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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 459 Records
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2000 (2) TMI 760 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the refill of a ball point pen fall within entry 135 of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. As immediately that there is no evidence on the record before us as to how a refill is regarded by the public or in commercial parlance, but we have used ball point pens for long enough to be able to give an authoritative opinion. As we see it, the ball point refill is the substitute for the ink that is filled from time to time in a fountain pen and it provides the ball or nib thereof.
While the refill can write, it is not intended to be used, and cannot conveniently be used, for that purpose without being first inserted in the ball point pen. We do not think, therefore, that the High Court was right in overturning the view taken by the Tribunal that the refill fell outside the scope of the said entry.
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2000 (2) TMI 755 - SUPREME COURT
Interpretation of notification which exempts from tax payable under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on sales of all books and periodicals with effect from April 1, 1964
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There not been the decision of the High Court rendered as early as 1972 which held the field for nearly three decades and no attempt was made to challenge that decision either in this Court or in the High Court. We think it would be unreasonable to upset the meaning given to the expression used in enactment which was in force for nearly three decades. In fact, the Government subsequently has taken note of this decision and has restricted the exemption only to periodicals and books for reading.
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2000 (2) TMI 747 - SUPREME COURT
Whether rubber that it bought the benefit of a notification (S.R.O. No. 641/81) issued by the State in exercise of power conferred by section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal found, taking into consideration the nature of the articles and the manner in which they were sold, that they had been treated as condemned articles and not as articles which could be put to use again and, accordingly, should be treated as scrap. It was not only the intention of the buyer and the seller that was taken into account but the nature of the articles that were being sold and, obviously, the Tribunal was satisfied that they were really no more than scrap and found that they should be taxed accordingly. The High Court was, therefore, right in not interfering.
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2000 (2) TMI 744 - SUPREME COURT
Additional income - powers of High Court - Held that:- Appeal allowed. As no question of law was involved and that, therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Tribunal which was essentially a decision on fact. In any event High Court does not appear to have noticed that the assessing authority had relied on no material which indicated that the additional income had come from transactions that were liable to sales tax. It was merely a presumption on his part and that presumption could not rightly be drawn.
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2000 (2) TMI 735 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the State of Haryana is justified in demanding interest from the appellant on the tax due by it for the assessment year 1975-76?
Whether there was a valid demand notice in the year 1982 (the year from which the interest is demanded) which obligated the appellant to pay the tax demanded under the said notice?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. As has been noticed the demand notice of the year 1982 which was issued during the period when the State had no authority to levy sales tax cannot be said to be a valid demand, based on which interest could be claimed. A valid demand for the assessment year 1975-76 could have been made by the State of Haryana only after the judgment of this Court, i.e., from January 6, 1997, and on such a demand being made on February 20, 1997, the appellant has satisfied the said demand within the period available to it. If that be so, in our opinion, the State could not have demanded interest on the tax due for the assessment year 1975-76 based on its earlier demand notice.
Thus the interest demanded by the State of Haryana on the amount due from the appellant for the assessment year 1975-76 cannot be sustained
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2000 (2) TMI 729 - SUPREME COURT
Deduction of tax at source from the payment to works contractors - Held that:- The appeal is allowed and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside. Section 13-AA of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, as amended with effect from October 4, 1993, is struck down as being beyond the purview of the Orissa State Legislature. Such amount as has been collected from the appellant under the provisions of section 13-AA shall forthwith be refunded by the State.
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2000 (2) TMI 724 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a company and its directors can be proceeded against for having committed an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 after the company has been declared sick under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 before the expiry of the period of payment of the cheque amount?
Held that:- Section 22 SICA does not create any legal impediment for instituting and proceeding with a criminal case on the allegations of an offence under section 138 against a company or its directors. The section as we read it only creates an embargo against disposal of assets of the company for recovery of its debts. The purpose of such an embargo is to preserve the assets of the company from being attached or sold for realisation of dues of the creditors. The section does not bar payment of money by the company or its directors to other persons for satisfaction of their legally enforceable dues.
