|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 2886 Records
-
1992 (12) TMI 71 - ITAT COCHIN
Reasonable Cause ... ... ... ... ..... importance of the interaction of the accountant with the auditor in the course of audit and the significant role played by him in assisting the audit. These aspects have not been considered in the proper perspective either by the Assessing Officer or by the first appellate authority. Further, penalty was not levied in this case for the belated filing of the return along with the audit report, perhaps for the reason that there was reasonable cause in the accountant s illness in causing delay in the filing of the return. Further, the fact that it is only for the first time that the assessee had started maintaining accounts should not also be lost sight of. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that there was reasonable cause for the assessee in not getting the accounts audited or obtaining the report within the specified time in view of the proven illness of the accountant. For these reasons we cancel the levy of penalty. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed
-
1992 (12) TMI 70 - ITAT COCHIN
Orders Prejudicial To Interests, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... that the Assessing Officer has not examined whether the appellant had made any investment in transporting the goods or in concealing the goods and had further observed that it was not known whether the decision of the Collector of Customs dated 10-6-1985 has become final. No enquiry seems to have been made on these lines even though there is a specific direction in the order under section 263. Further, it is also necessary to ascertain the commission or brokerage or any such remuneration received by the appellant in assisting the transportation of the contraband goods and whether the same had been reflected in the return of income furnished by the appellant. For all these purposes, we set aside the order of the CIT (Appeals) and restore tile issue to the Income-tax Officer to reframe the assessment after giving adequate opportunity to the appellant. 12. In the result, I.T.A. No. 388 (Coch.)/1989 is dismissed and I.T.A. No. 114 (Coch.)/1992 is allowed for statistical purposes.
-
1992 (12) TMI 69 - ITAT CALCUTTA-D
Educational Institutions ... ... ... ... ..... ly for philanthropic purposes and not for profit. The assessee has also not violated its objects. The exemption also cannot be denied to the assessee on the basis of incidental or ancillary objects of the institution as they are not against the main object and rather support it. The certificate from the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Deputy Chief Inspector of Plantation, Tinsukia and Medical Inspector of Plantation, Tinsukia, which is in page 30 of the Paper Book also clearly states that the assessee is maintaining and conducting free medical and hospital facilities for both the tea garden labourers and their families as well as for the inhabitants of surrounding areas since 1985. Therefore, considering the totality of facts and circumstances, we hold that authorities were not justified in denying exemption to the assessee under section 10(22A) of the IT Act for both the years, and accordingly we would direct them to grant exemption. 26. In the result, appeals are allowed.
-
1992 (12) TMI 68 - ITAT CALCUTTA-A
Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... received would be liable to be treated as its income during the year in which it was received. In such a case, the receipt would not be on the basis of any right vesting in the assessee company under the contract, but on the basis of its actual receipt. It would be liable to be brought to tax in the year the money was actually received. Since the right to this amount did not arise or accrue at all. It could not be held that merely because the assessee followed the mercantile system of accounting, the income accrued in the year in which the breach of contract took place. Therefore, in our view the Assessing Officer was not justified in assessing the sum of Rs. 46,695 for the assessment year under appeal. However, the Assessing Officer shall be at liberty to assess the said sum in the assessment year 1988-89 since in the previous year relating to that year the claim was accepted and refund ordered by the Central Excise Authorities. 8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed
-
1992 (12) TMI 67 - : ITAT BOMBAY-E
Additional Grounds, Assessing Officer, Assessment Order, Financial Year, Orders Passed, Orders Prejudicial To Interests, Original Assessment, Set Off
-
1992 (12) TMI 66 - ITAT BOMBAY-E
Debt Owed, Net Wealth, Tax Liability, Valuation Date ... ... ... ... ..... notification that every dealer whose gross turnover during the year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act exceeds taxable quantum shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on all sales effected after the date so notified.... After considering the said provision and the particular interpretation by the Supreme Court in the cases cited supra it was held by the Calcutta High Court that the assessees claiming deduction of such a tax debt under section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act was justified. Therefore, the claim of the assessee which is on pari materia with the claim of the appellant before the Calcutta High Court in the case discussed above has to be upheld. 8. We hold for the reasons given above that the assessee is entitled for the deduction of the tax payable under section 140A in respect of the return filed for the assessment year 1983-84 while computing the net wealth for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. 9. In the result, both the appeals are allowed
-
1992 (12) TMI 65 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
Development Rebate At Higher Rate ... ... ... ... ..... te. If the argument for the department is accepted, then it would mean that one should read into the sub-clause carried on by the assessee . These words are conspicuously absent specially when such words are present in item (iii). Even item (ii) contains the words used by it . In view of this glaring contrast, it is not possible to read certain words into item (i) which are not present there. Consequently, we come to the conclusion that in order to be entitled to the development rebate under sub-clause (B)(i), it is not necessary that the assessee should own the business or carry on the business producing the articles specified in the Fifth Schedule. Hence, the order dated 28-11-1978 rightly gave the development rebate at the higher rate of 25 per cent so that there was no mistake therein prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Hence, the order of the Commissioner under section 263 was not justified and is hereby cancelled. 10. In the result, the two appeals are allowed.
