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Showing 101 to 120 of 410 Records

• 1996 (4) TMI 427
  

  Whether cycle rims are declared goods or not?

  Held that:- Appeal allowed. Applying the test of common parlance, a rim which is admittedly round and an essential part of the wheel of the cycle would come within the said entry (xiv) and being declared goods the same cannot be taxed at the rate in excess of 4 per cent. The view taken by the single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the judgment under appeal gives a very narrow meaning to the said entry and cannot be upheld.

  Thus the judgment of the High Court is set aside and it is held that the appellant is only entitled to be taxed at 4 per cent on the sale price of the cycle rims.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 426
  

  Whether the levy of penalty under section 14(3) of the Act is sustainable in the facts of this case or not?

  Held that:- With respect to the assessment year 1973-74, the High Court has dismissed the tax revision case filed by the assessee on the ground that the assessment in that case was a best judgment assessment inasmuch as the Commercial Tax Officer had added a sum of rupees three thousand and odd to figure disclosed in the return. We see no reason to differ from the opinion of the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case to the extent of the said assessment year.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 424
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the extraordinary general meeting convened by the respondent.
  2. Validity of the criminal complaints filed by the respondent under sections 200, 628, 629, and 629A of the Companies Act, 1956.
  3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash proceedings.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Extraordinary General Meeting Convened by the Respondent:
  The petitioners, shareholders of the Bangalore Stock Exchange, challenged the legality of an extraordinary general meeting convened by the respondent after his removal as a director. The respondent allegedly coerced members into signing a notice for the meeting, which was later withdrawn by some members, leading to insufficient support under section 169 of the Companies Act, 1956. The board of directors refused to call the meeting, prompting the respondent to convene it illegally. The petitioners filed suits in the City Civil Court for a declaration that the notice was illegal. The court noted that the board of directors must call an extraordinary general meeting if a valid requisition is deposited, but if the board fails, the requisitionists may call the meeting themselves. The court found that the board's refusal to call the meeting did not constitute an offence under the Act.
  
  2. Validity of the Criminal Complaints Filed by the Respondent:
  The respondent filed multiple criminal complaints under sections 200, 628, 629, and 629A of the Companies Act, alleging false statements and failure to convene a meeting. The petitioners argued that the complaints were false, frivolous, and an abuse of the court process. The court examined each complaint and found that:
  - Section 629: The court held that filing a false affidavit in a civil suit does not constitute an offence under section 629 of the Companies Act. The affidavits were not required under the Act, and any false statements should be addressed under the Indian Penal Code, following the procedure under section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  - Section 628: The court found that the Arbitration Committee's report, even if false, did not fall under section 628 of the Act, which pertains to specific documents like returns, reports, and balance sheets required by the Act.
  - Section 629A: The court noted that section 629A provides penalties where no specific penalty is provided elsewhere in the Act. The failure to convene a meeting under section 169 did not constitute an offence as an alternative remedy was available under section 169(6).
  
  3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code:
  The respondent argued that the High Court should not interfere with the Magistrate's order taking cognizance of the case, citing the Supreme Court's guidelines in Bhajan Lal's case. The petitioners contended that the complaints fell within the exceptions outlined in Bhajan Lal, justifying interference under section 482 to prevent abuse of the court process. The court agreed with the petitioners, finding that the complaints were filed with mala fide intentions and did not disclose any offence under the Companies Act. The court emphasized that the inherent powers under section 482 should be exercised to prevent unnecessary harassment and to secure the ends of justice.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings in C.C. Nos. 1459, 1467, 1460, 935, 936, and 1253 of 1995, finding that the complaints did not constitute offences under the Companies Act and were filed with malicious intent. The court exercised its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to prevent abuse of the court process and to secure the ends of justice.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 423
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction of the High Court.
  2. Suppression and misrepresentation of material facts.
  3. Compliance with procedural rules for winding up petitions.
  4. Appealability of the order of admission and advertisement.
  5. Consequences of public advertisement of the winding-up petition.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of the High Court:
  The primary issue was whether the High Court of Gujarat had jurisdiction to entertain the winding-up petition. According to Section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place where the registered office of the company is situated has the jurisdiction. The appellant's registered office was in Calcutta, thus only the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta had jurisdiction. The respondent misled the court by not disclosing this fact and suggesting that the records were available with the Registrar of Companies, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad.
  