Non good reason for accepting the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in favour of the prayer for quashing the criminal proceedings or for keeping the proceedings in abeyance. It will be open to the appellants to place relevant materials in this regard before the learned magistrate before whom the cases are pending and the learned magistrate will examine the matter keeping in mind the discussions made in this judgment
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2000 (2) TMI 723 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up of sick industrial company ... ... ... ... ..... tion of the Official Liquidator in that regard has already been indicated by us supra. However, in the present cases, the appellants have already remitted the amounts to the Official Liquidator as per the order of the Court. We are also informed that the advertisement has already been made. Hence, the question of giving directions to BIFR regarding advertisement or suspending the order in regard to deposit of specified sum does not arise at this stage though the directions of the learned single Judge are not legally sustainable. But we lay down the legal position for future guidance. We further direct that the Official Liquidator should furnish the appellants from time to time the account for the expenditure incurred or the expenditure likely to be incurred within a reasonable point of time for the purpose of safeguarding the security and also refund the excess amount wherever necessary. 11. The appeals are disposed of with the above clarifications and observations. No costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 722 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments, Advertisement of order, Where the company has no available assets
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2000 (2) TMI 720 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Officer who is in default - Meaning of ... ... ... ... ..... se that A-2 has been described as the managing director of the company. Thus, it cannot be said that this A-1 company has no managing director. Thus, in this case inasmuch as A-1 the company has an officer described as managing director within the meaning of section 5, the question of any other director being liable for the criminal acts of the company abovementioned would not arise. Admittedly, the petitioners herein are the mere directors of the company and as such criminal liability cannot be fastened to the petitioners in view of the provisions above referred. In this view of the matter, it will be abuse of the process of law if these petitioners are compelled to undergo the ordeal of trial. 9. In the result, this petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings in C.C.No. 16 of 1998 on the file of the Special Judge for economic offences, Hyderabad shall stand quashed as far as these petitioners A-3 to A-6 are concerned. The petition is finally disposed of in these terms.
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2000 (2) TMI 719 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the remedy provided in section 29 or 31 of the State Finance Corporation Act, 1951 could be pursued notwithstanding the ban contained in section 22 of the SICA?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The conclusion which we have to draw is that if commission of the offence under section 138 of the NI Act was completed before the commencement of proceedings under section 22(1) of SICA there is no hurdle in any of the provisions of SICA against the maintainability and prosecution of a criminal complaint duly instituted under section 142 of the NI Act. The decisions rendered by the High Courts, which are assailed before us in this batch of appeals, are therefore not liable to be interfered with
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2000 (2) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency of funds, Winding up - Avoidance of transfers, after commencement of winding up
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2000 (2) TMI 717 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... isputed by the company. A petition presented ostensibly, for winding up order, but really to exert pressure has to be dismissed by the court because a winding up proceeding cannot be permitted to be a device for claiming disputed debts. Proper remedy to the aggrieved creditor is in a civil court and not by way of order for winding up of the debtor who disputes the existence of the debt. If the respondent had disputed the very existence of the debt of the petitioner-company in their letter dated 2-8-1997 (Annexure 4), the petitioner-company would have been well advised to seek remedy in a civil court where the entire matter could have been thrashed on evidence being led by the disputants and appropriate order passed. 12. In the result, and for the reasons stated above, I see no reason to grant the prayer of the petitioner-company for winding up of the respondent. Therefore, this petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their respective costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 716 - DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
Complaint - Maintainability of ... ... ... ... ..... ppeal before the Hon rsquo ble High Court. Moreover, in terms of the above orders of the Hon rsquo ble High Court and the undertaking given, the entire liability was to be liquidated in three monthly instalments and the first instalment was payable on or before 15-9-1999. In terms of the above order of the Hon rsquo ble High Court the last instalment was to be paid on or before 15-11-1999. There is also nothing on record to indicate as to whether in terms of the order of the Hon rsquo ble High Court and the undertaking given, payment to the depositors, including the respondent, has been made by the appellant. 8. In view of the position explained above, the contentions, advanced at the Bar, by the learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the case of the appellant, are devoid of substance. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, is, therefore, devoid of merit. The same deserves to be dis-missed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
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2000 (2) TMI 715 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Power of court to stay ... ... ... ... ..... t, the application cannot suffer for lapse of time or delay as pointed out by the respondent hereunder. Such type of action rightly can be made when element of such action is available to the party or parties. 17. Under such circumstances, I allow this application by modifying the order passed on 13-5-1998, by incorporating the sentence, lsquo the winding up petition is permanently stayed as far as the original petitioning creditor, i.e., Sree Krishna Trading Company is concerned but not against each and every applicant/applicants rsquo in the place and stead of lsquo the winding up petition is permanently stayed rsquo . 18. Thus, the application stands disposed of. Costs of this application will be costs of the winding up petition. 19. The applicant or applicants, if any, will be entitled to take steps in accordance with law before the appropriate court. 20. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of the judgment on the usual undertaking.
