|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 231 Records
-
1989 (4) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Customs duty - Auxiliary duty of customs ... ... ... ... ..... be pleased to impose upon the petitioner in this connection. 16. For the reasons stated above, it is prayed that this Hon ble Court may be pleased (a) to call for the records of the Second Respondent pertaining to import under Bill of Entry No. 221/89 dated 20-3-1989 by the Petitioner and issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order or direction in the nature of writ and quash the assessment made therein so far as it relates to auxiliary duty of customs under Notification No. 110/89 dated 1-3-1989 (b) to direct the second respondent to permit the petitioner to clear the goods covered by Bill of Entry No. 221/89 dt. 20-3-89 without payment of any auxiliary duty of customs pending disposal of the above Writ Petition and pass such further or other orders as this Hon ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of this case and render justice. Solemnly affirmed at Madras this 29th day of March, 1989 and signed his name in my presence BEFORE ME ADVOCATE, MADRAS
-
1989 (4) TMI 92 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Prosecution - Remand - Customs - Remand by Magistrate ... ... ... ... ..... 982 Crl.L.J. 747) having been overruled by a Full Bench of the same Court in Union of India v. O.P.Gupta and Others (Crl. Writ Nos.116 and 104 of 1984, judgment dated 19-7-1985) and there being no other judgment of any other High Court having taken a different view on the power of remand by a Magistrate in a Customs case, I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the High Courts of Kerala and Gujarat and the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. I hold that the Magistrate has the power to remand a person produced before him in accordance with Section 104 of the Customs Act by virtue of the powers of remand under Section 167(2) and (3) of the Code and could further exercise the powers under Section 437 of the Code. 29. Crl. M.P. No. 254 of 1989, is, therefore, dismissed. Though the records in Crl. M.P. No. 407 of 1989 had been called for to consider the legality of the arrest of the petitioner, this aspect having not been pressed, this petition is also dismissed.
-
1989 (4) TMI 91 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Assessment order - Stay of recovery - Encashment of bank guarantee ... ... ... ... ..... have taken we see no reason to accede to this prayer as we have already observed in the order in question that if the petitioners-appellants succeed in the petition, the Court can always give a direction to the Union of India to refund the amount within such time as it may direct and even with interest, if any, if they are so entitled. As against this, we find that the Union of India cannot live on Bank Guarantees as has been often observed by the Supreme Court itself. What is more, as has been pointed out in the order, the Union of India has been deprived of the amount for several years now and no prejudice whatsoever will be caused to the petitioners-appellants, since their moneys are always secured with the Government. We, therefore, reject the application for stay. 14. The Prothonotary and Senior Master will take steps to encash the Bank Guarantees within two weeks from today and pay the amount to the Union of India. The Prothonotary to act on the minutes of this order.
-
1989 (4) TMI 90 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Set-off of duty - Claim for setoff lodged after clearance of goods ... ... ... ... ..... tioner. Further sub-section (3) of Section 11-B reads as under - Where as a result of any order passed in appeal or revision under this Act, refund of any duty of excise become due to any person in presence of Assistant Collector of Central Excise may refund the amount to such person without his having to make any claim in that behalf. In view of this provision the petitioner was not required to make any claim and it was the duty of the Assistant Collector to grant the same in pursuance of the direction issued by the appellate authority that the petitioner was entitled to the same, may be by adjustment. But in law it did not make any difference and in any case the question of applicability of any limitation did not arise. 4. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. A direction is issued to opposite parties to refund the amount of duty as determined by Range Superintendent, Central Excise in pursuance of the order dated 7th October, 1986 by the Assistant Collector.
