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Showing 181 to 200 of 931 Records
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2008 (8) TMI 868
Whether the Tribunal was legally justified in holding that the transaction relating to 1,02,944 was a purchase for and on behalf of ex-U.P. principals despite the fact that evidence on record does not indicate that the purchases in question have been made in compliance with the orders from ex-U.P. principals and the despatches of such goods had occasioned the said purchases?
Held that:- Keeping in view the facts of the present case, it would be clear that the Tribunal has committed an error of law in reaching the conclusion that the purchases by the dealer-opposite party were made on behalf of ex-U.P. principals in the course of inter-State purchases. The dealer-opposite party has failed to establish that the purchase of goods and dispatch outside State of U.P., were parts of the same transaction. In this regard, the Tribunal has not set aside the contrary findings recorded by the two authorities below it. Purchase orders may be oral but nonetheless the dealer is required to maintain a record of such orders to establish that it made the purchases as agent on behalf of a particular principal and the purchased goods have been dispatched to the principal at the earliest opportunity.
Thus the order of the Tribunal is indefensible and is liable to be set aside. Both the revisions succeed and are allowed and the common order of the Tribunal is set aside.
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2008 (8) TMI 867
Rectification application rejected - Held that:- From the order sheet, it appears that when the matter was heard on July 14, 2006, the learned counsel for the assessee prayed for some time to file supplementary affidavit to bring on record form EI which was filed before the assessing authority in proceedings under section 22 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The matter was listed on various dates before different Benches, but the applicant failed to file the supplementary affidavit, as required by the order dated July 14, 2006. Thus no error in the order of the Tribunal dismissing the rectification application. Revision dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 866
Issues: Validity of tax levy under U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948; Retroactive amendment of section 3AAAA; Application under section 22 of the Act; Time limitation for filing application; Rectification of order by Tribunal.
In these four revisions, the applicant, a registered dealer under U.P. Trade Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act, challenged the tax levy under section 3AAAA for the years 1977-81. The Tribunal set aside the levy as the section was declared "ultra vires" by the court, later amended retrospectively. The Department filed an application under section 22, claiming the tax levy was valid post-amendment. The Tribunal, citing a Supreme Court decision, allowed the rectification application. The applicant argued the application was time-barred under the amended section. However, the court disagreed, noting the validity of the section as upheld by the apex court. Referring to precedents, the court held that even without the applicability of a specific amending section, the order could be rectified under section 22. Consequently, all revisions were dismissed.
This judgment delves into the intricacies of tax law, specifically regarding the validity of tax levies under the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948. The court addressed the impact of retroactive amendments, the procedural aspects of filing applications under section 22 of the Act, and the interpretation of time limitations for such applications. The court emphasized the significance of legal precedents, including a Supreme Court decision, in determining the validity of legislative provisions and the rectification of orders. The judgment highlights the importance of upholding the rule of law and ensuring the proper application of statutory provisions in tax matters.
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2008 (8) TMI 865
Whether section 3AAAA has been declared ultra vires by this court, the order of remand to the assessing authority for determination of the liability in the light of observations made in the body of the judgment is incorrect?
Held that:- A feeble attempt was made by the learned counsel for the dealer that the order of the High Court merges with the order of the Tribunal. This argument is devoid of any merit. The High Court being a superior court its order will not merge with the order of the Tribunal, an inferior authority.The principle of merger applies when there are two orders, the order of the inferior court merges in the order of the superior court and not vice versa.
In the result the applications under section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act are allowed. The judgment of this court being inconsistent to the judgment of the Supreme Court given in the case of Hotel Balaji [1992 (10) TMI 240 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] is rectified and the judgment is recalled. The revisions are restored to their original numbers for hearing on other points, if any.
