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Showing 441 to 460 of 5208 Records
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1997 (12) TMI 117
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the leviability of excise duty on a television set with a timer. The Tribunal's finding that a timer is not the same as a clock was upheld. The appeal was dismissed with no costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 116
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of a product known as 'New Sapan Dairy Special'.
2. Classification of 'partially skimmed milk powder' under Heading 0401.13 or 0401.19.
Classification of 'New Sapan Dairy Special':
The appeal arose from a consequential order following a decision on classification in favor of the assessee by the Tribunal. The respondent's Counsel argued that as the Tribunal's decision on classification had become final and no appeal was filed by the Department, the Department cannot challenge the consequential order on quantum alone. The Court noted that since the Department did not challenge the Tribunal's decision on classification, the appeal must fail solely on this ground. The appeal was dismissed based on this reasoning.
Classification of 'partially skimmed milk powder':
The Additional Solicitor General contended that 'skimmed milk' includes 'partially skimmed milk' and should be classified under Heading 0401.13. However, the Court upheld the view that 'partially skimmed milk powder' is a distinct commodity from 'skimmed milk powder' and should be classified under Heading 0401.19. The judgment provided detailed reasons for this decision, citing separate mentions in headings, ISI specifications, Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, and International Standards. The Court found no grounds to interfere in the appeals and accordingly dismissed them.
Separate Judgment:
No separate judgment was delivered by the Judges in this case.
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1997 (12) TMI 115
The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision that disputed articles used for packaging cigarettes should be classified under Chapter 48 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1985, not under sub-heading 4901.90. The appeal by the appellant-assessee was allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 114
Whether in view of the Industrial Policy Resolution (I.P.R.) dated 18-7-1979 issued by the Industries Department of the Government of Orissa, sales tax was not payable by a new industry on the purchase of raw material for the period prescribed in the I.P.R.?
Held that:- In the instant case, it has been stated on behalf of the State that various notifications granting sales tax exemptions to the dealers resulted in severe resource crunch. On reconsideration of the financial position, it was decided to limit the scope of the earlier exemption notifications issued under Section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. Because of this new perception of the economic scenario of the State, the scope of the earlier notifications had to be restricted. They were first abrogated altogether on 20-5-1977. Thereafter, it was decided to grant exemption at a limited scale.
Thus the plea of change of policy trade on the basis of resource crunch should have been sufficient for dismissing the respondent's case based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Public interest demanded modification of the earlier I.P.R. Appeal allowed
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1997 (12) TMI 113
Whether the goods had been imported for the purpose of recycling in the manufacture of mono-filament yarn and the respondent was not interested in using the goods for any purpose other than as scrap?
Held that:- The order of the Tribunal does not discuss the merits of the case. It does not hold as a fact that the goods were scrap or that the respondent had not sought to clear as scrap what was really serviceable material or that the confiscation, redemption fine and penalty were uncalled for. Without so finding, the Tribunal could not have set aside the Collector's order and directed merely the mutilation of the goods.
Appeal allowed and matter remanded to the Tribunal for being heard and disposed of on merits, uninfluenced by the judgment and order that we have set aside.
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1997 (12) TMI 112
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal as time-barred because the certified copy of the order was obtained after the appeal was filed, and the appellants cannot claim exclusion of time for obtaining the copy. The appeal was filed to the Collector and dismissed on 19-10-1995.
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1997 (12) TMI 111
Issues:
1. Inclusion of the value of packing materials for levying duty under the provisions of the Act.
2. Method of arriving at the value of chewing tobacco per kilogram under specific Notifications.
Analysis:
1. The first issue pertains to the inclusion of the value of packing materials for levying duty under the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court referred to a previous judgment where it was held that the value of packing materials should be included to arrive at the assessable value of excisable goods. The Tribunal had directed the exclusion of the value of packing materials, which led to the Revenue's grievance. Relying on the previous judgment, the Court allowed the Revenue's appeals to that extent.
2. The second issue concerns the method of arriving at the value of chewing tobacco per kilogram under specific Notifications. The dispute was whether the value per kilogram of chewing tobacco should be calculated by dividing the total value of the entire package by the total weight of the package, as contended by the assessee, or by dividing the value of the total package by the net weight of the tobacco after excluding the weight of the packing materials, as argued by the Revenue. The Court held that the same method used for assessing the value of goods for levying duty should be applied for the purpose of exemption as well. Therefore, it was decided that the value of chewing tobacco per kilogram should be determined by dividing the total value of the package by the total weight of the package. The Tribunal's contrary view was deemed erroneous, and the order was set aside accordingly. The appeals were disposed of, directing the Assistant Collector to pass appropriate orders in line with the Court's decision.
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1997 (12) TMI 110
Whether printing on glass bottles amounts to manufacture within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944?
