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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 382 Records
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1996 (1) TMI 343 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... in April, 1995. In such a situation, the application has to be held as not maintainable. Thus, I find that the application, as filed by the petitioner in 1995, which is after the proceedings were initiated before the BIFR and during the pendency of the proceedings is not maintainable and no application for winding-up lies before this court. Under these circumstances, I have to necessarily hold that the application does not lie in view of the bar contained under section 22(1) of the Act. However, the interest of the petitioner has been amply protected by sub-section (5) of section 22, wherein the limitation prescribed under the relevant statute shall be deemed to be extended till the bar under section 22 of the Act is cleared. Accordingly, the company petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. However, this order does not preclude the petitioner from obtaining permission/approval of the Board and initiating proceedings for winding up of the respondent-company.
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1996 (1) TMI 342 - NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
District forum -Jurisdiction of ... ... ... ... ..... t places apply for shares it does not mean that the cause of action will accrue to the applicants at the places they reside or are expected to receive the share certificates. The applications for the shares will be deemed to have been accepted at the place where the company has its registered office or from where the shares are to be despatched. Post Office will be deemed to be acting as agent for share holders for delivery of shares to them. As noticed above, the petitioner company has its registered office at Chandigarh while its place of work is at Mandsaur (MP). It has no branch office at Rajanand Gaon. Hence we hold that the District Forum at Rajanand Gaon has no jurisdic-tion to entertain the complaints. Accordingly we accept all the present revision petitions and set aside the orders of the District Forum as well as of the State Commission and dismiss all the complaints forming subject matter of the above revision petitions. No costs. Petitions allowed. SCL q JUNE 1996
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1996 (1) TMI 341 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... company petition if the respondents pay half of the value of the land. But the value of the land was not mentioned in the deposition as on 1-12-1987. Mr. V.V.S. Rao, learned counsel submits that Rs. 2 lakhs will be reasonable amount of the value of the petitioner s shareholding. In view of this, I think it is just and reasonable that respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are directed to pay Rs. 2 lakhs (rupees two lakhs only), to the petitioner and acquire his shares, within three months from today. In default, it is open to the petitioner to move this court for an appropriate direction regarding the purchase of shares of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 by him as on today at a price to be fixed by the court. The company petition is allowed. No cost. ON BEING MENTIONED On being mentioned, Mr. V.V.S. Rao says that the company petition, C.P. No. 27 of 1988, may be treated as disposed of and not as allowed. Accordingly, for the word allowed in the last para, substitute disposed of. SCL q DECEMBER, 1996
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1996 (1) TMI 340 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Appeals to High Court ... ... ... ... ..... said director had no competence to order the confiscation, was not correct and that was why the Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong in quashing the order of confiscation. In other words, the question in the said Supreme Court case mainly turned on the competency or jurisdiction of the Director of Enforcement to order confiscation on the facts of the said case. In the present case, the question of competency or jurisdiction of the Appellate Board in setting aside the confiscation, does not arise. But the only argument is that the Appellate Board was not justified on the facts in setting aside the confiscation. Viewed in this light, the said Supreme Court decision has no application to the present case. Accordingly, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the Appellate Board within the four corners of section 54 of the Act. The civil miscellaneous appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 339 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Restrictions on payments, Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents ... ... ... ... ..... h the penalty order may be retained, the confiscation order must be set aside since the confiscation is not mandatory. There is no merit in this contention also. In the light of what is stated above, there is sufficient reason for the confiscation order passed concurrently .by both the authorities below. One other faint submission made by learned counsel for the appellant is that, according to him, in a similar case, the confiscation was not ordered. Even assuming that confiscation was not ordered in another case, it cannot be said that confiscation should not be ordered in the present case since each case turns on its own facts. Thus, the Appellate Board also, in its order, has rightly observed in paragraph 7 of its order. The net result is, there is no warrant for interference at all with the orders passed by the authorities below. Accordingly the civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed with costs. Consequently C M. P. Nos. 1391 and 3604 of 1984 for stay are also dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 338 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... f of the facts on which the defence depends. This was reiterated in a recent case Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. v. North India Petrochemicals Ltd. 1994 79 Comp. Cas. 335 (SC), where the petition for winding up was not admitted since the relationship of creditor and debtor did not exist and the same was the subject-matter of arbitration which was pending adjudication and the defence raised was a substantial one. