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Showing 181 to 200 of 233 Records
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1982 (2) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... advanced by Mr. Dastur that even if the property is owned by the trustees, the assessment cannot be made under s. 3 but it will have to be made under s. 21(1) of the Act. In the view which we have taken and in view of the decision in Orient Club s case 1982 136 ITR 697 (Bom), we find that the notices issued to the club either under s. 17 or under s. 14 are wholly without jurisdiction. We are not therefore, required to go into the other contention raised by Mr. Dastur as to whether the WTO had any reason to believe that the wealth of the club had escaped assessment and, alternatively, even if there was any escapement, such an escapement was not on account of the failure of the club to file a return under s. 14 of the Act. In the view which we have taken, all the notices dated 11th October, 1970, and 17th March, 1979, impugned in this petition are quashed, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) with costs.. It is not necessary to make any order with regard to prayer (b).
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1982 (2) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... made by way of tickets and for advertisements should, on the facts and circumstances of this case, be regarded as merely voluntary contributions and in view of this the exemption contained in sub-s. (1) of s. 12 of the said Act would be clearly attracted, even assuming that these receipts constituted the income of the assessee and not the corpus thereof. Question No. 3, referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the view which we have taken, it becomes wholly unnecessary to decide questions Nos. 1 and 2 and we decline to answer the same. As far as question No. 4 is concerned, it is quite clear that these contributions could never be regarded as income derived by the assessee-trust from property and neither counsel has advanced any argument to that effect before us. That question is, therefore, answered in the negative. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (2) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... in view of this, it must be treated as a company also for the purposes of the said Act, because not to do so would result in an anomaly. We are afraid that this contention of Mr. Mehta has to be at once rejected. Merely because the said Corporation is declared to be a company for the purposes of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, it cannot be said that the said Corporation must be deemed to have been declared to be a company for the purposes of the said Act, namely, W.T. Act, 1957. If there is an anomaly, as is contended by Mr. Mehta, it is for the Legislature and not the court to remedy the same. Merely because the said Corporation has been recognised as a company for the purposes of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, we cannot assume, as is contended, that it should also be recognised as a company for the purposes of the said Act. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee to pay to the Commissioner costs of the reference.
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1982 (2) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Change Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... rectly made by the assessee. We may mention here that the provisions of s. 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, are in pari materia with the provisions of s. 64(iii) of the I.T. Act, 1961, with which we are concerned in this case. In Bhaichand Jivraj Muchhala v. CIT 1976 102 ITR 385, it has been held by a Division Bench of this court that where a portion of the capital contributed by a lady partner in a firm comes from money given to her by her husband, the interest paid by the firm on that portion of the capital will be includible in her husband s income under s. 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. In view of these two decisions and the aforesaid undisputed position regarding cross-gifts which we have referred to, it is clear that both the questions raised will have to be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The said questions are answered accordingly. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Change Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... se the case before us falls directly within the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Bhai Parekh s case, Moreover, it is significant that the very same Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which decided the case of Potti Veerayya Sresty, followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Bhai Parekh in G. Ethiraj In v. CIT 1972 85 ITR 16 (AP). In the result, question No. 2 referred to us must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In view of this answer to question No. 2, it becomes unnecessary and academic to decide question No. 1 and we decline to answer the same. We may, however, make it clear that it was the admitted position before the ITO that the assessee and his brother had made cross-gifts to the respective wives of each other and it cannot, therefore, be doubted that there was an indirect transfer of the assets by the assessee to his wife. The Commissioner, applicant, to pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1982 (2) TMI 48 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Interest Paid By Firm To Partner ... ... ... ... ..... e of the partners had entered into I partnership in his individual capacity but e loan was advanced from the HUF account and interest was also credited into a separate account. The facts as found by the authorities below in the reference before us are not the same and, therefore, the statement of law made by the Gujarat High Court in the above cited case will not apply to this case. Similarly the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. K. Krishnaiah Chetty and Sons 1981 131 ITR 410, is not in point because the facts were more or less similar to those obtaining in Sajjanraj Divanchand s case 1980 126 ITR 654 (Guj). In view of the discussion above we hold that the assessee-firm was not entitled to claim deduction of interest paid to its partners in view of the bar contained in s. 40(b) of the I.T. Act, 1961. Question No. (2) is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 47 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Deduction From Profits And Gains, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... falls squarely within the rule of law, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned two authorities, and, on the facts found, it must be held that the export wing of the assessee which is housed in a separate premises, in which new machinery had been installed, solely for the purpose of manufacture of knitwears for purposes of export, and there being absolutely separate accounts maintained for the said undertaking, is an independent entity which has no nexus with the original unit. It cannot, therefore, be said that the export wing had been formed by the reconstruction of the business of the assessee, already in existence. The answer to question No. (1) is, therefore, returned in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The finding in regard to question No. (2) has already been recorded, as the point involved in the same was not pressed. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference.
