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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 2888 Records
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1992 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Confiscation (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... ssel was not diminished. In our view, the suit as against the Customs authorities ought not have been dismissed on the oral application of the plaintiffs and without due consideration of the objections of the Customs authorities, particularly since the suit was otherwise undefended. 6. Accordingly, we are of the view that the impugned order of the Division Bench and of the learned single Judge deleting the Customs authorities (the 4th defendant) from the suit and passing an ex parte decree in favour of the plaintiffs and against the first and the second defendants should be set aside. The plaintiffs shall be at liberty to make an application in writing for the deletion of the Customs authorities (the 4th defendant) from the suit. The Customs authorities shall be entitled to object thereto by affidavit and oral submissions. The learned Single Judge hearing the application shall then pass an order considering the contentions of either side. 7. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
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1992 (12) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Seizure - Show Cause Notice ... ... ... ... ..... erent under Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act. Under the said enactment after the initial notice of six months, one more notice could be issued as enjoined by the second proviso to the Section made clear by the explanation appended thereto. Therefore the provision under the Gold Control Act being similar to the provision under the Customs Act, non-issuance of notice would only result in the returning of the seized gold to the person concerned and would not operate to stop further proceedings. This being the view we take on the questions referred to for our consideration, following will be our answer to the questions raised for our consideration (i) Both under the Customs Act and the Gold Control Act failure to issue notice within the time enjoined by law would only create an obligation on the part of the authority concerned to return the seized goods but would not hamper or preclude the continuance of the adjudication proceedings for confiscation or for levying of penalty etc.
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1992 (12) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
Levy of duty with retrospective effect on captive consumption - Writ jurisdiction - Molasses ... ... ... ... ..... he company from outside. Under the circumstances, it cannot be presumed that molasses is not saleable, so it is a question of fact as to whether molasses is saleable or not. Therefore, as stated above in the absence of any plea having been raised by the petitioner and keeping in view that it is a question of fact, the contention raised by the petitioner cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction and the case law cited by the counsel for the petitioner is not helpful and even if it is assumed to be a waste as argued by the counsel for the petitioner still it is excisable in view of the decision of Supreme Court in Khandelwal Metal s case (supra). In this view of the matter when the case is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court, we are not inclined to interfere in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. Accordingly, this writ petition has no force, so it is hereby dismissed. The stay order also stands vacated.
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1992 (12) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... od prima facie case in favour of the petitioner, on the other hand there is nothing to show that he should be asked to deposit Rupees Four Lakhs. In other words, the Tribunal has said nothing about the undue hardship or the interests of revenue. The orders, in my opinion, require interference for the limited purpose that the matter is remitted to the Appellate Tribunal for affording opportunity to the petitioner to show to the Tribunal how it shall suffer undue hardship if the duty demanded or part thereof is asked to be deposited as a pre-condition of the Petition is allowed the case is remitted to the Tribunal for a re-hearing and disposal of the question whether there should be any order dispensing with the condition of pre-deposit of the duty demanded. The petitioner accordingly is directed to appear before the Tribunal within ten days from today, on which date the Tribunal shall either fix a date of hearing or make suitable orders after hearing the petitioner. No costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that there was a mistake apparent from the record in its order dated July 1, 1971, and in passing its miscellaneous order dated February 15, 1972 ?
Whether the Tribunal was justified in directing that the following amounts should be excluded in computing the capital of the company under the provisions of rule 1 of the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, i.e. Amount set apart for contingent liabilities, Amount set apart for proposed dividend, Provision for profit sharing bonus and Provision for pension scheme?
Whether the amount of ₹ 9,97,410 being credited to the depreciation fund in excess of the amount actually allowed in the income-tax assessment was a reserve in depreciation which should be included in the computation of the assessee's capital for the purposes of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 ?
Held that:- The Tribunal rendered its decision without taking note of the Explanation to rule 1 in Schedule II was undoubtedly a ground for rectification. The Tribunal's power to rectify its orders under the Act flows from section 1 of the Act. A mistake apparent from the record is made a ground for rectifying the order. The first question was, thus, rightly answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
It is clear that the amount of ₹ 4,50,000 was a provision made to meet a tax liability existing on the relevant date by no stretch of imagination can it be treated as a reserve. Similarly, the second item, an amount of ₹ 15,82,000 set apart for proposed dividend cannot also be treated as a reserve but as a provision for meeting a current liability. The same must be said about the third item of ₹ 6,99,913, the amount set apart for profit-sharing bonus. With respect to the last item of ₹ 50,000 which was a provision for pension scheme, there can equally be no dispute that it is a provision.