Held that:- It is useful to refer to the tariff description in Item No. 23A of the Central Excise Tariff. The general description of the item is `glass' and `glassware'. There are four categories namely, (1) flat-glass (2) laboratory glassware (3) glass shells, glass globes and chimneys for lamps and lanterns and (4) other glass and glasswares including tableware. Admittedly, the bottles whether printed or not fall under category (4) mentioned above. If the contention of the Revenue is accepted it would lead to double taxation under the same tariff item. While at the gate of the main factory duty is leviable on the plain bottles under 23A(4), once again duty will be leviable on the printed bottles after the process of printing is over in the premises where such printing is carried out. Such duty will undoubtedly be on the value of the printed bottles which will include not only the cost of manufacture of the bottles but also the cost of printing charges. The Revenue cannot be permitted to levy duty twice on the same item when there is no warrant therefor in the relevant provisions of the Act.
Appeal allowed of assesse. No difficulty in holding that the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal is erroneous inasmuch as the process of printing is being carried out in a separate premises as found by the Tribunal and such process is not `manufacture' within the meaning of the Act.
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1997 (12) TMI 109
Leviability of excise duty on paper making machine which was erected by the appellant-company by using duty paid components purchased from the market and also by fabricating certain parts of the machinery in their factory
Held that:- In view of the finding of fact, it is not possible to hold that the machinery assembled and erected by the appellant at its factory site was immovable property as something attached to earth like a building or a tree. The Tribunal has pointed out that it was for the operational efficiency of the machine that it was attached to earth. If the appellant wanted to sell the paper making machine it could always remove it from its base and sell it. Thus unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that the machine must be treated as a part of the immovable property of the company. Just because a plant and machinery are fixed in the earth for better functioning, it does not automatically become an immovable property.
What the appellant has erected in its factory is a paper making machine. It may have purchased various components to make the machine but nonetheless what has been produced is something quite different from the components that had been purchased. A new marketable commodity has emerged as a result of the manufacturing activity of the appellant. Against assessee.
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1997 (12) TMI 108
Previous Year, Income From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... es) For the Respondent Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Advocate ORDER The civil appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 107
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal as the point in dispute had been settled in a previous case. The judgment under appeal was set aside with no order as to costs. (1997 (12) TMI 107 - SC)
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1997 (12) TMI 106
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision based on the agreement and dismissed the appeals without costs. (Case Citation: 1997 (12) TMI 106 - SC)
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1997 (12) TMI 105
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals after reviewing the High Court's order and the agreement, finding no error in the High Court's decision. No costs were awarded. (Case Citation: 1997 (12) TMI 105 - SC)
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1997 (12) TMI 104
Whether the balance-sheet figures as on March 31, 1972, should be taken for ascertaining the break-up value of the shares gifted and not the balance-sheet figures as on March 31, 1973 ?
Held that:- Having regard to the fact that the gift was made on the verge of the close of the accounting year ending on March 31, 1973, the balance-sheet as on March 31, 1973, should be taken as the basis for ascertaining the break-up value of the shares as on March 28, 1973. However, suitable adjustments will have to be made if there has been any variation in the value of the assets of the company between March 28, 1973, and March 31, 1973. That, however, is not the case of the assessee. Under these circumstances, the judgment under appeal is upheld. The appeal is dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 103
Issues:
1. Interpretation of section 5(1)(xii) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958 regarding exemption for gifts made for education purposes by a Hindu undivided family.
2. Whether gifts made by a Hindu undivided family to the daughters of the karta qualify for exemption under section 5(1)(xii) of the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
The case involved a Hindu undivided family (HUF) that made gifts to the minor daughters of the karta, claiming exemption under section 5(1)(xii) of the Gift-tax Act for educational purposes. The Gift-tax Officer denied the exemption, stating that the gifts were excessive, made by the HUF and not the karta individually, and therefore, not eligible for exemption. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal upheld this decision, reasoning that an HUF cannot have children, and thus, the exemption did not apply.
The court analyzed the provisions of the Act, emphasizing that the word "person" in section 5(1) includes an HUF unless contextually restricted. It noted that specific categories for exemption were mentioned in other clauses but not in clause (xii). The court addressed the contention that only living persons could qualify for the exemption under "his children" in section 5(1)(xii). It interpreted "his children" in the context of an HUF to mean the children of the family members, including wives and unmarried daughters, as an HUF comprises all descendants from a common ancestor. The court held that gifts by an HUF to its children should be eligible for exemption under section 5(1)(xii) similar to gifts by living persons to their children.
The court distinguished previous cases cited by the Revenue, stating they were not directly relevant to section 5(1)(xii). It specifically addressed the decision regarding gifts to a spouse, which was not applicable in this case. The court concluded that in the context of an HUF, children referred to the family members who are children, making gifts by an HUF to its children exempt under section 5(1)(xii).
