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Showing 181 to 200 of 1477 Records
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2016 (4) TMI 1298
CENVAT credit - manufacturer of sugar and molasses as well as exempted Bagasse - non-maintenance of separate records - reversal of 10% of the price of the exempted final products - Held that: - he issue of reversal of Cenvat, on bagasse have been decided in favor of assessee by the Apex Court in U.O. India v. DSCL Sugar Ltd. [2015 (10) TMI 566 - SUPREME COURT], where it was held that it is not in dispute that Bagasse is only an agricultural waste and residue, which itself is not the result of any process. Therefore, it cannot be treated as falling within the definition of Section 2(f) of the Act and the absence of manufacture, there cannot be any excise duty. Since it is not a manufacture, obviously Rule 6 of the Cenvat Rules, 2004, shall have no application - the Appeal is allowed subject to payment of cost of ₹ 10,000/- to be paid in ‘Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund’.
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2016 (4) TMI 1297
Leave to withdraw the appeal - liberty to approach the High Court - Clandestine removal of goods - Valuation of goods - the decision in the case of M/s. Belgium Glass & Ceramics Pvt. Limited And Others Versus Commissioner of Central Excise & S.T., Ahmedabad And Others [2015 (5) TMI 528 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] contested - Held that: - Leave and liberty granted - appeal dismissed as withdrawn.
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2016 (4) TMI 1296
Depreciation on fixed assets - non-commencement of business - not able to prove how the assets utilized by when no business was carried on by it. - Held that:- Liquor business is on a different footing than other business activities. It is undisputed before me that under Section 60 of the Uttar Pradesh Excise Act, carrying on trade in liquor without licence is punishable with imprisonment. - We are of the view that since assessee has not conducted any business or profession during the year under consideration, therefore, authorities below were justified in not granting depreciation and deduction on account of expenditure. The appeal of the assessee fails and is dismissed.
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2016 (4) TMI 1295
Maintainability of appeal - appeal filed beyond 60 days - Section 378(5) of Cr.P.C - order of acquittal - In the private complaint cases, for the victims, whether the right of appeal as provided in proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is available or the only option for them is to seek leave under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C ?
Held that: - the term 'victim' found in the Proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C shall not include a victim, who is a complainant in a complaint case and that the term 'victim' used in the said Proviso shall be confined to the victims in cases instituted otherwise than on a complaint. In the case on hand, the criminal case was instituted on the file of the trial Court on a complaint made by the respondent/complainant. In fact, the offence is a non-cognizable offence and hence, there can be no other mode of institution of the criminal case than by preferring a complaint to the Magistrate. The offence alleged is one punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
As the case ended in acquittal before the trial Court, the remedy available to the respondent herein (complainant) was to approach this Court (High Court) under Section 378(4) within the period stipulated in Section 378(5) seeking Special Leave to file an appeal against acquittal. Instead of adopting such a procedure, the respondent herein (complainant) chose to prefer an appeal under the Proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C before the Sessions Court and the learned Appellate Judge either without considering the scope of the Proviso to Section 372 or in an erroneous interpretation of the said provision, assumed jurisdiction and decided the appeal which went against the appellant herein (accused). The appellant is right in challenging the judgment of the learned lower Appellate Judge on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.
Whether a complainant, who is also a victim, should seek special leave, from the High Court as provided under Section 378(5) of the Code or whether as a matter of right, he can avail a statutory right of appeal is one question, which arises herein. In the cases arising out of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, invariably it is the complainant (either as a victim of the offence or otherwise), who sets the law in motion. But, in the case of other offences under the Indian Penal Code or other Enactments, the position may not be the same. In those cases, the law could be set in motion either on a police report or through a private complaint. Hence, an interpretation of Section 372 vis- -vis Section 378(4) in these matters will also have a bearing on the other types of offences also.
The correct law, as emerging from the Scheme of the Code, would be that the right of a victim to prefer an appeal (on limited grounds enumerated in proviso to Section 372 of the Code) is a separate and independent statutory right and is not dependent either upon or is subservient to right of appeal of the State. In other words, both the victim and the State/prosecution can file appeals independently without being dependent on the exercise of the right by the other. Moreover, from the act or omission for which the accused has been charged, there may be more than one victim and the loss suffered by the victims may vary from one victim to the other victims. Therefore, each of such victims will have separate right of appeal and in such appeals, the grievance of each of the appellant may be different.