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1982 (2) TMI 46 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Deduction From Profits And Gains, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... estricted it may be, of ownership of the assets. It is none the less imperative that there should be continuity and preservation of the old undertaking though in an altered form. The object of this provision is to provide an incentive for the setting up of new industries so as to accelerate the process of industrialisation, The expression splitting up or reconstruction of business already in existence must be understood in a broad commercial sense from a common sense point of view because the purpose of the provision is to encourage the setting up of new industries vide CIT v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd. 1974 94 ITR 73 (Cal). If the new undertaking is formed by the transfer of second-hand assets, Expln. 2 to sub-s. (4) may be invoked and on the facts found by the Tribunal it has been rightly invoked. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (2) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pportunity by way thereof under s. 23A(2) of the said Act, clearly arose on the record of the case and the question referred to us is wide enough to cover this controversy. In view of this, we fail to see how the Revenue can be precluded from raising this contention. In our view, it will be for the Tribunal to determine this question when the matter goes back to the Tribunal. In the result, we answer the question referred to us as follows In the event of the Tribunal holding that the assessee was entitled to a notice as contemplated under sub-s. (2) of s. 23A of the said Act, the order made by the ITO under s. 154 of the said Act, namely, the I.T. Act, 1961, has been rightly vacated. If, however, the Tribunal finds that the assessee was not entitled to Such notice as set out earlier, then the order made by the ITO under s. 154 of the said Act was not properly vacated. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (2) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Property To Prevent Evasion Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... id negotiations fell through as the I.T. authorities were unwilling to purchase the said house. The present case, as has been held by the learned trial judge, is an unfortunate one and peculiar, inasmuch as for no fault of the contributories who are the only beneficiaries in the winding-up of the cornpany most of the properties have been sold and large amounts of incometax had to be paid., although, belatedly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, as narrated by the learned trial judge in his judgment, the learned judge, exercised his powers under s. 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, and disallowed the payment of interest due by the company (in liquidation) under s. 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order of the learned trial judge. By reason of the premises, this appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. R. N. PYNE J.-I agree.
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1982 (2) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... ribunal had held that the said Lakshmi Nath Seva Trust was a public charitable trust. He could not enlighten us any further whether the Revenue had taken any steps or not thereafter. If that is the position, and, further, in view of the fact that it is not disputed that the factual contention of the assessee was that it had paid on good faith to the representative, it is also not disputed before us, that whether it was charitable trust or not and whether it received money from the assessee for charitable purpose or not is not relevant for us in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal that the assessee was entitled to exemption in respect of the sum of Rs. 10,850 paid to Shri Lakshmi Nath Seva Trust was right in law. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (2) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sallowance of certain items of expenses clause (b) relates to write off of loss or depreciation of investments and clause (c) deals with reserves for unexpired risks. These clauses do not help the assessee to exclude Rs. 4,58,049 from the assessment. It follows, therefore, that there is no way by which the assessee can claim exclusion from assessment for this amount. The sum of Rs. 4,58,049 forms very much part of the balance of profits according to the assessee s own annual accounts that is how the accounts were submitted to the Controller of Insurance. The assessee having made its bed must lie on it for good or bad, whether to dream on insurance, or keep awake on income-tax. The Tribunal s approach has altogether missed the compulsions of r. 5 of the First Schedule, according to which the question at issue must have to be answered against the assessee. That is the answer we return in this reference. The assessee will have to pay the Revenue its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (2) TMI 41 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decide the application under s. 18(2A) according to law on the basis of relevant considerations, it is imperative for the authority to state reasons for its decision. The authority must act fairly. It is a fundamental rule that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The rule is applicable in a proceeding under s. 18(2A). These are some of the reasons why giving of reasons is a must in proceeding under s. 18(2A) of the Act . We hold that the impugned order suffers from absence of any reason for the decision and as such the impugned order must be quashed which we hereby do. In the result, therefore, the petitions are allowed and the matters are remitted to the learned Commissioner for due disposal of the applications according to law. There is no order as to costs. Before parting, we would observe that we have derived considerable assistance from the judgment of Hansaria J. in Sardar Kartar Singh v. CWT 1982 135 ITR 379 (Gauhati).
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1982 (2) TMI 40 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of going through the order proposed by my brother, Sohani J. According to me, after having observed in para. 6 to the effect that It is not necessary for us in this case to decide as to whether the decision in Misc. Civil Case No. 142 of 1978 (Alok Paper Industries v. CIT 1983 139 ITR 1064 (MP)) which takes the same view as has been taken in Karsandas Bhagwandas Patel v. G. V. Shah, ITO 1975 98 ITR 255 (Guj), Singho Mica Mining Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1978 111 ITR 231 (Cal), Puthuthotam Estates (1943) Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 125 ITR 41 (Mad) and New Dewan Oil Mills v. CIT 1981 129 ITR 224 (P and H), is or is not the correct view , it does not appear to be necessary to express further opinion as per para. 8 that there is no conflict in the two decisions of this court in Misc. Civil Case No. 142 of 1978 (Alok Paper Industries v. CIT 1983 139 ITR 1064 (MP)) and CIT v. Narpat Singh Malkhan Singh 1981 128 ITR 77 (MP) . Subject to this reservation, I agree with the order proposed.
