Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 169 Records
-
1979 (10) TMI 70 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... port for my above view from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Merla Sitarama Prasad s case 1971 80 ITR 672 referred to above. In that case, a contention had been raised that because the accountable person had preferred an appeal, the period of three years should be computed from the date of the appellate order. This was rejected by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Their Lordships said that the expression the date of assessment in s. 73A(b) meant the date of completion of the initial assessment. For the reasons stated above I hold that the notice, Ex. N , issued by the respondent dated September 6, 1974, is beyond the period prescribed under s. 73A(b) of the Act and he could not commence any proceedings for reassessment as three years had elapsed from the date of first assessment. Accordingly, the notice dated September 6, 1974, is quashed and the respondent is restrained from taking any proceedings pursuant to the said notice. Parties shall bear their own costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 69 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year ... ... ... ... ..... n and stated as follows (at p. 91 para 5) The Board have re-examined the issues involved and are of the view that except the clarification given in part (a) of para. 1 above, which stands superseded by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the clarifications given in parts (b) and (c) of para- 1 above hold good. The clarification given in Part (b) in the aforesaid circular is what has been extracted earlier as being part of the circular issued on 14th October, 1965. It is, therefore, seen that the view of the Board also was that in a case where the total income computed before allowing the development rebate is a loss, there was no legal obligation to create any statutory reserve in that year. It is also in accordance with the relevant provision of law. Therefore, the ground on which the Commissioner interfered with the order of the ITO is not tenable. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute and the order of the Commissioner is quashed. Parties to bear their own costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... at any enduring benefit or advantage has accrued to the respondent-company by reason of the aforesaid contribution made towards the cost of the overhead supply line. The object of the respondent in making the payment was one of commercial expediency, namely, to obtain supply of electricity, without which the business of the manufacture of phosphorus in the unit at Bhavnagar could not go on. The payment was really in the nature of a payment made towards the cost of obtaining supply of electricity essential for manufacturing the activities carried on at Bhavnagar. In these facts and circumstances, and in view of the decisions which we have referred to earlier, the question sought to be referred, in our opinion, could only be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department and no useful purpose would be served by directing the Tribunal to state a case and to refer the said question for our determination. Rule, is, therefore, discharged with costs. Rule discharged.
-
1979 (10) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessed Income, Assessment Proceedings, Fraud Or Gross Or Wilful Neglect, Income From Undisclosed Sources
-
1979 (10) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Change Of Law, Law Applicable, Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... pment rebate had not been allowed to the firm in respect of the machineries and, as such, it is not open for counsel for the department to take up this stand. There would have been some force in this contention but it appears that the ITO had not allowed development rebate on these machineries as he treated these machineries as old machineries having been used by the firm at the time of succession. This apart, before the benefit of development rebate under s. 33(4) can be given to the company, it should have been allowed to the firm and as neither the ITO nor the AAC have examined this aspect in detail, the Tribunal should have considered as to whether this requirement was fulfilled or not before granting relief. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Tribunal should now dispose of the appeal in the light of the observations made in the judgment. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... at in the estate of late Smt. Rampa Devi there was Rs. 73,000 cash in hand. We fail to understand as to on what basis the Tribunal rejected the explanation with regard to the remaining sum of Rs. 38,000. There was absolutely no basis or material for doing so and thus the estimate of unexplained investment was based purely on surmises and conjectures. On the facts found and accepted by the Tribunal the explanation should have been accepted in regard to the entire property claimed to have been left by Smt. Rampa Devi and it was out of those assets that the amount of Rs. 86,907 was introduced as capital in his books by late Bate Krishna on November 28, 1963. For the reasons stated above, we do not agree with the view taken by the Tribunal for sustaining the addition of Rs. 38,000 and we answer both the questions in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 200 and counsel s fee in like amount.
-
1979 (10) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ation of a debt is not income. The provision enacts a fiction and would have to be construed strictly on its language. This is also, in a way, a charging provision and the charge must be clearly made out. It is not made out on the successor. It is thus the identity of the assessee, who enjoyed the benefit of the allowances, that is to be established in invoking this provision. In the present case, from the facts set out by the Tribunal in its order and from the statement of the case, it is clear that the partnership which carried on the business was dissolved. It is the assessee, who took over or succeeded to the said business and in such a case, the identity of the assessee is lost. The result is that the first two questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The third question is answered on the basis that s. 41(4) cannot be applied to tax the receipt in the hands of the assessee here. The assessee will be entitled to costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500.