Appeal dismissed being not maintainable.
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2016 (4) TMI 1294
Entitlement to claim the weighted deduction at the specified rate u/s S.35 (2AB) - approval of the in-house research and development facility - quantum of such expenditure - no show cause notice and an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner assessee before cost of purchase of motor vehicles and salary and wages of the trainees and apprentices as disallowed from the category of 'approved expenditure on scientific research' - Held that:- Undisputably before reducing the amount of R & D expenditure for these two Assessment Years in question i.e., 2011-12 and 2012-13 to the extent of ₹ 59.69 lakhs and 55.51 lakhs respectively, the said respondent Secretary did not give any prior show cause notice and an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner assessee as to why these two amounts under two different heads namely, cost of purchase of motor vehicles and salary and wages of the trainees and apprentices, be not disallowed from the category of 'approved expenditure on scientific research'. Thus, the assessee was deprived of its valuable right of hearing and rebut and controvert the case against him on the basis of which, the said respondent Secretary passed the impugned order approving the expenditure for scientific research as required under the provisions of S.35 (2AB) at a reduced level. Had such a notice been given by the said authority to the assessee company, perhaps the assessee company could have satisfied the said authority about the genuineness of the claim and rational nexus of these expenses relatable to the scientific research undertaken by it entitling it for claiming the weighted deduction in respect of these expenses also under the category of approved expenditure for scientific research under S.35(2AB) of the Act.
The impugned order is thus clearly hit by the vice of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice or audi alterm partem, the applicability of which even to the taxing statute cannot be ruled out. The competent authority passed this order under these provisions certainly exercising a quasi-judicial function when he passed this order approving the expenditure incurred by the assessee on scientific research. No such unilateral action or determination could have been taken by the respondent Secretary particularly when he chose to reduce the amount of expenditure incurred on scientific research as against the amount claimed by the assessee, to the detriment of the assessee company resulting in an adverse double tax effect as per the provisions of the Act.
This Court would not like to pronounce upon the includibility of these expenses in the head of 'approved expenditure for scientific research' at this stage and it is considered appropriate that the 1st respondent Secretary himself is allowed to reconsider the case on these issues after allowing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee in this regard
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2016 (4) TMI 1293
Offences punishable under Sections 21/22/29/61/85 of NDPS Act - prayer for grant of regular bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C - Held that:- There is alleged recovery of 50 vials of Rexcof Cough Syrup (100 ML each) from the petitioner and his co-accused/non-applicant-Ranjit Singh @ Happy, traveling in a Scorpio vehicle. Apart from that, there is a recovery of 500 intoxicating tablets of 'JACKSON', containing 4.2 mg of Diazepam in each tablet from the petitioner alone on his disclosure statement.
The co-accused Ranjit Singh was not involved in any other case whereas the petitioner is stated to be involved in three other cases including one under the NDPS Act.
After arguing for sometime, learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused wishes to withdraw the present petition. Dismissed as withdrawn.
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2016 (4) TMI 1292
TPA - comparable selection criteria - Held that:- The assessee is engaged in the business of managing call centers, software development and providing information technology enable services from the undertaking registered with the Software Technology Park, thus companies functionally dissimlar with that of assessee need to be deselected from final list of comparability
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2016 (4) TMI 1291
Transaction in the name of the minor - Suit instituted within three years of limitation from the date of attaining majority - Held that:- A quondam minor plaintiff challenging the transfer of an immovable property made by his guardian in contravention of Section 8(1)(2) of the 1956 Act and who seeks possession of property can file the Suit only within the limitation prescribed under Article 60 of the Act and Articles 109, 110 or 113 of the Act are not applicable to the facts of the case.