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2008 (8) TMI 864
Sales tax on coffee beans - interest demnded - Held that:- So far as the first three months are concerned, if the petitioners had filed revised monthly returns after the passing of the Finance Act in terms of rule 18(2A) of the KGST Rules, they could have avoided interest completely. It is only on account of this omission, the petitioners became liable for payment of interest under sub-section (3A) read with sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act. However, we feel the petitioners are not liable to pay interest on the first purchase turnover of coffee for April, May and June until August 10, 1998, when they could have filed revised returns along with payment of tax. However, since interest is payable for the delayed payment of tax from August 10, 1998 till date of payment, we dispose of all the sales tax revisions by setting aside the Tribunal's order to the limited extent indicated above. The assessing authority is directed to make modification in demand without any delay.
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2008 (8) TMI 863
Issues:
1. Whether the finding that the transaction amounts to a sale is correct?
2. Whether the imposition of additional tax on ornaments and bullions is justified?
Analysis:
1. The first issue pertains to whether the transaction in question amounts to a sale. The dealer claimed to be a goldsmith who manufactures ornaments on a labor basis without involving any sale or purchase of bullion or gold ornaments. However, this claim was rejected by all authorities, including the Tribunal, based on evidence from a survey. The Tribunal found 21 sets of silver ornaments with gold polish and 250 gms of gold ornaments during the survey, supporting the conclusion that the dealer was engaged in the sale and purchase of bullion. The Tribunal's finding was deemed factual and not arbitrary, as it was based on the evidence at hand, leading to the rejection of the dealer's claim of only doing job-work.
2. The second issue revolves around the imposition of additional tax on ornaments and bullions. The assessment order and the first appellate authority did not levy any additional tax on these items. However, the Tribunal imposed additional tax when the assessed turnover exceeded Rs. 10 lakhs. This decision was challenged based on the principle that the Commissioner cannot challenge the assessment order under section 10 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. Referring to a previous judgment, it was established that the subject matter of the appeal before the Tribunal was limited to the relief granted by the first appellate authority and did not extend to imposing additional tax not levied by the assessing officer. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision to levy additional tax at a rate of one per cent was deemed unjustified and was subsequently deleted, leading to the success of both revisions in part.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed the issues of whether the transaction constituted a sale and the justification for imposing additional tax on ornaments and bullions. The Tribunal's findings were upheld regarding the sale transaction, while the imposition of additional tax was deemed unjustified and subsequently deleted.
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2008 (8) TMI 862
Whether the Tribunal was legally justified to refund the amount of the tax which has been realised and deposited inspite of the fact that the tax had become legally payable and section 29(3) prohibited such refund?
Whether the Tribunal was legally justified to completely ignore a retrospective amendment made by U.P. Act No. 11 of 1997 regarding taxability of rectified sprit and alcohol?
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal is not legally justified to accept the additional evidence by passing the order on miscellaneous appeal filed under section 22 of the Act without giving opportunity to the Department for verification or rebuttal of the evidence?
Held that:- The Tribunal while deciding the appeal earlier, had placed reliance upon certain decisions of the apex court and of this court as well, to take a particular view of law on the issue. The said view can be set aside or corrected in a properly constituted revision as provided by section 11 of the Act. But, in the guise of rectification application, it is not permissible to take a different view in a proceeding under section 22 of the Act even if it is wrong. A decision on a debatable point of law or disputed question of fact is not a mistake apparent on the face of the record.
The order of the Tribunal passed on rectification application is indefensible and the same is liable to be set aside. The rectification application so far as it relates to the refund of ₹ 5,48,055.62 is concerned stands rejected. It may be added that by the said order the Tribunal has corrected certain mistakes in respect of three forms C. No argument was advanced by the learned standing counsel in this regard and as such, the said portion of the order of the Tribunal stands confirmed, being not subject-matter of the present revision. Revision succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside.
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2008 (8) TMI 861
Issues: Classification of stabilizer for tax purposes as electronic goods or electrical goods.