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1982 (2) TMI 39 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Non-resident ... ... ... ... ..... n the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the receipt of Rs. 3,17,741 could be subjected to tax in the assessment year in question as the income of the assessee ? We answer question No. 1 in the negative and question No. 2 in the affirmative. Before we part with these references, we are tempted to reproduce the observations of S. T. Desai J. in H. M. Kashiparekh and Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1960 39 ITR 706 (Bom), which read as under (p. 713) It is trite saying that income-tax is not and cannot be cast on logical lines. No considerations of equity or hardship can be permitted to control the application of the Act. Nor is it permissible to the court to disregard any axiomatic principle of tax law. We are conscious that the view that we take may cause hardship to the assessee but that cannot be helped. We, therefore, think that this is not a case in which any order should be made as regards costs. The three references are answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Deduction, Royalty ... ... ... ... ..... ps correct. further have it on record that in terms of the directions by the Board the necessary particulars were supplied by the petitioner, so it was expected of the Board, to deal with them and consider such particulars in accordance with law and in the light of the observations as made and that the re would be no bar for the said petitioner to enter into agreement, (1) for having the sole selling agency, and also (2) for supplying the technical services. This rule was made ready as regards service on 29th August, 1977, and I am informed that an opposition has been filed through Mr. Samar Banerjee. Such opposition was not available in the record. Mr. Bajoria has, of course, filed his clients reply. Let such reply be kept in the record. For the views which I have expressed, I make this rule absolute, set aside the determinations by the Board as mentioned above and send the matter back to them for further consideration and determination of the matter in accordance with law.
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1982 (2) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... of a third party the position is different. In such a case the onus of proof is not upon the assessee to show the source or nature of the amount of cash credit. The onus shifts on to the Department to show by some material that the amount standing in the name of the third party does not belong, to him but belongs to the assessee. We find that that decision was rendered on the facts of that case and it was a proceeding taken under s. 34 of the 1922 Act. We have already referred in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kale Khan Mohammed Hanij v. CIT 1963 50 ITR 1 and of our court in Chaturbhuj and Co, v. CIT 1959 36 ITR 386 (Al ). In our opinion, on the facts found by the Tribunal the disputed amount was rightly treated as the assessee s income from undisclosed sources. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The Department is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (2) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assets, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... erest or rights. Any one of those interests will itself be property, and hence has to be included in the connotation of assets . A life interest is a fractional interest in property, falling short of the entire interest in it. It is a well-known species of property under many systems of law, ancient and modern. The idea of a life interest perhaps emerged out of the recognition that property, especially immovable property, tends to outlast the span of human life or lives. We have no doubt whatever that a life interest in house property is an interest in the house. It follows that in a case where the house in question is lived in by the life-tenant, we do not see how exemption can be withheld from him under s. 5(1)(iv). We are satisfied that the Tribunal as well as the AAC were justified in granting the exemption. The question of law is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The Revenue will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (2) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... to be urged or not. The position with regard to the cross-objection is, however, different. The ground with regard to the legality of the allowance of Rs. 7,500 having been expressly taken in the cross-objection, the cross-objection could not have been decided properly and effectively unless the merits of this contention were adjudicated upon. The challenge to the validity of the decision of the Tribunal rejecting the cross-objection is not, therefore, in any way affected by the earlier decision not to permit the Revenue to raise the additional ground because that was not a decision on the merits of the contention sought to be canvassed by the Revenue. It appears to us that the Tribunal was, therefore, clearly in error in dismissing the cross-objection on the ground that an appeal was already filed by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, the answer to the question referred is in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The assessee to pay the costs of this reference.
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1982 (2) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penal Interest ... ... ... ... ..... h penal interest was waived, in the absence of the ITO relying upon such circumstances by reason of which he could waive the levy of penal interest. As far as the second and third submissions are concerned, they are totally beyond the scope of the question referred to us as aforesaid and we do not propose to discuss them at all. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The assessee to pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Poona, the costs of the reference. Before parting with the matter, we may mention that Mr. Mhaispurkar requested that we should clarify that our decision does not preclude the right of the assessee to apply for reduction or waiver of interest under r. 40 of the I.T. Rules. We do not see why it is necessary to give any such clarification at all. There is nothing which we have said in the judgment which would preclude such a right. Whether the assessee has such a right or not is not for us to say.
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