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Showing 21 to 40 of 5386 Records
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1998 (12) TMI 622 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... nstalled in the factory for the purpose of business of manufacture or production qualifies for deduction for investment allowance. 19. The decision of the CIT(A) is in conformity with the decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to above. We respectfully following the said decision of the Calcutta High Court, dismiss this ground of appeal raised by the revenue. 20. The last ground of appeal raised by the revenue is as to whether in the case of the employee directors the disallowance is to be worked out in accordance with section 40(c) and not as per the provisions of section 40A(5). 21. This issue is covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Continental Construction Ltd. (1998) 230 ITR 485. We respectfully following the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, dismiss this ground of appeal raised by the revenue. 22. In the result, whereas the appeal of the assessee is allowed, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 621 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... taxable wealth has taken place on the last date before the expiry of the period of limitation. If tax computation has taken place after March 31, 1979, obviously assessments in relation to the assessment year ending before April 1, 1975, shall be barred by limitation. Neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor the Tribunal has enquired whether computation of tax has taken place on March 31, 1979, or thereafter. It is a question of fact when computation of tax payable has actually taken place. In the absence of necessary finding to that effect, it is not possible for us to answer the question whether the assessments in question were completed prior to March 31, 1979, or were barred by limitation. It will therefore be for the Tribunal, when it is required to pass a fresh order in the light of decision of this court on the questions of law referred to it to examine this question and reach its conclusion. The reference accordingly stands disposed of. No order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 620 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed conduct; d) The involvement of the element of the public interest; e) The effect on parties who may be affected. 21. Therefore, I am of the view that logically lifting corporate veil or principles analogous thereto cannot be ruled out from using as a tool of juduciary in the dispute in between two parties. "Lifting of Corporate Veil" or principle analogous thereto cannot be monopoly of any statute but can be priority of any statute. Therefore, that does not necessarily mean such tool of judiciary either expressly or impliedly cannot be used by the court to prevent the abuse of process of Court of Law which has been caused herein as observed by this Court. 22. Therefore this application is dismissed. Interim order or orders, if any, passed is vacated. However, no order is passed as to costs. Prayer for stay is made, considered and refused. Joint Receivers and all parties are to act on a signed copy minute of the Operative Part of the Order upon usual undertaking.
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1998 (12) TMI 619 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ies where two views were possible and unless those findings were found to be patently bad and suffering from clear errors of law. As we have already discussed earlier while considering point nos. 1 and 3, the findings reached by the Labour Court on the relevant terms were patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal position on record. The said patently illegal findings could not have been countenanced under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indian by the High court and the High Court would have failed to exercise its jurisdiction if it had not set aside such patently illegal findings of the Labour Court. Consequently, on this point the appellant has no case. Point No. 4 is, therefore, answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. Point No. 5 In view of our conclusions on the aforesaid points, the inevitable result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 618 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... late court. The High Court erred in setting aside the concurrent findings of both courts. For the aforesaid reasons the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. We accordingly set aside the same and restore the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The learned counsel for the respondent- tenant, however, submitted that some time may be granted to respondent to vacate the premises. We accordingly grant time up to 30th June, 1999 for the respondent to vacate the suit shop subject to the condition that the respondent files an undertaking in this Court within 2 weeks from today. If the said undertaking is not filed within the said period of 2 weeks or in the event the conditions mentioned in the said undertaking are committed breach of, the order granting time up to 30th June, 1999 shall stand recalled and the appellant will be entitled to execute the decree of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.