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the above two cases. I hold that the petitioner cannot seek the relief of winding up since there is a prima facie case in the plea of the respondent that the debt is barred by limitation. It is, however, made clear that whatever is stated in this judgment about the debt being barred by limitation is only a prima facie view and it is open to the petitioner to recover the amount claimed in the appropriate forum, if permitted by law. The company petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 337 - NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
Complaint - Maintainability of ... ... ... ... ..... vidence and a detailed scrutiny and assessment of such evidence. It is no doubt true that the forums constituted under the Act are vested with the power to examine witnesses on oath and to order discovery and production of documents. But such power is to be exercised in cases where the issues involved are simple such as the defective quality of any goods purchased or any shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance of the service which the respondent has contracted to perform for consideration. Even in such cases, if it appear to the concerned Forum under the Act that the issue raised cannot be determined without taking elaborate oral and documentary evidence. It is open to it to decline to exercise jurisdiction and refer the party to his ordinary remedy by way of suit. 7. We, therefore, decline to go into the merits of the complaint and refer the complainant to its ordinary remedies by way of suit or other remedies. We make no order as to costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 336 - SUPREME COURT
What is "gambling"?
What is the meaning of the expression "mere skill" in terms of section 49A of the Madras City Police Act, 1888 (the Police Act), and section 11 of the Madras Gaming Act, 1930 (the Gaming Act)?
Whether the running of horse races by the club is a game of "chance" or a game of "mere skill"?
Whether "wagering" or "betting" on horse races is "gaming" as defined by the Police Act and the Gaming Act ?
Whether horse racing—even if it is a game of "mere skill"—is still prohibited under section 49A of the Police Act and section 4 of the Gaming Act?
Whether the Madras Race Club (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1986 (the 1986 Act), gives effect to the policy under article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India (the Constitution) and as such is protected under article 31(c) of the Constitution 1 If not, whether the 1986 Act is liable to be struck down as violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?
Held that:- Allow the writ petitions and the civil appeal. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. We hold and declare that horse racing is a game of mere skill within the meaning of section 49 of the Police Act and section 11 of the Gaming Act. Horse racing is neither "gaming" nor "gambling" as defined and envisaged under the two Acts read with the 1974 Act and the penal provisions of these Acts are not applicable to horse racing which is a game of skill. The 1986 Act is ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution and as such is struck down.
We direct the committee of management under the Chairmanship of Justice S. Natarajan, appointed by this court, to hand over the management, functioning and operation of the club to a duly constituted management committee, under the memorandum and articles of association of the club, before March 31, 1996.
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1996 (1) TMI 335 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Time for making award - Enlargement of ... ... ... ... ..... dings before the arbitrators have not become null and void. 8. Mr. Purohit informs this Court that the proceedings before the arbitra- tors have been completed and the arbitrators have just to make their award. The petitioner, as averred in the petition, also desires that the award be made at the earliest since restoration of his membership is dependent upon completion of pending arbitration proceedings against him. That being the position, it is in the interest of the petitioner that the arbitration proceedings instituted by the 1st respondents against the petitioner are completed at the earliest. 9. Since I find no merit in the petition, the petition is dismissed at the stage of its admission itself with no order as to costs. However, the respondents 2 and 3 are directed to make their award at the earliest and in any event by 31-3-1996. The learned Advocates for the 1st respondents are to intimate this order in writing to respondents 2, 3 and 4 within two weeks from to-day.
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1996 (1) TMI 334 - SPECIAL COURT (TRIAL OF OFFENCES RELATING TO TRANS
... ...
