by the lessees from the State, nor can the royalty be called the purchase price, or sale price, as the case may be. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each. The learned Government Pleader makes an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under article 133 of the Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that this case does involve a substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be considered by the Supreme Court. The question is whether the mining leases are leases , and what is the nature of royalty? In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd. 1977 40 STC 603 (SC), this question has become rather important and is likely to arise often. A certificate shall, accordingly, issue.
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1984 (12) TMI 280 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ller Flour Mills 1981 48 STC 297. With respect, I agree with that decision. 7.. This then brings me to decide whether the petitioner can get any relief. The petitioner, Gupta Brick Works, admittedly started production on 5th January, 1971 when the notification dated 19th September, 1969 was in force. Admittedly again, it was approved and registered as a small-scale industry by the Industries Department on 2nd July, 1976. Therefore, on 2nd July, 1976 it became a newly set up small-scale industry as defined in the notifications. But by that time it had completed more than five years of production. It was not a newly set up small-scale industrial unit under any of the notifications. 8.. I will, therefore, answer both the questions referred by the Tribunal in the negative and against the petitioner-assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. UDAI PRATAP SINGH, J.-For the reasons recorded in the judgment of Honourable the Chief Justice, I concur with the view expressed by him.
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