  2. Suppression and Misrepresentation of Material Facts:
  The appellant argued that the respondent obtained the order for publication by suppression and misrepresentation of material facts. The respondent knew that the appellant's registered office was in Calcutta but failed to disclose this, misleading the court into believing it had jurisdiction. The court noted that the respondent addressed the statutory notice to the registered office in Calcutta, indicating awareness of the true facts.
  
  3. Compliance with Procedural Rules for Winding Up Petitions:
  The court examined whether the petition complied with the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. Rule 95 mandates specific disclosures in the petition, including the registered office's location and the company's capital structure. The respondent failed to provide these details. The court emphasized the importance of these disclosures for determining jurisdiction and the company's financial status. The petition's failure to comply with these requirements and the improper service of notice rendered the process defective.
  
  4. Appealability of the Order of Admission and Advertisement:
  The court addressed whether the order of admission and advertisement was appealable. Section 483 of the Companies Act allows appeals from any order made in the matter of winding up. The court referenced precedents, including the Bombay High Court's decision in Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Ishwarbhai Somabhai Patel, which held that such orders are appealable due to their serious consequences. The Supreme Court's decisions in Shankarlal Aggarwala v. Shankarlal Poddar and Golcha Investment P. Ltd. v. Shanti Chandra Bafna further supported this position.
  
  5. Consequences of Public Advertisement of the Winding-Up Petition:
  The court discussed the severe implications of public advertisement of a winding-up petition. It noted that such an advertisement could cause irreparable harm to a solvent company. The court cited the Supreme Court's observation in Hind Overseas (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Raghunathprasad Jhunjhunwalla that the interest of the shareholders and other stakeholders must be considered before admitting such a petition. The court concluded that the respondent's failure to provide necessary material to demonstrate the company's commercial insolvency and the misrepresentation of jurisdictional facts warranted setting aside the order.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court of Gujarat concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the winding-up petition, as the appellant's registered office was in Calcutta. The respondent's suppression and misrepresentation of material facts, along with non-compliance with procedural rules, invalidated the petition. The court allowed the appeal, rejected the main company petition, and awarded costs of Rs. 10,000 to the appellant.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 419
  

  Whether a sale is an inter-State sale or not - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Whether a particular sale is an inter-State sale or an intra-State sale is essentially a question of fact. It must be said, at the same time, that it is not a pure question of fact inasmuch as the facts of a given case have to be examined in the light of the provisions contained in section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act. The main reason for entertaining the present appeals under article 136 of the Constitution is the grievance of BHEL that the same transaction of sale is being subjected not only to Central sales tax in more than one State but that the Orissa State is treating the very same transaction of sale as an intra-State sale and levying the Orissa State sales tax thereon. The grievance cannot be said to be not justified. The dispute is not only between BHEL and the States, it is also, in a sense, a dispute between the State inter se.

  Thus the matter remitted to the Tribunal. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of these appeals.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 406
  

  Whether by introduction of sub-section (2) to section 10 of the amending Act with retrospective effect, the respondents were absolved of their liability and were exonerated from the responsibility of complying with the direction given by the High Court in the earlier writ petition filed on behalf of the writ petitioner?

  Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As in the contempt proceeding the court was only endeavouring to ensure that the order of refund passed by the writ court was carried out. In the contempt jurisdiction the court was not really concerned with the merit of the case. It is also to be noted that the vires of the Amendment Act of 1969 has not been questioned by the appellant by filing any substantive application. The effect of the Amending Act is to impart validity to those assessment orders which had been struck down by the High Court. If the assessment orders are now held to be valid, the tax demands raised in the assessment orders are still enforceable. What the State of Tamil Nadu is seeking to do is to enforce these demands.

  Merely because taxes which had been realised earlier had been refunded under an order passed on a contempt petition, the respondent is not debarred from realising the demands which are now deemed to be valid and subsisting.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 405
  

  Interpretation of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act - Held that:- Appeal allowed. One must first satisfy the condition in section 8(4) to become eligible for the concessional rate in section 8(1). It is only thereafter that he can claim the benefit of the said notifications, for which purpose again he has to satisfy the conditions prescribed in the notifications. It is therefore wrong to think that section 8(5) or the notifications are self-contained and operate de hors the other provisions of the Act/Rules. The Division Bench has unfortunately failed to appreciate the notifications in their correct perspective. We are of the opinion that the judgment under appeal is unsustainable in law and it is accordingly set aside.