Ultimately, the court held that the Tribunal erred in denying the HUF's entitlement to exemption under section 5(1)(xii) for gifts made to the daughters of the karta for education purposes. The judgment favored the assessee, ruling in favor of the HUF and against the Revenue. The reference was answered negatively in favor of the assessee, disposing of the matter with no costs awarded.
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1997 (12) TMI 102
Issues involved:
The judgment involves the question of whether the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in deleting the addition of Rs. 7,57,076 made by the Assessing Officer on account of transfer of shares at rates lower than the quoted market rates.
Summary:
Issue 1: Transfer of Shares and Income Assessment
The assessment involved a resident individual for the year 1984-85 who transferred shares to another company at a value lower than the market rate. The Assessing Officer added the difference as income, but the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) reversed this decision, stating no grounds for changing the disclosed value. The Tribunal also upheld this decision, emphasizing the genuine nature of the transaction and the absence of evidence of fraudulent intent.
Key Details:
- The assessee transferred shares to a company at a lower book value than the market rate.
- The Assessing Officer added the price difference as income.
- The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) reversed this decision, finding no reason to alter the disclosed value.
- The Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner's decision, highlighting the genuine nature of the transaction and lack of fraudulent intent.
- Citing previous judgments, including one by the Supreme Court, the court affirmed that selling shares below market value does not automatically imply concealment or fraud.
- The court ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that no income was derived from the share transfer due to the lower selling price compared to market value.
This judgment emphasizes the importance of assessing transactions based on evidence of fraudulent intent rather than solely on differences in transaction values.
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1997 (12) TMI 101
Issues Involved:
1. Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme (VDIS) and its applicability.
2. Discrimination in the classification of tax evaders.
3. Validity of search operations during the VDIS period.
4. Interpretation of Section 64 of the Finance Act, 1997.
Summary:
1. Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme (VDIS) and its applicability:
The petitioner, an income-tax assessee, argued that the search conducted on his premises during the VDIS period (July 1, 1997, to December 31, 1997) arbitrarily deprived him of the right to make a voluntary disclosure. The petitioner claimed that the classification of those who have been searched as ineligible for the scheme was discriminatory.
2. Discrimination in the classification of tax evaders:
The petitioner contended that there was no distinction made between cases where nothing was discovered during the search and cases where something was seized, amounting to discrimination. The petitioner referenced circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) which allowed disclosures for earlier years in cases of survey, arguing that a similar benefit should not be denied to those subject to search.
3. Validity of search operations during the VDIS period:
The Revenue argued that the search was valid as the provisions of the Finance Act relating to searches and seizures were not kept in abeyance. The Revenue maintained that the intention of the scheme was to benefit only those who come forward voluntarily and with clean hands, and thus, excluding search cases was justified.
4. Interpretation of Section 64 of the Finance Act, 1997:
The court examined the provisions of Section 64, which grants tax concessions and immunity to undisclosed income declared during the scheme period. It was clarified that:
- Sub-section (2)(i) disallows the benefit for income assessable for any assessment year for which a notice u/s 142 or 148 has been served and the return was not filed before the commencement of the scheme.
- Sub-section (2)(ii) disallows the benefit for income in respect of the previous year in which a search u/s 132, a requisition u/s 132A, or a survey u/s 133A was conducted, or in respect of any earlier previous year.
The court concluded that the prohibition in sub-section (2)(ii) applies only to the income detected during such operations, not to the entire income of the previous year. Therefore, undisclosed income not detected in a search can still be declared under the VDIS.
Conclusion:
The court held that:
- Section 64 of the Finance Act, 1997, is constitutionally valid and grants concessions to undisclosed income declared during the scheme period.
- Income not returned within the time prescribed in notices u/s 142 or 148, which expired before the scheme's commencement, is ineligible for the scheme's benefits.
- The benefit is denied to income detected in a search, requisition, or survey, regardless of the previous year to which it relates.
- Undisclosed income other than detected income can still be declared and will be eligible for the scheme's benefits.
- If subsequently assessed as part of the total income, the tax paid under the scheme shall be adjusted against the assessed tax.
The court directed the respondents to entertain voluntary disclosures falling within these parameters and dismissed the writ petition accordingly. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected.
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1997 (12) TMI 100
Issues:
Challenge to communication regarding VDIS scheme and certificate issuance under Finance Act, 1997; Jurisdictional competence of Delhi High Court to entertain the petition; Binding effect of CBDT communication on subordinate authorities.
