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Showing 181 to 200 of 1557 Records
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2025 (1) TMI 1378
Declaration under the Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme (VCES) - declaration was "substantially false" or not - Department is of the view that the appellant has not made a true and truthful declaration under VCES scheme and basic premises on which the declaration of the appellant was rejected - Classification under Works Contract Service or Commercial Construction Service - HELD THAT:- The Adjudicating Authority has not considered the work invoices issued by the appellant. While deciding the matter, the Adjudicating Authority has not decided whether the activity undertaken by the appellant falls under the category of “Works Contract Service” or under “Construction Service”. It is also opined that the Adjudicating Authority while holding the subject activity falls under commercial construction service, he has also not provided the facility of the abatement of the value as provided under N/N. 13/2012-ST dated 28.06.2012 while confirming the demand of service tax. The fact is noted that while the appellant has been claiming that activity undertaken by them falls under category of “Works Contract Service” while the department has considered the same is “Commercial Construction Service”.
The Circular No.170/05/2013-ST dated 08.08.2013 clearly provides that the Commissioner would “in overall facts of the case take into account the reasons he has to believe, take a judicious view as to whether a declaration is “substantially false”, it is not feasible to define the term “substantially false” in precise terms, the proceedings under Section 111 would be initiated in accordance with the principles of the Natural Justice.” In view of the Board’s circular, the Adjudicating Authority has to categorically determine as to how a declaration made under VCES scheme is “substantially false”. In this case the Adjudicating Authority has not determined whether the activity undertaken by the appellant qualified to fall under “Works Contract Service” as claimed by the appellant on the basis of work orders and invoices.
Conclusion - The determination of whether a declaration under VCES is "substantially false" must be made in accordance with the principles of natural justice and relevant legal precedents. The classification of the appellant's services as "Works Contract Service" or "Commercial Construction Service" is crucial for determining the correct tax liability and entitlement to abatements.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (1) TMI 1377
Extended period of limitation - whether the demand for the period on 1 April 2010 to 30 September 2010 is barred by limitation for not? - HELD THAT:- From the provisions of Section 73 the 'relevant date' in the case of the appellant has to be computed calculating one year from the date of issue of show cause notice. The appellant was required to file service tax returns for the period April 2010 to September 2010 by October 25, 2010 and for the period October 2010 to March 2011 by April 25, 2011, therefore, the relevant date for computing the normal period in the case of service tax liability for the period April 2010 to September 2010 is 25.10.2010 and hence the show cause notice was required to be issued by 24.10.2011. The show cause notice dated 17.10.2011, therefore, falls within the period of one year and the demand for the period April 2010 to September 2010, therefore, falls within the normal period.
There are no error in the service tax liability confirmed by the authorities below on the appellant for the period involved. The calculation arrived at by the learned counsel for the appellant in the submissions placed during the course of hearing calculating the demand of Rs. 1,07,718/- for the period from 01.04.2010 to 30.09.2010 being barred by limitation is not correct.
There are no reason to interfere with the impugned order and hence the appeal is dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1376
Classification and tax liability of services - whether there is any liability to pay Service Tax by the appellant for the period prior to 01.07.2010 as well after or not and if they are liable to pay Service Tax, then under which category their services would fall? - HELD THAT:- The appellant have canvassed that the matter regarding non-leviability of Service Tax on CRCS or for that under WCS prior to 01.07.2010 is no longer res integra as it has been held in catena of judgments passed by the Tribunals that Service Tax is not leviable. Insofar as the issue of the activity being in the nature of WCS, which is not covered by the scope of the circular, he further submits that in terms of settled law now irrespective of whether the nature of construction service is simpliciter or in the nature of WCS, no Service Tax is leviable on them for the period prior to 01.07.2010. Therefore, the dropping of demand by the Adjudicating Authority for the period prior to 01.07.2010 is correct. For the period beyond 01.07.2010, their main argument is that since the Adjudicating Authority himself has confirmed the demand under different heading than what was proposed in the SCN, the demand itself is not tenable on this ground alone.