... ... ..... ovision read with section 13 which gives the Special Court Act overriding effect is a clear indicator that the jurisdiction of the High Court is clearly ousted. In our view, the incorporation of section 11A into the Special Court Act at a later date and non-mention of Contempt of Courts Act along with the other three statutes have not made any difference insofar as the scope of section 10 read with section 13 is concerned and all that section 11A has done is giving powers to the Special Court to punish a person before the court for having committed contempt of the Special Court. When a person is punished by Special Court for having committed contempt of itself, the order is naturally made by a Special Court and, therefore, an appeal against such order can only lie to Supreme Court and not to High Court. 18. In our view, these appeals cannot be entertained by this court and, hence, they are rejected. 19. Certified copy expedited. Appeals not maintainable. SCL q DECEMBER, 1 996
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1996 (1) TMI 333 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... supplies were made against the order prima facie a dispute is there as to whether the goods are according to specification or not. The correspondence which has been placed on record by the petitioner is one sided only. Even the legal notice which was alleged to have been sent through the advocate on December 21, 1993, which is referred to in annexure-9 has not been furnished. The direction for winding up or admitting the petition for that purpose could have been given if there was an admitted liability which the respondent-company neglected to pay. The claim on the basis of two bills Nos. 192 arid 196 as mentioned above is not admitted by any of the document by the respondents and on the contrary they have come with the clear case that the goods are not of required specification. In these circumstances, I consider that the claim of the petitioner is a disputed one for which it is not appropriate to entertain the petition for winding up. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act the Bank is competent to issue the notification dated 19-4-1993 inserting Paragraph 4A in the 1987 Directions?
Whether Paragraph 4A is violative of the provisions of articles 14 and 19(1)(g)?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Unable to uphold the judgment of the High Court striking down Paragraph 4A introduced by notification dated 19-4-1993. In our opinion, it is within the competence of the Bank to issue directions in the nature contained in Paragraph 4A and the said provision is not violative of the rights guaranteed under articles 14 and 19(1)(g). Peerless can make a representation to the Bank for the revision of the said amount in the light of the expenses that would be incurred by it on brochure/application form and servicing depositors' account and, if such a representation is made, the Bank shall give due consideration to the same and, if the amount prescribed is found to be inadequate, the Bank should revise the same.
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1996 (1) TMI 331 - NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
Compensation for negligence ... ... ... ... ..... ount of evidence or material can be looked upon a plea not put forward. At the appellate stage the appellant cannot be allowed to refer to its version in the memorandum of appeal to contend that the findings recorded by the State Commission are not correct. We have gone through the material on record before the State Commission as well as Annexures A, B and C before the State Commission and the calculations of the loss suffered by the complainant due to loss of interest and devaluation of the Indian currency qua U.S. dollars as well as the affidavits of the complainant and documents produced by him before the State Commission. The finding recorded by the State Commission about the balance amount as well as the loss of interest and the loss suffered on account of devaluation has been correctly arrived at. We uphold the findings of the State Commission. 6. There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 5,000. Appeal dismissed. SCL q OCTOBER, 1996
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1996 (1) TMI 330 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Enforcement of orders of one court by other courts ... ... ... ... ..... could be considered a decree and the same shall be enforced for the purpose of realising the amount ordered to be paid by merely filing a certified copy of the order before the proper officer of the court required to enforce the order. This section was incorporated in the Companies Act perhaps to ensure that company debts are recovered expeditiously. In view of the aforesaid, we sustain the objection raised by the registry and direct the registry to return the transfer application for filing an execution application. Before parting with this judgment, I must compliment the Assistant Registrar (Companies), Mr. Nirmal Sopory, for raising an intelligent query based on the legislative intention of section 635 of the Companies Act, 1956. C. A. No. 833 of 1995, for transfer of the decree to the court of Maharashtra for execution is rejected and the official liquidator instead is directed to file execution application. The application is disposed of in the terms as indicated above.
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1996 (1) TMI 290 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... .02 or 85.14 as the case may be and therefore the objection of the Ld. DR has some force but the imported item is not one of the types of generators indicated in the explanatory notes under Heading 85.43 or 85.02. Hence, in spite of the fact that it has not been presented together with heating station, it will be more appropriate to classify it under this heading. 3.0 emsp Looking at it from a slightly different angle, the imported item appears to be very akin to the type of items indicated in the explanatory note II under the heading ldquo other industrial or laboratory induction or dielectric heating equipment rdquo . Again looking, in a yet different way it is in the nature an assembly or sub-assembly which is admittedly a part of induction heating equipment and the parts of 85.14 are classifiable in the same heading as the main item as per HSN also. Once again 85.14 would be more appropriate heading. 3.1 emsp Hence, we set aside the impugned orders and accept the appeal.
