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Showing 141 to 160 of 453 Records
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1996 (2) TMI 469
Issues:
Interpretation of entry No. 41-E of the First Schedule to the Act for taxation purposes based on the assembly and sale of wet grinders, electric motors, and grinders separately.
Analysis:
The judgment delivered by the Madras High Court pertains to an appeal against an order passed by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under section 37 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The appellant/assessee contended that the tax assessment based on entry No. 41-E of the Act was not valid as they claimed to be selling electric motors and grinders separately, not as wet grinders. However, the Joint Commissioner found that the goods were sold together to consumers, indicating they were assembled into wet grinders before sale. The Joint Commissioner also noted that the appellant had purchased wet grinders with motors from registered dealers. The assessment was adjusted based on the profit margin, resulting in a revised taxable turnover for the appellant.
The appellant relied on a Division Bench decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Suguna Agencies but the court distinguished the case, emphasizing that when an entity assembles electrical motors and grinders into a new commodity like an electrical wet grinder, it falls under entry No. 41-E for taxation purposes. The court rejected the appellant's claim that they were selling the components separately, as it was found that they assembled and sold them as wet grinders. Consequently, the court upheld the Joint Commissioner's order, stating that it did not warrant interference, and dismissed the appeal without costs.
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1996 (2) TMI 468
Amendment of rule - Held that:- Statutory rules cannot be overridden by executive orders or executive practice. Merely because the Government had taken a decision to amend the rules does not mean that the rule stood obliterated. Till the rule is amended, the rule applies. Even today the amendment has not been effected. As and when it is effected ordinarily it would be prospective in nature unless expressly or by necessary implication found to be retrospective. The Tribunal was, therefore, wrong in ignoring the rule.
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1996 (2) TMI 467
Issues: Interpretation of exemption notifications under Central Excise law; Compliance with conditions of Notification No. 56/78 for concessional rate of duty; Legal interpretation of exemption notifications; Adherence to strict interpretation of exemption notifications by the judiciary.
In this case, the appellants challenged the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) regarding the interpretation of exemption notifications under Central Excise law. The appellants cleared two air-conditioners under Notification No. 56/78 for a concessional rate of duty but failed to comply with the conditions of the notification. The main condition required the submission of a report within one month to confirm the actual use of the air-conditioners for the specified purpose. The lower authorities demanded duty payment as the condition was not met. The appellants argued for a liberal interpretation of the exemption notification, citing a Supreme Court decision. They claimed to have submitted a letter indicating compliance with the notification. However, the Tribunal found that the appellants did not submit the required report or apply for an extension within the stipulated time frame, leading to the demand for differential duty being justified.
Regarding the interpretation of exemption notifications, the Tribunal emphasized that exemptions are exceptions and should be strictly construed. Referring to the Supreme Court judgments in the Novopan and Liberty Oil Mills cases, the Tribunal reiterated the principle of strict interpretation of exemption notifications. The Tribunal upheld the lower authorities' decision, highlighting that doubts in interpreting exemption notifications should be resolved in favor of the revenue department. Consequently, the appeal was rejected based on the adherence to the strict interpretation of exemption notifications and the failure of the appellants to comply with the specified conditions within the prescribed timeline.
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1996 (2) TMI 466
Issues: Denial of de novo adjudication, enhancement of redemption fine and penalty.
Analysis:
The appellants challenged the order of the Collector, Central Excise, which denied de novo adjudication and increased the redemption fine from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 50,000, and the penalty from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 25,000. The case involved the seizure of excess marble tiles by Central Excise Authorities from the factory premises of the appellants. The Collector allowed redemption of the goods on payment of a fine and imposed a penalty. Upon appeal to the Tribunal, the case was remanded for a speaking order. However, on de novo adjudication, the Collector raised the fines and penalties significantly, prompting the appeal before the Tribunal.
The consultant for the appellants argued that the seized marble tiles were not fully manufactured and had not reached the stage of entry in the RG-1 register. He contended that the seizure was unjustified and that the enhanced fines were disproportionate. The consultant highlighted that on a previous occasion, the Tribunal had sent the case for de novo adjudication, suggesting bias on the part of the Collector in increasing the fines without proper notice to the appellants.
On the other hand, the SDR submitted that even if the goods were in a semi-finished state, they should have been entered in the RG-1 register as it allows for semi-finished goods. The SDR acknowledged that the enhancement of fines may not have been necessary.