-
1989 (4) TMI 89 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ jurisdiction - Prosecution - Central Excise - Offence ... ... ... ... ..... his connection I asked Mr. Desai to furnish to the Court a copy of the order passed by the Collector of Customs. I have gone through the said order and I find that there is no such finding that the company or the petitioners had no such mala fide intention or that they had not intentionally evaded the duty. The observation is to the effect that assuming that there was no mala fide intention to evade payment of the Central Excise duty, still having regard to the fact that the petitioners have admitted that they have taken out from the factory goods worth Rs. 3 lakhs and odd, it can be said that they evaded payment of duty and that they have removed the goods without payment of duty. Therefore, this argument will not hold good inasmuch as there is no positive finding that there is any such finding by the Collector that the petitioners or the Company had not intentionally evaded payment of duty. 7. In the result, this petition does not survive and is dismissed. Rule discharged.
-
1989 (4) TMI 88 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Dip solution ... ... ... ... ..... e it would not be dutiable under excise law if the said article is not goods known to the market. Marketability, therefore, is an essential ingredient in order to be dutiable under the Schedule to Central Tariff Act, 1985. There does not appear to be any doubt that the dip solution is not a marketable commodity. The Respondents, through the affidavit of their expert S. Krishnamoorthy, have shown that the dip solution is not a marketable product. The Appellants have not produced any material to controvert that position. 4. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge was right in granting rule in terms of prayer (b) on the ground that the dip solution not being on artificial or Synthetic resins would not attract Tariff Item No. 15A(1), and secondly, that it was not a marketable commodity. Hence the Appellants were not liable to pay excise duty on the dip solution. We see no reason for interference with the order of the learned Single Judge. 5. The appeal stands dismissed.
-
1989 (4) TMI 87 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Interest on amount of refund of duty collected illegally or without the authority of law ... ... ... ... ..... fair to be guided by the strategy of equity by asking those who claim the service of the judicial process to impress the basic rule of distributive justice, while maulding the relief by consenting to restore little sums taken in little transactions, from little persons to whom they belong. Interest is the return or compensation for the use or retention of another s monies. The contentions of the respondents in this case are not tenable. The applicants were forced to pay the amount from their meagre resources to beat the dead line. Some advances were secured from the banks on interest. The respondents have collected, retained and enjoyed the benefit of this ill-gotton money for sufficient long time without authority of law. The applicant under these circumstances is entitled to interest. It is just and proper that the respondents should pay interest at the rate of 12 p.a. from the date of the collection of the amount till the date of actual payment. It is ordered accordingly.
-
1989 (4) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Gold (Control) - Search ... ... ... ... ..... st their counsel by bringing to his notice the appropriate notifications covering this case. The respondents were given numerous adjournments and ample opportunity to find out a relevant notification authorising the Assistant Collector to order search and the Deputy Collector to adjudicate on the matter. Even the Court was deprived of the opportunity to find out the relevant notification from their record. It may be that the office might not be in possession of the notifications issued from time to time or they intentionally avoided to produce the same. I have no option but to condemn the attitude of the respondent -department and leave it at that. 14.In the result, the petition is accepted. The orders passed vide Annexure P-6, P-8 and P-10 are quashed. The respondents are directed to refund the amount of Rs. 7500/- and Rs. 3000/- imposed upon the petitioners as redemption charges and personal penalty. The criminal proceedings launched against the petitioner are also quashed
-
1989 (4) TMI 85 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Bank Guarantee wrongly encashed by department - Effect - Refund - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... . 588 of 1984 recovered the Bank Guarantee furnished by the Petitioners. This was on the 27th of July 1984. The Petitioners on the 3rd of January 1985 protested and claimed refund. I fail to see how the claim for refund can be termed as barred by limitation. It was still within the period of six months from the date of the realisation of the Bank Guarantee by the first Respondent. But for the fact that the name of the Officer, who was concerned in encashing the Bank Guarantee is not readily available, this would have been an appropriate case to issue a suo motu notice of contempt of Court against him. 4. In the result, the Petition succeeds and the Respondents are directed to refund the amount of Rs. 2,63,967.75 p. along with interest at 18 per annum from the 27th of July 1984 till the date of payment. This amount shall be refunded expeditiously and in any event on or before the 15th of May 1989. Rule made absolute. The Petitioners will be entitled to costs of this Petition.