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1996 (1) TMI 281 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Synthetic waste ... ... ... ... ..... bres (P) Ltd. cited supra. Against this plea of the respondents herein the appellant submitted that the decision of the Bombay High Court has not become final as the appeal against this decision is still pending with the Supreme Court. Considering these two submissions, we find that the order of the Hon rsquo ble Bombay High Court is final and binding unless it is set aside or modified by the Hon rsquo ble Supreme Court. The respondents herein also relied upon the judgment in the case of Indian Scientific Glass cited supra. We find that this Tribunal in this case had come to the conclusion that synthetic waste shall be classifiable under T.I. 68 after considering a number of decision including the decision of the Hon rsquo ble Bombay High Court. Following the ratio of the two judgments cited supra, we hold that Synthetic waste imported by the respondents herein is classifiable under Tariff Item 68. In this view of the matter we uphold the impugned order and reject the appeal.
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1996 (1) TMI 276 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... n turbine fuel -- emsp 2710.29 Other The Heading indicates lsquo Kerosene rsquo ldquo which is ordinarily used as an illuminant in oil burning lamps rdquo and aviation turbine fuel, that is to say, any hydrocarbon oil excluding mineral colza turpentine substitute which has a smoke point of 18 millimetres or more and has a final boiling point not exceeding 300oC. This entry, therefore, makes a petroleum oil liable to tax under this entry provided it has a smoke point of 18 mm or more and a final boiling point not exceeding 300oC. It is on record that on chemical test the products were found to conform to these two basic specifications. The products admittedly also are petroleum oil within the meaning of Chapter 27. In this view of the matter considering that the products fully confirmed to the specification given in the Tariff the end use would be irrelevant in this case. In this view of the matter, therefore, we uphold the impugned order and reject the Revenue rsquo s appeal.
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1996 (1) TMI 272 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... at theirs is a composite product wherein the Teflon lining imparts the essential character to the goods and classification should therefore be as plastic material as correctly done earlier under Chapter 39 CETA. On the other hand, Shri D. Gurnani, JDR, referred to the product literature available on record and stated that the essential character is given to the goods by the steel pipes which alone is capable of withstanding high pressure and also fight corrosion. We find the issue is arguable and are of the view that prima facie case for dispensing with pre-deposit has not been made out. We therefore, direct that for the purpose of hearing the appeal on merits in terms of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the applicant should pre-deposit Rs. 10 lakhs on or before 15-3-1997. 3. emsp The matter will come up for ascertaining compliance with this order on 17-3-1997. On compliance with this order, pre-deposit the balance duty amount is disposed with and recovery stayed.
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1996 (1) TMI 271 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Valuation - Sale at factory gate ... ... ... ... ..... t find any deliberate intention on the part of the appellants to evade payment of duty. The appellants have taken a view as per the interpretation of Section 4 and which appears to my mind, the correct interpretation as observed earlier. Since, I have also held that the obovesaid expenses recovered through debit notes will not form the part of assessable value I do not find any justification not to waive the penalty and the same is, therefore, waived. rdquo 5. emsp On going through the submissions made by both the sides and records, particularly are impugned order passed by the ld. Collector (Appeals), we find that the issue in respect of the above expenses has been properly considered by the ld. Collector (Appeals) as it was correctly pointed but by the ld. Counsel for the respondents. 6. emsp In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do no find any infirmity in the impugned order. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the Department are hereby dismissed. Order accordingly.
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1996 (1) TMI 270 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Valuation - Demand - Penalty - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... excessive. Accordingly the McDowell case had no application here. In the circumstances, we hold that the Additional Collector was not justified in treating M/s. Minsulate India as a related person of the appellant company and treating the selling price of the former as the basis for assessment of duty at the hands of the latter. Though the appeal is thus allowed on merits, the plea against the application of the longer period of limitation is also acceptable. The appellants had filed price list in the appropriate form applicable in respect of sales through a related person. As has come out in the arguments before us which has also been referred to in this order earlier, the Assistant Collector had held that it was ldquo superfluous rdquo . In the circumstances of the case, the element of suppression or wilful mis-statement etc. cannot be said to be involved. The appeal succeeds on the plea of limitation also. 5. emsp The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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