After hearing both sides, the Judge found a dispute regarding the stage of the goods but agreed with the SDR that a breach in account maintenance occurred as the goods were not entered in the appropriate column of the RG-1 register. Consequently, a penalty was deemed appropriate. However, the Judge considered the initial penalty imposed by the Collector to be reasonable and reduced the penalty from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 10,000. Similarly, the redemption fine was reduced from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 5,000, considering the initial amount to be reasonable. The Judge upheld the impugned order with modifications, disposing of the appeal accordingly.
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1996 (2) TMI 465
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi ruled on the classification of Electrical Grade Industrial Insulation Board. The goods were classified under Heading 8546.00, following a previous decision in a similar case. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the classification under Heading 3920.31.
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1996 (2) TMI 464
Issues:
Claim for higher notional Modvat credit beyond six months.
Analysis:
The appeal was filed against the denial of Higher Notional Credit claimed beyond six months. The appellants, engaged in manufacturing HDPE/PP woven fabrics sacks, procured HDPE and claimed Modvat credit on the inputs. The Department contended that the higher notional credit of duty was inadmissible as it was claimed beyond six months. The Advocate for the appellants argued that there is no time-limit for claiming Modvat credit of duty under the scheme. He cited various Tribunal judgments supporting the view that there is no limitation for claiming Modvat credit. The Advocate emphasized that once GP 1 showing the credit of duty is submitted to the Department, the notional higher credit claimed on the strength of the gate pass should not be subject to any limitation. He relied on judgments like Premier Cables Company Limited, Veekay General Industries, and HCL to support his contention. The Advocate concluded that there is no specific provision under Modvat Rules for claiming credit of duty. On the other hand, the JDR argued that the claim for Modvat credit must be made within a reasonable time, as held in previous Tribunal cases.
The Tribunal examined whether there is a limitation on claiming Modvat credit of duty. It was observed that there is no specific stipulation in the Modvat Rules regarding the time limit for claiming Modvat credit. The appellants had claimed normal Modvat credit by submitting relevant gate passes to the authorities, showing that the manufacturer of the inputs enjoyed the benefit of a specific notification. Therefore, anyone purchasing inputs from a small-scale industrial unit under the notification was entitled to higher notional credit. The Tribunal held that the claim for higher notional Modvat credit was established when GP-1 was submitted to the Department while filing RT-12 returns, making any limitation inapplicable in this case. The Tribunal noted its consistent stance that in the absence of a specific limitation in the Modvat Rules, Modvat credit of duty can be taken without any restriction.
Regarding the contention that 'reasonable time' necessarily means six months, the Tribunal found that since the claim was already established by submitting relevant GP-1 with RT-12 returns, the six-month limitation would not apply in this scenario. Considering the discussions and case laws cited, the Tribunal concluded that the limitation was not applicable in the circumstances of the case and in line with its consistent view. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
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1996 (2) TMI 463
Issues: Appeals against order of Collector (Appeals) dismissing appellant's appeals filed against Assistant Collector's orders regarding import of dry fruits.
Import of Green Raisins, Almonds, and Abjosh (Specific Duty): Assistant Collector adopted highest value in the season to arrive at assessable value, leading to confiscation due to exceeding value of import license. Tribunal established that actual price paid by importer must be shown for debiting to licenses, following Glaxo Laboratories case. Decision applied to commodities with ad valorem duty as well, as transaction value was genuine. No case by Department against transaction value's genuineness. Confiscation, fines, and penalties set aside, appeals allowed.
Excess Weight in Imports: Actual weighment showed slight excess weight in some imports, violating license conditions. However, differences were negligible (26 Kgs to 50 Kgs out of total weights varying from 2,000 Kgs to 7,240 Kgs) and not deliberate excess quantities. Variations condoned. Orders confiscating goods, fixing fines, and levying penalties deemed unsustainable and set aside. Appeals allowed.
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1996 (2) TMI 462
Issues Involved:
1. Confiscation of consignment of ball bearings.
2. Refund of fine and personal penalty imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962.
3. Validity of import license and classification of ball bearings as banned or unstandard.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Confiscation of consignment of ball bearings:
The petitioner sought quashing of the order dated June 18, 1977, passed by the Special Secretary to the Government of India, which upheld the confiscation of 48 cases of ball bearings. The Customs authorities had rejected the clearance on the grounds that the dimensions of the imported ball bearings (25x62x17 mm) did not match those declared in the invoice and Bill of Entry (24x61x16 mm). The authorities issued a show cause notice under Section 111(d) and (m) of the Customs Act, 1962, and the petitioner responded, denying the discrepancy and claiming the bearings were unstandard and not banned. However, the Collector of Customs concluded that the imported bearings were of banned sizes, materially different from the declared dimensions, and ordered confiscation under Section 111(m) and 111(d) of the Customs Act, allowing redemption on payment of a fine.