-
1989 (4) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Intermediate product ... ... ... ... ..... ty and there is no bar and/or impediment to grant the reliefs prayed for in such regard. Questions of praying for refund of the dues already paid does not appeal to this Court and it finds nothing to grant such relief in a straightway manner. Petitioner may make an appropriate application before the concerned authorities for such purpose and the concerned authorities will take steps to refund the same in accordance with law. 10. For the reasons discussed above, the writ petition is allowed to the extent as aforesaid and the Rule is made absolute to the extent that the impugned orders or circulars contained in the Circular dated September 24, 1980 and the purported notice dated August 18, 1981 and the purported orders dated August 28, 1981, the order dated August 18, 1981 are set aside and/or quashed. 11. Let all assessment orders fixing duty on such solutions pursuant to aforesaid proceedings be also set aside and be not given effect to. 12. There will be no order for costs.
-
1989 (4) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Resins - Dip solution ... ... ... ... ..... le it would not be dutiable under Excise Law if the said article is not goods known to the market. Marketability, therefore, is an essential ingredient in order to be dutiable under the Schedule to Central Tariff Act, 1985. 4. There does not appear to be any doubt that the dip solution is not a marketable commodity. The Respondents, through the affidavit of their expert S. Krishnamoorthy, have shown that the dip solution is not a marketable product. The Appellants have not produced any material to controvert that position. 5. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge was right in granting rule in terms of prayer (b) on the ground that the dip solution not being an artificial or synthetic resin would not attract Tariff Item No. 15A(1), and secondly, that it was not a marketable commodity. Hence the Appellants were not liable to pay excise duty on the dip solution. We see no reason for interference with the order of the learned Single Judge. The appeal stands dismissed.
-
1989 (4) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Appellate Tribunal duty ... ... ... ... ..... of the order Ext. P1 shall be kept in abeyance. The original petition is disposed of with the above directions. Communicate a copy of this judgment together with a copy of the original petition to the first respondent forthwith, for information and compliance. Issue photo copy of the judgment on usual terms. Order on CMP No. 9582/89. - Dismissed. APPENDIX PETITIONER S EXHIBITS Ext. P1 True copy of the order in Original No. C. No. V/40/15/2/ 87/CX. Adj. dated 22-12-1988 Sl. No. 134/87 issued by the Collector of Central Excise, Cochin-31 to the petitioner. Ext. P2 True copy of the appeal memo filed by the petitioner to the 1st respondent dated 8-3-1989. Ext. P3 True copy of the stay petition filed by the petitioner to the 1st respondent dated 8-3-1989. Ext. P4 True copy of the affidavit filed by the petitioner to the 1st respondent dated 8-3-1989. Ext. P5 True copy of the communication No. F. 136/89/469, dated 30-3-1989 issued by the petitioner s Counsel to the 1st respondent.
-
1989 (4) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the agreement dated 1st May, 1962 is an agreement for sale or is one for sole selling agency?
Held that:- Having regard however to the fact that we have come to the conclusion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the transaction with the Gillanders was not a transaction of sale but an agreement for agency, there was, therefore, no sale in favour of Gillanders as contended for by the appellants. If that is the position, then the first sale was by the Gillanders to the customers of the market. Then the price of that sale would be the assessable value under Section 4 in this case. The decision of the Tribunal is, therefore, right in any view of the matter, and this other aspect of the matter referred to by the Tribunal is not necessary for us to determine to dispose of this appeal. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal must be upheld. Appeal dismissed.
-
1989 (4) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant is entitled to refund of ₹ 22,43,002.09 paid as excise duty on the price of packing material used for packing of superfine cement which according to the appellant was paid under protest whereas according to the respondent, it was not paid under protest and therefore, the claim of refund is barred by time?
Held that:- A perusal of the letter dated June 11, 1974 clearly shows that all possible contentions which could be raised against the levy of duty on the value of packing material were raised. If this could not be said to be a protest one fails to understand what else it could be. It does not require much time to analyse the contents of the letter. An ordinary reading with common sense will reveal to anybody that the appellant was not accepting the liability without protest. We have no hesitation to hold that the letter was in the nature of protest. That being the position, the question of limitation does not arise for refund of the duty.