  The proviso to sub-section (4) of section 8 has been interpreted and explained by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Production Ltd. [1994 (4) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]. It is obvious that the said decision shall guide the authorities in the matter.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 404
  

  Whether the appellant's case comes within the provisions of sub-section (3)(aa) of section 24 of the Advocates Act to justify the claim made by Mr. Ganpule?

  Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is nothing in the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act or the rules framed thereunder to suggest that the right of appearance before a sales tax authority amounts to entitlement to practise the profession of law as contemplated by clause (aa) of sub-section (3) of section 24 of the Advocates Act.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 391
  
  Issues:
  - Appeal under section 483 of the Companies Act against the order dismissing the application under section 446 of the Companies Act for continuation of execution proceedings after the company was wound up.
  - Interpretation of sections 441 and 537 of the Companies Act regarding the commencement of winding up and validity of sales after commencement of winding up.
  - Application of legal principles from previous court decisions in similar cases.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment involves an appeal under section 483 of the Companies Act against the dismissal of an application filed under section 446 of the Companies Act. The appellant had filed a suit for recovery of money from a company, which was decreed in 1976. Subsequently, the company went into winding up proceedings, and the appellant sought to continue execution proceedings to take possession of the property purchased in execution of the decree. The main contention revolved around the interpretation of sections 441 and 537 of the Act regarding the commencement of winding up and the validity of sales after the commencement of winding up.
  
  The court analyzed section 441 of the Companies Act, which states that the winding up of a company by the court shall be deemed to commence at the time of the presentation of the petition for winding up. In this case, the winding up proceedings began in 1977 when a petition was filed for winding up the company. The court also examined section 537 of the Act, which declares that any sale held without the court's permission after the commencement of winding up shall be void. As the sale in question took place after the commencement of winding up, section 537 was found to be applicable, supporting the respondent's case against the appellant.
  
  Moreover, the court referred to legal principles from previous court decisions to support its analysis. The court cited a passage from the Guide to the Companies Act by A. Ramaiya, based on a decision of the Rajasthan High Court, to emphasize that the commencement of winding up is considered from the date of the presentation of the petition for winding up. The court also discussed various decisions, including those of the Supreme Court and the Patna High Court, to address the appellant's arguments based on previous legal precedents.
  
  Ultimately, the court found no error in the impugned order and dismissed the appeal. The judgment highlighted the application of relevant sections of the Companies Act, supported by legal interpretations from previous court decisions, to conclude that the sale held by the appellant after the commencement of winding up was void.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 385
  

  Cumulative effect of the three statutory provisions, namely, section 293A of the Companies Act, 1956, section 13A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is, to bring transparency into election-funding

  Held that:- Appeal allowed. The political parties are under a statutory obligation to file a return of income in respect of each assessment year in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The political parties—referred to by us in the judgment—who have not been filing returns of income for several years have prima facie violated the statutory provisions of the Income-tax Act as indicated by us in the judgment.

  That the income-tax authorities have been wholly remiss in the performance of their statutory duties under law. The said authorities have for a, long period failed to take appropriate action against the defaulter political parties. The Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, the Government of India, shall have an investigation/inquiry conducted against each of the defaulter political parties and initiate necessary action in accordance with law including penal action under section 276CC of the Income-tax Act.

  The Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India, shall appoint an inquiring body to find out why and in what circumstances the mandatory provisions of the Income-tax Act, regarding filing of return of income by the political parties were not enforced. Any officer/officers found responsible and remiss in the inquiry be suitably dealt with in accordance with the rules. A political party which is not maintaining audited and authenticated accounts and has not filed the return of income for the relevant period, cannot, ordinarily, be permitted to say that it has incurred or authorised expenditure in connection with the election of its candidates in terms of Explanation 1 to section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

  That the expenditure (including that for which the candidate is seeking protection under Explanation 1 to section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951), in connection with the election of a candidate—to the knowledge of the candidate or his election agent—shall be presumed to have been authorised by the candidate or his election agent. It shall, however, be open to the candidate to rebut the presumption in accordance with law and to show that part of the expenditure or whole of it was in fact incurred by the political party to which he belongs or by any other association or body of persons or by an individual (other than the candidate or his election agent). Only when the candidate discharges the burden and rebuts the presumption he would be entitled to the benefit of Explanation 1 to section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951