-
1992 (12) TMI 64 - ITAT BANGALORE
... ...
... ... ..... is assessed. Thus, all these four different aspects of dispute should arise only out of a regular assessment under s. 143(3) or s. 144 and not an intimation under s. 143(1)(a) of s. 143(1A) of the IT Act, 1961. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Representative of the assessee on the ground of amount of tax determined also fails. As a consequence the appeal is not maintainable even on feat count. Thus, the appeal is not maintainable on all the three grounds of contention raised by the learned Representative of the assessee and, therefore, it is crystal clear that the Dy. CIT(A) has wrongly entertained the appeal against an order under s. 143(1A) though wrongly styled as under s. 143(1)(a) of the IT Act, 1961. In these circumstances, the grounds taken by the Revenue are quite valid and justified in law and, therefore, the impugned order of the Dy. C1T(A) is hereby cancelled as it is unjustified in law and is ab initio void. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1992 (12) TMI 63 - ITAT BANGALORE
Assessing Officer ... ... ... ... ..... efore, the DCIT(A) has erroneously assumed jurisdiction and adjudicated the appeals filed before him. Therefore, the orders of the DCIT(A) cannot stand. Consequently the impugned orders of the DCIT(A) are set aside because infirmity of jurisdiction has set in by wrong assumption of the jurisdiction which legally lies with the CIT(A). Therefore, while setting aside the impugned orders of the DCIT(A) I direct that all these appeals should be transferred to the CIT(A) having proper jurisdiction over these appeals so as to enable him to adjudicate the appeals in accordance with law. There is no illegality in the orders passed by the DCIT(A) and those orders would not become ab initio void because there is infirmity in the procedural assumption of jurisdiction and this infirmity could be cured by transferring the appeals to the CIT(A) who is competent to entertain these appeals because the jurisdiction lies with him only. 7. In the result, the appeals are allowed as directed above
-
1992 (12) TMI 62 - ITAT BANGALORE
Additions To Income, Assessing Officer, Business Premises, Chargeable To Tax, Sale Proceeds, Search And Seizure, Secret Profits
-
1992 (12) TMI 61 - ITAT BANGALORE
Assessee's Appeal ... ... ... ... ..... ferent aspects of dispute should arise only out of a regular assessment under section 143(3) or section 144 and not an intimation under section 143(1)(a) or section 143(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned representative of the assessee on the ground of amount of tax determined also fails. As a consequence the appeal is not maintainable even on that count. Thus the appeal is not maintainable on all the three grounds of contention raised by the learned representative of the assessee and, therefore, it is crystal clear that the DCIT(A) has wrongly entertained the appeal against an order under section 143(1A) though wrongly styled as under section 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In these circumstances, the grounds taken by the revenue are quite valid and justified in law and, therefore, the impugned order of the DCIT(A) is hereby cancelled as it is unjustified in law and is ab initio void. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed
-
1992 (12) TMI 60 - ITAT BANGALORE
Actual Cost, Capital Asset ... ... ... ... ..... ly one and the same and these provisions do not contain any condition or obligation to spend the subsidy for acquiring any fixed capital asset so as to reduce the cost of the fixed capital asset by the amount of subsidy relating to it. Therefore, the ITO in the fresh order passed has made only a distinction without there being any difference in the provisions of the State Subsidy Scheme vis-a-vis the Central Subsidy Scheme. In view of the decisions of the Courts relied upon by the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) and also the cases cited, the logical conclusion that emerges is that there is no justification for reducing the subsidy for the purpose of granting depreciation on the fixed capital assets because there is no warrant in the Schemes of both the Central and State Governments to this effect. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the orders of the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) are upheld and the grounds taken by the revenue are rejected. 12. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
-
1992 (12) TMI 59 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