The amount of ₹ 9,97,410 credited to the Depreciation Fund was the excess amount over the amount actually allowed as depreciation in the assessments made under the Income-tax Act. It thus clearly constitutes reserves as per the decision in Vazir Sultan [1981 (9) TMI 105 - SUPREME Court]. The High Court was right in answering the same in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1992 (12) TMI 41 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thod of accounting and the taxing authority can object only if it is of the opinion that the method employed is such that the income cannot be properly deduced therefrom. The Tribunal has taken the view that the assessee adopted the same system of accounting for valuing the opening stock and closing stock and that there is no basis for taking the view that the income cannot be properly deduced from the method employed by the assessee. This view is consistent with law. For the aforesaid reasons, we uphold the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal that the assessee had properly opted to value the closing stock at cost price in the first year of its business. The question referred is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court will be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. N. G. DAs J. -I agree.
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1992 (12) TMI 40 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... sub-clauses is a fact recognised even by the Board. Mr. Raghavendra Rao tried to justify the Revenue s stand by referring to the amended Explanation 2 to section 35B. It reads For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in clause (b) shall be construed to include any expenditure which is in the nature of purchasing and manufacturing expenses ordinarily debitable to the trading or manufacturing account and not to the profit and loss account. It was contended that the expenditure incurred in connection with the samples would be covered by this Explanation. It is not possible for us to agree with this contention because the expenditure incurred in connection with the samples sent for advertisement, cannot be considered to be in the nature of purchasing and manufacturing expenses. In these circumstances, we disagree with the view expressed by the Appellate Tribunal. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and against the Revenue.
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1992 (12) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... tatement of, the case from the Tribunal. We do not find any force in this submission. The controversy in this case is regarding interpretation of an item of day-to-day use which is a pure question of law. No further facts are needed in this case to apply the test laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Mir Mohammad Ali 1964 53 ITR 165 and to decide whether the article miner s safety cap lamps can be termed as machinery or not. In view of the foregoing discussions, we hold that the Tribunal was not correct in law in holding that mining safety lamps were mining machinery within the meaning of item No. (4) of the Sixth Schedule to the Income-tax Act and allowing the assessee-company relief under section 80-I of the Act in respect of its income arising from the manufacture of such lamps. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us by the Tribunal in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... 248 appears to be more apposite. In this case, following the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Indira Balkrishna 1960 39 ITR 546, it was held that in order to acquire the status of an association of persons, the persons must join in a common purpose or action and the object of the association must be to produce income. It is not enough that the persons receive the income jointly. In view of the foregoing discussion and applying the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the various High Courts to the facts of the present case as set out above, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the lease rent from the property Shiv Sagar Estates accrued to, the individual co-owners and not to any association of persons. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 37 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Dependent, Exemptions, Gift Tax, Relative ... ... ... ... ..... and get an unmarried daughter married. That right of the unmarried daughter to be maintained and to get married and the obligation of the family to do so may be inchoate. These rights and obligations do not attach to any specific property. There is an undoubted right under the Hindu law of an unmarried daughter to be maintained and to get married and the corresponding obligation of the Hindu family to discharge these obligations cannot, therefore, be under any doubt. The provision made for the unmarried daughters towards their maintenance and marriage is not a gift within the meaning of section 2(xii) of the Act. A view similar to ours has been taken in CGT v. Budur Thippaiah 1976 103 ITR 189 (AP). In view of the analysis made, the conclusions of the first appellate authority and the Tribunal do not appear to be correct. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J. - I agree.
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1992 (12) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... ssee-company had obtained in terms of Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the computation of its total income? Learned counsel for the Revenue fairly submitted that the issue involved in the aforesaid question is covered in favour the assessee by the decision of the Supreme Court in Second ITO v. Stumpp Schuele and Somappa P. Ltd. 1991 187 ITR 108. In this view of the matter, he further submitted that the preparation of the paperbook may be dispensed with and reference may be disposed of accordingly. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... he ceiling of Rs. 72,000 contained in the proviso to section 40A(s)(a) read with section 40(c) would be applicable and consequently in vacating the Commissioner s order under section 263 ? It is stated at the Bar that a similar question has already been decided in favour of the assessee in the assessee s own case in I.T.R. No. 20 of 1978(CIT v. Hico Products Pvt. Ltd. (No.1) 1993 201 ITR 567 (Bom)) by the judgment dated November 17, 1992. Following the same, the question is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 34 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as acted in conscious disregard of its obligation, penalty could be levied. The assessee has not only failed to submit the return in accordance with the provisions of section 139(1) but even after a notice was issued under section 139(2) the return was not submitted within 30 days from the date of service of the notice and, therefore, it was for the assessee to prove that he had any bona fide belief which has not been brought on record and, therefore, we are of the view that there was no necessity for the assessing authority to establish mens rea on the part of the assessee when no explanation or any evidence in support thereof was given. Section 271(1)(a) does not require mens rea to be established by the Department and the assessee has to adduce evidence with regard to the reasonable cause and if he fails to do so, penalty provisions would be attracted. In these