While the appellant is mainly adducing that demand is not sustainable on the ground that Adjudicating Authority has not confirmed the demand under proposed classification and on this sole ground, the demand is liable to be set aside. It is found that in the facts of the case, it is not tenable as Commissioner has classified in the impugned order as CRCS, considering it as part of WCS and by holding that this is more specific and at no point of time he has held that there is no element of WCS in the said CRCS. In other words, he has not held, in the case of appellant, that it was CRCS simpliciter rather he has held that it is CRCS, which is very much in the nature of WCS. There is some merit in the departmental appeal as well as appellant’s claim. However, the best way would be to remand the matter to the Commissioner to decide the matter afresh for the demand for the period beyond 01.07.2010. While doing so, he shall go by the admitted facts and evidence on record to decide whether there is any exclusion or exemption available for the said service (WCS/CRCS) in the given set of facts and evidence on record to arrive at the demand for the period beyond 01.07.2010.
Conclusion - The classification of services post 01.07.2010 requires reevaluation by the Adjudicating Authority to determine the correct category and applicable tax liability.
The Adjudicating Authority, in the remand proceedings, should examine proper classification i.e., WCS or CRCS, in the facts of the case and whether any exemption or exclusion exist for not demanding Service Tax for the period beyond 01.07.2010. This appeal is allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (1) TMI 1375
Time limitation - whether the Revenue was justified in invoking the extended period of limitation in fastening the service tax liability under BAS on the appellant? - HELD THAT:- It is not the case of the Revenue that in every case where the early payment incentive is received, the end--customers had in fact made payments in advance or at an early date. But there is no cross verification as to the payments made in advance by the appellant vis--à--vis the payments made by the end customers.
The period of dispute is from 01.04.2007 to 31.03.2011, for which the show cause notice dated 19.10.2012 came to be issued, by invoking the larger period of limitation, for which the finding given in the OIO is that the receipt of incentive was noticed only on the scrutiny of annual financial records of the appellant. The same was therefore held to have been knowingly suppressed, to justify the issuance of the show cause notice under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 - There is also no specific logical finding that the early payment incentive received by the appellant was liable to service tax other than mentioning that the same was liable to service tax under BAS. Hence, the Revenue has failed to make out a case for invoking the larger period of limitation and that too, to demand service tax which the appellant was not established to be liable to pay.
There are no merit in the demand based against the appellant which came to be upheld in the order and hence, the impugned order deserves to be set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1374
Liability to pay service tax under the category of "Commercial Coaching and Training" for the period from 2006-07 to 2009-10 - benefit of exemption under N/N. 10/2003-ST dated 20.06.2003 - Extended period of limitation - suppression of facts or not - HELD THAT:- As regards the findings on merit returned by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) supported with relevant notification and the case-laws, there are no infirmity in the same; but as regards the invocation of extended period of limitation, it is found that the demand has been confirmed by invoking the extended period of limitation and the learned Commissioner (Appeals) has recorded a finding that though there was no intention to evade the payment of service tax, still suppression on their part satisfies one of the ingredients of Section 73 of the Act. The finding of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) is self-contradictory because the “suppression” and for that matter other ingredients in Section 73 of the Act are qualified by the phrase “with intent to evade payment of tax”, therefore, if there is no intention to evade payment of tax, then the charge of suppression is not sustainable in law.
The issue involved in the present case was purely of interpretation of the exemption notification and therefore, “suppression” cannot be alleged. Further, when the extended period of limitation cannot be involved, then the demand for period, which is within the limitation, cannot be confirmed.