  The expression "conduct of election" in article 324 of the Constitution of India is wide enough to include in its sweep, the power of the Election Commission to issue—in the process of the conduct of elections—directions to the effect that the political parties shall submit to the Commission for its scrutiny, the details of the expenditure incurred or authorised by the political parties in connection with the election of their respective candidates.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 377
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the Board Resolution dated 30th December 1992 and subsequent issuance of 68,000 Equity Shares.
  2. Validity of the letter of offer dated 20th January 1993.
  3. Alleged wrongful recording of 22,120 equity shares in the name of defendant No. 3.
  4. Alleged interference by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the affairs of defendant No. 1.
  5. Alleged siphoning of funds by defendants Nos. 2 and 3.
  6. Requirement of additional working capital for defendant No. 1.
  7. Alleged benefits given to Flexaire, a partnership firm.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Board Resolution dated 30th December 1992 and Subsequent Issuance of 68,000 Equity Shares:
  The petitioners sought a declaration that the resolution to issue new shares passed on 30th December 1992 and all acts pursuant to it were illegal, null, and void. They also sought a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from giving effect to the resolution. The petitioners alleged that the resolution was passed with the intention to oust them from management and reduce them to a minority. The court, however, found no prima facie case of mala fides or breach of trust by the directors. The court referenced the Supreme Court judgment in Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holdings Ltd., which held that the issuance of shares for the benefit of the company cannot be struck down if it incidentally benefits the directors.
  
  2. Validity of the Letter of Offer dated 20th January 1993:
  The petitioners challenged the letter of offer for the issuance of 68,000 equity shares, claiming there was no genuine demand for augmenting working capital. The court found that the decision to issue shares is primarily within the purview of the directors and should not be interfered with unless there are extreme circumstances of mala fides or breach of trust. The court dismissed the petitioners' apprehensions regarding the American company's participation in the rights issue.
  
  3. Alleged Wrongful Recording of 22,120 Equity Shares in the Name of Defendant No. 3:
  The petitioners alleged that 22,120 equity shares were illegally recorded in the name of defendant No. 3, a transferee of Dilip Sen. The court noted that the transfer took place in 1983 and the suit was filed in 1993, making it barred by limitation. Additionally, the court observed that one of the plaintiffs was present in the Board Meeting in 1983 when the transfer was accepted, and no objections were raised for ten years.
  
  4. Alleged Interference by Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the Affairs of Defendant No. 1:
  The petitioners sought a permanent injunction to restrain defendants Nos. 2 and 3 from interfering in the affairs of defendant No. 1. The court found no prima facie evidence to support the allegations of interference or meddling by the defendants.
  
  5. Alleged Siphoning of Funds by Defendants Nos. 2 and 3:
  The petitioners alleged that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had been siphoning funds belonging to defendant No. 1. The court found no prima facie evidence to support these allegations and dismissed the application for an interim injunction on this ground.
  
  6. Requirement of Additional Working Capital for Defendant No. 1:
  The petitioners argued that there was no genuine need for additional working capital. The court held that the decision regarding the need for additional capital is primarily decided by the directors and should not be interfered with unless there are extreme circumstances indicating mala fides or breach of trust.
  
  7. Alleged Benefits Given to Flexaire, a Partnership Firm:
  The petitioners alleged that Flexaire, a partnership firm of Mrs. Rita Sen, was given undue benefits. The court noted that the facilities were granted in 1976 with a Board Resolution and that Flexaire had been paying rent to the company. The court found no prima facie case for issuing an interim injunction based on these allegations.
  
  Conclusion:
  The application for interim injunction was dismissed, and all interim orders were vacated. The respondent No. 1 company was allowed to proceed with the issue of rights shares. The court found no prima facie case of mala fides, breach of trust, or personal aggrandizement by the directors. The judgment emphasized that the directors' decision to issue shares should not be interfered with unless there are extreme circumstances warranting such interference.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 375
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Locus standi of the petitioners.
  2. Relegation to suit.
  3. Violation of undertaking given to Company Law Board (CLB) in C.P. No. 29 of 1992.
  4. Sale of shares as a sale of the undertaking.
  5. Violation of section 84(2) of the Companies Act and Companies (Issue of Share Certificates) Rules, 1960.
  6. Removal of the name from the Register of Members without sufficient cause.
  7. Prayer for rectification of the Register of Members.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Locus Standi of the Petitioners:
  The CLB held in favor of the petitioners, affirming their right to present the petition. The petitioners, being shareholders and having a substantial interest in the companies involved, were deemed to have the necessary standing to challenge the actions of the respondents.
  