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2000 (2) TMI 713 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Suspension of legal proceedings, contract etc. ... ... ... ... ..... he principal debtor under section 37 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and section 22 cannot operate against the 2nd defendant or their partners. I, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that proceedings against the 2nd defendant or their partners also cannot continue since the 1st defendant-company is a sick industrial company. 10. As a matter of fact, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel or the defendants except raising the objection of section 22 of the SICA, did not raise any other argument in respect of the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 5. 11. There is no plausible defence, therefore, raised on behalf of the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 5 and I am satisfied that the summons for judgment deserves to be made absolute against the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 5. 12. Accordingly, the summons for judgment is made absolute against the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 5 and is dismissed as withdrawn against the defendant Nos. 1 and 4.
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2000 (2) TMI 712 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... clearly reveals that though in a given case a part of the company could be allowed to be amalgamated under the scheme of arrangement but herein the transferor-company and the transferee-company were doing differ- ent business. By the said scheme, certain properties are being transferred to the transferee-company. It is patently a device adopted to transfer certain assets including immovable property without due process of the law. No consideration is being passed nor any transfer deed executed. This must be taken to be a device, thus, adopted, to defeat the normal provisions of law. Secondly, despite the limited jurisdiction of this Court, when on the face of it the scheme does not appear to be in public interest and is defeating the provisions of law, no useful purpose would be served by giving permission for calling of the meetings of the shareholders and the creditors. 12. As an off-shoot of the reasoning, necessarily the company petition must fail and is hereby dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 710 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... ssed or not. 6. As noted above, the company petition had been admitted by this Court on 11-3-1999 holding that in any case an amount of Rs. 7,68,100 was due. Regarding the other disputes, no other opinion had been expressed.The said amount had been paid with some interest. In fact, the total amount paid is more than Rs. 8 lakhs after the order of admission of the company petition. Even publication charges have since been paid. Keeping in view these facts, it is obvious that it is not a fit case for further direction to wind up the respondent-company. It cannot be held that the respondent-company is unable to pay its debt or it would be just and equitable that the respondent-company should be wound up. These events show that the ingredients of section 433(e) and (f) are not satisfied. The petitioner would be at liberty to take recourse under the common law for recovery of any other dues regarding which no opinion is expressed. 7. Accordingly, the company petition is dismissed.
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2000 (2) TMI 709 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Investigation of company’s affairs ... ... ... ... ..... is clear that as per clause (b)( i) the business of the company should be found to be conducted with an intent to defraud. Obviously, the exact words are that the business of the company is being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, members or any other persons, or otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or in a manner oppressive of any of its members, or that the company was formed for any fraudulent or unlawful purpose . 9. The apprehensions referred to above are merely referring to some reports and materials that the Company Law Board had with it at the relevant time. According to the Board, these were the portend of things to come. If they were so the things would have certainly come to head. We have recorded the fact that this very situation is missing. 10. For these reasons we are setting aside the impugned action without going into the question of mala fide or bona fide. The net result, therefore, is that the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute.
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2000 (2) TMI 705 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Offences by companies ... ... ... ... ..... firm is liable for prosecution. A-2 is the Chief Managing Director and Signatory. A-2 is liable for prosecution. A-3 is the Director and Authorised Signatory. Therefore, A-3 is liable for prosecution. A-4 is a Director. The prosecution against A-4 may not be maintainable because no qualification is attached to A-4 as to what role he has played in the commission of the offence under section 138. Therefore, A-4 will not be liable to be prosecuted under section 138. Whereas A-5 is a financial controller. He has a definite role to play in the working of the company. Therefore, A-5 is liable for prosecution. 8. Under these circumstances, taking into consideration the legal aspect this Court holds that all the accused except A-4 are liable to be prosecution under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the complaints filed against A-4 are only quashed and the other accused have to face the trial. Thus, the criminal petitions are partly allowed. Order accordingly.
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