The High Court addressed the dispute regarding the tax classification of stabilizers as either electronic goods or electrical goods for the assessment year 1994-95. The dealer claimed that stabilizers should be taxed as electronic goods, but the tax authorities treated them as electrical goods and taxed them at 10%. The Tribunal, in Second Appeal No. 195 of 1999, determined that solid-state stabilizers are electronic goods and should be taxed at 5%. The main question of law raised was whether the Tribunal was justified in classifying voltage stabilizers as electronic goods without considering the mechanism of the stabilizer. The High Court referred to a previous judgment where it was established that solid-state stabilizers and servo control voltage stabilizers are considered electronic goods under specific notifications. The Court found the Tribunal's decision to be in line with this precedent and dismissed the revision, noting that the assessing authority had consistently treated solid-state stabilizers as electronic goods in previous assessment years, except for the year in question.
In the present case, the primary issue revolved around the classification of stabilizers for tax purposes. The dealer argued that stabilizers should be taxed as electronic goods, while the tax authorities initially classified them as electrical goods and taxed them at 10%. However, the Tribunal, in Second Appeal No. 195 of 1999, determined that solid-state stabilizers are indeed electronic goods and should be taxed at a lower rate of 5%. The High Court referred to a previous judgment where it was established that solid-state stabilizers and servo control voltage stabilizers are considered electronic goods under specific notifications. The Court found that the Tribunal's decision was consistent with this precedent and dismissed the revision. Additionally, the Court noted that the assessing authority had consistently treated solid-state stabilizers as electronic goods in previous assessment years, except for the year under review. Consequently, the High Court found no merit in the revision and ruled in favor of the tax classification of stabilizers as electronic goods, affirming the Tribunal's decision.
In summary, the High Court addressed the dispute surrounding the tax classification of stabilizers as electronic goods or electrical goods for the assessment year 1994-95. The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision that solid-state stabilizers are electronic goods and should be taxed at 5%, based on previous judgments and notifications specifying such classification. The Court dismissed the revision, emphasizing the consistent treatment of solid-state stabilizers as electronic goods by the assessing authority in previous years. This comprehensive analysis reaffirmed the classification of stabilizers as electronic goods for tax purposes, settling the dispute raised in the case.
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2008 (8) TMI 860
Recovery proceedings - arrears of sales tax due from fifth respondent for the assessment year 1993-94 - Held that:- Petitioner consciously or indifferently entered into the transaction and he has no escape from the consequences.
In the circumstances, and on equitable grounds, direct the District Collector to inspect the property and estimate the present per cent value of the property excluding the value of building and machinery, which are put up for the industry, and if petitioner offers the market value, the same will be collected from petitioner and attachment will be lifted. It is for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to proceed for recovery against the fifth respondent for the balance liability by attachment and sale of balance property or any other property transferred by him in similar manner, after issuing notice to transferees. If the defaulter has concealed or benami wealth and recovery is consciously avoided, section 65 proceedings also should be initiated against him.
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2008 (8) TMI 858
Issues:
Inclusion of inward freight in turnover of coal for assessment year 1995-96.
Analysis:
The revision before the High Court was against the Trade Tax Tribunal's order regarding the inclusion of inward freight in the turnover of coal for the assessment year 1995-96. The applicant, a coal dealer, claimed to be a coal agent and argued that the inward freight should not be part of the turnover as it was separately charged in the bills. However, this argument was not accepted by the authorities, including the Tribunal. The main question raised in the revision was whether the Tribunal was legally justified in including freight in the value of coal sales, even when it was separately charged in the bill.
The assessing officer found that the dealer had purchased coal in their own account and bore the freight for transportation from the colliery to the depot. The Tribunal established from the case records that the dealer imported the coal and paid the freight, leading to the conclusion that the inward freight should be part of the turnover. The High Court referred to previous judgments, including Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Sunil Kumar Coal Agent, Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Ramapati Tewari Jainath Tewari, and Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Sharma Coal Co., which held that dealers like the applicant were principals, not agents, and therefore, the inward freight should be included in the turnover.
Based on the precedents and the facts of the case, the High Court found no merit in the revision and dismissed it. The applicant was ordered to pay costs amounting to Rs. 2,000.
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2008 (8) TMI 857
Issues involved: Assessment of turnover including freight amount in coal business for the assessment year 1993-94.