circumstances, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 33 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... that land is a capital asset and only then (sic) it is liable to tax. If the price of two capital assets has been charged at one consolidated price, then the assessee is entitled to bifurcate the same. A situation may arise where gain from one of the capital assets is a short-term capital gain while from the other it is a long-term capital gain as in the present case and, in such a situation, the benefit to the assessee cannot be denied in respect of the gain arising from the sale of an asset which could be considered as a long term capital gain. Even for the purpose of value, the valuer and the Department have taken the value of the land and superstructure thereon separately therefore, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the capital gains arising from the sale of land has to be treated as long-term capital gains. The reference is, accordingly, answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Prizes On Unsold Lottery Tickets, Winnings From Lottery ... ... ... ... ..... into the pocket. We need not go into the question at all. As mentioned earlier, the matter is left at large for the petitioner s assessing authority under the Act. The petition succeeds. Accordingly, a declaration is made under article 226 of the Constitution of India that monies credited to the petitioner-company by the Government of Goa under clause 15 of the agreement dated December 21, 1989, are not income by way of winnings from lottery. Further, a writ of mandamus directing respondent No. 1, the Income-tax Officer, Ward No. II, Panaji, to withdraw the demand for income-tax and surcharge made by him on the ex-officio Director of Lotteries, Government of Goa, in respect of monies credited to the petitioner under clause 15 of the agreement and accordingly the letter dated February 25, 1992, of the ex-officio Director of Lotteries, respondent No. 2 is quashed. Rule accordingly made absolute to the extent as indicated. Parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ax determined on the basis of the regular assessment . Therefore, it is clear that the penalty under section 273(b) of the Act is dependent on the quantum of tax assessed against the assessee. Since in the present case the very order of assessment has been set aside as barred by limitation, no tax liability remains against the assessee. As such, the penalty is also not calculable. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal has rightly set aside the order of penalty. The same view has been taken by this court in the case of this assessee for this very assessment year in relation to imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Act, which is reported in CIT v. S. P. Viz Construction Co. (No. 3) 1989 176 ITR 47 (Patna). For the reasons aforesaid, the question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench. AFTAB ALAM J. - I agree.
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1992 (12) TMI 30 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Income, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... the expression before 30th day of October, 1987 , is interpreted as meaning before the end of that day. Hence, I hold that it is open to the Department to act upon statement in Form No. 37-1 filed by the petitioner and respondent No. 4 on October 30, 1987. It is contended that, before making the order under section 269UD neither the petitioner nor respondent No. 4 had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order being made by the appropriate authority. This contention is not contradicted. Hence the order under section 269UD impugned herein shall stand quashed. The statement in Form No. 37-1 filed by the petitioner and respondent No. 4 on October 30, 1987, shall be treated as if it were filed today and the appropriate authority shall proceed to consider the same in the light of the order made in Transferred Case No. 26 of 1987 (see 1993 199 ITR 530 ) by the Supreme Court referred to earlier and in accordance with law. Rule made absolute accordingly.
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1992 (12) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... r different sections of the Act, separate appeals have to be preferred with reference to the sections under which the Income-tax Officer has sought to exercise his jurisdiction. Therefore, in my view the appeal as filed against the common order passed by the Income-tax Officer was quite maintainable. The above view of mine is in parity with the view taken by the other High Courts as well. I may refer to some of the decisions in this regard, namely, CIT v. Hansa Agencies 1980 121 ITR 147 (Bom), CIT v. Rupa Traders 1979 118 ITR 412 (Cal), Ansari Jewellers v. CIT 1987 167 ITR 380 (Raj), Bishambar Dayal Srinivas v. CIT 1986 162 ITR 5 (Raj) and Patel and Co. v. CIT 1986 161 ITR 568 (Guj). For the reasons aforesaid both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, as required under section 260 of the Act. AFTAB ALAM J. -I agree.
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1992 (12) TMI 28 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Company, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... ous exercise of power in overseeing or superintending the work to be done. The nature of the superintendence and control may vary depending upon the nature of the work to be performed. In the instant case, it is also clear that a minimum sum of Rs. 2,500 per month is guaranteed to each of them irrespective of the result, which is an indication that these joint managing directors are being paid remuneration treating it as salary. In view of the above, we are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal has not taken a correct view and the answer to the first question has to be in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The answer to the second question necessarily will have to be consequential to the answer given to the first question because the remuneration received by the joint managing directors will have to be considered as salary and permitted deductions only could be deducted. Accordingly, the second question also is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.
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1992 (12) TMI 27 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs of the firm are served with notices. But the printing charges have not been remitted for printing the papers. Notice sent to the partner was not claimed. It has been returned. The matter was posted for orders. This Bench posted the matter for disposal on December 3, 1992. That is why it has come up for disposal today. This is a case where the reference is made by the Appellate Tribunal, at the instance of the assessee. The assessee has not taken steps to enable this court to render its opinion as required by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In so far as no steps have been taken by the applicant-assessee, which will enable this court to give its opinion as sought by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal we are not in a position to answer the reference. We, therefore, decline to answer the question referred to this court. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be given to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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