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Showing 101 to 120 of 473 Records

• 2000 (1) TMI 930 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Powers of chairman to specify matters which may be dealt with by a Bench

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... order passed in C.A. No. 179 of 1988 in C.P. No. 76 of 1998 is an order on the merits or an ex parte order. It should be pointed out that the order was not passed after hearing of both the parties or in the presence of both the parties. Such order though may have a bearing regarding the facts and merits of the case, yet it has to be construed only as an ex parte order and therefore, the facts of the case. 17. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that as per the provisions of regulation 44 of the Company Law Board Regulations, an appeal would lie only if a question of law arises, but in the instant case, no question of law has arisen. The question of law is whether the Company Law Board has passed an ex parte order or a speaking order and also whether the provision of regulation 26 would apply to the facts of the instant case. I am satisfied that there is a question of law to be decided in the matter. 18. In the result, both the C.M.As are dismissed. No costs.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 929 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
  

  Modvat/Cenvat - Duty paying document

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... not utilized or used in the production of the final product. In this context, reference may be made to Crazy Candies and Sweets (P) Ltd. v. CCE, 1998 (102) E.L.T. 161 (T) wherein the words were ldquo duplicate or carrier copy ldquo instead of words ldquo duplicate for transporter rdquo and tick mark was placed against the relevant words. It was ruled that for want of a departure from the prescribed proforma, Modvat credit could not be denied as placing a tick mark against the relevant words was sufficient to serve the same purpose and there was substantial compliance with the requirement of the Rules. 7. emsp Following the ratio of the law laid down in this case and the facts and circumstances discussed above, in my view the appellants are entitled to claim the Modvat credit of the disputed amount on the basis of the invoices in question. 8. emsp Consequently, the appeal of the appellants is accepted and the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) in appeal is set aside.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 928 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
  

  Rectification of mistake

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... rtant point was neither argued before the adjudicating authority nor before the Tribunal. In such a situation, I am at a loss to comprehend any mistake apparent from record as contemplated by section 35C(2) warranting rectification of mistake. 7. emsp In view of what has been stated above, I agree with the opinion expressed by Learned Member Judicial holding that this application is not coming under Section 35C(2). Scope and meaning of the words ldquo mistake apparent from records rdquo should be glaring mistake of fact or law, which should be apparent from the record. If those mistakes are to be made out by process of argument, such mistakes are outside the purview of Section 35C(2). Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hero Cycles Private Ltd., Ludhiana (1997) 8 SCC 502. 8. emsp Since no mistake apparent from record is discernable from the final order dated 14-5-1999, the petition is only to be dismissed.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 927 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
  

  Modvat/Cenvat - Modvat on capital goods

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... CCE, Coimbatore, 1999 (108) E.L.T. 47 held the view that above two decisions are not laying down the correct proposition of law and that while rendering these two decisions the Tribunal did not take into consideration the Supreme Court decision in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weavmg Mills Co. Ltd., 1997 (91) E.L.T. 34 and Gujarat High Court rsquo s decision relevant to the point in issue. Since the two decisions which are relied on by the Commissioner have been specifically descented to by the Larger Bench of this Tribunal, I feel appellant rsquo s contention is well founded. This means that the claim of Modvat credit on the duty paid on Blower/Electric Fan, LPG Storage Tank and Oven are legally permissible. 3. emsp Therefore, I order absolute stay of impugned order till the final disposal of this appeal. Revenue is directed not to take any coercive action for realising the amounts arising out of the impugned order till final disposal of the appeal. Post the appeal in due course.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 926 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
  

  Appeal - Maintainability

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... cedure. 7. emsp As regards the merits of the Appeal also, I find that the objection raised by Counsel for Respondents is valid. The authorisation given by the Commissioner for filing the appeal was clearly restricted to two items viz., electrical switches and electronic flicker unit. The modvat credit claimed on these two items is Rs. 72/- and Rs. 1,1017/- respectively whereas in the Appeal filed by the Dy. Commissioner availment of modvat credit by the Respondents amounting to Rs. 19,096/-, Rs. 95,829/-, Rs. 58,578/- and Rs. 1,11,900.50 have been mentioned. This shows that the Dy. Commissioner who filed the Appeal has far exceeded the authorisation given to him by the Commissioner in the Order-in-Review dt. 13-7-1999. Non-application of mind at every level is writ large on the face of this Appeal. It reflects poorly on the Department and the officers concerned. 8. emsp For the above reasons, I am of the view that this appeal is not maintainable and is, accordingly, rejected.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 925 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
  