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1998 (12) TMI 617 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... atements and gave a clear finding of the appellant accepting a bribe and even recommended his termination. All these were done behind the back of the appellant. The Managing Director passed the termination order the very next day. It cannot in the above circumstances be stated, by any stretch of inspection that the report is a preliminary inquiry report. It's findings are definitive. It is not a preliminary report where some facts are gathered and a recommendation is made for a regular departmental inquiry. In view of the principles laid down in the cases referred to above, this case is an obvious case where the report and its findings are the foundation of the termination order and not merely the motive. The Tribunal was right in its conclusion. The High Court was in grave error in treating such a report as a preliminary report. For all the above reasons, we set aside the High Court's Judgment and restore the Tribunal's order. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g in the parent establishment, its Service Rules, including the Standing Orders, and would be in a better position, than an outsider, to assist the delinquent in the domestic proceedings for a fair and early disposal. The basic features of the Model Standing Orders are thus retained and the right of representation in the disciplinary proceedings through another employee is not altered, affected or taken away. The Standing Orders conform to all standards of reasonableness and fairness and, therefore, the Appellate Authority was fully justified in certifying the Draft Standing Orders as submitted by the Appellant. o p /o p The appeals are consequently allowed. The impugned judgment dated 28.6.1996, passed by the Bombay High Court, in so far as it relates to the Clauses in question which is the subject matter of these appeals, is set aside and the order passed by the Appellate Authority certifying the Draft Standing Orders is upheld. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1998 (12) TMI 615 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . A party may not be allowed to by-pass the normal channel of civil and criminal litigation. High Court does not act like a proverbial 'bull in china shop' in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. We, therefore, hold that appellant is an authority controlled by the State Government and the service condition of the employees of the appellant particularly with regard to disciplinary proceedings against them are statutory in nature and thus writ petition was maintainable against the appellant. To this extent, we agree with the High Court. However, disciplinary proceedings were held against the respondents in accordance with law with due observance of the rules of natural justice. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, not correct to that extent. The appeals are, therefore, allowed impugned judgment of the High Court holding that the dismissal of the respondents was not legal is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 614 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... provision if the assessee fails to get his accounts audited under s. 44AB, he is liable to penalty as laid down in this section. The object is to get a clear picture of assessee's accounts whose turn-over exceeds the prescribed limit. The rates envisaged two types of defaults are also different. Therefore without dilating on the issue further we find no difficulty in holding that impugned, second notice dt. 11th Sept., 1989 cannot be ascribed to the direction of AO for initiation of penalty proceedings in his assessment order dt. 30th May, 1986. Since it is not covered by that order, it should be treated initiating penalty proceedings under s. 271B from the date it was issued and this was not barred by time under s. 275(b). This shall not, however, be construed to validate this impugned notice for all purposes, should it be suffering from some other infirmity. But it surely is not barred by time under s. 275(b) of the Act. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 613 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reference to this Court. 5. Shri Dubey argued that Revenue was not given any opportunity against the additional evidence brought on record by the Tribunal viz. letter dt. 2nd Feb., 1992. He relied on a judgment of this Court in Uttam Construction Co. vs. CIT (1986) 50 CTR (MP) 261 in support. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that denial of principles of natural justice in a given case could raise a legal question. But in the present case it was again a question of fact. It is not in dispute that Revenue was represented when documents explaining delay by assessee were considered and that matter was considered and disposed of after hearing both parties. Therefore, the question of Tribunal bringing any additional evidence on record at the back of Revenue does not arise and involves a factual inquiry in the matter. The Tribunal had, therefore, rightly rejected Revenue's application under s. 256(1) and this application also deserves the same fate and is dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 612 - ADVANCE RULING AUTHORITY
Whether in the light of article 26 of the agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital entered into by the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the French Republic, the applicant is chargeable to tax in respect of income earned from business, as computed under article 7 of the treaty from the assessment year 1996-97, at the rate applicable to a domestic company, in so far as is beneficial to the applicant?
Whether the rate of tax payable by a non-domestic company cannot be reduced by relying upon article 26 of the DTAA between India and France?
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1998 (12) TMI 611 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ance where, although the assessee has incurred the liability to pay the discount in the year of issue of debentures, the payment is to secure a benefit over a number of years. There is a continuing benefit to the business of the company over the entire period. The liability should, therefore, be spread over the period of the debentures. The appellant, therefore, had, in its return, correctly claimed a deduction only in respect of the proportionate part of discount of ₹ 12,500/- over the relevant accounting period in question." 7. The ratio fully governs the case at hand. It makes little difference whether the company has undertaken to pay larger sum than borrowed on account of issuing debentures on discount or is made redeemable at premium. As the answer to the question of law is concluded by decision of the Supreme Court, and the decision of the Tribunal is in consonance with it, we decline to grant this application. Application under, Section 256(2) is rejected.
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1998 (12) TMI 610 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... As we have held above, at the instance of the landlord the suit was only maintainable if it was based on the inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent and for that purpose the necessary jurisdictional fact to be found was the date of the construction of the accommodation and if the court wrongly decided that fact and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon itself which it did not possess, it exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the matter fell within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Joy Chandlal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury (1949) L.R- 76 I.A. 131. The High Court had the power to interfere and once it had the power it could determine whether the question of the date of construction was rightly or wrongly decided. The High Court held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the construction was of a date after June 30, 1946, and therefore fell within s. 3-A. In these circumstances the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 609 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
Whether the rationale behind the provisions of section 44BBB would be applicable in the case of the appellant and a sum equal to ten per cent. of the contract amount as and when paid shall be deemed to be the profits and gains chargeable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’?