The High Court as well as the Trial Court erred in applying Article 109 of the Act, where Article 109 of the Act clearly speaks about alienation made by father governed by Mitakshara law and further Courts below proceeded in discussing about the long rope given under Article 109 of the Act and comparatively lesser time specified under Article 60 of the Act. It is well settled principle of interpretation that inconvenience and hardship to a person will not be the decisive factors while interpreting the provision. When bare reading of the provision makes it very clear and unequivocally gives a meaning it was to be interpreted in the same sense as the Latin maxim says “dulo lex sed lex”, which means the law is hard but it is law and there cannot be any departure from the words of the law.
Hence, in view of our above discussion, the limitation to file the present Suit is governed by Article 60 of the Act and the limitation is 3 years from the date of attaining majority. When once we arrive at a conclusion that Article 60 of the Act applies and the limitation is 3 years, the crucial question is when there are several plaintiffs, what is the reckoning date of limitation? A reading of Section 7 makes it clear that when one of several persons who are jointly entitled to institute a Suit or make an application for the execution of the decree and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against all of them but when no such discharge can be given, time will not run against all of them until one of them becomes capable of giving discharge.
In the case on hand, the 1st plaintiff was 20 years old, the 2nd defendant was still a minor and the plaintiffs 3, 4 and 5, who are married daughters, were aged 29, 27 and 25 respectively, on the date of institution of the Suit in the year 1989. As per Explanation 2 of Section 7, the manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by Mithakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without concurrence of other members of family only if he is in management of the joint family property. In this case, plaintiffs 3 to 5 though majors as on the date of institution of Suit will not fall under Explanation 2 of Section 7 of the Limitation Act as they are not the manager or Karta of the joint family. The first plaintiff was 20 years old as on the date of institution of the Suit and there is no evidence forthcoming to arrive at a different conclusion with regard to the age of the 1st plaintiff. In that view of the matter, the Suit is instituted well within three years of limitation from the date of attaining majority as envisaged under Article 60 of the Act.
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2016 (4) TMI 1290
Provision of overdue interest on NPA accounts - Held that:- It is an undisputed fact that assessee is a co-operative bank and is governed by the Reserve Bank of India guidelines. We find that ld. CIT(A) after considering the CBDT Circular, provisions of Act and various decisions cited in the order has held that A.O. was not justified in disallowing the claim of deduction on the issue of interest on overdue loans.
We find that Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Deogiri Nagar Sahakari Bank Ltd. & Ors. (2015 (1) TMI 1218 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) has held that prudential norms issued by Reserve Bank of India are equally applicable to co-operative banks and that interest on sticky advances is not taxable. Before us, Revenue has not brought on record any contrary binding decision in its support. In view of the aforesaid facts, we find no reason to interfere with the order of ld. CIT(A). Thus, the ground of Revenue is dismissed.
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2016 (4) TMI 1289
Maintainability of appeal - monitory limit - Held that:- From Circular No.21 of 2015 the respondent/assessee submitted that pending appeals before the High Court, below the specified tax limits as stated in paragraph 3 of the Circular, are liable to be withdrawn/not pressed.
It is appropriate to notice that the Central Board of Direct Taxes has issued the instructions contained in the said Circular in exercise of its power available to it under Section 268-A(i) of the Income Tax Act,1961 and hence, the Circular has statutorily enforceable character. In that view of the matter, we treat this appeal as not pressed and dismiss it as such. However, it goes without saying that the questions of law raised in this appeal for consideration of this Court in this appeal, are kept open to be decided on merits in an appropriate case
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2016 (4) TMI 1288
Renewal of lease - whether acceptance of rent, in the instant case, by the DDA pursuant to a demand made by it amounts to a renewal of lease in respect of the property in question? - Held that:- In the instant case, as per Clause III(b) of the lease deed and Sections 21 and 22 of the DD Act read with Rule 43 of the Nazul Land Rules and there cannot be an automatic renewal of lease in favour of the original lessee once it stands terminated by efflux of time and also by issuing notice terminating the lease. Merely accepting the amount towards the rent by the office of the DDA after expiry of the lease period shall not be construed as renewal of lease of the premises in question, in favour of the original lessee, for another period of 20 years as contended by the Respondent.