Summary:
The High Court of Allahabad heard a revision against the Tribunal's order in Second Appeal No. 224 of 1997 regarding the assessment year 1993-94. The dealer, involved in the coal business, had their account books rejected by the assessing officer, which was partially modified in appeal by the first appellate authority. The Tribunal excluded a specific freight amount from the turnover, citing separate billing for freight charges. The Tribunal's decision was based on previous court cases and reduced the average selling price of coal. The revision raised questions regarding the legality of excluding freight from taxable turnover, examination of the case in light of previous court observations, and the substantial reduction in selling rate without proper basis.
The main contention was whether the freight amount should be included in the turnover, with the standing counsel arguing that the dealer purchased coal as a principal, not as an agent. The controversy was found to be covered by previous court decisions, establishing that the dealer was a principal and thus, the inward freight should be part of the turnover. Distinctions were made from previous cases where the dealer acted as an agent. The High Court found the Tribunal's order indefensible and set it aside, ruling in favor of including freight in the turnover and restoring the selling rate of coal fixed by the first appellate authority at Rs. 900 per metric ton.
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2008 (8) TMI 856
Issues involved: Interpretation of taxable turnover including inward freight, application of relevant case laws, reduction of selling rate without proper basis.
Interpretation of taxable turnover including inward freight: The case involved a coal trader importing coal into the State of U.P. and selling it within the state. The assessing officer disputed the turnover declared by the trader and included the freight cost in the turnover. The Tribunal, however, ruled that since the dealer charged freight separately in the bills, it should not be considered as part of the turnover. The Tribunal's decision was based on the precedent set by the apex court in the case of Vinod Coal Syndicate. The questions raised in the memo of revision pertained to the legality of excluding inward freight from the taxable turnover and whether the Tribunal correctly applied relevant case law in its decision.
Application of relevant case laws: The High Court referred to previous decisions in similar cases, such as Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Sunil Kumar coal Agent, Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Ramapati Tewari Jainath Tewari, and Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Sharma Coal Co. These cases established that a dealer like the one in the present case, who acts as a principal, should include inward freight in the turnover. The court distinguished the Vinod Coal Syndicate case by highlighting that in that instance, the dealer acted as an agent, unlike the present case where the dealer made purchases in their own account. The court also cited other cases supporting this interpretation.
Reduction of selling rate without proper basis: One of the questions raised in the memo of revision was whether the Tribunal was justified in significantly reducing the selling rate of coal without a proper basis, despite it being initially fixed by the assessing officer based on the available evidence. The High Court did not provide detailed reasoning on this issue but ultimately allowed the revision, setting aside the Tribunal's order and reinstating the decision of the first appellate authority.
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2008 (8) TMI 855
Whether the judgment and order of the Tribunal is based on assumption and presumption and is conjectural?
Held that:- The Tribunal has noticed that the goods receipt is drawn in triplicate and one copy is handed over to the bank to collect the sale proceeds and the other two copies were handed over to the transporter and the endorsement is made on the transporter's copy, would amount to the transfer of title by endorsement. The Tribunal has failed to address the real issue involved as to whether the dealer-opposite party has proved that the subsequent sale took place by endorsement of document of title. It proceeded on the presumption and assumption that the State of Madhya Pradesh is a neighbouring State and a person may reach there within 3-4 days. It may be so but it does not mean that in the absence of any other evidence the dealeropposite party collected the document of title from the bank and made the endorsement for transfer of goods thereon. Unless and until the evidence is produced by the dealer-opposite party that he collected the document of title from the bank, and transferred the goods, by making endorsement thereon, no inference of subsequent Central sale by endorsement of document of title can be drawn in view of the plain language of section 6(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
Thus the order of the Tribunal is indefensible and it suffers with manifest error of law. It is held that there is no evidence on record to show that the dealer-opposite party made the subsequent Central sales by endorsement of document of title. Revision succeeds and is allowed.