Development Allowance, Export Promotion, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... ighted deduction. We are unable to accept this submission for the simple reason that there is no evidence on record which could form basis for a firm finding to the effect that a particular portion of the commission represented expenditure on advertisement or publicity outside India in respect of the goods which the assessee dealt in in the course of the business. Consequently no portion of the commission paid to Indian Agents would be eligible for weighted deduction. In the case of Kerala Nut Food Co. which the learned counsel has strongly relied on, the assessment year involved was the assessment year in which clause (ii) was in force and on the facts of that case the finding arrived at was that clauses (i) and (ii) were attracted. Such is not the case here. We accordingly confirm the order of the ITO disallowing weighted deduction in respect of commission of Rs. 2,22,399 paid to the Indian Agents. 19 and 20. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
-
1992 (12) TMI 58 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Duty Drawback - Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... nd (vii) There is overwhelming evidence that the goods exported are known as bright steel bars in market parlance and thus are rightly classifiable under sub-serial No. 3606 on that basis. 26. It is clear from the above discussion and conclusion that the grounds on which review is sought are not without force. It is accordingly held that there is nothing to debar the term steel covering stainless steel also that goods exported being specifically described as bright steel bars which is a specific description in Drawback Schedule are not articles and are appropriately classifiable under sub-serial No. 3606. In the result the order passed by the Collector (Appeals) is neither proper nor based on correct legal position and rules of interpretation. Therefore, acting under Section 129DD Customs Act, 1962, Government is constrained to set aside the impugned order-in-appeal and restore the orders-in-original passed by the Assistant Collector (DBK), Bombay. It is ordered accordingly.
-
1992 (12) TMI 57 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI-LB
Redemption fine (Customs) - Determination of - Relevant date for
... ... ... ... ..... to be looked into while fixing the quantum of fine. 21. Thus, the Tribunal has specifically held in three cases - Ashwini Vanaspati s case, Vaghani s case and Kalpana Import and Export Agency s case that the material date for determination of the market price is the date of import, and it is this view with which the referring Bench differed for reasons recorded in their order. It is this point which was required to be considered by the Larger Bench. 22. For reasons recorded in the foregoing paragraphs, with respect, I take a different view and propose that the market price should be determined at the time of passing the order of confiscation of the goods and not at the time of import of the goods into India. Final Order 23. In view of the majority view, we direct the adjudicating authority to recalculate redemption fine on the basis of the market price prevalent on the date of the importation of the goods in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of in the above manner.
-
1992 (12) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... rsued the High Court will not allow the parallel proceedings under Article 226 to be pursued and will reject the petition. 32. For the above reasons, on the first point we hold that the petitioner cannot be permitted to pursue two parallel proceedings and therefore the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 33. In view of our finding on the first point and in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Sheo Nath s case AIR 1971 SC 2451 (supra) that having found that the writ petition is not maintainable, the High Court ought not to have decided the question on merits, we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the second point. 34. Having regard to the fact that the appeal filed by the petitioner is pending before the 2nd respondent from 9-7-1990, we consider it appropriate to direct the 2nd respondent to dispose of the appeal on merits within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment. 35. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1992 (12) TMI 55 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Rate of duty - Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... ing of the two tariff items and the exemption notification leaves no manner of doubt that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of exemption notification. In these circumstances, the decision of the learned Single Judge as well as the order passed by the Central Government cannot be sustained. It is required to be stated that identical orders were passed in respect of another bill of entry filed by the appellants and Writ Petition was filed to cover both the bills of entries. 5. Accordingly, appeal is allowed and judgment dated July 12, 1989 delivered by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 2876 of 1982 as well as order dated July 7, 1992 passed by Joint Secretary of Government of India are set aside and order dated June 5, 1981 and June 25, 1981 in respect of two appeals passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals) stands restored. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The Bank guarantee furnished by the appellants stands discharged.
