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Showing 181 to 200 of 285 Records
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1993 (2) TMI 108 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... ch are enumerated in paragraph 10 of the writ petition. The application was rejected on 4th April, 1986. Thereafter, instead of filing an application under sub-section (3) of Section 350 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, the petitioner filed the present writ petition and obtained a stay order. The petitioner s counsel was informed on the last occasion that the writ petition was not maintainable. The time was sought for converting the writ petition into application for reference, but this has not been done, since a specific remedy for filing an application for reference is provided in the Central Excise Act, this writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected on that ground. The writ petition is rejected and the interim stay order given on 23rd April, 1986 is withdrawn. Therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, I uphold the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, and accordingly dismiss the writ petition. No costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Writ Jurisdiction - Existence of alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... ths or five years, as the case may be. (2) The Assistant Collector of Central Excise or, as the case may be, the Collector of Central Excise, shall, after considering the representation, if any, made by the person on whom notice is served under sub-section (1), determine the amount of duty of excise due from such person (not being in excess of the amount specified in the notice) and thereupon such person shall pay the amount so determined. In the case of suppression, within a period of five years, it is open to the Collector to issue a show cause notice. It is a different matter after a written statement is filed and evidence is produced, the Collector may come to a different conclusion that the suppression is not proved and may close the proceedings. But it is not possible to hold as per the contents of the show cause notice that the Collector has no jurisdiction to issue such a notice. That being so, we do not see any ground to admit this appeal. It is accordingly rejected.
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1993 (2) TMI 106 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Warehousing - Rate of duty ... ... ... ... ..... isfactory explanation by the Customs Officers as to why this long delay took place. 18. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case and following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Priyanka Overseas Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 1991 (51) E.L.T. 185 (S.C.), it must be held that there was no valid reason for demanding enhanced rate of duty from the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, is entitled to the delivery of the goods after payment of the duty which was in force before 1st March, 1992. 19. The writ petition is disposed of by directing the Customs Department to release the goods of the petitioner without charging any interest but charging only duty at the rate which was in force before the Finance Bill, 1992 came into effect. In other words, the duty chargeable must be calculated at the rate which was in force before 1st March, 1992. 20. All parties shall act on the signed copy of the operative part of this order on the usual undertaking.
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1993 (2) TMI 105 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... as given rise to the present petition. 2. Shri Vyas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the appellate proceedings filed before the Tribunal at New Delhi are still not finally determined. The learned counsel urged that it is in the interest of justice that the complaint should not be proceeded with till the appellate proceedings are disposed of. The submission is reasonable. The Magistrate to proceed with the complaint only after the fact of disposal of the proceedings before the Tribunal is brought to the notice of the Magistrate by the complainant. 3. Accordingly, hearing of Criminal Case No. 118/S of 1985 is deferred till the disposal of proceedings instituted by the petitioners before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. The complainant shall bring to the notice of the Magistrate the fact of disposal of the proceedings if the proceedings are still not disposed of, or whenever the same will be disposed of.
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1993 (2) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Manufacture - Mercerising ... ... ... ... ..... ons contained in the licence granted to the petitioner was to the effect that the licence was liable to be. rejected or suspended or the renewal of the same can be refused, if any declaration made or information given in the application therefor is found to be false or if any undertaking given in such application is not carried out. The contention is that the petitioner while applying for licence has declared that he required the licence to manufacture mercerised yarn. As the mercerisation of yarn will not amount to manufacture for the purpose of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, the declaration given in the application becomes incorrect, if not false. Therefore the Department is entitled to revoke the licence already granted on the ground that such licence is not required by the petitioner. 11. In the light of the discussion above, I sustain the order impugned in this writ petition and consequently, this writ petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
Valuation (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... erred to the very transaction M/s. Europa had with the petitioner in 1987. But no documents were produced to establish this correlation. On the contrary, it is strenuously urged by Shri Verma that the quotation relied upon by the revenue did not relate nor was it in response to any enquiry as to the value of the goods actually supplied by M/s. Europa. 4. In the circumstances, we think that while all other findings of the Tribunal are left undisturbed, the question of revaluation for purposes of computation of duty and redemption-fine should be remitted to the Tribunal for a reconsideration and a fresh disposal in the light of such material as the parties may place before the Tribunal in support of their respective contentions as to the value at the relevant time. We order accordingly. The Tribunal will dispose of the matter within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 5. The appeal and the Special Leave Petition are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 99 - SC ORDER
Deduction, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... n CWT v. B. K Sharma 1991 187 ITR 325. In view of the judgment in B. K. Sharma s case 1991 187 ITR 325 (SC) and for the reasons recorded therein, we dismiss this appeal. No costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1993 (2) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the discretion exercised by the Division Bench in refusing to entertain the earlier writ petition for non-availing of alternate remedy and dismissing it, could be said to be an unwarranted exercise of discretion?