-
1979 (10) TMI 63 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... v. Braham Dutt Bhargava 1962 46 ITR 387 (Rai), S. Raghbir Singh Sandhawalia v. CIT 1958 34 ITR 719 (Punj), Hirday Narain v. CIT 1965 57 ITR 363 (All) and Jugal Kishore Jai Prakash v. CIT 1971 79 ITR 598 (All). The aforesaid view is consistent with the view taken by the Privy Council in the case of Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur 1891 ILR 19 Cal 123. From the records it does not appear that the transaction has been questioned by any member of the coparcenary. In such a situation, I am of the view that the gift impugned is valid in law having been made in respect of movable property out of love and affection and within reasonable limits. Accordingly, question No. (1) is answered in the affirmative. As question No. (1) has been answered in the affirmative, there is no occasion to answer question No. (2). In the circumstances of the case, a consolidated cost of Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty) is awarded to the assessee-opposite party. SHIVESHWAR PRASAD SINHA J.--I agree.
-
1979 (10) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... , but voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business, may yet be expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade. Considered in the light of this principle, in the present case, the amount having been paid only to avoid further loss, could only be treated as an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business There is no element of any penalty there is no infraction of law or offence against public policy. In these circumstances, the amount was rightly allowed as deduction by the Tribunal. In a similar case, the same view has also been taken by us in CIT. v. Vasantha Mills Ltd. (T.C. Nos. 614, of 1975 and 26 of 1976) in the judgment dated 7th August, 1979 since reported in 1979 120 ITR 321 (Mad). The question referred is, accordingly answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1979 (10) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Commission Paid To Directors, Interest Payable, Provident Fund, Purchase Tax ... ... ... ... ..... yet it was given by the directors as per usual requirement of the bank, as, in case the guarantee had not been given, the assessee would not have been able to secure the loan from the bank. From the finding recorded by the Tribunal, it is clear that the bank would not have advanced the loan in case the directors had not stood security for the payment. This being so, the case cannot be distinguished from the decisions in the case of this very assessee for the earlier years, where substantially a similar situation obtained. The Tribunal was, thus, correct in holding that the amount of commission paid to the directors satisfied the tests laid down under s. 40(c) of the Act. We, accordingly, answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assesee. Question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. In view of the partial failure and success of the parties, they shall bear their own costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 60 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... rket price and the price paid by the purchasers as profit of the seller. The Tribunal has pointed out that that was exactly what happened in the present case. In other words, the Tribunal s finding on the facts was that the assessee had charged only the net price and that there was no discount or rebate given to the purchasers. The bona fides of the transaction ire not in dispute. In these circumstances and in view of the finding of the Tribunal as to what happened between the seller and the purchaser in the present case, it has to be held that there was no expenditure which could be disallowed by reference to s. 40A(2)(a). In this view, it is unnecessary to go into the concept of commission or rebate discussed in Harihar Cotton Pressing Factory v. CIT 1960 39 ITR 594 (Bom). The result is that the question referred to this court in each of the years is answered in the negative and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set.
-
1979 (10) TMI 59 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... , 1965. He also completely denied all the allegations against him. Learned counsel for the State brought to my notice his examination before the committing court. There he was asked whether he had substituted the return originally filed which contained his signature. It does not appear that the signature itself was brought to his notice. However, while answering this question, he stated that the whole allegation was untrue. He could not say positively that the signature on the substituted return was his. In the face of this answer, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to get his signature verified and compared by an expert at the sessions stage. In this state of affairs, it is very difficult to use this solitary circumstance against the appellant. In my view, the case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and the sentence imposed upon the appellant are set aside. He is acquitted and discharged from his bail-bond.
-
1979 (10) TMI 58 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Capital Asset, Capital Gains Tax, Profit On Sale ... ... ... ... ..... at the land lay within the municipal limits of the town of Ranchi or that the assessee had made his entire plot of land into parcels and was selling each one of them for the purpose of constructing a house thereon. The fact that the purchaser has purchased it for the purpose of constructing his house has no relevance, because so far as the seller is concerned, he will be deemed to have parted with the agricultural land in the form of agricultural land, unless it is proved otherwise. The department has not brought up any such material on the record by which it could be said that the criteria adopted by the Tribunal for determining the character of the agricultural land was wrong. In our view, on the facts as stated by the Tribunal, its conclusion that the land sold by the assessee was an agricultural land is valid and correct. In the result, the question is answered in the affirmative and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs and hearing fee, Rs. 250.