In the absence of renewal of lease after 10.8.1968, the pleadings of the original lessee that the DDA is estopped from taking the plea that there is no renewal of lease after having accepted the rent after 10.8.1968, in respect of property in question and after accepting certain sums in respect of the same, subsequently, for change of the property in question from leasehold to freehold are all irrelevant aspects for the reason that the same are contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the DD Act, the Nazul Land Rules applicable to the fact situation and the terms and conditions of the lease deed. Further, it is clear from the contents of the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 served upon the original lessee by the DDA that it has not only refused to renew the lease of the property but also asked the original lessee to hand over the possession of the property in question within 30 days, which is absolutely in consonance with Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
The grant of perpetual injunction by the Trial Court in favour of original lessee, restraining the DDA from taking any action under the said termination notice dated 01.09.1972, on the ground that the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 being illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction and the affirmation of the same by both the first appellate court, i.e., by the learned ADJ and further by the High Court by its impugned judgment and order are not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law. Thus, Point No. 1 is answered in favour of the Appellant.
The contention urged by the learned senior Counsel for the Respondent that it has deposited a sum of ₹ 96,41,982/- as conversion charges of the property in question from leasehold to freehold right of the same is also of no relevance and lends no support to the Respondent for the reason that in the absence of renewal of lease of the property by the DDA, the original lessee himself becomes an unauthorised occupant of the property in question. The deposition of conversion charges in respect of the same to the office of the DDA cannot help the Respondent in claiming any right with respect to the property in question. The question whether such a procedure in respect of the public property is permissible in law or not is not required to be decided in this case. The instant case having peculiar facts and circumstances, namely, after 10.08.1968 the lease stands terminated by efflux of time, which is further evidently clear from the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 and thereafter, the original lessee becomes an unauthorised occupant in terms of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and consequently, not entitled to deal with the property in question in any manner. The very concept of conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights is not applicable to the fact situation.
Keeping in view the public interest involved in this case and particularly having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we have to allow this appeal of the DDA. Since we have answered the points framed in this appeal in favour of the Appellant-DDA, we further, direct the DDA to take possession of the property immediately without resorting to eviction proceedings, as the Respondent has been in unauthorised possession of the property in question, by virtue of erroneous judgments passed by the courts below. The Respondent has been unlawfully enjoying the public property which would amount to unlawful enrichment which is against the public interest.
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2016 (4) TMI 1287
Action of ADA in sanctioning map/plan of constructions over disputed land - Held that:- This Court finds its constitutional obligation and duty to make these observations having come across the flagrant violation of statute on the part of both the parties in the case in hand, and, that too, without resorting to accountability and responsibility of the Officers of the statutory body. The attempt of violator is to retain benefit from persistent and frequent violation of the statute. Time has come when State Government and ADA should look into the matter and take appropriate steps in the following manner:
"(i) ADA is directed to ensure implementation of master plan and zonal development plan etc. strictly in accordance with one as approved under the statute and no change, alternation, amendment be allowed therein except in accordance with procedure prescribed in Act, 1973 and in particular section 13 thereof.
(ii) The ADA shall put on its website every sanctioned plan(s)/map(s) etc. of any development/construction in the area under its operation, submitted by any individual, Corporate body, Government or its instrumentalities etc., approved on and after 1.1.2001 till date and henceforth. In respect to sanctioned plan of city etc., the same shall also be placed on website. In respect to individual plan(s)/map(s), as above, which shall include colonies, townships etc., the sanctioned plan(s)/map(s) etc. shall be placed on website wherever the area of land is 200 square meters and above; or the building constructed and owned by an individual for his own use, but is three storied and above. In case there is any data problem in a single website, the ADA may open more sites locality wise etc., as advised technically.
(iii) If any developer, builder, contractor, individual or corporate or Government etc., as the case may be, has violated sanctioned plan/map and has applied for compounding, the kind of violation and the order passed by ADA compounding the said violation, if any, the reasons for the same and the procedure followed therein shall also be made known to the public at large by giving details on the website, as directed above.
(iv) The ADA shall also give details of officers responsible for sanction, inspection, enforcement and approval of plan/map, the actual execution thereof and implementation of plan in respect to respective areas and the officers who remained posted since 1.1.2000 and onwards in respect to above work and their period of function shall also be let known to public at large.
