|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 1653 Records
-
2017 (4) TMI 1477
Unexplained cash deposits in bank account - peak credit - HELD THAT:- AO is directed to consider only the peak deposit in the S.B. Account for the purpose of assessing the income. Further since the account is in the name of three joint account holders therefore only 1/3 rd of the peak credit can be assessed in the hand of the assessee.
As regards the claim of the assessee that this represents the business proceeds of the 3 HUFs it is noted that the assessee has not furnished any evidence in support of the claim except the return of income wherein the income was declared on estimate basis without mainlining the book of accounts therefore,the said contention of the assessee cannot be accepted. In view of the above, the order of the authorities below are set aside and the AO is directed to assess only 1/3 rd of the peak credit.
Addition as interest income - AO found that the assessee has not offered the interest income from the deposit to tax - HELD THAT:- Before the Tribunal nothing has been produced to show that the assessee has already offered this income of ₹ 39,265. However if this interest income is pertaining to the deposits in the joint Savings Bank Account, then only 1/3 rd of the same can be added to the income of the assessee. Accordingly, the AO directed to verify the same and assess the interest income as indicated above.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1476
Addition u/s 40A(9) - amount reimbursed by the Company to an institute established for running a school at Satna - Tribunal upholding the order of the CIT(A) who has deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- The impugned order of the Tribunal has dismissed the Revenue's appeals for the two subject Assessment Years by holding that the amounts, which were paid by the Assessee Company to its Institute for running a school at Satna in Madhya Pradesh, were not hit by Section 40A(9) of the Act as it was in the nature of reimbursement of expenditure. This the impugned order holds by following the decision of this Court in CIT vs. Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [2012 (3) TMI 565 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] as well as the decision of the Apex Court in Kennametal India Ltd. vs. CIT [2013 (2) TMI 627 - SC ORDER] on identical issues. No substantial question of law arises
-
2017 (4) TMI 1475
Disallowance being expenses incurred by the Company on account of mines development expenditure treated as deferred revenue expenses - HELD THAT:- The impugned order is common order passed for the AY 2000-01, 2003-04 and 2004-05. In the two appeals filed by the Revenue in respect of A.Y. 2000-01 and 2004-05, to this Court an identical question as raised herein was raised therein by the Revenue. We have today, by a separate order, dismissed the Revenue's appeal on this very issue in the above two appeals.
Therefore, for the reasons recorded in our order passed today, Question(2) as proposed does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Thus, not entertained.
Appeal admitted on substantial question of law at Q.(1) above - Tribunal was justified in holding the order of the CIT(A) in deleting disallowance being expenses incurred by the Company on account of mines development expenditure treated as deferred revenue expenses without appreciating the fact that benefit derived by the Company is staggered over the periods of years and therefore it will give enduring benefits to the Company?
-
2017 (4) TMI 1474
Certificate under N/N. 108/95 - purchase of material for the work of above Package No. UDA/DR/01 under Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Project (RUIDP) - Counsel for the appellant merely contended that in view of the certificate which was issued in his favour by NSC Constructions, he was required to be granted the benefit - HELD THAT:- In view of the concurrent finding of the fact, no substantial question of law arises and even otherwise the certificate ought to have been in MOP or no substantive argument for ANS has purchased the material from the present appellant. He might have been in a position to make out the case. Nothing is shown to us to establish that.
Appeal dismissed.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1473
The Supreme Court of India in 2017 (4) TMI 1473 - SC Order, with judges Mr. Rohinton Fali Nariman and Mr. Navin Sinha, condoned delay and issued notice as the respondent did not appear. Appellant represented by multiple advocates.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1472
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the Special Leave petitions after condoning the delay. Pending applications were disposed of. (2017 (4) TMI 1472 - SC Order)
-
2017 (4) TMI 1471
Diversion of income through overriding title - Computation of capital gains - property which was sold by the assessee’s were offered by them as collateral security to M/s. Axis Bank for a loan raised by company as Assessee’s were directors of the said company - Since the company did not make the payment, possession of the property was taken by M/s. Axis Bank - HELD THAT:- No doubt by virtue of SARFAESI Act once the borrower takes possession of the secured asset, sale of such an asset could be effected only when the debtor agrees to pay the amount realized from the sale, against the outstanding dues. However, this in my opinion will not establish an overriding title to the borrower on the income arising out of the sale of the property. Offering a property as a collateral security and selling the property which was offered as a collateral security are two independent and different transactions. Just because the seller is duty bound to pay the proceeds to the borrower for the settlement of the loan, would not perse create an overriding title on the income arising from the sale of the property. It is not a pre-existing title on the income arising out from the sale of the property. The proceeds of the sale are only used to satisfy a debt. When proceeds of a sale is used to satisfy the debt, the debt cannot be set off against such proceeds while computing capital gains. It is only a application of income. Just because the property was offered as a collateral will not in my opinion change the complexion of the transactions.