Held that:- When a judge of single judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another single judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. The second writ petition cannot be so entertained not because the learned single judge has no jurisdiction to entertain same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition would render the order of the same court dismissing the earlier writ petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power.
This reason which supports the first ground urged in support of the appeal, to wit, that the learned single judge ought not have entertained a second writ petition in respect of the order of compulsory retirement of the respondent, when a Division Bench of the same court had refused to entertain a writ petition of the same respondent filed respecting the same subject-matter for non-availing of the alternate remedy before the forum of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, is also a valid reason. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 97 - SC ORDER
Any Remuneration, Other Sources, Remuneration Received By Managing Director ... ... ... ... ..... for both the parties state that, following the decision of this Court in CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty 1981 128 ITR 294, this appeal has to be dismissed. It is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 96 - SC ORDER
Intercorporate Dividends ... ... ... ... ..... in Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. v. Union a India 1985 155 ITR 120. Indeed, the same result follows from section 80AA introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1968. For the above reason, the appeals are allowed. The application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act made by the Revenue shall be deemed to have been allowed, a reference made and answered in the manner indicated above. We may clarify that the assessment years concerned herein are 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73.
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1993 (2) TMI 95 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Company, Widely Held Company ... ... ... ... ..... language, resort to any interpretative process to unfold., the legislative intent becomes impermissible. The supposed intention of the Legislature cannot then be applied to whittle down the statutory language which is otherwise unambiguous. If the intendment is not in the words used, it is nowhere else. The need for interpretation arises when the words used in the statute are, on their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the Legislature. The language used in section 10(29) is so clear and unambiguous that there is no scope for accepting the submission of learned counsel for the assessee that the plain meaning is to be given a go by. In view of the analysis made by us, the first question referred is answered in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. In view of this answer, there is no necessity to answer the second question which is merely academic. The reference is accordingly disposed of. No costs. D. M. PATNAIK J. - I agree.
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1993 (2) TMI 94 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Any Remuneration, Other Sources, Remuneration Received By Managing Director ... ... ... ... ..... Rs. 2,77,364 paid by the assessee on account of the income-tax liability of a company whose business assets and liabilities it had purchased. The court held that the assets and liabilities of the transferor-company formed part of the consideration for the acquisition of the business of the transferor-company. The expenditure of Rs. 2,77,364 representing the liability of the transferor-company which was discharged by the assessee was, therefore, held to be in the nature of capital expenditure and, as such, not deductible in the computation of the income of the assessee. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to the deduction of the sum of Rs. 2,35,000 in respect of tax liability of the transferor-firm discharged by it. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 93 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Failure To Deduct Tax On Interest Payment, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... uired to be anaesthetized. Consequently, even while refusing to order discharge, and leaving the charges undisturbed, I find it just and appropriate to quash the revisional order so that the trial court is left free to consider and decide the points involved without feeling in any way shackled by the observations of the superior court. In the circumstances, the revisional order dated September 18, 1991, is hereby quashed. The trial court is directed to consider all the objections as were raised before the revisional court as also in this court ignoring all objections contained therein and conclude the trial by June 30, 1993, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on February 22, 1993, to take further orders as regards recording of evidence subsequent to the framing of the charges. The record, if received, shall be returned immediately. The petition thus stands disposed of with the observations as above.
