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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 265 Records
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1986 (9) TMI 389 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessing authority. Thereafter in case the appellate authority permitted such additional evidence to be brought on record, then an opportunity must be given to the other side to rebut the same. In the present case there is no such order on the record to show that such evidence was really admitted by the Tribunal. In view of this, reliance placed by the Tribunal on the aforesaid two agreements could not be made without following the procedure as laid down under section 12-B of the said Act. Admittedly in this case neither there is any order justifying any admission of such document nor affording any opportunity to the department. In view of this the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal could not be sustained. As observed above the order passed by the Tribunal on account of the aforesaid finding, is not sustainable and the same is set aside. The case is sent back to the Tribunal for deciding afresh this question in accordance with the aforesaid observations. Petition allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 388 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tioner No. 1. 3.. It is not in dispute before us that the articles were being transported for the purpose of execution of the agreement with National Aluminium Company Limited. The transaction in respect of those goods, when completed would be considered for regular assessment under the Orissa Sales Tax Act or any other Act. When the object of the transport of the articles, the person transporting and the destination to which the same were being transported were known and it is not claimed that false statement was being made before the check-gate Officer, there was no justification for seizure of the goods merely because power is vested under the statute. Where, however, the facts disclosed by the petitioner No. 1 would have been disbelieved, the matter would have stood on a different footing. 4.. In the circumstance, the impugned annexures are quashed and the writ application is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. H.L. AGRAWAL, C.J.-I agree. Writ petition allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 387 - SUPREME COURT
Preventive detention - contention of the petitioner/appellant that the order of preventive detention could only be justified against a person in detention if the detaining authority was satisfied that his release from detention was imminent and the order of detention was necessary for putting him back in jail. The service of order of detention on the petitioner while he was in jail was futile and useless since such an order had no application under section 3(2) of the Act.
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Though the order of preventive detention when it was passed was not invalid and on relevant considerations, the service of the order was not on proper consideration. It may be mentioned that in the petition it is nowhere stated that the detenu has since been released or that the prospect of his imminent release was properly and with seriousness considered by the detaining authority. The order of detention, therefore, is set aside.
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1986 (9) TMI 386 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lause (iii) of clause (44) of section 2, to the tax Recovery Commissioner, and the appeal is to be presented within thirty days from the date of the order appealed against. Under sub-rule (3) of rule 86, pending the decision of any appeal, the appellate authority has power to stay the execution of the certificate. Thus, an appeal lies and is pending where all the questions have been agitated. The appeal is an efficacious remedy. The sale has been confirmed under rule 63 of the principal Rules. I am, therefore, of the opinion that because an appeal has been filed and is pending and it is an efficacious remedy under the Act, it will not be proper to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution on the facts and circumstances of the present case. Consequently, on the ground of availability of the alternative efficacious remedy under the Income-tax Act and the principal rules, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 385 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the incomes arising from the Reserve Fund and the Expenses Account of the Nizam's Family Trust Deed, can be aggregated in single assessment - HC was right in holding that the settlor intended to create separate trusts in respect of the Reserve Fund and the Family Trust Expenses Account & that the respective incomes arising from the corpus of those trusts cannot be aggregated in one single assessment but must be assessed separately - question is answered in favour of the assessee
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1986 (9) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessment made under section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the State Act is bad since it is inconsistent with the provisions of section 15(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and violative of article 286(3) of the Constitution of India?
Held that:- Petition allowed. While quashing the assessment orders, we leave open freedom to the assessing authority to reassess the petitioners for the years in question, after ascertaining whether the petitioners have suffered liability by way of sales tax for the goods in question at any one stage. If they have been assessed before, they will not be assessed further. If they have not been assessed, assessment can be made making it clear in the assessment orders that the goods in question will not suffer any assessment further within the State.
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1986 (9) TMI 376 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... provision in the Companies Act to retransfer that matter to any other court having concurrent jurisdiction to try the same. In this case, the winding up court had entertained the application relating to the second, third, fourth and fifth private references in exercise of its special jurisdiction under section 446 of the Companies Act. The present application, whether it is an independent proceeding or a continuation of the same arbitration proceedings, must be moved before the winding up court both under section 446 as well as under section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act. On the facts and circumstances of this case, the validity or otherwise of these awards cannot be determined by any other court excepting the winding up court in view of the provisions of section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act as well as the provisions of sections 446(2) and 446(3) of the Companies Act. In this view of the matter, the application is returned to the petitioner for filing before the proper court.