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2008 (8) TMI 854
Penalty under section 4B(5) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 - Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to set aside the penalty order passed by the assessing authority under section 4B(5) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 despite the fact that the dealer had clearly acted in contravention of the provisions contained in section 4B of the Act?
Held that:- The amount of penalty shall not be less then the difference between the amount of the tax on the sale or purchase of such goods payable under the provisions of the Act and the amount of tax payable at concessional rate under section 4B, where the goods are purchased after paying a tax at concessional rate. The intention is to make good at least the loss of tax by providing the minimum penalty. It does not grant any exemption to such dealer holding recognition certificate to dispose of such raw material purchased at concessional rate of tax or without payment of tax in any manner. The raw material has necessarily to be used in the manufacture of the specified goods. On the unused portion of the raw material, may be waste for a dealer, it has to pay the tax by way of penalty as provided for under sub-section (5) of section 4B. It may be in such cases the minimum one.
In view of the above discussions, the order of the Tribunal is indefensible and is liable to be set aside so far as it holds that no penalty can be levied on the glass sheet raw material amounting to ₹ 2,43,277.10. On the facts of the present case, the interest of justice will be served by levying the minimum penalty as per provisions of the Act on the said amount. For the purposes of calculation of penalty amount only, the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal.
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2008 (8) TMI 853
Issues:
Validity of order under section 4A(3) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 regarding cancellation of eligibility certificate for a new unit due to closure for more than six months.
Analysis:
The dealer challenged the order passed under section 4A(3) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, seeking cancellation of the eligibility certificate for their new unit. The Tribunal upheld the order, stating that the dealer failed to provide evidence that the unit was not closed for over six months. The eligibility certificate was issued for three years starting from March 29, 1985. During the assessment year 1987-88, the unit was closed due to various reasons, including curfew. A survey report from September 6, 1988 revealed that production had stopped since April 1987, leading to the initiation of proceedings for cancellation of the certificate.
In response to the show-cause notice, the dealer mentioned curfew as the reason for closure and claimed that production resumed in October. Despite multiple opportunities, the dealer did not substantiate their defense or participate in the proceedings. The authority canceled the certificate from April 1, 1987, which was confirmed by the Tribunal. The dealer's argument that the certificate could not be canceled post-expiry was rejected, citing retrospective amendments in the law. The court noted the lack of participation from the dealer and upheld the validity of the cancellation based on the unchallenged survey report as valid evidence.
The court emphasized that the dealer failed to provide any valid reasons for non-participation in the proceedings. The decision on whether the unit was closed for over six months depended on evidence, and in the absence of contrary material, the survey report was considered valid evidence. The court found no merit in the revision and dismissed it, affirming the cancellation of the eligibility certificate.
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2008 (8) TMI 852
Cancellation of the eligibility certificate on the ground of its misuse - Held that:- No illegality or perversity in either of the two orders of the authorities below rejecting the adjournment application and deciding the matter ex parte against the applicant. The Tribunal is right in its observation that the allegation that on the date the counsel of the dealer was busy in other time barring cases has not been substantiated by giving particulars, if any, of such cases. The copy of the adjournment application was not produced before the Tribunal and also not before this court.
From the order sheet dated July 11, 2006 it appears that the matter was taken up by the court and the case was adjourned on the request of the learned counsel for the assessee to enable him, to bring on record certain facts and documents for the purpose of establishing the existence of the firm from whom the purchases were made and reflected in the account books. But, no document or material was filed, though time was granted by the order dated July 11, 2006. The revision was argued finally without asking for any further time. This also negates the case of the dealer-applicant. No merit in the revision. No question of law is involved therein.
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2008 (8) TMI 851
Rejection of account books - suppression of production and sale - Held that:- Non-production of the books of account at the time of survey is a relevant factor which can be considered by the assessing authority. It has been further laid down that the burden is upon assessee to give plausible explanation as to why no adverse inference should be drawn. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, the explanation given by the dealer having not been accepted, thus find that the rejection of the account books is perfectly justified.