2. Refund of fine and personal penalty imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962:
The petitioner also sought a refund of the fine of Rs. 44,800/- paid for redeeming the confiscated goods and a personal penalty of Rs. 12,800/- imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act. The Collector of Customs had imposed these penalties, which were upheld by the Central Board of Excise & Customs and the Government of India, Department of Revenue and Banking. The authorities concluded that the goods were of a banned category as per the Import Trade Control Policy and confirmed the penalties.
3. Validity of import license and classification of ball bearings as banned or unstandard:
The petitioner argued that the imported ball bearings were unstandard and not of the banned size 25x62x17 mm, as per the relevant Import Trade Control Policy. The petitioner cited test reports and a letter from the Bulgarian Embassy to support their claim. However, the Customs authorities and subsequent appellate bodies, including the Central Board of Excise & Customs and the Government of India, found that the ball bearings were either of the banned size or very close to it. The authorities relied on the test results and the relevant Import Trade Control Policy, which did not permit the import of ball bearings of the size mentioned in Appendix 14(1)(a).
Court's Conclusion:
The court considered the submissions and found that the dimensions of the ball bearings on actual inspection were 25x62x17 mm or close to it, contrary to the declared dimensions. The court noted that the petitioner's claim of importing unstandard bearings was not supported by the Import Trade Control Policy, which only considered the size of the bearings for determining the ban. The court emphasized that judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not allow it to act as an appellate body over administrative decisions but to examine the decision-making process. The court found no arbitrariness, irrationality, or patent illegality in the authorities' decisions.
Judgment:
The writ petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged. There was no order as to costs.
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1996 (2) TMI 460
Issues: Alleged misclassification of goods for duty exemption, exclusion of exported goods from duty calculation, limitation period for declaration, determination of manufacturer status, evidence of exports for duty calculation.
The judgment pertains to an appeal against an order of the Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi, regarding the alleged manufacture and clearance of sterile surgical sutures without duty payment after exceeding the exemption limit under Notification No. 175/86. The appellant argued that they manufactured non-sterile sutures leviable to duty under a different heading and were exempt under Notification No. 279/88. They contended that the duty, if applicable, should be paid by the Institutes handling sterilization. The appellant also claimed that the Collector erred in not considering the value of exported goods in the duty calculation, providing evidence of export through gate passes, certificates, and invoices. The appellant raised a limitation defense due to a missing date on the declaration and failure to inform the Department of exceeding the exemption limit. The Department argued that the appellant was the actual manufacturer based on re-packing, labeling, and testing activities post-sterilization, indicating ownership and manufacturing responsibility.
The appellate tribunal examined the manufacturing process involving sheep/goat caring treatment, twisting, polishing, packing, sterilization at external Institutes, and final repacking by the appellant. The tribunal found that the appellant was indeed engaged in manufacturing sterile surgical catguts, supported by a Drug license and labeling indicating their manufacturing status. The tribunal emphasized that despite sterilization being outsourced, the appellant remained the actual manufacturer responsible for testing and final packaging, distinguishing cited cases. Regarding the limitation defense, the tribunal noted the absence of a declaration date and upheld the extended period due to incomplete information. Concerning exports, the tribunal observed that while shipping bill details were provided, the Collector's denial of benefits lacked merit. The tribunal directed a reevaluation by the Collector, instructing to consider shipping bills as evidence of exports and reduce the quantity cleared without duty accordingly, remanding the matter for further determination and penalty assessment.
In conclusion, the tribunal upheld the appellant's manufacturing liability, rejected the limitation defense, and instructed a reassessment of exported goods for duty calculation based on shipping bill evidence, emphasizing substantive benefits eligibility despite technicalities. The appeal was partially allowed for duty calculation reconsideration, subject to the Collector's review and penalty determination.