The Appellate Collector and the Tribunal clearly stated that the only question agitated before them was the question of limitation. The order does not indicate that the counsel for the Department or the departmental representative raised any other question on merits. Indeed no objection could have been raised on the merits of the matter. Appeal allowed & the appellant is entitled to refund of the amount..
-
1989 (4) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Rule 10A of the Rules, as it stood at the relevant time, was valid or not?
Held that:- The validity of the delegated legislation is generally a question of vires, that is, whether or not the enabling power has been exceeded or otherwise wrongfully exercised. Scrutinising the provisions of Rule 10A in the light of the above principles and pronouncements of this Court, we have no doubt that Rule 10A of the Rules, as it existed at the relevant time, was valid and not ultra vires the rule making power. Demand notices lawfully issued under the rule by the competent authority could not, therefore, be challenged on the ground of the Rule 10A itself being ultra vires. Whether those could be challenged on any other ground must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
The High Court having proceeded on the basis that Rule 10A was not available to support the demand notice, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court, allow the appeal, and remand the case to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law.
-
1989 (4) TMI 77 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... taxation as dividends will be within the competence of entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule (See Balaji v. ITO 1962 43 ITR 393). In considering the question as to whether a particular item in the possession of a citizen can be regarded as his income or not, it would be inappropriate to apply the test traditionally prescribed by the Income-tax Act as such. Having regard to the fact that the Legislature was aware of the nature of the trade and the difficulty in assessing and collecting the tax, it will be competent to the Legislature to devise a fiction for treating a percentage of the purchase price paid by the assessee as income coming under the head Profits and gains . Therefore, it cannot be stated that the legislature has travelled beyond the legislative field assigned to it by entry 82 in List I (See Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K. K. Sen, AAC 1965 56 ITR 198 (SC)). We, therefore, find no substance in the contention of the appellants. All the writ appeals are dismissed.
-
1989 (4) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ase, the Tribunal is right in upholding the order of Commissioner of Income-tax, Meerut, under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? (2) Whether the Tribunal s finding is vitiated in law in doubting the market value of plant and machinery without any material and ignoring the materials on record ? We, accordingly, direct the Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and submit the same to this court.
-
1989 (4) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... Appellate Tribunal was justified in restoring the matter to the Me of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) with the direction to ignore the additional evidence brought on record in remand proceedings ? We, accordingly, direct the Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case to the question quoted above and submit the same to this court.
-
1989 (4) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution, Prima Facie Case, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... vested, and forfeit whatever the appellant has established himself by dint of his perseverence, goodwill, enterprise and acumen, covering a period of almost twenty years. So far as the acquisition of the car in 1977-78 for Rs. 5,000 and the premiums paid towards the Life Insurance Corporation s policies are concerned, they had emanated from the account books of the business where the requisite amounts were available. Their source, therefore, could not be treated as unexplained. Then there remains the investments in Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. None of them has emanated from the account books of the appellant and to this extent their source remained unexplained. The forfeiture, therefore, if at all, can be sustained of these investments only. They are stated to have lapsed. In view of the discussion above, the appeal is allowed and the forfeitures quashed except to the extent of investments existing with Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd.
-
1989 (4) TMI 73 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the trees comprised in the rubber estate sold ? An identical question has been answered in CIT v. Alanickal Co. Ltd. 1986 158 ITR 630 (Ker) in the negative and against the Revenue. So, we also answer the question in the negative and against the Revenue. The second question referred to in the above ITR is Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the subsidy received from the Rubber Board is income of the assessee ? In view of the decision in ITRs Nos. 217 and 218 of 1980, we answer the question in the negative and against the Revenue. Income-tax Reference No. 8 of 1984. In view of the decision rendered in ITRs Nos. 217 and 218 of 1980, the question referred is answered in the negative and against the Revenue. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these income-tax referred cases. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
....
|