The impugned demand is entirely barred by limitation; accordingly, on merit the demand is upheld, but on limitation, the demand is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1373
CENVAT Credit - whether the inputs like angles, channels, beams etc,, used to erect tower and prefabricated buildings/shelters which are used for housing / storage of generator set / equipments and hoisting the antenna etc., in respect of which the credit has been denied by the Department, would be eligible for taking credit when used for setting up of mobile towers and pre-fabricated structures etc., by treating them as immovable goods? - HELD THAT:- This matter has been dealt with in detail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Bharti Airtel [2024 (11) TMI 1042 - SUPREME COURT], where they have gone through various judgements including that of Mumbai High Court in the case of Bharti Airtel as well as Delhi High Court in Vodafone [2018 (11) TMI 713 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and finally observed and held that mobile towers are not in the nature of immovable goods.
Hon’ble Supreme Court also examined and decided on the issue, as to whether the credit would be admissible as an input or capital goods. Relevant observation by Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was, interalia, held that since tower is to be considered as capital goods and therefore all components, spares and accessories would also fall within the category of capital goods.
Conclusion - The denial of credit in respect of Angles, Channels, Beams etc., used to erect towers as also on PFB etc., falling under Chapter 94 used for housing /storage of generating sets and other equipments/components, is not sustainable.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1372
Valuation - Demand of differential central excise duty - inclusion of the notional cost of drawings and designs supplied free of cost by Maruti Suzuki India Pvt Ltd. in the assessable value of parts and components of motor vehicles manufactured by the appellant and cleared to Maruti Suzuki India Limited - HELD THAT:- The issue raised in the case of Denso India Pvt Ltd. [2024 (3) TMI 686 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] was whether the notional cost of specifications in the form of drawings and designs supplied free of cost by Maruti to the potential vendors should be included in the assessable value of the parts or components manufactured by the vendors and cleared to Maruti for their motor vehicles. To appreciate the said issue, the Principal Bench considered the provisions of section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and Rule 6 of the Valuation Rules and observed that anything which is supplied by the buyers to the manufacture before even identifying the potential seller/ manufacturer cannot be treated as additional consideration for sale. It was, therefore, held that something can be treated as an additional consideration for sale of goods only when there exists a contract of sale or an agreement to sale between two parties and in terms thereof the buyer pays something over and above the price agreed - The Tribunal, therefore, concluded that the drawing and designs supplied by MSIL at the time of identification and short listing of potential vendors for supply of parts and components, the provisions of section 4 1(b) of the Act read with Rule 6 of the Valuation Rules, could not have been invoked as no consideration was received by the vendors from MSIL.
It is also pertinent to take note of the fact that the Principal Bench had noted the distinction between mere specification and detailed engineering drawing as considered in the earlier decision in Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. Vs. CC, Mangalore [2012 (9) TMI 712 - CESTAT, BANGALORE], where the Tribunal has held that there is a distinction between mere specifications and detailed engineering drawing. It is only the latter which is covered under rule 9(1)(b)(iv) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988 (which is now rule 10(1)(b)(iv) of the 2007 Customs Valuation Rules).
Conclusion - The notional cost of MSIL's specifications should not be included in the assessable value of the final products manufactured by the appellant.
The impugned order is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1371
Demand of differential duty - difference in sales figures reflected in the assessee’s ER – 1 Returns filed and the sales figures reported in their Balance Sheet - invocation of extended period of limitation - suppression of facts or not - HELD THAT:- From the documents placed on record, in the reply to the SCN, it is revealed that during the visit of the officers of DGCEI in 2010 and subsequent resumption of records from JFSPL and its suppliers of raw materials, the Show Cause Notice dated 16.04.2014 relating to the period June 2009 to December 2010 came to be issued. It is also asserted that the said agency had looked into the ER – 1 Returns, Books of Account including balance sheet, etc. and, at no point of time did they raise any query as regards the alleged removal of TMT bars or billets without payment of duty. From the OIO, it is found that the Authority has tried to negate the above contention on the ground that the DGCEI’s case was based on specific intelligence to the effect of the assessee taking credit without actual receipt of material as against which, the present case was one of clandestine removal; and therefore, the extended time limit has been correctly invoked.