-
1992 (12) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Demand - Show cause notice - Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... anufacturers succeed, unless they succeed in showing to the statutory authorities that they had not passed on the whole or any part of the duty in question to others. 10. It is true that the Supreme Court was considering a case where an application for refund is pending whereas in the present case, the refund has already been effected. However, Section 11A read with Section 11B of the Act confers jurisdiction on the authorities to recover duty alleged to have been erroneously refunded and it is for the manufacturer to prove that the refund is not erroneous. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of the petitioner-company that the Assistant Collector has no jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice. It is open to the petitioner to raise all the objections raised in this writ petition before the Assistant Collector and the authorities shall consider them and pass appropriate order. 11. The Writ Petition is therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1992 (12) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
Writ of mandamus or any appropriate directions to seek that the component/parts of ball bearings imported from foreign supplier M/s. Impex Matel Lucka, Sarszawa (Poland) are liable to excise duty prevalent as on February 20, 1989 and to release the goods on payment thereof or in the alternative to declare Section 15(l)(a) ultra vires of Arts. 14, 19(l)(g), 21, 265 and 300A of the Constitution
Held that:- The relevant date under Section 15(l)(a) is the date on which entry inwards after delivery of import manifest was granted to discharge the cargo for the purpose of the levy of the customs duty and rate of tariff. The contention, therefore that the ship entered Indian territorial waters on February 20, 1989 and was ready to discharge the cargo is not relevant for the purpose of Section 15(1) read with Sections 46 and 31 of the Act. The prior entries regarding presentation of the bill of entry for clearance of the goods on February 27, 1989 and their receipt in the appraising section on February 28, 1989 also are irrelevant. The relevant date to fix the rate of customs duty, therefore, is March 2, 1989. The rate prevailed as on that date would be the duty to which the goods imported are liable to the impost and the goods would be cleared on its payment in accordance with the rate of levy of customs prevailing as on March 2, 1989.
If the interim directions of the court are taken to be substitute for the statutory operation of the relevant provisions, the interest of the revenue would be prejudicially affected and the fraudulent conduct and acts done in furtherance thereof would get legitimacy to avoid payment of duty and tariff prevailing as on either dates on which the bill of entry was presented or the goods are actually removed from the warehouse. It would be easy for an importer to have the goods imported, get an order from the court to keep them in private warehousing till either the rate of tariff is reduced or the price of the goods are substantially increased by creating artificial scarcity in the market which would jeopardise the economy of the country. Accordingly we are of the considered opinion that the importer cannot be permitted to circumvent the law through judicial process which is otherwise impermissible under the Act. The contention of the petitioner that Section 15(1) of the Act is ultra vires of the provisions of the Constitution is no longer res integra as per decision in M. Jhangir Bhatusha etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc. [1989 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]. Appeal dismissed.
-
1992 (12) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Appeal lies to Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... o suffers from the violation of principles of natural justice, in the sense that it was passed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing, there is no difficulty in setting aside the impugned Order. Accordingly, the order passed by the first respondent is quashed. The writ petition is allowed, and the matter is remanded to the concerned Appellate Tribunal for further hearing. The concerned Appellate Tribunal will take on its file, the file relating to Order No. 29-A/85 and dispose of the same in accordance with law, after giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, within four months from this date. No costs. Writ Petition No. 1398 of 1986 Venkataswami, J. - This matter is posted for being spoken to at the instance of the Court. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, it is felt that no further orders are necessary in this matter. The Order already passed will stand except to the fact that the time limit of four months will commence from today.
............
|