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1986 (9) TMI 367 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order, Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof
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1986 (9) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
Power to cause investigation to be made into scheduled industries, Powers of Central Government on completion of investigation under section 15, Powers of Central Government to assume management or control of an industrial undertaking in certain cases
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1986 (9) TMI 356 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal made under section 23EE of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 dismissed - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant con travened section 12(2) of the Act. The High Court committed no error in rejecting the appellant's submission.
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1986 (9) TMI 342 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Aluminium circles - Test report - Presumption - Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... arose was available there was no need to take up duplicate and triplicate samples for re-test. It is not a case where the original sample has been totally lost calling for re-test of the second and third samples. No flaw has been pointed out in respect of the test report already received (except a case of tolerance limit under ISI). The question of sending the second and third samples for re-test and basing conclusions on those reports does not arise. We may also mention that the appellants did not attribute any defect in the drawing of samples or in the test already conducted. 9. emsp On the question of limitation the Tribunal by the judgment of M/s. Atma Steels (supra) has concluded that the date of show cause notice would be the material date in respect of the earlier changes that occurred subsequently. In view of the above decision which we respectfully follow, the question of limitation does not survive. 10. emsp In view of the above conclusions this appeal is rejected.
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1986 (9) TMI 334 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Baggage - Declaration of unaccompanied baggage ... ... ... ... ..... that in several earlier decisions we have held that the Landing Certificate will not satisfy as a Declaration under Section 77 when the same does not give all necessary details, including value, relevant for making an assessment. The said observation would not apply to the facts of the present case since in the Landing Certificate filed by the appellant, he claims to have mentioned all particulars necessary for making an assessment including the value of the goods. Therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of this case we hold that the Landing Certificate dated 12-7-1989 satisfied all the requirements under Section 77 of the Customs Act. The goods had been imported on 12-7-1980 itself. We, therefore, hold that in the circumstances of this case, duty should have been demanded at the rate prevalent on 12-7-1980 and not at the rate prevalent on 16-7-1980. 12. emsp Accordingly this appeal is allowed and the orders of the lower authorities are set aside, with consequential relief.
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1986 (9) TMI 333 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... wer is that it is the definition of motor vehicle rsquo as given in Item 34 which will govern us and not what has been said in other enactments or literature. The object of the Central Excise Act is to raise revenue and with this end in view the legislature has defined the term motor vehicle rsquo . In the context of the Act the expression motor vehicle rsquo has to be understood. The context must govern the true meaning of the term motor vehicle rsquo . We respectfully note the views of the High Court and those of the Supreme Court cited therein and follow the principles laid down by the High Court and the Supreme Court in the judgments cited above. As already mentioned, we had dealt with all the other arguments in our Order No. 882/86/B2. We need not traverse the same once again. 8. emsp In the light of these observations, we allow this appeal and order that the dredger may be extended the benefit of Notification No. 262-Cus/58 being treated as an ocean going vessel rsquo .
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1986 (9) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntended to convey that both canalised and non-canalised items would be covered within the ambit of the order. 5. The position has been clarified by the letter dated 18th June, 1986 written by the respondent which appears at page 132 of the Paper Book. It has been mentioned that the holders of additional licence issued for 1978-79 would be entitled to import only those goods which are included in Appendix 6 Part II of AM 85-88. The fact that the Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) on 23rd April, 1986 wrote a letter which is not in consonance with the subsequent direction would not in any way affect the position or create any estoppel. Nor can such a letter be used as an argument that that was the Government’s understanding of the matter. That is irrelevant. 6. In the premises the interim order prayed for in these applications is refused. 7. The applications are thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 331 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Bona fide baggage ... ... ... ... ..... cannot be considered as a declaration by the owner of the baggage and as such the provisions of Section 77 are not strictly attracted. Section 79 speaks of bona fide baggage. Admittedly the baggage brought by a passenger is not his bona fide baggage. They are sent by a person who was staying abroad. Therefore, it cannot even be considered as baggage of the passenger. The other provision relied upon by Shri Shah is Section 80 which has no relevance. Firstly because the passenger who brought the baggage was not the owner of the baggage, secondly because it cannot be considered as baggage of the passenger and thirdly because the passenger did noz make a request to detain these articles for the purpose of being returned to him for re-export. 7. Having regarding to my finding that the articles were not the baggage of the passenger, the decision relied upon by Shri Shah also will not apply. In the result and for the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and the same is rejected.