  Modvat/Cenvat - Paper and Paper Board

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... c. Such printed wrapper serves multiple purposes such as protection, advertising and information. It becomes an article of paper by itself. Once the paper suffices the above characteristics and used it ceases to be just paper by itself and is classifiable under 4817.90. So from these things it is clear that as contended by the appellant the input in this case namely the printed soap wrappers come under the category of article of paper and not covered by the notification. The Notification 177/86-C.E. amended by Notification 149/87, dated 20-5-1987 is not attracted. Period involved is November 1989 to June 1991. The restricted Modvat credit therein is not applicable to the instant case on hand. So the demand for differential amount of credit is not sustainable. Under these circumstances the impugned order cannot be maintained. Hence I pass the following order ORDER For the reasons discussed above the appeals are allowed with consequential relief and impugned order is set aside.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 909 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Karnataka High Court quashing a criminal proceeding instituted by the complainant-company alleging that the accused-respondent, a former director of the company committed an offence under section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956

  Held that:- A bare scrutiny of the impugned judgment would indicate that the High Court has thought, as if it is trying the case, and then after weighing the materials it has come to a conclusion one way or the other. This is certainly in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under section 482. In that view of the matter, no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court by the impugned order has exceeded its jurisdiction vested under section 482 in quashing the criminal procee-ding. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct that the complaint proceeding should proceed in accordance with law.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 908 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Winding up - Powers of Court on hearing petition

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... curity should be given to the unsecured creditors on whose behalf these petitions have been filed. I find no justification in the aforesaid stand taken by the ICICI. In fact, the submission made by the learned counsel amounts to seeking an implied permission from this court for selling the assets of the company which are already in the custody of the receiver. The sale of these assets is not likely to reduce the liability of the company towards the petitioners in the present as also the connected petitions. In view of the above, judges rsquo summons made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b ). Injunction to continue till the Liquidator takes possession. Drawn up order is dispensed with. 5. The Official Liquidator to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the company Registrar of this Court. 6. At this stage, Mr. Sen, the learned counsel for the company prays for stay of the operation of this order. I find no justification for the same. Rejected.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 907 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... blishing the amount due and the work executed by it. It is only when such a claim is established in a properly framed suit in a civil court or they can make counter-claim in the suit filed by the respondent-company for damages and for the amounts due to the petitioner for works executed in which both parties will have an opportunity to plead defence in detail, for establishing the amount due or collusion and fraud pleaded about the minutes of meeting dated 18-8-1995, and issuance of cheques etc. If the petitioner obtains a decree in the suit already instituted, then this Court will certainly have no hesitation to pass an order of winding up on a company petition being filed. Until then, it is not a fit case where this Court can proceed further in the matter by admitting the case and advertise the notice in the newspapers. 15. In view of the above conclusion, there are no merits in the company petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 906 - DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
  

  Consumer, Deficiency in service

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... espondents. In our opinion, the above contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is also without substance because when a fixed deposit is given, the opposite party is bound to repay the amount and it cannot absolve itself of the liability on the plea that it does not have sufficient liquidity. Almost a similar view has been taken by the State Commission, Maharashtra in case Family Planning and Medical Aid Trust v. Pune Cooperative Bank Ltd. 1993 (3) CPR 370. No other point was urged or pressed 16. In view of the position explained above, in our opinion, the abovementioned appeals, filed by the appellant are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant is also burdened with costs and it is directed that the appellant shall pay a sum of Rs. 500 in each case to the respondents by way of litigation expenses. The appeals mentioned above stand disposed of in above terms. Appeals dismissed.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 905 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Winding up - Suits stayed on winding up order

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... ompany under liquidation, it cannot be said that the company under liquidation is in possession or was in possession at the time when the winding up order was passed. Such being the position, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravindra Ishwardas Sethna (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant in Company Application No. 280 of 1999 would be wholly inapplicable. It is not the case of the Official Liquidator that the premises are required for carrying on business for the benefit of the winding up. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in Company Application No. 280 of 1999. The same is hereby dismissed. Company Application No. 543 of 1999 is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). 4. The Official Liquidator to take charge of any assets which may be found in the premises which are sealed. It is made clear that the observations made above shall not be taken into consideration while the case is being decided in the Small Causes Court.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 901 - KERALA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
  

  Deficiency in service

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... istrict Forum found deficiency of service on account of the suspension of the Scheme, that cannot be sustained. 7. Whereas in O.P. No. 222 of the 1998 the District Forum made a direction to return the amount under Ext. A3 series along with interest with quarterly rests and also compensation, in O.P. No. 533 of 1998 on the finding of deficiency of service direction was made to pay Rs. 2,000 as compensation. In view of the fact that the suspension/termination of the scheme is consistent with clause (33) of the scheme, the same cannot constitute deficiency within the meaning of section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act. When such is the position it is clear that the District Forum has gone wrong in finding deficiency of service and making the consequential directions. The said direction has to be set aside and the respective complaints are liable to be dismissed. 8. In the result the appeals are allowed but in the circumstance of the case there will be no order as to costs.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 900 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
  

  Suspension of legal proceedings, Public deposits

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... contained in section 22(1) do not lend themselves to any liberal interpretation. The said provisions must be interpreted in a limited sense and cannot be said to cover situations where there really is no element of execution, distress or the like against any property owned by the industrial company. Interpreting the term no suit for recovery of money thus, we find that it certainly would not cover a simple claim made by depositors for the return of their deposits after maturity. As held by the apex court in the decision, supra, it is a sum kept with the company by the depositors in trust for return after maturity. The learned single judge has no proper and detailed appreciation of the matter has come to the correct conclusion. The reasons assigned by the learned single judge for arriving at the said conclusion are well-founded and do not call for any interference. 9. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we find no merit in the appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 899 - HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
  