Analysis:
The petitioners, assessable under the Income-tax Act, challenged a communication related to the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, seeking a mandamus for certificate issuance under the Finance Act, 1997. The bank sought extension of prohibitory orders on deposits until December 31, 1997, aligning with the VDIS scheme. The VDIS, enacted by the Finance Act, 1997, allows tax evaders to disclose income, pay tax at 30%, and gain immunity from further investigation. The petitioners, yet to declare or pay tax, feared denial of VDIS benefits due to a CBDT communication. The High Court dismissed the petition, noting the petitioners' Mumbai assessment jurisdiction and premature invocation of Delhi High Court's writ jurisdiction.
The Court emphasized that the petitioners' VDIS declaration would occur in Mumbai before the Commissioner of Income-tax, who would issue the certificate. The Court rejected premature adjudication, stating the petitioners decide to declare under VDIS voluntarily. The CBDT communication did not bind income-tax authorities or the petitioners regarding VDIS benefits. The communication lacked the character of an order under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, allowing petitioners to seek relief from the appropriate forum if the certificate is unreasonably withheld by the Mumbai authority.
The Court held the petition premature and beyond Delhi High Court's territorial jurisdiction. It advised the petitioners to proceed with VDIS declaration in Mumbai and seek redressal locally if needed. The dismissal of the petition was based on the lack of cause of action within Delhi's jurisdiction and the premature nature of the petition.
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1997 (12) TMI 99
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to separate exemption for passage money under section 10(6)(i)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Applicability of the ceiling fixed by section 10(6)(viia)(A) on the exemption for passage money.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to Separate Exemption for Passage Money under Section 10(6)(i)(a):
The primary issue is whether the assessee, a foreign technician employed in India, is entitled to a separate exemption for passage money under section 10(6)(i)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee claimed an exemption of Rs. 28,030 under this provision for passage money paid by his employer for home leave out of India. The Income-tax Officer initially granted this exemption, treating it as separate from the exemption under section 10(6)(viia)(A).
2. Applicability of the Ceiling Fixed by Section 10(6)(viia)(A):
The second issue revolves around whether the exemption for passage money under section 10(6)(i)(a) is subject to the ceiling limit specified in section 10(6)(viia)(A). The Commissioner of Income-tax contended that the assessee was not entitled to the exemption for passage money in addition to the exemption under section 10(6)(viia)(A), which has an upper limit of Rs. 4,000 per month. The Commissioner argued that these provisions were not mutually exclusive and should be considered together.
Court's Analysis and Judgment:
The court examined the provisions of section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which outlines various exemptions. Section 10(6) provides exemptions for individuals who are not citizens of India. Specifically, sub-clause (i) of clause (6) exempts passage money received by the assessee from his employer for home leave out of India. Sub-clause (viia) of clause (6) provides an exemption for remuneration received by a technician, subject to a ceiling limit of Rs. 4,000 per month.
The court emphasized that each exemption under section 10(6) is independent and separate. The exemptions for passage money under sub-clause (i) and for remuneration under sub-clause (viia) cannot be clubbed together. The court noted that the language of the statute clearly indicates that these exemptions are distinct and should be treated as such.
The court concluded that the exemption for passage money under section 10(6)(i)(a) is an independent exemption and is not subject to the ceiling limit specified in section 10(6)(viia)(A). Therefore, the assessee is entitled to claim both exemptions separately.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the court held that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in its decision that the exemption for passage money under section 10(6)(i)(a) is an independent exemption and cannot be clubbed with the exemption under section 10(6)(viia)(A). The question referred to the court was answered in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee. The reference was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 98
Issues involved: Validity of notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1988-89.
Summary:
The petitioners, who were partners of a firm, challenged the notices issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1988-89, claiming that income had "escaped assessment." The petitioners received amounts from the Daman Ganga Dam arbitration, which they considered as capital receipts not liable to tax. The Assessing Officer, however, assessed the entire amount received on account of the Daman Ganga Dam Construction in the firm's name. The petitioners contended that the reasons for issuing the notices were based on a change of opinion and lacked objective satisfaction. The Income-tax Officer's belief that income had escaped assessment did not mention a relevant judicial decision. The court held that the notices were unsustainable as the assessing authority was aware of all facts, and no valid reason was provided for issuing the notices. The court quashed the notices, ruling in favor of the petitioners.
The court noted that the assessing authority should have a valid reason to believe before issuing notices under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, emphasizing that reason to believe cannot be a result of a mere change of opinion. The court highlighted the importance of objective satisfaction by the officer before taking any action. Since the reasons provided did not establish an objective basis for issuing the notices and all relevant facts were disclosed to the assessing authority, the court found the notices to be unjustifiable and quashed them. The court emphasized the need for a valid and objective reason to support the issuance of such notices to prevent unnecessary harassment and prolonged legal proceedings.
In conclusion, the court allowed the petitions and quashed the notices dated March 13, 1997, issued to the applicants, without imposing any costs. The court's decision was based on the lack of a valid reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, as required under the Income-tax Act, leading to the notices being deemed unsustainable and subsequently annulled.
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9911796707