There was no transfer of ownership of the property to M/s. Axis Bank when the property was offered as collateral. Computation of capital gains was rightly done by the ld. Assessing Officer and confirmed by the ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). - Decided against assessee.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1470
Condonation of delay - delay of 312 days - Sufficient cause for delay - HELD THAT:- Assessee has not given any plausible reasons for condoning the huge delay of 312 days in the said Application and Affidavit. Assesse has also not filed any evidence as per the averments made by the assessee in the Application for condonation of delay.
We find considerable cogency in the contentions raised by the Ld. CIT(DR) that before the AO as well as Ld. CIT(A), the Assessee was represented by a qualified/Competent Advocate, hence, the question of ignorance of law and bonafide belief does not arise. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are unable to condone the huge delay of 312 days in filing the present Appeal. - Decided against assessee.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1469
Disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D - HELD THAT:- As rightly held in assessee's own case [2016 (6) TMI 385 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] when there was interest free funds available with the assessee, there does not arise a question of disallowing expenditure under Section 14A
Nature of expenditure - payment towards control system for heat setting and stretching machine - revenue or capital expenditure - HELD THAT:- After giving a thoughtful consideration to the factual matrix qua the findings of the First Appellate Authority, in our considered opinion, by incurring the impugned expenditure no new asset has come into existence. Therefore, there is no error or infirmity in the findings of the ld. CIT(A). This ground is accordingly dismissed.
Addition on account of plastering, RCC work, fencing, flush system, etc - allowable revenue expenditure - HELD THAT:- Bearing in mind the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Saravana Spinning Mills P. Ltd. [2007 (8) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT] and coming back to the facts of the present case, it can be seen that by carrying out the repairs, the assessee did not bring into existence any new assets but was required to expend amount to preserve and maintain the asset already in existence.
TDS u/s 194H - Addition u/s 40(a)(ia) - amount to various dealers as incentives - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors Association [2012 (9) TMI 298 - SC ORDER] had held that the discount given to stamp vendors for purchasing stamps in bulk quantity was in nature of cash discount in transaction of sale, and, therefore, section 194H has no application to that transaction. - Decided in favour of assessee
-
2017 (4) TMI 1468
Addition on account of alleged on money in respect of Ratnakar III and Ratnakar IV projects - HELD THAT:- As for the point made by the learned Commissioner (DR), whatever may be the approach of the assessee, unless any points of distinction between the facts of the assessment year 2011-12 and 2012-13 are demonstrated to us, we are bound to follow the decision of the coordinate bench for the assessment year 2011-12.
Learned Commissioner (DR) fairly accepts that facts of these two assessment years are material similar. On these facts, nothing turns on the inconsistency, even if there be any, in the stand of the assessee. The decision of the coordinate bench for the assessment year 2011-12 binds us. Respectfully following the same, we uphold the grievance of the assessee, and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the impugned addition on account of alleged on money. - Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1467
Demand of interest - Whether the interest is chargeable from the date of original adjudication order or from the date of issuance of the adjudication orders in de-novo proceedings, once the demand of duty was upheld by the Tribunal but only the quantum of duty was ordered to be re-adjudicated in de-novo proceedings?
HELD THAT:- Issue Notice.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1466
Seeking to submit some key and relevant documents by applicant - copies of certain pages of Police diary maintained Under Section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - application was opposed by the Appellant herein/complainant on the ground that the fresh documents cannot be allowed to be produced by the Accused at the premature stage of trial and it is always open for the Accused to produce, such documents during the stage of recording of statements of the Accused Under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure - HELD THAT:- It is evident from Sub-section (2) of Section 172 Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Trial Court has unfettered power to call for and examine the entries in the police diaries maintained by the Investigating Officer. This is a very important safeguard. The legislature has reposed complete trust in the Court which is conducting the inquiry or the trial. If there is any inconsistency or contradiction arising in the evidence, the Court can use the entries made in the diaries for the purposes of contradicting the police officer as provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 172 of Code of Criminal Procedure. It cannot be denied that Court trying the case is the best guardian of interest of justice.
Coming to the use of police diary by the Accused, Sub-section (3) of Section 172 clearly lays down that neither the Accused nor his agents shall be entitled to call for such diaries nor he or they may be entitled to see them merely because they are referred to by the Court. But, in case the police officer uses the entries in the diaries to refresh his memory or if the Court uses them for the purpose of contradicting such police officer, then the provisions of Sections 145 and 161, as the case may be, of the Evidence Act would apply.