It is clear that the time limit would start ticking when the Revenue came to know about the manufacturing activity of the appellant and that was the time when the show cause notice should have been issued and the Revenue having failed to do so, they cannot therefore allege suppression on the part of the appellant and invoke the extended time limit. Hence, the ratio of the said order is squarely applicable here also, in the case on hand, since from the date of visit/verification of records by DGCI in 2010 and the date of SCN, more than three years have lapsed. Hence, the same clearly is hit by the time limitation.
Conclusion - The extended period for demanding duty is only applicable when there is clear evidence of fraud, collusion, or willful suppression of facts. Mere discrepancies in records, especially when previously examined by authorities, do not justify invoking the extended period.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1370
Suo-moto abatement of duty for the days when the machines were sealed by the Department and not in operation - SCN demanded Central Excise duty of Pan Masala for the whole month even when the machines were remained non-operational - HELD THAT:- From the perusal of the order and facts of the appeal it emerges that demand of Central Excise duty has been confirmed on the machines for the days for which they have remained non-operational. It is also found that nowhere in the impugned order-in-original it has been mentioned by the adjudicating authority that appellant has not followed the laid-down procedure in the Pan Masala Packing Machines (Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2008. Whenever the appellant wanted to stop working of a number of machines, due intimation has been given to the Department and the machines were sealed by the jurisdictional Superintendent of the range and whenever the machines were made operational, the appellant have informed the department and they have started operating the machine only after the officers have de-sealed the machines.
So, it is apparent from the reading of Rule 10 of Pan Masala Packing Machines (Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2008 that abatement for the period of non-working of the machines is provided in Rules with certain conditions.
This Tribunal in the case of M/s. PM Products vs. CCE, Ahmedabad [2023 (9) TMI 1370 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] has held that the appellant is eligible for abatement and under no circumstance full duty can be demanded for the period when the machines were not in operation.
Conclusion - The essence of the Pan Masala Packing Machines (Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2008 is that the manufacturer has to pay duty for the operational days of the machines, and since the appellant has deposited the proportionate amount of duty for working days of the machines, the Central Excise duty cannot be demanded for the period when the machines remained non-operational.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1369
Refund of an amount deposited by the appellant during the course of an investigation - entitlement to interest on that refund - HELD THAT:- In the present case impugned order clearly observes that the amount that was deposited by the appellant at the time of visit of officers to their premises was appropriated by the Original Authority. The amount so appropriated acquired the character of duty, the moment it is appropriated against the demand made.
In case of Mafatlal Industries [1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT], Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that 'While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 - and of this Court under Article 32 - cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. The writ petition will be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11B.'
Conclusion - The appellant was entitled to interest on the refunded amount at the rate prescribed under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, from the date of deposit to the date of actual refund.
There are no merits in the appeal - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1368
Exercise of revisional powers vested in him u/s. 9 (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 r/w Section 64 of Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - levy of penalty u/s 10A r/w Section A3 (b) of the Act, 1956 - absence of ‘mens rea’ on the part of the appellant - HELD THAT:- The relevant form, namely Form-C is prescribed pursuant to Rule 12 of the CST (Registration & Turnover) Rules 1957. Thus, a Registered dealer purchasing the goods is eligible to avail concessional levy of CST by issuing C-Forms against the purchases of goods which are included in its Certificate of Registration and are intended for resale, for use in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale. The legislative intent is very clear. Such a concession cannot be availed if the goods bought by the Assessee are not included in its Certificate of Registration and are not used in the manner prescribed in Section 8 (3) (b). In the current context, the purchased goods ought to have been used in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale and not utilized in the construction of building or for office interiors of the Assessee.
The record does not show any effort on part of the Appellant Assessee to actually demonstrate that his purchases meet the test of “integral connection” to the ultimate production of goods. It is one thing to say so repeatedly and it is another to prove the integral connection. The test of integral connection is laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in JK COTTON [1964 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] - this judgment is placed by the Appellant Assessee himself in his compilation filed across the Bar. When the Apex Court has dealt with building material specifically in JK COTTON and held it to be ineligible for the purposes of Section 8 (3) (b) of the 1956 Act, there is very little room for the Appellant to maneuver.