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1998 (12) TMI 608 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e and the nature of offence allegedly committed by the employee. There being no material before the Review Committee, in as much as there were no adverse remarks in the character roll entries, the integrity was not doubted at any time, the character roll entries subsequent to the respondent’s promotion to the post of Asstt. Food Controller (Class II) were not available, it could not come to the conclusion that the respondent was a man of doubtful integrity nor could have anyone else come to the conclusion that the respondent was a fit person to be retired compulsorily from service. The order, in the circumstances of the case, was punitive having been passed for the collateral purpose of his immediate removal, rather than in public interest. The Division Bench, in our opinion, was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Single Judge and directing reinstatement of the respondent. We find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 607 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly and there was no indifference lethargy or negligence in dealing with the same. The file was not unnecessarily held up at any level but moved from level to level promptly. We are, therefore, satisfied that the explanation tendered by the Deputy Secretary in this behalf is acceptable and does not detray any lack of sense or urgency in dealing with the representation. We, therefore, do not see any merit in the first contention." In the present case, however, there is no explanation forth coming as to why the representation could not be dealt with by the Minister concerned from 9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the delay from 9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998 remains unexplained and such unexplained delay has vitiated further detention of the detenu. The corollary thereof is that further detention must necessarily be disallowed. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. We direct the appellant-detenu to be set at large forthwith.
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1998 (12) TMI 606 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e disability to the extent of 80%. Such District Medical Officer wherein the disabled ordinarily reside will constitute a Board with Specialist in Orthopaedic and one other Specialist whom he thinks suitable for the purpose and examine the person and would grant necessary certificate for that purpose. We are quite conscious of the financial position of the Indian Airlines but yet we are issuing the aforesaid direction keeping in view the broad objectives of the Act, as already narrated, and keeping in view the fact that concession is already being granted by the Airlines to the persons suffering from blindness. With these direction and observations the Writ Petition is disposed of. Before we conclude the matter we cannot but thank the petitioner who appeared in person and brought this matter to the notice of the Court which resulted in acceleration of the implementation of different provisions of the Act not only by the Union Government but also by the State Governments.
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1998 (12) TMI 605 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... United Kingdom on 15 October 1996) is likely in the light of the Advocate General 39 s opinion delivered on 11 June 1998 to be directly relevant to the issues in this case. I do not consider that it is and since it seems to me that the answers to the issues raised in the appeal are clear, I would allow the appeal. LORD NOLAN. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons which he gives I, too, would allow this appeal. LORD CLYDE. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons which he gives I, too, would allow this appeal. LORD HUTTON. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons which he gives I would allow this appeal. Appeal allowed. Solicitors Solicitor for the Customs and Excise Mainprice and Co.
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1998 (12) TMI 604 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... elief asked for by them and therefore the O.Ps. and T.P. are dismissed, but without costs, except modifying the order of the appellate authority in S.P. No. 406 of 1998 in A.P. No. 412 of 1998 dated August 5, 1998 as indicated below (a) The petitioner will pay 25 per cent of the disputed tax, surcharge and additional sales tax on or before December 30, 1998 instead of September 4, 1998 as ordered by the appellate authority. (b) The petitioner will pay a further 25 per cent of disputed tax surcharge and additional sales tax on or before January 30, 1999 and (c) For the balance of taxes and penalty the petitioner will file a personal bond to the satisfaction of the assessing authority on or before December 30, 1998 in lieu of security. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 15th day of December, 1998. Petitions dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 603 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ide purchaser for value without notice. These considerations are irrelevant to decide a dispute between the parties, more so, when a statutory charge is created, the court is not entitled to go into these questions and as there is erroneous application of law. I am of the view that the finding given by the lower appellate court is perverse and as such, it is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, the trial court rightly came to the conclusion that after receiving the final order under exhibit B2, the acknowledgment has been marked as exhibit B3 signed by Malayan Chettiar. When the statutory charge is there, the alienation made by the assessee is not valid under law and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any relief. 19.. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and the suit is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. Since reported in 1999 113 STC 145 (Mad.)
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