The right of the Accused to cross examine the police officer with reference to the entries in the police diary is very much limited in extent and even that limited scope arises only when the Court uses such entries to contradict the police officer or when the police officer uses it for refreshing his memory and that again is subject to provisions of Sections 145 and 161 of the Indian Evidence Act. Thus, a witness may be cross-examined as to his previous statements made by him as contemplated Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act if such previous statements are brought on record, in accordance with law, before the Court and if the contingencies as contemplated.
The police diary is only a record of day to day investigation made by the investigating officer. Neither the Accused nor his agent is entitled to call for such case diary and also are not entitled to see them during the course of inquiry or trial. The unfettered power conferred by the Statute Under Section 172 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure on the court to examine the entries of the police diary would not allow the Accused to claim similar unfettered right to inspect the case diary.
Thus, it is clear that the denial of right to the Accused to inspect the case diary cannot be characterized as unreasonable or arbitrary. The confidentiality is always kept in the matter of investigation and it is not desirable to make available the police diary to the Accused on his demand - Since in the matter on hand, neither the police officer has refreshed his memory with reference to entries in the police diary nor has the trial court used the entries in the diary for the purposes of contradicting the police officer (PW-15), it is not open for the Accused to produce certain pages of police diary obtained by him under the provisions of Right to Information Act for the purpose of contradicting the police officer.
The High Court is not justified in permitting the Accused to produce certain pages of police diary at the time of cross examination of PW-15/Investigating Officer - appeal allowed.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1465
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- After recording reasons for reopening, the AO has issued notice u/s.148. Thus, there is no infirmity in the order of CIT(A) for upholding the reopening.
Coming to the merit of the addition, we found that allegation of the AO was as per information from the Sales Tax Department, assessee has taken accommodation purchases. However, the corresponding sales have not been denied by the AO. Without purchases there cannot be sale. Therefore, adding entire amount of purchases in assessee’s income is not justified.
Referring to nature of assessee’s business, restrict addition to the extent of 12.5% of such bogus purchases. - Decided partly in favour of assessee.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1464
The Supreme Court of India in 2017 (4) TMI 1464 - SC Order, with Justices Mr. Madan B. Lokur and Mr. Deepak Gupta, condoned delay, issued notice, and tagged the case with C.A. No. 2132-2133 of 2015.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1463
Validity of reopening of assessment - Whether notice u/s 147 issued to the Assessee for reassessment after four years was barred by limitation? - HELD THAT:- Question No.1, is answered in favour of appellant and it is held that limitation in the case in hand was six years under Section 149(i)(b), hence, notice under Section 147 was not barred by limitation and finding of Tribunal on this issue, which otherwise, is reverse
Whether the reasons given by competent authority approving reassessment is within scope of Section 147 of Act, 1961? - Coming to the second question, it is not in dispute that entire amount and deduction claimed by Assessee was fully disclosed to Assessing Officer when assessment was made by allowing claimed deduction under Section 154, on 07.12.2007, and subsequent orders under Sections 144, 251 and 254 would make no substantial difference in this regard. That being so, we have to examine whether here is a case of change of opinion or it is a case of genuine reason to believe to Assessing Officer that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for A.Y. in question.
There has to be some valid ground, that is some relevant document or material having escaped notice or there has been wrong calculation due to human error bona fide committed, or ignorance of correct and complete facts due to mistake or ignorance of fraud/ misrepresentation.
It is not in dispute that Assessee has disclosed full and correct facts and there was no misrepresentation or concealment on the part of Assessee at all.
With open eyes, after examining the entire matter, AO, completed assessment under Section 143(3) and that being so, subsequent changed opinion that 100% depreciation has wrongly been allowed, it could not have issue notice under Section 147. In this regard, view taken by Tribunal, we find is correct and in accordance with law. Question No.2, therefore, is answered against appellant and in favour of Assessee.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1462
TP Adjustment - comparable selection - HELD THAT:- Infosys Technologies cannot be compared with any other company like that of the assessee-company engaged in the business of provision of marketing data management services to customers of SMS USA. This ground of the revenue is dismissed.
Direction of the DRP that DRP to give IT risk adjustment to assessee-company - HELD THAT:- DRP only as a means of guidance has sought IT risk adjustment but the matter was restored to the file of the TPO to calculate risk adjustment in accordance with well accepted method. By this direction, the revenue could not be aggrieved.