Conclusion - The necessity of adhering to the specific categories of goods listed in the Registration Certificate for concessional tax rates under the CST Act. The goods must be used in manufacturing or resale to qualify for concessional rates.
The impugned order is justifiably structured and rightly has set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1367
Dismissal of application filed by NHAI under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal - execution of a contract awarded by NHAI to the appellant regarding the work of four laning and strengthening of the existing two lane section - HELD THAT:- Division Bench of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act acknowledged that primarily it was for the Arbitral Tribunal to interpret the contractual terms and if the interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal is a plausible one, then the court would not interfere with the award merely because according to the court, another interpretation is preferable. Having said that, Division Bench examined Clauses 51 and 52 of the contract. Instead of interpreting the aforesaid clauses in the contractual context, Division Bench went into the dictionary meaning of the expression ‘variation’ and opined that variation would mean the difference between what is provided for or contemplated in relation to the work under the contract and what is the final effect or outcome. Such variation or outcome may be or may not be the result of an instruction given by the Engineer.
Division Bench disagreed with the observations of the Arbitral Tribunal as upheld by the learned Single Judge that even if there was error in estimating the quantity of geogrid while preparing the BOQ, that by itself would not lead to the conclusion that NHAI cannot seek renegotiation of the rates even if the actual quantity exceeds by over 300 percent. The contract does not provide that NHAI should suffer on account of the estimated quantities mentioned in the BOQ turning out to be way off the mark when the contract is executed - Division Bench held that there is no reason as to why variation in quantity beyond the limits set out in the contract, whether instructed or not instructed, should not lead to renegotiation of the rates at the instance of either party. That would be the only fair, reasonable and equitable way to work the contract.
In so far Clause 51.1 is concerned, the variation contemplated thereunder relates to the form, quality or quantity of the works which in the opinion of the Engineer is necessary. In the present case, there is a clear finding of fact by two authorities i.e. DRB and the Arbitral Tribunal, both comprised of technical experts, that there is no variation either in the form or quality or quantity of the works. What actually happened is that at the time of execution of the contract pertaining to the RE wall, the geogrid required turned out to be much more than the estimated figure given in item No. 7.7 of the contract. It is in this backdrop that both the fact finding authorities held that there was no variation in terms of Clause 51.1 and that the Engineer did not have the competence to renegotiate the price or rate of the geogrid for the excess quantity of geogrid required.
It is the correct interpretation of Clause 51 made by the DRB and the Arbitral Tribunal. As such, learned Single Judge rightly declined to interfere with the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. If that be the position, there was no justification at all for the Division Bench of the High Court to set aside the award under Section 37 of the 1996 Act.
In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. [2023 (5) TMI 1319 - SUPREME COURT], this Court referring to one of its earlier decisions in UHL Power Company Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [2022 (1) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT], held that scope of interference under Section 37 is all the more circumscribed keeping in view the limited scope of interference with an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is fairly narrow. Therefore, when it comes to scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, jurisdiction of the appellate court in examining an order passed under Section 34, either setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award, is all the more circumscribed.
Again in M/s Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company [2023 (8) TMI 985 - SUPREME COURT], this Court reiterated the position that Section 37 of the 1996 Act grants narrower scope to the appellate court to review the findings in an arbitral award if it has been upheld or substantially upheld under Section 34.
Conclusion - The Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted Clause 51 in a reasonable manner based on the evidence on record. This interpretation was affirmed by the learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, Division Bench of the High Court was not at all justified in setting aside the arbitral award exercising extremely limited jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act by merely using expressions like ‘opposed to the public policy of India’, ‘patent illegality’ and ‘shocking the conscience of the court’. As reiterated by this Court in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd, it is necessary to remind the courts that a great deal of restraint is required to be shown while examining the validity of an arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly or substantially, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat the very purpose of the 1996 Act.