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1996 (2) TMI 458
Issues:
1. Acceptability of transaction value of imported reconditioned used machines.
2. Application of Customs Valuation Rules, 1988, specifically Rule 8.
3. Interpretation of Ministry letters regarding depreciation method.
4. Duty of authorities to consider transaction value before invoking Rule 8.
5. Necessity of remand in the circumstances.
6. Guidelines for depreciation method issued by the Ministry of Finance.
7. Discrepancy in declared value and value determined by depreciation method.
8. Determination of duty leviable based on transaction value and depreciation method.
Analysis:
1. The appellant imported six reconditioned used machines in 1994 from West Germany for a Dairy Project, with certificates from Chartered Engineers. The authorities did not accept the transaction value, instead relying on the depreciation method based on Custom House practice and Ministry letters. The appellant challenged this valuation method.
2. The appellant argued that the authorities did not properly consider the transaction value and erroneously applied Rule 8 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988. They contended that since there is no international trade in such machines, sub-section (1A) of Section 14 of the Act should apply, and the authorities should have sequentially considered Rules 3 to 8 before resorting to the depreciation method.
3. The Tribunal clarified that the Ministry letters did not mandate the depreciation method for all cases of second-hand machinery imports. It emphasized that customs authorities must first assess the acceptability of transaction value before applying Valuation Rules 5 to 8. Since there was no international trade in the imported goods, the comparison with similar imports was irrelevant.
4. The Tribunal found that the authorities did not adequately consider the acceptability of transaction values before resorting to the depreciation method. The absence of a show cause notice and failure to assess the genuineness of declared values were highlighted as errors in the decision-making process.
5. Despite the option of remand, the appellant preferred the Tribunal to determine the assessable value based on the existing record. The Tribunal accepted this request and proceeded to evaluate the values of the imported machines.
6. Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance regarding the depreciation method were discussed, outlining the permissible depreciation rates and the calculation methodology. The Tribunal acknowledged the reasonableness of the depreciation method but also noted the need for flexibility based on the condition of the imported items.
7. A significant difference was observed between the declared values and the values determined by the depreciation method for some machines. The Tribunal concluded that for certain items, the vast difference warranted the application of Rule 8 to determine the value, while for others, the declared transaction values were acceptable.
8. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the jurisdictional Assistant Collector was directed to reevaluate the duty leviable based on accepting transaction values for specific items and the depreciation method for others, as determined by the Tribunal.
This comprehensive analysis of the judgment addresses all the issues involved and provides a detailed understanding of the Tribunal's decision-making process.
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1996 (2) TMI 451
Whether the sales tax authorities were justified in treating the purchases of the applicants made from Sulekha Enterprises as from an unregistered dealer on the ground that even though the registration certificate of Sulekha Enterprises was cancelled on August 25, 1967, the cancellation thereof was operative with effect from January, 1967 in so far as the purchases of the applicants effected from the said party prior to August 25, 1967 were concerned?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court was right in answering the question in favour of the respondents. A purchasing dealer is entitled by law to rely upon the certificate of registration of the selling dealer and to act upon it. Whatever may be the effect of a retrospective cancellation upon the selling dealer, it can have no effect upon any person who has acted upon the strength of a registration certificate when the registration was current. Also the learned Advocate-General, appearing for the department before the High Court, stated that the genuineness of the transactions between the registered dealer and the respondents was not in doubt and not disputed. This being so, it is difficult to see how there could have been a cancellation of registration with effect from a date that preceded the dates of the transactions and how, accordingly, the respondents could be made liable to pay tax.
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1996 (2) TMI 450
Issues Involved:
1. Contravention of Section 12(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
2. Nature of the export (consignment basis vs. outright sale).
3. Repatriation of the full amount payable by the foreign buyer.
4. Deductions for commission and expenses without Reserve Bank permission.
5. Applicability of precedents and judicial interpretations.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Contravention of Section 12(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947:
The appellant-firm was charged with contravening Section 12(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, by not repatriating the full declared export value of Rs. 56,783 for nine consignments of sharkfins and fishmaws exported to Singapore during 1970-71. The firm realized only Rs. 20,690.97 and failed to repatriate the balance of Rs. 36,092.03. Both the Enforcement Directorate and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board levied a penalty of Rs. 3,600 for this contravention.
2. Nature of the Export (Consignment Basis vs. Outright Sale):
The appellant contended that the exports were made on a consignment basis and not as outright sales. The values mentioned in the G.R. 1 forms were not the real values but were declared to satisfy customs authorities. The firm argued that the consignee in Singapore sold the goods and repatriated the sale proceeds after deducting commission and expenses. The court examined the G.R. 1 forms and found that the term "seller" was scored out, indicating that the exports were indeed on a consignment basis.