Benefit u/s 10A - reducing telecommunication expenditure and insurance incurred in foreign currency from export turnover - HELD THAT:- The issue sought to be raised in the above grounds is covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Tata Elxsi Ltd. ( [2011 (8) TMI 782 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT]) as directed the AO to reduce this expenditure from export turnover as well as total turnover for the purpose of calculating benefit u/s 10A . Since the DRP has only followed the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the cased of Tata Elxsi Ltd. (supra), we do not find any merit in the appeal raised by the revenue, hence dismissed.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1461
Erroneous treatment of Business Income as Royalty Income - DRP confirming entire payments received by the Appellant from customers in India during the captioned year are taxable as "royalty" under Section 9(1)( vi) and under Article 12 of India - Ireland DTAA - HELD THAT:- The issue has been decided by this tribunal in assessee‟s own case against the assessee [2014 (1) TMI 1281 - ITAT MUMBAI] as held a customer of the present assessee made payment without deduction of tax at source u/s 195 of the Act - the payments made for online use of database was for licence to use said database and hence the consideration was royalty, liable for deduction of tax at source u/s 195 of the Act - Decided against Assessee.
Levy of interest u/s. 234B - HELD THAT:- AO erred in charging the interest u/s. 234B as assessee being a non-resident, the Indian payers were obliged to withhold Tax at Source u/s. 195 of the Act and therefore the question of payment of advance tax and corresponding levy of interest u/s. 234B of the Act does not arise. - Decided in favour of Assessee.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1460
Renting of immovable property service - non-payment of service tax - license endorsement fee - period w.e.f. 1/4/2008 to 31/1/2013 - opportunity of hearing to the petitioner - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the Show Cause Notice can never be said to be a Show Cause Notice issued by an Authority without jurisdiction. It is a mere Show Cause Notice and the petitioner show cause before the authorities by filing a proper reply and, therefore, the question of interference by this Court, inspite of the fact that a complete mechanism is provided for ventilating the grievance before the authorities, does not arise.
This Court in similar circumstances has declined to interfere in the matter, as it was certainly against the Show Cause Notice. This Court is of the considered opinion that the present Writ Petition is certainly a premature Writ Petition. Petitioner does have a remedy to file a reply to the Show Cause Notice. He does have a remedy to raise all possible grounds before the Addl. Director General, Directorate General of Central Intelligence and, therefore, the admission is declined.
Petition disposed off.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1459
Addition u/s 14A r.w.r. 8D - HELD THAT:- As decided in own case [2017 (2) TMI 1428 - ITAT MUMBAI] as contended by the assessee, it is settled position of law that the provisions of Rule 8D of the I.T. Rules, 1962 are applicable prospectively for and from A.Y. 2008- 09 and would not operate for the assessment years prior thereto. In this view of the matter, CIT(A)'s directions to the AO to work out/compute the disallowance under section 14A of the Act by applying Rule 8D of the Rules is erroneous and we therefore delete the same and in the fitness of things, we direct the AO to re-compute the disallowance under section 14A of the Act afresh, in accordance with the law prevalent for the year under consideration, after affording the assessee adequate opportunity of being heard and to file details/submissions required in this regard. Assessee's appeal are treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
Disallowance of interest on loans to subsidiaries - HELD THAT:- Assessee stated that loans and advances which are under consideration have already been considered by the Tribunal in earlier years and decided the issue in favour of assessee allowing the claim of the assessee. The assessee stated that the issue now stands covered in favour of assessee. On the other hand, the learned Sr. DR fairly conceded that there is reduction in loans and advances what was in earlier years. We find that this issue is squarely covered in favour of assessee and against Revenue by the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case. Hence, respectfully following the same we allow the claim of the assessee. The orders of the lower authorities are set aside and this issue of assessee’s appeal is allowed.
-
2017 (4) TMI 1458
Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - addition of deemed dividend under the provisions of section 2(22)(e) - HELD THAT:- Section 2(22)(e) of the Act creates legal fiction whereby loans/advances received by an assessee are deemed as taxable income in the hands of the recipient assessee in certain circumstances as specified therein. In view of section 2(22)(e) of the Act, loans/advances amount under consideration artificially partake the character of dividend and brought to tax as deemed dividend.
The aforesaid provision of section 2(22)(e) has brought a deeming and unnatural concept of treating the returnable loans/advances as taxable income in the hands of borrower in departure with the operation of the normal provisions. Admittedly, the relevant facts concerning the issue were available to the AO. Thus, there is no concealment of any ‘particulars’ of any fact per se.
Assessee has simultaneously claimed that the aforesaid advances have been received the course of ordinary business and owing to ongoing business transactions and thus not susceptible to provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act. Thus, while the provisions of s.2(22)(e) have been applied, the issue is not entirely free of any debate. As noted, section 2(22)(e) of the Act is only deeming provision of law and is not a substantive provision. Thus, in the absence of any perceptible malafides, we find no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) deleting the penalty imposed by the AO. Thus, we do not see any merits in the appeals of the Revenue.
............
|
9911796707