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1986 (9) TMI 328 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Effect of common storage of raw materials ... ... ... ... ..... ion thereof was also proper. Duty had also been rightly demanded on this total quantity of 7013 containers. The redemption fine of Rs. 7,000/- imposed with reference to this quantity does not appear to be excessive. 18. emsp Shri Gujral contends that in any event the penalty of Rupees one lakh levied on the appellant was unjustified and excessive. We have held that the charge of evasion of duty by creation of a fictitious entity has not been made out. Taking that circumstance into consideration as also the other consideration that in respect of the quantities of fully manufactured containers mentioned above there had been violation of the relevant rules, we hold that a reduction in the penalty is called for. The demand for duty on 263 containers unaccounted is also confirmed since the explanation that the same had been eaten away by white ants is not acceptable. The penalty is reduced to Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) only. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
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1986 (9) TMI 325 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Refund claim - Limitation - Duty paid under protest ... ... ... ... ..... ates of payment subsequent to 6-8-77 only, the said claim for refund would be governed by the New Rule 11 which had come into force on 6-8-77 . In taking the above view, the Special Bench had relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Universal Drinks Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 1984 (18) E.L.T. 207 (Bombay). 15. emsp The Collector (Appeals) finding which has been challenged before us is in conformity with the decision of the Special Bench referred to above as well as the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reported in 1984 (18) E.L.T. 207 (Bombay). We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with that part of his order. We reject Shri Pattekar rsquo s contention that because the refund claim was made after the coming into force of new Rule, the period of limitation prescribed in the rule applies and not the period of limitation that was existing at the time of payment of duty. 16. In the result, both these appeals fail and the same are rejected.
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1986 (9) TMI 324 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Refund - Limitation - Conditional exemption notification ... ... ... ... ..... e case of New Jatiaga Vallley Tea Estates Ltd., Calcutta v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong 1983 E.L.T. 1274 (CEGAT)J cited above. It is also not clear from the records of the case whether the assessment had been finalised by the time of the issue of, the Assistant Collector rsquo s letter or not. This was crucial from the point of view of determining whether any time limit applied at all. But, unfortunately, neither the appellant nor the respondent has referred to this aspect at the Tribunal stage. It, therefore, appears to me that the order of the learned Collector (Appeals) and the order of the learned Assistant Collector are based on incomplete examination of basic facts and have been passed without reference to the relevant provisions of law. 16. emsp I, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Collector (Appeals) and remand the case to the Assistant Collector to reconsider the matter in accordance with the law keeping in mind the observations mentioned above.
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1986 (9) TMI 317 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ermining the lsquo value rsquo has to be approved much prior to the actual clearance of goods. In fact the provisions of Rule 173C of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 are ultravires the Section 4 unless they are read harmoniously with Section 4. In fact the present Section 4 or as it stood prior to its amendment in 1975, neither specifically nor by necessary implication stipulate that there should be one assessable value in relation to the goods of same kind and quality See Assistant Collector v. Madras Rubber Factory - 1987 (27) E.L.T. 553 (SC) It is regretted that the decision of Shri K.P. Anand, Member (Technical) and Shri M.G.S. Murthy, Member (Judicial) expressing difference of opinion amongst themselves, has not been released for publication and it is only the decision of third Member on Reference that has been released. The Third Member decision does not independently stand on its own legs but has to be effectuated by incorporating the decisions of the other two members.
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1986 (9) TMI 316 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Customs Adjudication ... ... ... ... ..... le of criminal jurisprudence which also applies to the Departmental proceedings that at least there must be some sort of evidence from the side of the Department to show that the appellant had contravened any provisions of the Customs Act and it is only when such evidence is forthcoming that the appellant is supposed to rebut that evidence. In the instant case, the Department have miserably failed to prove the alleged recovery. The opinion of the Adjudicating Authority that it also cannot be believed that the police would be in a position to plant so much silver and opium is also against the experience of life. In the case in hand the probability that the person concerned might have escaped at the time of his apprehension cannot be ruled out and the further probability that the police might have seized the silver as an abandoned property also cannot be ruled out. 5. emsp In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order so far as it relates to the appellant.
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