3. Repatriation of the Full Amount Payable by the Foreign Buyer:
The court emphasized that under Section 12(2) of the old Act, only the "full amount payable by the foreign buyer" needed to be repatriated, not the "full export value" as required under the new Act. The court referred to precedents, including the Supreme Court decision in Enforcement Directorate v. Krishnaswamy, which clarified that the amount payable by the foreign buyer is the actual price agreed upon and not any inflated or fictitious value declared in the invoices.
4. Deductions for Commission and Expenses Without Reserve Bank Permission:
The appellant claimed deductions for the consignee's commission and expenses without obtaining prior permission from the Reserve Bank of India. The court disagreed with the Kerala High Court's view in N. A. Paul and Co. v. Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, which suggested that no permission was necessary for such deductions. The court emphasized that the full amount payable by the foreign buyer must be repatriated, and any deductions for commission and expenses require Reserve Bank permission. The court highlighted the risk of collusion between consignors and consignees to inflate deductions, thereby depriving the nation of legitimate foreign exchange.
5. Applicability of Precedents and Judicial Interpretations:
The court referred to several precedents, including Venkata Subbu v. Director of Enforcement, Krishnaswamy v. Government of India, and T. K. M. Company v. Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, to support its interpretation of Section 12(2). The court noted that in consignment sales, the declared value in G.R. 1 forms is only approximate, and the actual sale proceeds realized must be repatriated. The court also cited the Supreme Court's observation in M. G. Wagh v. Jay Engineering Works Ltd., emphasizing the importance of ensuring that the nation does not lose foreign exchange.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the appellant had contravened Section 12(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, by not obtaining Reserve Bank permission for the deductions claimed. However, considering the nature of the contravention, the court reduced the penalty from Rs. 3,600 to Rs. 500. The appeal was allowed to this extent, with no order as to costs.
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1996 (2) TMI 438
Issues:
Leviability of duty on spent sulphuric acid emerging after the use of concentrated sulphuric acid in the manufacture of chlorine.
Analysis:
1. The issue in the appeals pertains to the leviability of duty on spent sulphuric acid that arises after the concentrated sulphuric acid is utilized in the production of chlorine. The lower appellate authority upheld the duty demand on the spent sulphuric acid cleared from the appellant's unit under Rule 57F read with Rule 57D.
2. The appellant contended that spent sulphuric acid should not be subject to duty under Rule 57F(4)(a) as it has not undergone any process in the appellant's factory. The acid is solely used as a drying agent, and thus, it cannot be considered as having been through a manufacturing process.
3. The respondent argued that the concentrated sulphuric acid used in the appellant's unit participates in the manufacturing process of chlorine, indicating that the sulphuric acid has indeed undergone a process within the appellant's factory, making Rule 57F(4)(a) applicable.
4. The Tribunal noted that the issue at hand aligns with previous decisions, such as the case of M/s. Detergents India Ltd. v. CCE and M/s. Varuna Sulphonators Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI, which provide guidance on the application of relevant rules in similar contexts.
5. The Tribunal emphasized the correct utilization of Modvat credit under Rule 57A, highlighting that the notification specifies the conditions for availing credit on inputs used in manufacturing. It clarified that there is no requirement to declare the exact consumption of inputs in the finished product, as long as the inputs and finished products are specified in the notification.
6. The Tribunal further elaborated on the treatment of spent acid under the Modvat Scheme, emphasizing that once goods are brought in as inputs under the Scheme, their status changes, and any waste or by-product arising from the processing of inputs must be handled according to Rule 57F(4). The Tribunal concluded that the demand for duty on the appellants is not maintainable, and the appeal was allowed.
7. Referring to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court, the Tribunal affirmed that duty on spent sulphuric acid was correctly demanded from the appellants. Citing the circular dated 18-5-1992, which allowed Modvat credit on the full quantity of sulphuric acid used in manufacturing detergents, the Tribunal upheld the lower authority's order and dismissed the appeal.
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1996 (2) TMI 430
Whether the impugned tax has been established to be compensatory in nature or whether it can be called a regulatory measure.
In case the impugned tax is not established to be compensatory-or as a measure of regulation-whether it is saved by virtue of the provision contained in article 304(b) read with article 255 of the Constitution?