(v) A High Powered Committee shall also be constituted in ADA headed by a retired judicial officer, not below the rank of District Judge, to find out year wise deviation in the implementation of plan who shall submit its periodical report every fortnight to ADA and it shall then be the responsibility of ADA through its Vice Chairman and Secretary to seek remedial steps in the light of report received and remove illegal encroachment, obstruction, construction etc. without any further delay.
(vi) The ADA will also specify and shall make it known to public at large by placing relevant information on website as to which particular area is reserved and for what purpose and the activities which are not permissible to be carried out therein.
(vii) In addition to what has been said above, in the next six months, the ADA shall find out the activities which are/were not permissible in a particular area but are/have being carried out; and shall immediately take steps for stopping/removing those activities. All subsequent requisite steps necessary to check unauthorised use or enjoyment etc. by anyone shall also be taken forthwith.
(viii) The Principal Secretary/Secretary, Urban Development, U.P. is directed to look into this matter and appropriate instructions, if necessary, by issuing a Government Order, be given to all other Development Authorities in the State of U.P. to follow steps as directed above. The Principal Secretary shall issue necessary instructions within two months and shall also lay down a time table for all Development Authorities to take appropriate steps, as directed above herein.
(ix) A High Powered Committee at the level of the Government shall also be constituted to find out as to how many violations in different Development Authorities which constitute an offence under section 26 and 26-D have been committed and whether any criminal prosecution has been initiated against the guilty in the past decade, i.e., from 1.1.2000 and onwards. If not, who are the persons responsible for such lapses. The Committee, as directed above, shall be constituted within 15 days and it shall submit its first report in six months after its constitution to the Court.”
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2016 (4) TMI 1286
Interest under Section 234A, 234B & 234C - default in payment of advance tax - cash seized in the course of search - Adjustment to the cash lying in the P.D. account against the advance tax - Held that:- No reason to entertain this Special Leave Petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed.
HC has held [2015 (3) TMI 543 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] no doubt that before the due date, the cash was available with the department. The same could have been adjusted against the advance tax. The return was filed on or before the due date so the interest for default in furnishing the return of income under Section-234A was not desirable. Similarly, the interest for default in payment of advance tax is also not leviable under Section-234B for the reason that assessee had already made a request for adjustment of the amount against the advance tax which was already in the custody of the department. Similarly, Section-234C is not attracted as there was no deferment. See CIT Versus Ashok Kumar [2010 (9) TMI 771 - Punjab and Haryana High Court] and CIT vs. Kesar Kimam Karyalaya [2005 (5) TMI 58 - DELHI High Court ] - Decided against revenue.
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2016 (4) TMI 1285
Setting aside the order of acquittal - High Court held the appellant-accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - establish the guilt of the accused - legality of evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court Held that:- In order to constitute an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, ‘proof of demand’ is a sine quo non.
In the present case, trial court recorded an order of acquittal on the evidence and circumstances:-(i) delay in lodging the complaint; (ii) even though the appellant is alleged to have made the demand on 09.12.1997 at Chitradurga, absence of the appellant in Chitradurga from 07.12.1997 to 10.12.1997 and absence of proof of demand; (iii) doubts raised regarding the submission of the documents Ex. P6 to P15 by PW-1 for processing the pension papers and settling the retiral benefits and (iv) inconsistency in the evidence of prosecution witnesses in establishing the acceptance of the amount by the appellant.
Absence of proof of demand on 09.12.1997, coupled with PW-2’s evidence that the amount was paid by PW-1 to the appellant towards purchase of diesel raises serious doubts about the amount being paid by PW-1 as illegal gratification. High Court neither considered the defence plea of alibi nor it held that the decision of the trial court was erroneous or perverse. In our view, evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court while recording an order of acquittal does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality or manifest error and the grounds on which the order of acquittal is based cannot be said to be unreasonable. While so, High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
In the result, appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of trial court acquitting the appellant of the charges is restored. The appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand discharged.