  2. Relegation to Suit:
  The CLB found against the petitioners, deciding that the matter need not be relegated to a civil suit. The Board determined that sufficient material was available to adjudicate the issues within the summary procedure under section 111 of the Companies Act, thus negating the need for a more extensive civil trial.
  
  3. Violation of Undertaking Given to CLB in C.P. No. 29 of 1992:
  The CLB found against the petitioners, concluding that the undertaking given by the second respondent in C.P. No. 29 of 1992 did not survive the disposal of the petition. The undertaking was specific to the proceedings of that petition and did not extend beyond its resolution.
  
  4. Sale of Shares as a Sale of the Undertaking:
  The CLB found against the petitioners, determining that the sale of shares by the second respondent did not constitute a sale of the undertaking. The Board differentiated between the sale of shares and the sale of the company's undertaking, finding no violation in the sale of shares.
  
  5. Violation of Section 84(2) of the Companies Act and Companies (Issue of Share Certificates) Rules, 1960:
  The CLB found in favor of the petitioners, holding that the issuance of duplicate share certificates by the first respondent was against the law. The Board highlighted the lack of proper investigation and adherence to statutory requirements before issuing the duplicate certificates, thereby invalidating the issuance process.
  
  6. Removal of the Name from the Register of Members Without Sufficient Cause:
  The CLB found in favor of the petitioners, concluding that the removal of the second respondent's name from the Register of Members and the subsequent entry of respondents 17 to 19 were done without sufficient cause. The Board noted the collusion and fraudulent actions of the directors of respondents 1 and 2, which led to the improper removal and entry.
  
  7. Prayer for Rectification of the Register of Members:
  The CLB granted the prayer for rectification, directing the removal of the names of respondents 17 to 19 from the Register of Members and the re-entry of the second respondent's name. The Board found that the transferees (respondents 17 to 19) were not bona fide purchasers for value without notice and that the issuance of duplicate certificates and the subsequent transfer were fraudulent and collusive.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court upheld the CLB's findings on issues 1, 5, 6, and 7, affirming the petitioners' locus standi, the illegality of the duplicate certificates, the improper removal from the Register of Members, and the need for rectification. The Court dismissed the appeals challenging these findings, thereby supporting the CLB's decision to rectify the Register of Members and reinstate the second respondent's name. The Court also modified the CLB's direction regarding the repayment to respondents 17 to 19, stating that the second respondent-company was not liable to pay any amount, and respondents 17 to 19 could pursue appropriate proceedings against the directors if necessary.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 374
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the court should confirm the sale of assets of a company in liquidation to the highest bidder or consider subsequent higher offers.
  2. Whether the court can exercise discretion to reauction the property if there is a possibility of obtaining a higher price.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1:
  The High Court was faced with the decision of whether to confirm the sale of assets of a company in liquidation to the highest bidder or consider subsequent higher offers. The official liquidator received 18 tenders for the purchase of the assets, with the highest offer being made by the State Bank of India for Rs. 52 lakhs. Another offer was made by the FACT for Rs. 26,76,000. The FACT later sought a direction to negotiate for the purchase of specific land, offering a higher amount of Rs. 66.09 lakhs. The State Bank of India opposed this, arguing that the auction was conducted fairly, and the court should not entertain subsequent higher offers. The court considered past judgments emphasizing the importance of confirming sales at reasonable prices and safeguarding against inadequate prices due to irregularities or fraud. Ultimately, the court decided to exercise discretion and ordered a reauction of the property with wide publicity, considering the significant difference in the offers and the duty to safeguard the interests of the company and creditors.
  
  Issue 2:
  The court also had to determine whether it could exercise discretion to reauction the property if there was a possibility of obtaining a higher price. Referring to a recent Supreme Court decision, the court highlighted the duty to secure the most remunerative price and the discretion to reopen auctions to achieve this goal. The court emphasized the importance of considering the interests of creditors, workmen, and the company in liquidation when deciding on the sale. In this case, despite no allegations of fraud or irregularity, the court found it appropriate to order a reauction due to the substantial difference in offers and the potential for securing a higher price. The court directed the official liquidator to conduct the reauction within three months with an upset price of Rs. 66.09 lakhs, requiring the FACT to deposit funds for preliminary expenses.
  