-
1979 (10) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Change Of Law, Law Applicable, Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... cided on the express language of s. 153(1)(c), which indicates by using the word whichever is latest that for purposes of calculating the limitation the factual date on which the return or revised return under sub-s. (4) or sub-s. (5) of s. 139 is filed has to be taken into account. It is settled that a principle applied for purposes of interpreting one particular provision of a statute may not be appropriate for another provision, where the language of that provision is such that the object of the enactment would be defeated if it were applied. As s. 153(1)(c) clearly indicates that the extended limitation has to be calculated from the actual date of the revised return, it is not possible to accept the contention. We, therefore, following the earlier decisions of this court answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee, and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel fee is assessed at the same figure.
-
1979 (10) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... der s. 55 is one which is under s. 53(1), the requirement of s. 53(3) need not be strictly complied with. So far as the first question is concerned the deceased died on the 23rd of September, 1959, and a notice on the accountable person was served on the 5th of March, 1963. In E.D.R. No. 11 of 1977, Padampat Singhania v. CED decided on 26-9-1979 1980 122 ITR 162 (All)) we have held that a notice under s. 55 starts proceedings under the Act, and if it has been done before the expiry of five years after the death, the bar of limitation created by s. 73A is saved. As the notice under s. 55 was given and served before, the expiry of the period of five years, which in the present case was the 22nd September, 1964, the proceedings for levy of estate duty were validly commenced within limitation. We, accordingly, answer the first question in the affirmative, and the second question in the negative. As none has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Rejection Of Accounts, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... employed by the assessee is such that the true income cannot be properly deduced. We see no substance in this argument. There is no finding by any of the authorities that the method of accounting employed by the assessee is such that the income cannot be properly deduced therefrom. The, ITO rejected the accounts on the ground of various defects found by him and the fact that there was an excessive shortage and the gross profit shown was less. The order of the ITO and the reasons given by him cannot be rewritten, so as to bring it in line with the first proviso to s. 145(1). We are, accordingly, of the view that there was no justification for making the addition. We, accordingly, answer the first question by saying that the Tribunal was not justified in making the addition of Rs. 10,000 towards the trading result. The second question is answered in the negative. The assessee, is entitled to his costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
-
1979 (10) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Advance Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 30, 1972, and as a consequence of that order the amount of interest allowable to the assessee under s. 214 should have been correspondingly reduced, but that was not done. Hence, when on scrutiny of record this mistake was detected, the ITO took action under s. 154 and reduced the amount of interest to which the assessee was entitled under s. 214 and the amount so reduced was Rs. 22,281. The impugned order, therefore, was merely a consequential order. There was no controversy at all involved of the nature to which the Appellate Tribunal addressed itself while disposing of the department s appeal. We, therefore, do not agree with the Appellate Tribunal that there was any debatable or controversial question involved in this proceeding so that action could not be taken under s. 154 of the Act. Our answer to the question referred therefore, is in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
-
1979 (10) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... on the basis of the cost of the centering machine as worked out by the experts board, was written under a misapprehension and ignorance of the experts report. The letter of the assessee being a voluntary one, and the assessee having agreed to the costs of the machine being worked out on the basis of the report of the experts board, the ITO was justified in working out the profit on the sales of these machines by deducting the cost price as worked out by the experts from the sale price. Counsel for the assessee has not been able to draw our attention to any authority to the effect that the profit of an assessee cannot be worked out on the basis of an admission made by the assessee as respects the cost incurred in manufacturing the particular article, and deducting that amount from the sale price. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200.
-
1979 (10) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Amalgamation Expenses, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Set Off, Total Income
-
1979 (10) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Computation Of Capital For Surtax Purposes, Development Rebate Reserve, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... on for the three years followed. The notice and the order were challenged by the petitioner. For 1968-69, a rectification notice was issued and that was challenged. It would thus be seen that the facts here are fundamentally different. As a result of the revised returns after the circular, the petitioner had been granted additional development rebate for all the four years. That was when the circulars were in force. By the rectification notices the development rebate thus granted was sought to be undone. This attracts the principle of our decision in CIT v. Edward 1979 119 ITR 334 (Ker) FB . The decision is, therefore, distinguishable. In the result, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs . A copy of our judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of this court will be communicated to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
....
|