The impugned order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, judgment and order dated 17.11.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is hereby set aside and the arbitral award dated 03.06.2005 is restored - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1366
Seeking grant of regular bail - reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence - Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in connection with charges under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - HELD THAT:- During the investigation conducted by CBI, based on information received from Interpol, the Applicant was apprehended while attempting to collect parcels containing psychotropic substances. The Applicant’s contention that he was not in possession of the parcels and had no knowledge of their contents is, prima facie, unsustainable. The Applicant’s conduct, as revealed during investigation, establishes prima facie evidence of conscious possession. The Applicant went to the Post Office in person, enquired about the parcels and attempted to collect them. Despite not being the consignee, he attempted to claim parcels under names that were not his own — one addressed to Rohit Yadev and the other to his driver, Anil Kumar. Moreover, the Applicant’s act of concealing his identity while going to collect the parcels, by covering his face, inquiring about the parcels beforehand, and attempting to flee on sensing the presence of the CBI team, indicates that he was aware of the illicit nature of the parcels.
In the case of MOHAN LAL VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN [2015 (4) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT] the Supreme Court has clarified that conscious possession does not require physical custody alone but also an awareness of the presence of the contraband and control over it. In this case, the Applicant’s actions and admissions establish a strong prima facie case of knowledge and intent, sufficient to satisfy the threshold of conscious possession under the Act.
On a prima facie assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case, in the opinion of this Court, the Applicant has not met the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act for grant of bail. The allegations against him are grave and serious in nature and there is prima facie credible evidence which links him to a larger conspiracy. Thus, the Court does not deem it fit to grant bail to the Applicant at the present stage.
Conclusion - i) There were no reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant was not guilty of the alleged offenses under the NDPS Act. ii) The Applicant's conduct indicated a likelihood of committing further offenses if released on bail, given his involvement in an international drug trafficking network.
Application dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1365
Cancellation of registration of petitioner - non-furnishing of returns in compliance of the provisions of Section 29[2][c] of the GST Act, 2017 for a continuous period of 6 or more months - HELD THAT:- Having regard to the fact that the GST registration of the petitioner has been canceled under Section 29[2][c] of the CGST Act, 2017 for the reason that the petitioner did not submit returns for a period of 6 [six] months and more; the provisions contained in the proviso to sub-rule [4] of Rule 22 of the CGST Rules, 2017 and the orders passed by the coordinate benches of this Court as well as by this Court in similar matters whereby the matters have been disposed of with a direction to the respondent authorities to revoke the cancellation of registration upon due payment of all statutory dues payable by the petitioners, this Court is of the considered view that no purpose will be served by keeping this writ petition pending and the present writ petition can be disposed of in similar terms, as had been made in similar other writ petitions.
The impugned order dated 10.02.2021 [Annexure-C] is hereby interfered with and set aside. The petitioner is directed to approach the concerned authority within a period of 1 [one] month from today, seeking revocation of cancellation and restoration of his GST registration - Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1364
Levy of penalty u/s 129 (3) of the West Bengal GST Act, 2017 imposing a penalty equal to 200% of tax payable - failure to roduce original/duplicate copy of the tax invoice/delivery challan/E-way bill at the time of interception as per the GST law - intent to evade present or not - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted position that there were discrepancies in the E-way bill and the delivery chellan, i.e, the delivery challan subsequently submitted by the appellant does not match the E-way bill generated in favour of Pisi Suriya Singhpo of Arunachal Pradesh. Noticing the aforesaid discrepancy the adjudicating authority imposed penalty.
There was no finding on the issue of mismatch between the e-way bill and the delivery challan vis-à-vis appellant’s intention to evade tax. Given this situation, the adjudicating authority as a fact finding body was not precluded from going into the aforesaid issue.
As per the E-way bill generated by the appellant, the consignor is one Pisi Suriya Singhpo of Arunachal Pradesh who is an unregistered person whereas the delivery challan subsequently placed on record was not signed by the consignor and was accompanied by a release letter issued by one M/s. B. G. Enterprise, a registered person under the GST Act. This mismatch is not an inadvertent one but gives opportunity to conceal the identity of the actual user (a registered person) of the inward services supplied and thereby evade payment of GST on such supply.