  In conclusion, the High Court's judgment addressed the issues of confirming sales at reasonable prices, safeguarding against inadequate prices, and exercising discretion to reauction properties to secure the most remunerative price, ultimately ordering a reauction in this case to protect the interests of the company and creditors.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 355
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether there were more than one manufacturer in the same factory premises.
  2. Imposition of penalties and duty related to the manufacture of excisable goods.
  3. Confiscation of Crank shafts and imposition of redemption fine.
  4. Denial of exemption under specific notifications.
  5. Allegations of substitution of Crank shafts and duty demand.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The main issue in this appeal was whether two appellants, Banara Enterprises and Banara Udyog, were engaged in manufacturing excisable goods in the same factory premises. The Commissioner of Central Excise imposed penalties and demanded duty based on the belief that the two parties were operating as more than one manufacturer in the same location. However, the Tribunal examined various pieces of evidence, including lease deeds, bills, and ground plans, to determine the actual manufacturing setup. It was found that Party No. 2 had acquired its own machinery and was operating in a separate shed adjacent to Party No. 1's factory building. The Tribunal concluded that there was no substantial evidence to prove that the two parties were carrying out manufacturing activities from the same factory, and thus, the Commissioner's conclusions were deemed unsustainable.
  
  2. The Commissioner had imposed penalties and demanded duty relating to the clearances made by Party No. 2 during specific financial years. However, the Tribunal found that the evidence presented did not support the allegations made by the Department. Additionally, the charge of substitution of Crank shafts was not backed by any substantial inquiry results. Consequently, the duty demand and penalties imposed were set aside, as the Tribunal deemed them unjustified based on the lack of concrete evidence.
  
  3. The confiscation of Crank shafts and the imposition of a redemption fine were also challenged in the appeal. The Tribunal noted discrepancies in the panchnama and statements provided regarding the seized Crank shafts. It was observed that the evidence did not conclusively prove the allegations of substitution. Therefore, the confiscation of Crank shafts and the redemption fine were deemed unsustainable and set aside by the Tribunal.
  
  4. Another issue addressed in the appeal was the denial of exemption under specific notifications to the appellants. The Tribunal found that the denial of exemption was not justified, as there was no concrete evidence to establish that the appellants did not qualify for the exemptions under Notification No. 105/80 and 77/83. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the denial of exemption based on the lack of substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision.
  
  5. In conclusion, the Tribunal found that the demands of duty, penalties, and confiscation made by the Commissioner of Central Excise were not sustainable based on the lack of concrete evidence and inconsistencies in the Department's allegations. As a result, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeals of the appellants were allowed, providing relief from the penalties and duty demands imposed by the Commissioner.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 351
  
  Issues: Inclusion of filling charges in the assessable value under the Central Excise Act, 1944.
  
  The judgment pertains to an appeal filed by the Revenue regarding the inclusion of filling charges collected separately by M/s. Solar Chemicals from their customers in the assessable value. The Revenue contended that the extra sums of Rs. 10/- per tanker, collected when filling was done manually due to pump failure, should be part of the assessable value. The Respondent argued that these charges were only for manual filling when power supply failed, and therefore should not be included. The Appellate Tribunal considered whether these charges should be included in the assessable value under Section 4 of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944.
  
  During the hearing, the Revenue argued that the additional sums of Rs. 10/- per metric ton were an additional consideration and should be included in the assessable value. On the other hand, the Respondent contended that these charges were only collected when manual filling was required due to power supply failure, and were not part of the assessable value. The Tribunal noted that the filling was done within the factory premises before delivery to customers, and held that filling charges, regardless of manual or pump operation, should be included in the assessable value.
  
  The Tribunal found that the extra sums of Rs. 10/- per metric ton, collected separately, were not included in the assessable value. They determined that these filling charges, when done within the factory premises, should be included in the assessable value. The Tribunal also noted that the filling charges needed to be considered in arriving at the factory gate price, despite arguments that they were not essential. The Tribunal emphasized that the correct assessable values must be determined under Section 4 of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944, and concluded that the filling charges were indeed includible in the assessable values.
  