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2016 (4) TMI 1284
Benefit of notification of December 28, 2012 - duty credit scrip - Held that: - the petitioners will be entitled to the benefit under the notification of December 28, 2012 irrespective of the modification that was brought in by the notification of September 25, 2013. Accordingly, the petitioners’ claim should be considered by the DGFT in such light and on the basis of the earlier notification and without reference to the later. The order impugned dated October 5, 2015 is set aside to the extent that it disallowed the petitioners’ claim under the notification of December 28, 2012 - petition allowed by way of remand.
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2016 (4) TMI 1283
Pre-deposit - 1% of penalty - petitioner pointed out that in another proceedings arising out of the same chain of transactions, where, Tribunal had required the petitioner to deposit ₹ 1 lac by way of pre-deposit looking to his status as an employee - Held that: - looking to his position as an employee, we modify the pre-deposit requirement to ₹ 5 lacs which shall be done latest by 30-6-2016 upon which the remaining demand shall remain stayed - petition allowed in part.
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2016 (4) TMI 1282
Payment of professional services rendered by the assessee company - Held that:- The payment of professional services rendered by the assessee company needs to be verified by the Assessing Officer, as there was no agreement or evidence verified by the Assessing Officer at the time of the assessment proceedings. In fact there was no mention in CIT(A)’s order about the agreement as well and whether the same was verified or not is not clear. Thus, the said issue is remanded back to the Assessing Officer. In view of this, assessee’s appeal is partly allowed for statistical purpose.
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2016 (4) TMI 1281
Order u/s 3(1) of COFEPOSA - The main challenge is to the order of detention passed u/s 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 – the decision in the case of Tushar Kishore Trivedi S/o Shri Kishore Trivedi and Others Versus Principal Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, Home Department and Detaining Authority And Others [2013 (10) TMI 272 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that onsidering the grounds on which the detention order is sought to be quashed at the pre-execution stage and the law relating thereto, none of the grounds are attracted in the present case - Held that: - No ground for interference is made out to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India - SLP dismissed.
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2016 (4) TMI 1280
TPA - comparable selection criteria - Held that:- the addition is to be confined only to the component of transactions with associate enterprises alone and not to the entire segmental results.
Where separate data is not available, then the principle of proportionality is to be applied and where the data relating to control and uncontrolled cost price is not available, then proportionate sales relatable to international transactions with its associate enterprises i.e. controlled cost has to be worked out and the addition, if any, is to be confined to the component of international transactions with its associate enterprises alone and not to the entire segmental entity.
Assessing Officer/TPO directed to consider profit margins of only engineering design services segment and the same be applied to benchmark the international transactions entered into by the assessee with its associate enterprises.
The assessee was in the business of rendering designing and developing services relating to products in CAD/CAM of auto parts and also customer support servicing and techno marketing services to its associate enterprises i.e. TACO and Visteon International Holdings, USA, thus companies functionally dissimilar with that of assessee need not to be added to final comparable list.
Erroneous computation of deduction under section 10A - claim of the assessee was rejected, in view of the assessee being agreed to exclude the expenditure incurred in foreign currency from export turnover and total turnover - Held that:- In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (2012 (7) TMI 158 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) the appellate authorities had power to consider the claim not made in the return of income. The Tribunal in turn, following the same directed the Assessing Officer to compute the deduction under section 10A of the Act as per law after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The learned Authorized Representative for the assessee pointed out that during the assessment proceedings relating to the instant assessment year i.e. 2009-10, this plea was raised before the Assessing Officer. However, following the consistency, since the issue has been set-aside to the file of Assessing Officer in the preceding year, we direct the Assessing Officer to compute the deduction under section 10A of the Act in accordance with law and in line with the directions of Tribunal in assessment year 2008-09. The Assessing Officer shall afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The ground of appeal No.11 raised by the assessee is thus, allowed for statistical purposes. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee are partly allowed.
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2016 (4) TMI 1279
TPA - selection of comparable - selection criteria - Held that:- The assessee company is a wholly owned subsidiary of C3i Inc., USA and engaged in providing business process outsourcing services (BPO) in the field of healthcare administration to it’s A.E. It is registered under the Software Technology Park of India Scheme. Thus companies functionally dissimilar with that of assessee need to be deselected from final list of comparable. The assessee being a BPO it cannot be compared with a company which was into KPO services.
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