The E-way bill foot print is easily available to the tax authorities, hence the name of an URP has been intentionally declared in the E-way bill with the intention to conceal the actual recipient of the rental/lease service of the said JCB machine by a registered person with the sole intention to evade the tax liability.
Conclusion - The discrepancies in transportation documents, particularly those suggesting an intention to evade tax, justify the imposition of penalties under the GST framework.
The findings of the Hon’ble Single Judge are well merited and does not call for interference - Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1363
Seeking modification of the condition in the Bail Order - HELD THAT:- In view of the submissions made, the condition imposed vide Order dated 20.12.2023 is modified to the extent that instead of seeking prior permission of the learned CJM/Trial Court, the Petitioner shall intimate the Department/Respondent about his travel and shall furnish his contact number and address where he intends to reside.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1362
Levy of penalty u/s 129 of WBGST Act, 2017 - alleged discrepancies in transportation documentation and invoice - whether the respondents have rightly invoked the provisions of Section 129 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 or not? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, Input Tax Credit on the car has already claimed and utilized by M/s MMD & Brothers Enterprise, Proprietor Mr. Marto Lollen, Arunachal Pradesh on the very first instance, thus this Court is of the view that the margin value scheme is not applicable in the case of the petitioner.
This Court considered the judgments relied by the petitioner but finds that the judgments as distinguishable from the facts and circumstance of the present case. In the present case after interception of the conveyance, the respondent no.2 has followed all the procedure by issuing notice to the petitioner and proper opportunity was provided to the petitioner. It is found from record that documents relied by the petitioner are contrary to each other. The petitioner failed to prove that M/s Shifting Gears, Assam has purchased the said vehicle from Mr. Marto Lollen. The e-way bill relied by the petitioner for transportation of the car contrary to the Invoice–cum–Bill of Supply dated 13th May, 2023 and subsequent invoice submitted by the petitioner shows that no Tax was paid.
Conclusion - The invocation of Section 129 was appropriate given the inconsistencies in the transportation documentation and the failure to establish a clear chain of ownership and sale.
This Court did not find any illegality in the order passed by the respondent no. 2 dated 30th May, 2023 and thus the order does not require any interference - Petition dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1361
Rejection of appeal on the ground of time limitation - mismatch between GSTR -3B and GSTR-2A - petitioner is ready and willing to pay 25% of the disputed tax and that he may be granted one final opportunity before the adjudicating authority to put forth their objections to the proposal - HELD THAT:- The impugned order dated 29.04.2024 is set aside - The petitioner shall deposit 25% of the disputed taxes as admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1360
Cancellation of registration of the petitioner - non filing of the GST return for a continuous period of six months - HELD THAT:- An identical controversy has been decided by this Court in SUNIL SAH VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [2024 (9) TMI 904 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'the present writ petition is also decided in terms of the said order.'
The matter is covered by the said order, the present writ petition is also decided in terms of the said order. The petitioner shall be at liberty to move an application for revocation or cancellation of the order under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, within two weeks.
The writ petition is disposed of.
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2025 (1) TMI 1359
Unjust adjustment of excess refunds - Award of interest at 15% per annum from the date of adjustment of the said amount till the date of payment of the refund - as submitted that the statutorily fixed rate of interest u/s 244-A is only 6% per annum, therefore, the High Court [2021 (3) TMI 1014 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT] could not have ordered for refund @ 15% per annum
HELD THAT:- We find that this Court by an interim order [2021 (8) TMI 1433 - SC ORDER] had stayed the direction of the High Court insofar as it pertains to the award of interest in excess of 6% per annum. However, by then there had been compliance of the order of the High Court.
We hence allow this appeal by directing the respondent to refund the amount of interest in excess of 6% per annum to the appellant(s)/Department being Rs.36,61,013/- within a period of four weeks from today.
Appeal is allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
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