  After considering all relevant factors, the Tribunal held that the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) was improper and allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the decision was made in favor of the Revenue.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 347
  
  The appeal was against the order of the Collector (Appeals) upholding the Assistant Collector's decision. The case involved the Modvat scheme and the validity of gate passes with endorsements. The Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondents, allowing them to take credit of duty under the Modvat scheme. The appeal was rejected.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 346
  
  The appeal dealt with Modvat Credit for HDPE Granules not declared initially. The appellants did not declare HDPE granules as an input but later sought permission for using them, which was granted. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, stating that the appellants satisfied the authorities by seeking permission for using the HDPE granules, thus granting them the benefit of Modvat Credit.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 345
  
  Issues:
  - Appeal against Order-in-Appeal dated 31-7-1992 allowing appeal filed by M/s. K.B. Corporation
  - Additional evidence by Collector for valuation of goods
  - Opposing introduction of new evidence by respondent
  - Interpretation of Delhi High Court's judgment in Gunvant v. Collector of Central Excise
  - Application of Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal
  - Consideration of Rule 23 of CEGAT (Procedure) Rules
  - Necessity of additional evidence for proper disposal of the matter
  - Remand of the matter for de novo adjudication
  
  Analysis:
  The Collector of Customs, Bombay filed an appeal against the Order-in-Appeal allowing the appeal by M/s. K.B. Corporation, setting aside the Order-in-Original and directing the assessable value based on the invoice value for imported goods. The Collector sought to introduce additional evidence regarding markings on the bags of the goods, which was opposed by the respondent. The respondent argued that the Collector lacked authority to introduce new evidence, citing judgments to support the opposition. The Tribunal considered the submissions, referencing the Delhi High Court's judgment and the Supreme Court's decision, emphasizing that additional evidence should not be permitted without sufficient cause. However, Rule 23 of CEGAT (Procedure) Rules allows for the production of documents if necessary for justice. The Tribunal found the evidence crucial for decision-making, especially in comparing goods and manufacturers, leading to the allowance of the miscellaneous application.
  
  The Tribunal noted that the respondents had not been given an opportunity to respond to the department's case based on the additional evidence. Consequently, the impugned order-in-appeal was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Assistant Commissioner of Customs for fresh adjudication after providing the additional evidence to the respondents and allowing them a fresh hearing. The appeal was allowed on these terms, ensuring fairness and proper consideration of all relevant evidence in the adjudication process.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 344
  
  Issues:
  1. Modvat benefit on high explosives used in mining operations for blasting limestone.
  2. Modvat credit for grinding media in coal mills used in cement manufacture.
  3. Eligibility of lignite and lining matter as inputs in cement manufacture.
  
  Issue 1: Modvat benefit on high explosives used in mining operations for blasting limestone:
  The appeal filed challenged the grant of Modvat benefit to the respondent for using high explosives in mining operations for blasting limestone. The Appellant argued that since limestone is the end product and not high explosives, Modvat credit should not be allowed. The Respondent contended that the wide interpretation of "used in relation to manufacture" should include high explosives. The East Regional Bench decision supported the Respondent, but the South Regional Bench limited Modvat credit to explosives used in licensed factory premises for obtaining limestone for cement manufacture. Due to conflicting decisions, the matter was referred to the Hon'ble President for resolution.
  
  Issue 2: Modvat credit for grinding media in coal mills used in cement manufacture:
  The second appeal involved the disallowance of Modvat credit for grinding media (balls) used in coal mills for cement manufacture. The Consultant argued that grinding balls are consumed in the cement manufacturing process and should be considered an input. However, the DR contended that grinding media's purpose is to crush raw materials and not directly related to cement manufacture. Previous Tribunal cases supported Modvat credit for grinding media, but the South Regional Bench held otherwise. The matter was referred to the Hon'ble President for clarification.
  
  Issue 3: Eligibility of lignite and lining matter as inputs in cement manufacture:
  Lastly, the Consultant for India Cements Ltd. argued that lignite and lining matter should be considered inputs in cement manufacture. However, it was concluded that lining plates and lignites are integral parts of equipment and not inputs directly related to cement manufacture, affirming the lower authority's reasoning.
  
  In summary, the judgment addressed the conflicting interpretations of "used in relation to manufacture" concerning high explosives and grinding media in cement manufacture, leading to the referral of both issues to the Hon'ble President for resolution. Additionally, the eligibility of lignite and lining matter as inputs in cement manufacture was clarified, affirming the lower authority's decision.

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• 1996 (4) TMI 343
  
  The appeal was filed against the Collector (Appeals) order denying Modvat credit on CO2 gas used in the manufacture of sand moulds. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, stating that CO2 gas is an eligible input for Modvat credit as it is used in the manufacture of steel castings. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

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