  Companies Law Board – Power of

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. The appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion.... In the instant case the Company Law Board for resolving the issues between the parties passed the impugned orders as mentioned above. The Company Law Board exercised discretion within its limit which cannot be said to be unreasonable or injudicious. In the circumstances the decision making process of the Company Law Board cannot be held to be unlawful requiring interference from this court. For the reasons stated above the appeal stands dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 897 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
  

  Name of company - Rectification of

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... took into consideration various irrelevant factors as noticed hereinbefore which were not germane for exercising his jurisdiction under section 22. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the words error apparent on the face of the record include exercise of jurisdiction by an authority which he did not have upon taking into consideration irrelevant factors and/or refusing to take into consideration the relevant factors. 11. As the learned trial judge has not considered this aspect of the matter at all, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order dated 30-6-1997, passed by the second respondent and as contained in annexure A hereto is set aside with liberty to the parties to agitate their respective contentions in the suit pending before this Court. 12. In the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Ansari, J. mdash I agree.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 876 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
  

  Dutiability

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... i S.K. Misra with Shri S.K. Verma, learned Advocates. 3. emsp We find that the issue involved in this appeal has been decided by the Tribunal vide Final Order No. 896/98-C, dated 6-10-98 2002 (147) E.L.T. 86 (T) in the case of respondents themselves holding that the product, P.C. Acid is excisable and liable to excise duty. As the matter is squarely covered by the Tribunal rsquo s decision in the case of respondents themselves we allow the appeal filed by the Revenue.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 868 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
  

  Professional misconduct

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... ne something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency, then it is open to the General Medical Council to say that he has been guilty of lsquo infamous conduct in a professional respect . rsquo The Privy Council approved of the definition in George Frier Grahame v. Attorney General, Fiji, AIR 1936 PC 224 and this Court in the matter of P. An Advocate, 1964 1 SCR 697 has followed the same. . . . (p. 113) 7. Normally in a case of this nature, where professional misconduct of the nature involved has been concluded, a reprimand would have been proper and appropriate. But in view of the fact that the whole episode took place nearly eight years back, and in view of the physical state of mind of the respondent and his present lack of professional work, we think it proper to file the proceedings, as recommended by the Council. The reference is accordingly answered. Order accordingly.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 867 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
  

  Stock Exchange - Default fee on member

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... bed by the council of management. Both these amount to nothing more than regulating the internal business of the stock-exchange and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that such internal management of the affairs of the stock-exchange would amount to discharge of a public duty by the stock-exchange. The action complained of by the appellant in the present petition being purely within the ambit of the management of the internal affairs of the stock-exchange no writ petition can lie against such action. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for appellant that bye law No. 337 suffers from excessive and unbridled delegation of powers to the council of management and, therefore, ultra vires of article 300A of the constitution. As stated earlier, the appellant is a signatory to the articles of association and cannot be heard to complain against any of the articles contained therein. 9. In the result, we find no merit in the writ appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 866 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
  

  Winding up - Suits stayed on winding up order, Offences - Dishonour of cheques

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... y of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Section 138 to section 142 in Chapter XVII was introduced in the Negotiable Instruments Act, by the Central Act 66/1998 with effect from 1-4-1989. The above provisions were incorporated in the Negotiable Instruments Act with the intention of safeguarding and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions and those provisions were introduced while section 446 was in force. When specific provision has been made with respect to the commission of an offence under section 138 by a company or its directors or its employees, it has to be presumed that the Parliament introduced the above provisions in the Negotiable Instruments Act fully knowing that section 446 was there in the Companies Act. In the above circumstances we find force in the above argument also. We find no merit in the appeal and it has only to be dismissed. In the result this appeal is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 2000 (1) TMI 865 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
  

  Nominated Director

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... will not, however, prevent the persons and/or members from holding annual general meeting of plaintiff No. 1-company provided the same is permissible under the law as on today. 20. Costs of this application be cost in the cause. 21. As regards the application being G.A. No. 3592 of 1999 in connection with Suit No. 452 of 1999 is concerned I am of the view that plaintiff No. 2 has no right or authority to use the name of the Sikkim Bank, so I transpose plaintiff No. 1 in the category of the defendant. Upon prima facie enquiry I find the said suit requires trial so at this stage the said suit cannot be dismissed nor the plaint can be rejected. All points are kept open. 22. So far as the application being G.A. No. 3466 of 1999 in Civil Suit No. 452 of 1999 is concerned, in view of my findings in G.A. No. 3000 of 1999 in connection with Civil Suit No. 408 of 1999, I am of the view that no interim order is called for. Accordingly the same is dismissed. 23. Costs cost in the cause.

  ---

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