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1993 (2) TMI 92 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... the sale price was spent would also be evident from those returns. The recital in the original agreement that the sister concern approached the assessee for purchasing timber and the assessee agreed to part with the standing trees thus making the land suitable for tea plantation was also before the Income-tax Officer. Thus, there was no failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of primary facts necessary for the assessment for that year. The jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer is dependent on such non-disclosure. In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment for the year concerned. We answer the question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal. There will be no direction as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 91 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... t on the direction of the Controller. It has already been stated that the postponement of recovery of estate duty or allow payment of the demand in instalments may be allowed on payment of specified interest. But no such order was made by the Controller. Therefore, while the whole of the assessed amount of duty had been paid, though the payment was made at the convenience of the petitioner, the question of imposition of interest on the amount paid by the petitioner did not arise. A similar view was adopted in Prem Nath Khandelwal v. Asst. CED 1970 77 ITR 949 (Cal) and H. M. Jaffar v. Asst. CED 1980 124 ITR 443 (Kar). I respectfully agree with the view taken in the above-referred cases. For these reasons, the order imposing interest by the Controller subsequent to payment of the demand was made without jurisdiction. In the result, the petition is allowed, the impugned order of the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty at Guwahati made on November 28, 1980, is quashed. No costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 90 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Exclusion, Precedents ... ... ... ... ..... rom the definition of capital assets. The factors which have been considered by the Tribunal in deciding whether the land should be considered as agricultural land are not in any manner inconsistent with the tests laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case of CWT v. Officer-in-Charge (Court of Wards), Paigah 1976 105 ITR 133. The Supreme Court has also said that entries in the revenue record are good prima facie evidence, though they may not be conclusive. In the present case also, the Tribunal has looked at other surrounding circumstances also in addition to the entries in the revenue record for coming to the conclusion it has come to. We may add that the Tribunal was bound to apply the tests laid down by the Bombay High Court in the case of CWT v. Poddar Mills (W.T.R. No. 5 of 1964 4-2-1972 ) as this decision was binding on the Tribunal. In the premises, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 89 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal Against Penal Interest, Construction Company ... ... ... ... ..... s and obtained certain payments for surrendering its rights. This was a case of cancellation of a contract which had been entered into in the ordinary course of business. Any payment received in connection with the termination of the contract really represented the profit which the assessee would have made had the contract been performed. Hence the entire amount received by the assessee-firm was a business receipt. In the present case also the amount which is received by the assessee-company for assignment of a contract which it had entered into and which formed a part of its business activities, really represents the profit it would have made on the contract. The assignment has not affected in any manner the trading structure of the company or its business activities. The amount received for assigning this contract, therefore, must be viewed as revenue receipt. In the premises, question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 88 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... gative. Each sub-clause (b) must be read independently according to the words used by Parliament. There is no justification for reading the terms of one sub-clause into those of another sub-clause in the absence of words which compel such a construction. We are supported in this view by CIT v. Eldee Wire Ropes Limited 1978 114 ITR 485 (Bom), CIT v. Jay Engineering Works 1984 149 ITR 297 (Delhi) and CIT v. Vippy Solvex Product Private Limited 1986 159 ITR 487 (MP). For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Appellate Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the assessee was entitled to weighted deduction in respect of expenditure incurred on marine insurance (Rs. 23,448.03) and sea freight (Rs. 5,82,832.64) under sub-clause (viii) of section 35B(1)(b) of the Act. We are, however, unable to agree with the Appellate Tribunal in so far as expenditure of Rs. 1,40,732.86 on account of railway freight being qualified for such weighted deduction is concerned. We decide accordingly.
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1993 (2) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... in filing the appeal since the appeal was from the order dated September 30, 1972, while the appeal was filed on February 15, 1974. In these circumstances, in our view, the supplementary appeal which was filed by the assessee cannot be considered as an appeal from the order of rectification under section 154. It was clearly an appeal from the order of assessment under section 143(3). Since the assessee had already filed an appeal from the assessment order under section 143(3), which was disposed of separately by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on May 14, 1973, long prior to the filing of the supplementary appeal, in our view, this supplementary appeal is not maintainable looking to the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Hence question No. 1 which is referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In view of our answer to question No. 1, question No. 2 does not arise and it is not necessary for us to answer the same. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 86 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was not filed within the time prescribed under section 139(3) of the Act. In this case, the Tribunal proceeded on the footing that no proof was adduced before the Assessing Officer whether any extension was obtained by the assessee before filing the return. Admittedly, the return was filed after the due date but before the assessment was completed and, as such, the return could not be ignored by the Income-tax Officer. In our view, therefore, the principles laid down in the aforesaid two decisions of this court will equally apply to the facts of this case. Following the said decision, we answer the first question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In view of our answer to the first question, we do not consider it necessary for examining the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal as raised in question No. 2. We, therefore, decline to answer question No. 2 in this reference. There will be no order as to costs. NURE ALAM CHOWDHURY J. -I agree.
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