But there is some substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that there is no material in possession of the Department to show that the brick-kiln was fired on April 1, 1987, therefore, hold that the brick-kiln was fired on April 11, 1987. The period from April 1, 1987 to April 10, 1987 should be deducted from 91 days of the firing as was determined by the Tribunal.The firing period is reduced to 81 days. The Tribunal shall calculate the production of bricks for 81 days and pass consequential order accordingly. The revision succeeds and is allowed in part as indicated above.
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2008 (8) TMI 850
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to set aside the order of section 21 whereby the inter-State sales were determined on the basis of the information received against the dealer from the check-post which was not verified either from the assessment file or from the account books of the dealer?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to quash the order of the first appellate authority whereby the case was remanded back to the assessing officer to pass an order afresh under section 21 after making detailed enquiry in respect of the information received against the dealer by depriving the opportunity of conducting enquiry by the Department?
Held that:- The learned counsel appearing for the dealer-opposite party could not show from the order of the first appellate authority that any such finding was arrived at by the first appellate authority. On the contrary, the only plea which was raised before the first appellate authority was that proper opportunity of hearing was not afforded. Accepting the said plea, the matter was restored back to the assessing officer to grant a fresh opportunity of hearing. Evidently, no such finding, as assumed by the Tribunal in its order that it was found by the first appellate authority that the said information does not relate to the dealer, was recorded. The Tribunal, thus, proceeded to decide the appeal on presumption and assumption. The order of the Tribunal is perverse as it is based on existence of certain facts which do no exist.
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2008 (8) TMI 849
Whether the Sales Tax Tribunal was legally justified in law in fixing the liability of tax upon the applicant against form IIIB duly issued by the purchasing dealer?
Held that:- The Tribunal has recorded a finding that the dealer could not produce any evidence to show that any sale transaction took place at the hand of the dealer. It could not explain the manner in which the goods were despatched from Allahabad to Aligarh. The only explanation which was submitted by the dealer-applicant was that the purchaser took the delivery of goods at his shop and payment was made to him but the same has not been accepted. It has further found that the dealers received various bank drafts, the details of which have been noted in the order of the Tribunal. In view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the alleged sale by the dealer-applicant is suspicious and not beyond doubt, the authorities below were justified in refusing to extend any benefit of form IIIB to the dealer-applicant. When a transaction itself is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, as has been found in the present case, a person cannot take the shelter that the purchasing dealer had issued form IIIB. Revision dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 848
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to hold that transportation charges and sales tax amount, not separately charged by the dealer from the customers, were not part of the turnover of the dealer?
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to allow exemption to the dealer on the sums charged from the customers for not returning the empty bottles after consumption of their contents, despite the fact that the definition of 'business' as amended by Act No. 25 of 1985 dated September 13, 1985, included in its ambit ancillary and incidental transactions?
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to allow exemption on the exchange of empty bottles to the dealer, though the definition of 'sale' as contained in section 2(h) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act did not exclude 'exchange' from its ambit?
Held that:- Since the Tribunal has not examined the relevant material and has proceeded to decide the appeal on the assumptions and presumptions, it is desirable that the matter may be restored back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration in the light of the material available on record to find out the correct factual position in the light of account books and bill book, etc. Therefore, so far as question No. 1 is concerned, the matter is restored back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.
Taking up question No. 2 the controversy involved therein is no longer res integra and has been set at rest by the apex court in Kalyani Breweries Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1997 (9) TMI 490 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] wherein it has been held that non-return of the empty bottles and forfeiture of the security amount, amounts to sale under the Sales Tax Act. Therefore sufficient force in the argument of the learned standing counsel that cost of the empty bottles which have not been returned will amount to sale and as such the dealer-opposite party shall be liable to pay tax thereon. This part of assessment order is therefore legally justified.
So far as the third question is concerned, the apex court in the case of Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. [2006 (5) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] has held that barter is conceptually different from the sale. Obviously, as held in the above case, exchange of bottles is not sale and the order of the Tribunal is therefore justified on this issue. Revision succeeds and is allowed in part
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