Whether the Bihar Legislature is deprived of its legislative competence to enact the impugned Act on account of the enactment of ADE Act and/or because the State of Bihar is getting a portion of the taxes levied and collected under the ADE Act?
Whether the impugned enactment is outside the purview of entry 52 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and, therefore, beyond the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature for the reason that it does not provide for the revenues raised thereunder to be passed on to the local authorities for being used for the purposes of the respective local areas?
Whether the proviso to section 3(1) and section 6 are void for the reasons assigned by the High Court?
Held that:- Appeal allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside.
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1996 (2) TMI 428
Whether auction sale is invalid because the auction purchasers did not deposit the full purchase price on the date of the auction sale?
Held that:- Appeals are allowed and the auction sale held on 2nd of January, 1974 is set aside. The High Court was not right in observing that the objections could be decided at a later date even after the sale of the shares to which the objections pertained. Proceeding with the auction sale without adjudicating upon the objections is a material irregularity which vitiates the sale. The appellant has thereby lost his valuable right to have his objections adjudicated upon in accordance with law. The objections were raised much prior to the auction sale and they ought to have been decided before the auction sale took place. Failure to do so vitiated the sale. Respondents 2 and 3 will be at liberty to withdraw the purchase price deposited by them which as informed, is invested in fixed deposits together with accrued interest thereon.
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1996 (2) TMI 427
Whether cotton and hair beltings thus sold are cotton fabric falling under item 4 of the Third Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 or whether they should be considered as parts or accessories of machinery falling under entry 81 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959/
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Simply because belts made out of cotton and hair beltings are used in machinery the belting does not become a part of the machinery or its accessory. The belting material consists of cotton fabric as defined in item 19 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It cannot be equated with belts of different kinds used in different machines. Hence it is neither a part nor an accessory of a machine.
It is correctly classified under entry 4 of the Third Schedule.
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1996 (2) TMI 420
Whether departmental authorities were not correct in disallowing the delivery charges and transportation charges while computing the total and taxable turnover of the appellants?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The High Court did not record any finding that the facts in the present case relating to the same assessee are in any manner different from those on which its earlier decision had been rendered. However, the High Court placed reliance on certain decisions of that court and a decision of this Court. The facts on which those decisions were rendered are different. This aspect was apparently over- looked by the High Court. The Tribunal was right in saying that the departmental authorities were bound by the earlier decision of the High Court rendered on the same set of facts in respect of the same assessee
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1996 (2) TMI 414
Whether it would be reasonable to mean that if a manufacturer uses the brand name or trade mark of an existing industrial unit even in respect of a small portion of its production, it would be totally deprived of the benefit of the said exemption from sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Having regard to the object and purpose underlying the said Rule 3(66a), it would be reasonable to say that the respondent shall not be entitled to the benefit of the said exemption from sales tax in respect of the goods, for which the trade mark or brand name of an existing industrial unit is used. But in so far as other products for which the brand name is not used are concerned, it will be entitled to claim the benefit of the aforesaid sub-rule. The burden of clearly establishing that in respect of certain goods manufactured by it, the trade mark or brand name of an existing industrial unit is not being used, shall be squarely upon the manufacturer.
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1996 (2) TMI 413
Whether Iron and steel is taxable at the first point of sale?
Held that:- If the appropriate authority is satisfied that the transporter or consignee had, in fact, not negligent in the matter, and the consignor or selling dealer had not issued or refused to issue the declaration, in spite of request for the same, there should be neither any seizure of iron and steel declared goods nor imposition of penalty on the sole ground that the declaration has not been produced in terms of rule 89A(2) is not only impractical but is also likely to lead to several complications. In any event, in the light of the clarification made with respect to the meaning and purport of rule 89A(2), the above direction becomes unnecessary and is accordingly deleted.
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1996 (2) TMI 409
Whether the sale should be deemed to have taken place at the end of the period stipulated in the agreement or on the date when the hirer actually exercised the option to purchase after paying the full price?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. It cannot be said that merely because the hire-purchase agreement stipulates a particular period for the total payment of the consideration and for the purchaser to exercise the option to purchase at the end of the said period, the sale does not take place at the end of that period willynilly. There may be cases where the hirer may default in paying the amount within the stipulated period, he may ask for extension and the dealer may grant the extension. In such cases, the sale obviously takes place only when the purchaser exercises the option to purchase after fully paying the agreed amount.
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